Planning for the Future...

Scanning the Toronto Environment

Toronto Police Service
August 2011
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1. Demographic Trends

Information based on demographic and social trends provides a basis for good planning, identifying areas where changes are likely to occur. The task is then to relate the population and social changes to possible service needs: what are the implications for current and future decisions regarding the delivery of police service, provisions of programs, allocations of resources, and so on.

Highlights

- According to estimates, the population of the City of Toronto increased by 10% since 2001, reaching 2,855,085 in 2011. The population of Toronto is expected to grow slowly, to about 3.4 million people by 2036.

- Within the GTA as of the 2006 Census, the median age in Toronto was the same as the median age in Halton (38.4 years), but older than the median ages in Durham (37.7), Peel (35.6), and York (37.5). Within Toronto itself, all policing divisions except 52 Division (in the downtown core) also saw an increase in median age between 2001 and 2006. In both years, 22 Division had the population with the oldest median age (42.3 in 2006) and 52 Division had the population with the youngest median age (33.8 in 2006).

- According to the Ontario Ministry of Finance projections, only the 65 years and over age group will show an increase between 2011 and 2036. The proportion of older adults in Toronto is expected to increase from about 14% in 2011 to 21% in 2036. Given that 22, 32, and 33 Divisions have consistently had large proportions of older adults at each census, it is likely that these divisions will continue to have a relatively older population in coming years.

- According to the 2006 Census, 1 in 2 Toronto residents (50%) were born outside of Canada, up from 48% in 1996 and 49% in 2001. In 2006, of those born outside of Canada, 22% were recent arrivals, having immigrated in the past five years. Southern Asia, Eastern Asia, and West Central Asia & the Middle East were the largest sources of newcomers, representing 77% of total immigrants during 2001-2006. Newcomers from Southern and Eastern Asia were predominantly from India and China.

- The growth of the visible minority population has largely been due to the shift in sources of immigration to Canada. Within Toronto, the total visible minority population increased 32% between 1996 and 2006, representing almost half the population in 2006 (47%). South Asians are now the largest visible minority group in Toronto, followed by the Chinese and Black populations. Although the numbers were still relatively small, the Korean, Filipino, and Latin American communities also increased significantly between 1996 and 2006.

- Recent projections from Statistics Canada suggest that by 2031, the proportion of the Toronto CMA identifying as visible minority could increase to 63%. South Asians are likely to continue to be the largest visible minority group, followed by the Chinese. Two smaller visible minority groups that are expected to grow rapidly are Arabs and West Asians.

- While almost half (48%) of the population in the 2006 Census said they had a mother tongue other than just English or French, up slightly from 46% in 2001, only 5% of Toronto’s
population in 2006 said they were not able to carry out a conversation in either French or English.

- Mirroring the growing diversity of Toronto’s population was a growing diversity in the religious make up of the city. Much of the change in Toronto’s religious profile was the result of the changing sources of immigration.

- According to the 2006 Census, median household income in the City of Toronto increased to $52,833 in 2005, up from $42,752 in 1995, however Toronto’s median household income was lower than the median household income in each of the four outer GTA regions. Toronto also had the highest incidence of low income: 24%, compared to 9% in Durham, 8% in Halton, 14% in Peel, and 13% in York.

- Census income data for Toronto households reflected a growing income inequality: in 2005, while 21% of Toronto’s households had an income of over $100,000, up from 12% ten years previously, almost half (47%) had an income under $50,000.

- Surveys have found that low income households are more likely to say that social disorder and socially disruptive conditions (for example, people using or dealing drugs, vandalism, property damage, public drunkenness, litter, noisy neighbours, loud parties) are problems in their communities.

A. TORONTO POPULATION

According to estimates, the population of the city of Toronto increased by 10% since 2001, reaching 2,855,085 in 2011.\(^1\) As has been noted in previous Environmental Scans, Toronto’s population continued to grow at a slower pace than the populations of the other regions of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA).\(^2\) According to Statistics Canada census data, the population of Toronto increased 10% between 1991 and 2006, from 2,275,771 to 2,503,281.\(^3\) However, census data also showed that between 1991 and 2006 the population in the outer regions grew much faster than in Toronto: the population of Durham grew by 37%, the population of Halton grew by 40%, the population of Peel grew by 58%, and the population of York grew by a large 77% (Figure 1.1). In 1991, Toronto had 54% of the total GTA population; by 2006, this had decreased to 45%.

Also shown in Figure 1.1 is the population growth for each of the GTA regions over the next 25 years, as projected by the Ontario Ministry of Finance.\(^4\) Driven mainly by international

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\(^1\) Estimates are based on census data, projections from the city of Toronto’s Urban Development Services, and the Statistics Canada undercount rate.

\(^2\) The Greater Toronto Area consists of Toronto, Durham, Halton, Peel, and York.


**NOTE: The 2006 Census data were the most recent census data available at time of writing.**

immigration, the GTA is expected to be the fastest growing region within the province over the next 25 years, with over half (52%) of Ontarians living in the GTA by 2036.

While each of the GTA regions will see an increase in population over the next 25 years, Toronto’s population is expected to continue to grow more slowly than the populations of the other GTA regions. The population of Toronto is expected to grow about 22% from the 2011 level, bringing Toronto’s population to about 3.4 million people. The populations of Durham, Peel, and York are expected to grow by about 60%, while Halton is expected by grow by a considerable 82%.

The population of the GTA itself is projected to increase 45.1% between 2011 and 2036, from 6.3 million to 9.1 million people. The growth and projected growth in the surrounding regions means that the proportion of the total GTA population living in the 905 areas will continue to increase, while the proportion living in Toronto will continue to decrease (Figure 1.2). In 1991, the population of Toronto accounted for 54% of the population of the GTA, in 2006, this proportion had decreased to 45%. If the populations grow in line with the projections made, by 2036 the population of Toronto will account for only 37% of the total GTA population. To ensure that Toronto remains a vibrant and dynamic centre to the GTA, Toronto’s Official Plan encourages and accommodates growth within the city boundaries.5

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The changing industrial profile of the city and the growing population will likely mean that more people will be employed in other areas of the GTA, even if they live in Toronto. This will have implications for traffic, commuting patterns, and public transit, which are discussed further in the Urban Trends chapter.\(^6\) In addition, while the growing communities surrounding Toronto are quite self-contained, there is still significant commuter and visitor travel into the city for employment, entertainment, and education. This will continue to put substantial pressure on transportation networks, contributing to greater congestion, diminishing air quality, parking problems, and so on, for the foreseeable future, affecting quality of life within the city. Further, as the populations of the surrounding areas grow, the transient daytime population (commuters, tourists, visitors for entertainment purposes, etc.) can be expected to grow as well, and points to the need for an efficient, effective, and integrated public transit system for the GTA. It should be noted that this transient population also makes use of police services but is not captured in resident population statistics used in crime rate and workload analyses.

**B. AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION**

Age is a strong predictor of human behaviour and awareness of the age structure of the population not only provides context for current behaviours and trends, but also allows some forecast of future behaviours and trends.

The median age of Canada’s population, which has been rising steadily, reached an all-time high of 39.5 years in 2006, increasing 1.9 years from the previous census. The median age is expected to continue to rise, possibly exceeding 44 years by 2031.\(^7,8\) Seniors aged 65 years or older increased to a record 14% of the population – representing 1 in 7 Canadians – and is projected to nearly double by 2031. In particular, those aged 80 and older showed the largest increase from the previous census. In contrast, children aged 15 and younger decreased to 18% of the national population, its lowest level.

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\(^8\) The median age is the age at which one half of the population is older and one half is younger.
Statistics Canada also found that the census metropolitan areas (CMAs), while still aging, generally had a smaller proportion of seniors and a larger proportion of children than at the national level. There were some differences, however, between the central municipality of the CMAs and the surrounding municipalities: the peripheral or suburban areas were younger than the central urban areas, with more children and fewer seniors. The urban areas tended to have larger proportions of those aged 20-34 years. It was suggested that this pattern, which was also evident in the Toronto CMA, was due to larger proportions of young working-age adults moving to the urban centre (i.e. the City of Toronto), larger proportions of international immigrants (who tend to be about 30 years old on average when they arrive), and more senior residences and health care services for the elderly.\textsuperscript{9,10}

In line with the national level projections, the provincial projections also anticipate a shift to an older population. However, compared to the rest of the province, the GTA “is expected to remain the region with the youngest age structure as a result of strong international migration and positive natural increase.”\textsuperscript{11}

Within the GTA as of the 2006 Census, the median age in City of Toronto was the same as the median age in Halton (38.4 years), but older than the median ages in Durham (37.7), Peel (35.6), and York (37.5). Each of these median ages was an increase of about a year or more from the 2001 Census.

Within Toronto itself, all policing divisions except 52 Division (in the downtown core) also saw an increase in median age between 2001 and 2006. In both years, 22 Division had the population with the oldest median age (42.3 in 2006) and 52 Division had the population with the youngest median age (33.8 in 2006). While 52 Division had the youngest median age, this was not the result of a large proportion of children or youth; this division had, in fact, the smallest proportion of young people under 25. This division did, however, have by far the largest proportion of young working age adults (25 to 34 years). As can be seen in Figure 1.3, the east and northwest suburban divisions tended to have the largest proportions of children and youth under 25 years of age. See Table 2 in the Appendix to this chapter for a breakdown of the population by age group and division.

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{10} The Toronto Census Metropolitan Area covers the GTA plus a few additional areas; the Toronto CMA extends from Ajax to Oakville, and north to Newmarket, and includes the following municipalities: Ajax, Aurora, Bradford, West Gwillimbury, Brampton, Caledon, East Gwillimbury, Georgina, Halton Hills, King, Markham, Milton, Mississauga, Mono, New Tecumseh, Newmarket, Oakville, Orangeville, Pickering, Richmond Hill, Toronto, Uxbridge, Vaughan, and Whitchurch-Stouffville.
As shown in Figure 1.4, the suburban divisions also tended to have the largest proportions of older adults (65 years or more), particularly those in the southwest and north-central areas of the city, followed by those in the northwest and southeast. Given that 22, 32, and 33 Divisions have consistently had large proportions of older adults at each census, it is likely that these divisions will continue to have a relatively older population in coming years.
According to the Ontario Ministry of Finance projections, only the 65 years and over age group will show an increase between 2011 and 2036 (Figure 1.5). The proportion of older adults in Toronto is expected to increase from about 14% in 2011 to 21% in 2036. In contrast, the proportion of those in each of the other age groups is expected to decrease between 1% and 3% over the same period.

With regard to actual number of people within each age group, the province expects the number of those aged 65 or more to increase by about 86% in Toronto between 2011 and 2036. In contrast, the number of those under 25 is expected to increase only by about 16% over the same period. Similarly, the number of those aged 25-44 and the number of those aged 45-64 are expected to increase only by 9% and 10%, respectively.

The aging of the population could have a significant effect on crime and victimisation patterns. This may be particularly true given that it has been found that more seniors are living in the community with a spouse, children, or alone, rather than living in a health care institution.\(^\text{12}\) It is important that officers be familiar with the physical and emotional challenges of aging. Officers interacting with older adults should be aware of possible vision, hearing, and mobility difficulties. These physical difficulties may also result in the deterioration of driving skills and challenges for senior pedestrians.

The mental illnesses that can accompany aging will also be a concern. The Alzheimer’s Society of Canada estimates that in 2010, there was 1 new case of dementia every 5 minutes and over the next 25 years, if there are no medical breakthroughs, there will be more than 4 million Canadians with Alzheimer’s disease or a related dementia.\(^\text{13}\) With an increase in the population of older adults, this will potentially mean more officer contact with seniors with a dementia and an increasing number of calls from family members or care-givers related to missing seniors.

A related issue may be an increase in suicides by seniors. Citing a 2002 Health Canada report, the Canadian Mental Health Association noted that men over the age of 80 years have the highest suicide rate among Canadians, and that suicidal behaviour by seniors is more likely to

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result in a completed suicide.\footnote{Canadian Mental Health Association. \textit{Seniors and Suicide}. (Retrieved July 28\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www.ontario.cmha.ca/seniors.asp?cID=6363)} According to Statistics Canada data, those 65 and older represented 12\% of suicides in 2003 and 13\% of suicides in 2007 (the most recent year for which data was available).\footnote{Statistics Canada. (2010). CANSIM, table 102-0551 and Catalogue no. 84F0209X. (Retrieved July 27\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/hlth66a-eng.htm)} Suicide by seniors has been linked to difficulties in coping with aging and lifestyle changes, and depression.\footnote{Senior suicides expected to rise as boomers age. (2011, March 22). \textit{Toronto Star}.}

With the growing elderly population, there is also a great potential for white-collar crime, especially fraud, and for elder abuse and neglect to increase. The Police Service must ensure that it is prepared to deal with continuing increases in fraud, and especially in the types of fraud to which seniors are most vulnerable, as well as increases in elder abuse and neglect, by ensuring that adequate resources are allocated and training provided to officers so that they have the knowledge and resources they need to understand, recognise, and investigate these crimes.

There may also be an increase in the number of seniors committing certain crimes, such as shoplifting. Japan, the country with the oldest population, has noted an increase in arrests of seniors: in 2006, for every two teenagers, three people 65 or older were arrested.\footnote{Elderly Japanese turn to petty theft to ease loneliness, isolation. (2008, December 3). \textit{Toronto Star}.} Most arrests were for petty theft, and were the result of loneliness, isolation, and/or poverty; if caught shoplifting, they had someone to talk to.

An increase in seniors may result in different demands for service to the police. While older adults may be relatively unlikely to be victimised by crime compared to other age groups, they may feel more vulnerable and less able to deal with the consequences of victimisation. An increased fear of crime may, in turn, lead to an increase in calls for service to the police.\footnote{Powell, J. & Wahidin, A. (2007). \textit{Old Age and Victims: A Critical Exegesis and Agenda for Change}. \textit{Internet Journal of Criminology}. (Retrieved December 30\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, from http://www.internetjournalofcriminology.com/Powell_Wahidin_Old_Age.pdf)} A study by the federal Ministry of the Solicitor General found that to increase feelings of safety and security, seniors wanted police to be more visible on the streets, to be more accessible, to be more a part of the community, and wanted to be able to call on them when afraid.\footnote{Kinnon, D. & MacLeod, L. (1990). \textit{Police and the Elderly: Evolving Implications in an Aging Society}. Ottawa: Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada.}

With regard to providing services to older adults, police will have to increase their knowledge of other services in the community – they will then be better able to provide referrals, since seniors may think of police as their only source of help, especially if they have no children to provide care. Police must work in partnership with the media, community agencies, and government services to develop and disseminate crime prevention and safety information, and to reduce fears that may be associated with reporting crime to police, including elder abuse. And, police training programs must be reviewed to ensure that officers are well informed about the realities of aging and the fears, needs, and strengths of seniors.

The growing number of seniors will also mean an increasing demand for caregivers, particularly children, as aging parents require increased care. And, this responsibility will probably affect women in particular.\footnote{Frederick, J.A. & Fast, J.E. (1999). \textit{Eldercare in Canada: Who does how much? \textit{Canadian Social Trends (Statistics Canada)}, Autumn.}} More than two-thirds of informal caregivers are between 30 and 59 years of age. This increased need to provide care may mean that many people with
appropriate abilities will not be able to reach their full potential in their chosen field of work, including those in the Police Service, due to lack of time and energy. It may also mean increased absence from work and increased tension within families. Organisations interested in promoting employee wellness will have to consider innovative ways of assisting with the care for aging parents; one possibility is the provision of eldercare facilities, similar to childcare.\textsuperscript{21}

With the potential for increased family stress and tension, the Service must be prepared for a potential increase in elder abuse, and, internally, must ensure that support and systems are available for Service members caring for elderly parents.

Finally, the population projections in Figure 1.5 have implications for the recruitment and retention of Service members, as well. Aging Service members are and will continue to be eligible for retirement in increasing numbers, and since the decrease in younger age groups is not as marked in Toronto as elsewhere due at least in part to the large numbers of young immigrants, the Service will need to ensure continued recruitment outreach to the various diverse communities of Toronto. Recruitment and retention issues are discussed in detail in the Police Resources chapter.

### C. Immigration

Immigration will be increasingly important, both for growth and to meet labour force requirements given the retirement of the baby boomers in increasing numbers. However, the proportion of permanent immigrants to Canada who chose to settle in Ontario decreased from 59\% in 2001 to 42\% in 2010.\textsuperscript{22} And the proportion of immigrants to Ontario who chose to settle in the Toronto area, decreased from 84\% in 2001 to 78\% in 2010. In contrast, the proportion of permanent immigrants to Canada who settled in Montréal increased over the same period.

Still, immigration continues to be the main force driving population growth in the Toronto CMA, and by 2031, Statistics Canada has projected that 78\% of the CMA’s population could be immigrants or children of immigrants.\textsuperscript{23,24} And, as of the 2006 Census, almost two-thirds (60\%) of recent immigrants to the CMA settled in the City of Toronto. According to the 2006 Census, 1 in 2 Toronto residents (50\%) were born outside of Canada, up from 48\% in 1996 and 49\% in 2001. In 2006, of those born outside of Canada, 22\% were recent arrivals, having immigrated in the past five years, while almost half (48\%) arrived before 1991. As shown in Figure 1.6, the largest proportions of immigrants have settled in the divisions in the north and east parts of the city.

\textsuperscript{23} Heisz (2006).
Immigration is changing the outer regions of the GTA as well as Toronto. While Toronto had 58% of the GTA’s foreign-born population in 2001, this decreased to 53% in 2006. Both Peel and York had large immigrant populations in 2006: almost half (49%) of Peel’s population were foreign-born, followed by 43% in York. Around 20% of Durham residents were foreign-born, as were 25% of Halton residents. As in Toronto, all proportions increased from 2001. Peel had the largest proportion of recent immigrants (21%), while 9%-12% of Durham, Halton, and York immigrants were recent arrivals.

Analysis by Statistics Canada found that the geographic concentration of immigrants is related more to a location’s overall attractiveness – presence of amenities, opportunities, social networks – to immigrants, rather than simply the sheer size of the pre-existing immigrant community.25

Of the over 1.2 million Toronto residents born outside of Canada, the largest proportion in 2006 had come from Eastern Asia, followed by Southern Asia and Southern Europe.26 These areas accounted for 63% of all immigrants in Toronto. Within each of these regions, China, India, and Italy were the source countries for a large proportion of the immigrants in Toronto. Almost half (44%) of immigrants were between the ages of 25 and 44 years when they moved, while almost one-quarter (23%) were under the age of 14. Figure 1.7 shows the largest source of immigrants for each division, as of the 2006 Census.

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26 Due to data suppression for privacy reasons, in 2006, Statistics Canada provided information on immigrant places of birth generally by region only. Occasionally, the country of birth for a large proportion of immigrants was also noted for some regions. Therefore, a comparison with past census data on the main countries of immigrant birth is no longer possible. See Table 4a in the chapter Appendix for a list of the countries included in each region.
As noted previously, of those Toronto residents who were born elsewhere, almost 1 in 4 (22%) came to the city relatively recently, between 2001 and 2006. Those who have arrived in Toronto more recently indicate a shift in the source regions for immigrants to Toronto. Southern Asia, Eastern Asia, and West Central Asia & the Middle East were the largest sources of newcomers, representing 77% of total immigrants during the five-year period. Again, newcomers from Southern and Eastern Asia were predominantly from India and China.

Table 1.1 shows the five regions that were the top sources of immigrants to Toronto overall, and in recent years, as well as the proportion of all immigrant residents who said they were born in those areas. If available, the source country for the largest proportion of immigrants from an area is noted in brackets.
Table 1.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immigrant Places of Birth27</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia (China)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada

While India and China have for some time been the two main sources of immigration to Toronto, the growing economies in both these countries and improving standards of living may possibly result in somewhat lower levels of immigration in the future. Figure 1.8 shows where in Toronto recent immigrants have settled.

Figure 1.8

Source: Statistics Canada

27 See Footnote 26.
Immigrants to Canada, and Toronto, face a number of challenges, with a main one being employment. The difficulties in finding employment, particularly for recent immigrants, can include: recognition of foreign credentials, level of educational attainment, language barriers, degree of experience outside their home country, strength of social networks, and knowledge about the Canadian labour market. In the 2008 Labour Force Survey, Statistics Canada found that employed immigrants had lower hourly wages than Canadian-born workers, although the gap narrowed for immigrants who had been in Canada longer. Statistics Canada also found that immigrants had “a lower share of workplace injuries, lower share of union coverage, higher shares of involuntary part-time work, higher shares of temporary jobs, lower shares of employer-sponsored pension plans and life insurance coverage compared with the Canadian born.”

Again, the gaps between recent immigrants and Canadian-born workers were most pronounced. Both immigrant and Canadian-born workers reported high levels of job satisfaction: 89% of immigrants and 92% of Canadian born said they were satisfied with their job.

Similarly, the Statistics Canada Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants, which asked new immigrants about their experiences since coming to Canada, found that when asked about the difficulties they had encountered, almost half (46%) cited finding an adequate job. When asked about barriers to employment, most cited multiple obstacles, including lack of Canadian work experience and lack of recognition of foreign experience or foreign qualifications. Linguistic and cultural issues were also cited when people were asked about their difficulties since coming to Canada: 26% said they had difficulty learning a new language, while 13% said they had difficulty adapting to a new culture and values. Despite these challenges, two-thirds said that their material well-being was better or the same as before they arrived, and 84% or more (depending on admission category) said their quality of life was better than before coming to Canada.

Information from the 2001 Census found that the educational and economic outcomes of second generation Canadians (i.e. those with at least one parent born in another country) was generally more positive than those of their parents. Young adult second generation Canadians were more likely to have a university degree and to have higher average earnings than young adults with Canadian-born parents.

A large international study, including Canada, of immigrant youth found substantial relationships between how well youth acculturate and how well they adapted. Those youth who integrated well (had a strong sense of their heritage as well as close ties to their new society), had the best psychological and socio-cultural outcomes (felt better about themselves and had fewer social or academic problems). These youth had better outcomes than did those who assimilated (adopted their new culture while leaving behind their old) or those who stayed

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separate (maintained their old culture and avoided the new). In Canada, 50% of the youth involved in the study were considered integrated. Given the results of this study, the authors suggested that immigrant youth should be encouraged to keep a sense of their heritage and cultural identity while also participating in the larger, new society; policies should promote pluralism and diversity.

Finally, there has been some debate, particularly in the United States (US), as to whether immigrants are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. Recent research from the US suggests this is not the case. A 2008 study using data from the California state prison system and census, found that immigrant adults were considerably less likely than US-born to be in a California prison or jail: the incarceration rate for US-born men was 3.3 times higher than for immigrant men. The study also examined the belief that immigrants take away jobs, perhaps causing native-born people to turn to illegal opportunities; they found that between 2000 and 2005, California cities with a larger share of immigrants saw their crime rates, particularly for violent crime, fall more than cities with fewer immigrants. Further review found continued low levels of criminal activity in the children of immigrants. A second US study found that first generation immigrants (those born outside the US) were 45% less likely, and second generation immigrants were 22% less likely, to commit violence than third generation Americans, adjusting for individual, family, and neighbourhood background.

Similarly, Statistics Canada found that, all other factors being equal, neighbourhoods with a high proportion of immigrants generally had lower crime rates; in particular, neighbourhoods with a higher proportion of recent immigrants had lower rates of drug offences, all types of violent crime, mischief, and other thefts. Less access to socio-economic resources rather than number of new immigrants was linked to higher levels of crime. It was felt the two are often confounded since the average income of recent immigrants, which tends to be lower than other residents, causes them to live in neighbourhoods with limited access to socio-economic resources and high rates of violent crime.

Some awareness of the diversity of the populations being served is important to the provision of policing services. Many newcomers to Toronto have had political and economic experiences that are quite different from what is common in many Canadian cities. As was noted during consultations for this Scan, newcomers may also bring different experiences with and attitudes toward the police and different family role expectations. For example, recent research has explored the difficulties faced by immigrant women and elderly women in abusive situations. Knowledge of where newcomers to Toronto have come from will assist in the planning for liaison, officer training, and community information/public education programs.

References:
D. Diversity

One of the factors that makes Toronto such a vibrant and dynamic city is its striking ethnic and racial diversity. As in 2001, the Toronto CMA had the largest proportion of visible minorities of all CMAs in Canada, largely due to receiving a considerable share of visible minority immigrants between 2001 and 2006: the Toronto CMA received 40% of all newcomers to Canada, 82% of whom belonged to a visible minority group.\(^{37}\) At the 2006 Census, 43% of the Toronto CMA’s population identified as visible minority. Most of the visible minority population of the CMA lived in six municipalities: Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, Markham, Richmond Hill, and Vaughan. The two largest visible minority groups in Toronto CMA were South Asians (the largest group) and Chinese; Blacks and Filipinos were the third and fourth largest visible minority groups, respectively.

While Toronto had 52% of the visible minority population of the GTA in 2006, this share was down from 60% in 2001, reflecting increasing visible minority populations in the surrounding regions. Mainly due to a large South Asian population (24% of the total population), half (50%) of Peel’s population was visible minority in 2006, up from 39% in 2001. Similarly, due to a large Chinese population (16% of the total population), 37% of York’s population was visible minority, up from 30% in 2001.

Smaller proportions of the populations of Durham and Halton were visible minority in 2006 (17% and 13%, respectively), but the proportions were also increases from 2001. The largest visible minority group in Durham was Blacks (6% of the total population), while the largest visible minority group in Halton was South Asians (4% of the total population).

Within Toronto, the total visible minority population increased 32% between 1996 and 2006, representing almost half the population in 2006 (47%). The composition of the Toronto population in 2006 is shown in Figure 1.9.

![Population Composition Toronto 2006 Census](image)

**Figure 1.9** Source: Statistics Canada

In both 1996 and 2006, Chinese, South Asians, and Blacks were the largest visible minority groups. In 2006, these three groups represented 31% of the total population and almost 70% of the visible minority population in Toronto. Of these three groups, the South Asian

population saw the largest increase and in 2006 was the largest visible minority group in Toronto: 12% of the total population and 26% of the visible minority population.

Although the numbers were still relatively small, the Korean, Filipino, and Latin American communities also increased significantly between 1996 and 2006: the Korean population increased by 57%, while the Filipino community increased by 56% and the Latin American community increased by 35%. In 2006, the Korean community represented 1%, while the Filipino community represented 4%, and the Latin American community represented 3% of the overall Toronto population. Figure 1.10 shows the visible minority population by policing division as of the 2006 Census.

The visible minority population is expected to continue to grow over the next few decades, as a result of the high levels of immigration from non-European regions noted previously and a relatively young visible minority population. With the majority of this visible minority population expected to continue to live in Ontario, Toronto “will likely become increasingly differentiated from other regions of Canada in terms of cultural diversity and the presence of visible minorities.”

Recent projections from Statistics Canada suggest that by 2031, the proportion of the Toronto CMA identifying as visible minority could increase to 63%. Under these projections, two of every five visible minority persons in Canada would live in the Toronto CMA. South Asians are likely to continue to be the largest visible minority group, with accounting for 24% of the CMA population, followed by the Chinese at 12%. Two smaller visible minority groups that are expected to grow rapidly are Arabs and West Asians.

39 Ibid., p.25.
40 Statistics Canada (2010).
Such diversity within the population being served presents both opportunities and challenges for the Toronto Police Service. Opportunities, for example, relate to the potential for recruitment, volunteers, and community partnerships. Challenges, on the other hand, include the need to ensure that officers are aware of different cultures and sensitivities, and language barriers which could hinder crime prevention, information dissemination, and ability to access services.

According to the 2004 Statistics Canada General Social Survey, 28% of visible minorities in Canada (compared to 13% of non-visible minorities) said they had experienced discrimination – most of these (81%) believed it was because of their race or ethnic origin. Blacks and Latin Americans were the most likely visible minority groups to say they’d experienced discrimination (36% both groups). And, 14% of visible minorities said they’d experienced discrimination when dealing with the police or courts, compared to 8% of non-visible minorities.

A study conducted in 2007 following up on a 2004 survey, found that while overall perceptions of the police were positive, people were generally more likely to believe the police were biased. While more Chinese respondents and white respondents said they believed the police treated Chinese people worse than white people, fewer black respondents said they believed this. And, while more black respondents and white respondents said they believed the police treated black people worse than white people, fewer Chinese respondents said they believed this. The study also found that recent immigrants had the most positive attitudes toward the justice system, becoming less favourable with time spent in Canada and most negative among Canadian-born racial minorities. The researchers also noted that negative experiences with the police appeared to have a stronger impact than positive experiences on perceptions of the police.

Finally, a poll conducted in 2010 by Leger Marketing for the Association for Canadian Studies, found that almost two-thirds of Canadians (65%) agreed that visible minorities and whites were treated equally at their place of work. However, almost half of Canadians (46%) also agreed that racism is on the rise; those over 65 were most likely to agree, while those under 35 were least likely.

The Police Service must work to ensure that members of all communities in Toronto feel they are treated professionally, respectfully, and fairly, especially during contact that could be viewed negatively.

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E. Language

Toronto is also a city of diverse languages. Almost half (48%) of the population in the 2006 Census said they had a mother tongue (the first language they learned at home and still understood) other than just English or French, up slightly from 46% in 2001 (single responses). Only 5% of Toronto’s population in 2006 said they were not able to carry out a conversation in either French or English.

Home language is defined by Statistics Canada as being the language spoken most often or on a regular basis at home, or if the respondent lives alone, the language he/she is most comfortable with. In 2006, just under one-third of Toronto’s population (31%) said they spoke only a language other than English or French at home. This was up from 19% in 2001, but similar to the 29% in 1996. The number of those who said they spoke English and another non-official language at home was around 4% in both 1996 and 2006. Table 1.2 shows the top ten (by proportion) single response, non-official home languages in Toronto (i.e. respondent spoke this language and no other most often at home) in 1996 and 2006, as well as the proportion of Toronto’s population who said they spoke this language at home.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>% of pop.</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>% of pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>Tagalog (Filipino)</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagalog (Filipino)</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>Persian (Farsi)</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada

As can be seen in the above table, Chinese continues to be the language spoken most often at home, while Tamil has replaced Italian as the second most common home language. While the top five most common home languages were unchanged overall, the remaining five differed from 1996 to 2006, mainly reflecting the increasing recent immigration from the Asian continent and Eastern Europe, as shown in Table 1.1. In both years, the languages shown accounted for only about 20% of the home languages spoken, illustrating the diversity of languages spoken at home.

Use of Language Line Services, previously the AT&T Language Line, assists Toronto Police Service communications operators at the 9-1-1 centre to manage calls from citizens who do not speak English, and allows field officers to contact on-line telephone interpreters, if required, to communicate with citizens who attend the divisions or persons in custody. Service is available in more than 140 languages.
Use of Language Line Services increased 127% between 1996 and 2007 (Figure 1.11). While this increase in use may be due to increased advertising and awareness of the availability of the Language Line, it may also be reflecting the increasing diversity of languages within the city. In each year except for 1999, the most frequently provided languages were Chinese and Spanish. (In 1999, the second most frequently provided language was Italian.)

Between 1996 and 2000, the top five languages requested were consistently Chinese, Spanish, Italian, Vietnamese, and Portuguese, in varying orders. From 2001 on, however, Tamil, Korean, and/or Russian have displaced one or more of these five. In 2010, the top five languages requested were: Chinese, Spanish, Russian, Portuguese, and Korean.

With, as noted previously, at least 5% of the city’s population not able to understand English or French, and with an increasing proportion of people who’s mother tongue is not English and who may, in a stressful situation, have difficulty speaking or understanding officers, it is critical that the Service continue to have access to – and use – qualified, skilled, and impartial translators and interpreters. Mistakes or misinterpretations could lead to wrong information being communicated to or from officers, wrong referrals, and so on.

Further, people unable to speak either official language may have difficulty accessing, using, or perhaps even knowing about public services, including police services. Language barriers may also hinder crime prevention and information dissemination efforts. The Police Service must work to ensure that information about policing services is available and accessible in as many different languages as possible. In particular, the Service should make a special effort to ensure that programs delivered to schools and youth outreach initiatives are accessible and understandable to all young people. Officers must also be aware that some people may not speak English and take care to ensure that these people, if stopped or arrested, understand both their situation and their rights.

F. RELIGION

Mirroring the growing diversity of Toronto’s population was a growing diversity in the religious make up of the city. According to 2001 Census data, the proportion of those saying they were Roman Catholic or Protestant decreased, while the proportions of those with other religious affiliations increased. The proportion of those who reported they had no religion also increased. Much of the change in Toronto’s religious profile was the result of the changing sources of immigration discussed previously. Toronto’s increasingly multi-faith profile provides an opportunity to become familiar with different beliefs and practices in an

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44 The census collected information on religious affiliation only, regardless of whether or not respondents actually practiced their religion. This information is collected in every other census, i.e. every ten years.

environment of mutual respect and tolerance. However, it also provides the potential for conflict between individuals and between groups with strongly held, but differing beliefs and values.

Figure 1.12 shows the religious affiliation by proportion of population in Toronto. As can be seen, those with Roman Catholic affiliation represented the largest proportion (31%), followed by Protestants (21%), those claiming no religious affiliation (19%), and Muslims (7%).

According to projections by Statistics Canada, the population having a non-Christian religion could more than double by 2031, representing about 30% of the population of the Toronto CMA.46

Research, based on results from the 2002 Statistics Canada Ethnic Diversity Survey, found that new religious minorities – mainly Muslims, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Hindus – were slower to integrate into the larger community mainly because of their racial minority status.47 Strength of religious commitment had little impact for any of the religious groups examined.

G. INCOME

At each census, Statistics Canada collects data on income for the previous year. According to the 2006 Census, median household income in the City of Toronto increased to $52,833 in 2005, up from $42,752 in 1995.48 Toronto’s 2005 median household income of $52,833 was lower than the median household income in each of the four outer GTA regions. Figure 1.13 shows the median household income across the GTA.

46 Statistics Canada (2010).
48 The median income is the middle value – one half of households have an income that is greater and one half of households have an income that is less. The median is less influenced by extreme high or low values than the average.
Toronto also had the highest incidence of low income: 24%, compared to 9% in Durham, 8% in Halton, 14% in Peel, and 13% in York. Similarly, although Toronto had only 45% of the GTA population and 44% of GTA families, it had 61% of all low-income families, 73% of all low-income, non-family persons, 65% of all low-income lone parent families, and 68% of all low-income seniors in the GTA.

According to 1995 income data, the largest proportion of Toronto households (15%) had a household income of $10,000-$19,999. Reflecting the increase in median household incomes, according to 2005 income data, the largest proportion of Toronto households (21%) had a household income of $100,000 or more. Figure 1.14 shows the proportion of households in each income range in Toronto, according to the 1996 and 2006 Censuses. As shown, between the two census periods, the proportion of households with incomes less than $40,000 decreased, from 49% in the 1996 Census to 36% in the 2006 Census. The proportion of households with income of $100,000 or more almost doubled, from 12% to 21%.

The growing income inequality in the city is reflected in Figure 1.14: in 2005, while 21% of Toronto’s households had an income of over $100,000, almost half (47%) had an income under $50,000. The 2005 median household income in each of the policing divisions is shown in Figure 1.15.

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49 Before tax, all persons living in private households.
In a report in 2006, Statistics Canada noted that rising family income was creating a widening inequality between higher and lower income families: in 2004, the 12% after-tax low income rate was significantly higher than the 10% seen in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{51} In particular, the median after-tax income for families (two or more members) had risen and was higher in Toronto than in either Vancouver (15% lower) or Montréal (27% lower). It was felt that a factor in the higher rate of low income was the proportion of recent immigrants in Toronto, since the low-income rate was higher for recent immigrants than for non-immigrants. It was also noted that spatial as well as income polarization was occurring: the widening gap between high and low income families was mirrored in a widening gap between high and low income neighbourhoods.

Similarly, an analysis of Statistics Canada’s 2005 income data by the United Way of Greater Toronto, found that there was deteriorating ability of Toronto families to meet the high cost of living in Toronto.\textsuperscript{52} The \textit{Losing Ground} analysis found that Toronto families were falling behind the rest of the nation, province, and Toronto CMA in median incomes, proportion of low-income families, and number of low-income families.

In a 2011 report, \textit{Vertical Poverty}, the United Way of Toronto used long-form census data from 1981 to 2006 to further examine the geographic concentration of poverty.\textsuperscript{53} The

\textsuperscript{51} Heisz (2006).
researchers found that while 30 years ago, less than 20% of city’s low-income families lived in neighbourhoods where more than a quarter of families were low income, by 2006, this had risen to 46%. This increase in geographic concentration of poverty was most pronounced in Toronto’s inner suburbs, especially Scarborough and North York. Further, it was found that low-income families made up a larger share of the high-rise tenant population: in 1981, about 25% of families in high-rise apartments were ‘poor’; by 2006, this had increased to 39%. Again, the trend was most evident in the inner suburbs: almost half of families in high-rise apartments in Scarborough were ‘poor’; York, East York, and North York also had relatively high proportions. It was felt that with the rising cost of owning a house, high-rise apartments had become a source of relatively affordable housing.

A survey of high-rise tenants conducted for the Vertical Poverty analysis found that most tenants felt their neighbourhoods were good places to live and raise children, and that there were often strong social bonds among many tenants (especially where people shared common origins, language, and/or religion). However, while they felt safe, high-rise tenants were more likely to report being victims of property damage than Canadian households overall. Social disorder was also seen as a major problem: just under one-third of tenants said drug use, drug dealing, vandalism, and trespassers were problems in the building, and about one-quarter said drunkenness, rowdiness, and noisy neighbours and loud parties were problems.

The relationship between household income and victimisation was also examined by Statistics Canada. Using data from the 2004 General Social Survey, it was found that rates of violent crime victimisation (including assault, sexual assault, and robbery) were at least one and a half times greater for low income households (under $15,000). And, while low income households were less likely than high income households to experience motor vehicle theft, theft of household property, and vandalism, low income households were more likely to report socially disruptive conditions in their neighbourhoods.

Income level can have a significant effect on many aspects of life. Research has found that higher incomes are almost always associated with cognitive, behavioural, physical, and social/emotional outcomes for children. While outcomes generally improved more quickly with increases in incomes at lower levels than at higher levels, there was no ceiling above which income no longer mattered for child outcomes. Increases in income at very low-income levels were found to be particularly important for young children (4-7 year olds). Other research has found that youth from lower income families are less likely than youth from higher income families to attend university. In addition to financial reasons for not attending, youth from lower income families did not perform as well on standardized tests, had lower marks in high school, and were less likely to have parents that expected them to complete a university degree – all of which were found to exert a strong influence on the probability of

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going to university. Not attending university means not gaining the benefits of a university education that accrue over a lifetime.

The relationship between poverty or income inequality and the commission of crimes has been the subject of study for many years, and the “notion that income inequality and crime rates are positively related is considered as conventional wisdom in the literature of both economics and criminology.”

However, empirical support for such a relationship, when available, tends to involve correlation or association rather than a causal/cause-and-effect link.

In an analysis of 34 data studies reporting on violent crime, poverty, and income inequality, Hsieh and Pugh (1993) concluded that poverty and income equality were each positively correlated with violent crime, possibly homicide and assault in particular.

Similarly, Kennedy et al (1998) found a strong, positive correlation between income inequality and firearm violent crime that held even when poverty and firearm availability were controlled for.

In contrast, Doyle et al (1999) found that income inequality had no significant effect on property or violent crime. This study did find, however, that an increase in wages predicted a decrease in crime. Lee (2002) found evidence for a relationship between income inequality and robbery and theft, but not murder. However, they found no support for a causal link between income inequality and crime. Fajnzylber et al (2002), on the other hand, concluded that an increase in income inequality had the significant, causal effect of raising rates of both homicide and robbery.

Many of the authors of these studies suggested that efforts to address violent crime should consider addressing broader social and economic issues, rather than only targeting individuals at high-risk. They also discussed the need to further explore crime reduction strategies that involved poverty alleviation, acknowledging that policies to reduce crime may be more effective if they can include measures to address income inequality.

In Canada, with a time series analysis of data from 1962 to 2003, Pottie Bunge et al (2005) found that increased unemployment rates were associated with increased homicide rates. However, inflation, not unemployment rates, was found to be associated with ‘financially-motivated’ crimes (robbery, motor vehicle theft, and break & enter).

Researchers have also examined other types of violence. Benson and Litton Fox (2004) looked at connections between self-reported intimate violence and personal and economic well-being, and at how the type of neighbourhood the women lived in influenced their decision

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61 Lee (2002).


to leave or stay in abusive relationships. They found that violence against women by intimate partners occurred more often and was more severe in economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods; they also found that women struggling with money in their relationships (unemployment, not enough money to make ends meet, worrying about finances) had a higher risk of intimate violence. The authors felt the findings suggested that strategies to prevent and detect violence in domestic relationships should give greater attention and priority to disadvantaged neighbourhoods.

Given that crime has continued to decrease during the recent recession in the United States, the supposed link between poverty and crime is being questioned. Crimes that increased during previous periods of economic downturn, such as drug offences, have not shown similar increases to date. While it is acknowledged that there may be a lag between changing economic conditions and changes to crime patterns, it is also suggested that crime rates may have been affected by factors such as improved technology available to police, more effective deployment of resources and investigative strategies, and better strategies by a variety of agencies to deal with youth at risk. The challenge will be to continue these efforts in a period of budget constraint for public services, including the police.

In early 2006, a British epidemiologist noted that people who live in unequal societies trust each other less and that social status contributes to good feelings—people feel good if they feel they measure well against others around them. With greater inequality, people have no or bad jobs, lower incomes, and feel deprived of material goods that others have and that mark status. Vulnerable to the perceived indignity of relative rather than absolute poverty, they may be less willing to overlook incidents that they feel cause them to lose ‘face’.

With the increasing income disparity, a lower median household income than in the four outer GTA regions, and a relatively large proportion of low-income households in Toronto, the Service should explore the possibility of developing crime prevention/reduction strategies specifically in partnership with agencies or government departments responsible for the economic support of residents in disadvantaged areas. Strategies to address social disorder issues in low-income communities, including vertical communities, should also be considered.

**Recommendations for Police Service**

- The aging of the population could have a significant effect on the types of services demanded of police, as well as on crime and victimisation patterns. There will be increased contact with older adults with physical and/or mental impairments and there is a potential for both fraud and elder abuse to increase. The Service must ensure that it is prepared to deal with an increase in these areas by allocating adequate resources and providing training to officers so that they have the knowledge and resources they need to address these situations.

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• Tolerance and respect are vital in a city with such diverse cultures, ethnicities, languages, and religions. Given that negative experiences with police may have a stronger influence than positive experiences on perceptions of police, the Police Service must ensure that its officers and civilian members interact with the community, and with each other, in a manner that is professional, respectful, fair, and without discrimination, especially during contact that could be viewed negatively.

• The diverse population of the city presents both opportunities and challenges for the Toronto Police Service. The Service must take advantage of opportunities relating, for example, to the potential for recruitment, volunteers, and community partnerships. It must also be prepared to meet challenges such as the need to ensure that officers are aware of different cultures and sensitivities, and language barriers that could hinder crime prevention, information dissemination, and ability to access services.

• Values and culture from immigrant home countries may be different from Canadian values and culture, especially teen culture, potentially creating clashes between immigrant parents and their children, particularly if the children are expected to act socially as if they were in the home country. The Service should consider initiatives to encourage children and youth, including the children of immigrants, to speak to someone if clashes with parents involve abuse or violence.

• The Service must ensure that information about policing services and crime prevention is available and accessible in as many different languages as possible. Officers must also be aware that some people may not speak English and take care to ensure that these people, if stopped or arrested, understand both their situation and their rights. In particular, the Service should make a special effort to ensure that programs delivered to schools and youth outreach initiatives are accessible and understandable to all young people.

• The Service must ensure that officers have an understanding and awareness of the differing sensitivities of the growing diversity of religions in the city.

• With the increasing income disparity in Toronto, the Service should look at exploring the possibility of developing crime prevention/reduction strategies, including strategies to address domestic violence, in partnership with agencies or government services responsible for the economic support of residents in disadvantaged areas. Strategies to address social disorder issues and socially disruptive conditions in low-income communities, including vertical communities, should also be considered.
### Table 1: Dominant Divisional Demographics – 2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Household Size</th>
<th>Median '05 Household Income</th>
<th>Dwelling Type</th>
<th>Period of Immigrat’n</th>
<th>Immigrant Place of Birth</th>
<th>Recent ('01-'06) Immigrant Place of Birth</th>
<th>Non-Offic. Home Language</th>
<th>Visible Minority</th>
<th>Religion (2001)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Division</td>
<td>35-44 yrs</td>
<td>1 person</td>
<td>$54,642</td>
<td>Apts. &lt;5</td>
<td>1991-00</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Division</td>
<td>5-19 yrs</td>
<td>2 persons</td>
<td>$43,153</td>
<td>Apts. 5+</td>
<td>1991-00</td>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Black</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Division</td>
<td>35-44 yrs</td>
<td>1 person</td>
<td>$50,932</td>
<td>Single, det.</td>
<td>1991-00</td>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Division</td>
<td>25-34 yrs</td>
<td>1 person</td>
<td>$47,017</td>
<td>Apts. &lt;5</td>
<td>1991-00</td>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Black</td>
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<td>Apts. 5+</td>
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<td>$57,656</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Division</td>
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<td>$62,940</td>
<td>Single, det.</td>
<td>1991-00</td>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5-19 yrs</td>
<td>4-5 pers.</td>
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<td>$43,995</td>
<td>Apts. 5+</td>
<td>1991-00</td>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
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<td>2 persons</td>
<td>$57,343</td>
<td>Apts. 5+</td>
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<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Division</td>
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<td>$59,373</td>
<td>Apts. 5+</td>
<td>1991-00</td>
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<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Single, det.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5-19 yrs</td>
<td>2 persons</td>
<td>$54,777</td>
<td>Single, det.</td>
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<td>Tamil</td>
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Data Source: Statistics Canada
## Table 2: Proportion of Divisional Population by Age – 2006 Census

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<th>Division</th>
<th>0-4 yrs</th>
<th>5-19 yrs</th>
<th>20-24 yrs</th>
<th>25-34 yrs</th>
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<th>55-64 yrs</th>
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<th>85+ yrs</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Division</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
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<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6.4%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Division</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Division</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
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<td>6.8%</td>
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<td>1.2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.5%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
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<td>3.0%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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<td>52 Division</td>
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<td>10.9%</td>
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<td>5.5%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<td>53 Division</td>
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<td>16.8%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 Division</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
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<td>55 Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Division</td>
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<td>5.8%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
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<td>16.5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15.7%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
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<td>8.4%</td>
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<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>33 Division</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
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<td>14.2%</td>
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<td>8.4%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Division</td>
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<td>18.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
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<td>9.8%</td>
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<td>10.7%</td>
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<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
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Data Source: Statistics Canada
### Table 3: Immigrants and Period of Immigration by Division – 2006 Census

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</tr>
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<td>12 Division</td>
<td>50,135</td>
<td>55.9%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Division</td>
<td>60,612</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Division</td>
<td>61,219</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
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<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>51 Division</td>
<td>34,014</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
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<td>12.3%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>52 Division</td>
<td>15,373</td>
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<td>5.6%</td>
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<td>15.4%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>53 Division</td>
<td>53,498</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 Division</td>
<td>58,487</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Division</td>
<td>33,523</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA FIELD</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>22 Division</td>
<td>73,309</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>24.9%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Division</td>
<td>84,125</td>
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<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Division</td>
<td>101,185</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Division</td>
<td>115,910</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>32.0%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Division</td>
<td>106,830</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Division</td>
<td>79,639</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>34.9%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Division</td>
<td>169,659</td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Division</td>
<td>96,252</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Data Source: Statistics Canada
### Table 4: Immigrant Places of Birth* - Top 5 by Division – 2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>CENTRAL FIELD</th>
<th>AREA FIELD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Div. pop.</td>
<td>% of Div. pop.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 9.3%</td>
<td>Southern Europe 6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Division</td>
<td>Southern Europe 15.8%</td>
<td>Caribbean/ Bermuda 8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Division</td>
<td>Southern Europe 17.6%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Division</td>
<td>Southern Europe 13.8%</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 6.8%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 15.8%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 4.7%</td>
<td>Northern Europe 4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 10.5%</td>
<td>Southern Europe 8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 8.5%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 4.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Statistics Canada

* Due to data suppression for privacy reasons, in 2006, Statistics Canada provided information on immigrant places of birth generally by region only. (See Footnote 26) See Table 4a following for a listing of countries included in each region.
### Table 4a: Countries included in Cited Regions of Birth – 2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caribbean/ Bermuda</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Eastern Europe</th>
<th>Northern Europe</th>
<th>Southern Europe</th>
<th>Western Africa</th>
<th>Eastern Africa</th>
<th>West Central Asia/ Middle East</th>
<th>Eastern Asia</th>
<th>South-east Asia</th>
<th>Southern Asia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua &amp; Barbuda</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Bulgarian</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Andorra</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Maldives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Czechoslovakian</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>i.e.</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>Falkland Islands</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
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<td>French Guiana</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Mayotte</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Palestine/ West Bank/ Gaza Strip</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Réunion</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Saint Helena</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Martinique</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Kazakstan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Antilles</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Yugoslovia</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>n.i.e.</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Kitts &amp; Nevis</td>
<td>Antilles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>St Lucia</td>
<td>Antilles</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Vincent &amp; Grenadines</td>
<td>Antilles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>Antilles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virgin Islands, Br.</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virgin Islands, US</td>
<td>Antilles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5: Places of Birth* – Recent (2001-2006) Immigrants - Top 5 by Division – 2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTRAL FIELD</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>Total Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 3.6%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 3.6%</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 2.4%</td>
<td>South America 1.5%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 1.3% 34,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 2.2%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 2.0%</td>
<td>Caribbean/Bermuda 1.9%</td>
<td>South America 1.8%</td>
<td>Eastern Africa 1.6% 50,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Division</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 3.6%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 2.5%</td>
<td>Southern Europe 2.0%</td>
<td>South America 1.6%</td>
<td>Caribbean/Bermuda 1.2% 60,612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 5.9%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 2.8%</td>
<td>South America 1.6%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.2%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 0.8% 61,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 6.2%</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 5.7%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 3.2%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 2.3%</td>
<td>Eastern Africa 1.5% 34,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 10.9%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 3.6%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 3.2%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.5%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 1.2% 15,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 7.7%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 3.6%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 3.0%</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 2.4%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.8% 53,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 9.8%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 3.9%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 2.8%</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 2.6%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.9% 58,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 7.0%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 2.7%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.2%</td>
<td>United States 1.1%</td>
<td>Northern Europe 0.9% 33,523</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA FIELD</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. immig. pop.</th>
<th>Total Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 5.2%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 2.4%</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 2.2%</td>
<td>Southern Europe 1.7%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 1.5% 73,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 11.9%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 1.9%</td>
<td>South America 1.6%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 1.5%</td>
<td>Western Africa 1.3% 84,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 6.5%</td>
<td>South America 2.4%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 1.8%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.8%</td>
<td>Caribbean/Bermuda 1.6% 101,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 Division</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 6.2%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 5.7%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 5.3%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 3.1%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 1.2% 115,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 11.0%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 4.9%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 4.1%</td>
<td>Eastern Europe 2.5%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.8% 106,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 9.3%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 3.8%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 3.5%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 1.8%</td>
<td>Eastern Africa 0.8% 79,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 Division</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 10.9%</td>
<td>Southern Asia 5.3%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 1.4%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 1.0%</td>
<td>South America 0.5% 169,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Division</td>
<td>Southern Asia 10.6%</td>
<td>Southeast Asia 2.5%</td>
<td>Eastern Asia 1.9%</td>
<td>West Central Asia/Middle East 1.7%</td>
<td>Caribbean/Bermuda 0.8% 96,252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Statistics Canada

* Due to data suppression for privacy reasons, in 2006, Statistics Canada provided information on immigrant places of birth generally by region only. (See Footnote 26) See Table 4a preceding for a listing of countries included in each region.
### Table 6: Proportion of Divisional Population by Visible Minority (Single Response) Group – 2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>South Asian*</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Latin American</th>
<th>Southeast Asian **</th>
<th>Arab ***</th>
<th>West Asian †</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Visible Minority n.i.e. ††</th>
<th>Aboriginal Identity †††</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL FIELD</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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**AREA FIELD**

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<th>Arab ***</th>
<th>West Asian †</th>
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<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* E.g. East Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan
** E.g. Laotian, Cambodian, Indonesian, Vietnamese
*** E.g. Egyptian, Lebanese, Moroccan
†† n.i.e. = not included elsewhere
††† ‘Aboriginal Identity’ = reported identifying with at least one Aboriginal group

The three largest visible minority communities in each division are bolded.

Data Source: Statistics Canada
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Language 1</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Language 2</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Language 3</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Spanish</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>Tagalog(Filipino)</td>
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<td>Vietnamese</td>
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<td>Romanian</td>
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<td>Tamil</td>
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<td>1.7%</td>
<td>Gujarati</td>
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<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>Tagalog(Filipino)</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* ‘Home Language’ is defined by Statistics Canada as language spoken most often or on a regular basis at home or (if live alone) language most comfortable with.

Data Source: Statistics Canada
Table 8: Religious Affiliation - Top 5 by Division – 2001 Census*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>% of Div. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. pop.</th>
<th>% of Div. pop.</th>
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<tr>
<td>11 Division</td>
<td>Roman Catholic 35.7%</td>
<td>None 22.1%</td>
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<td>Roman Catholic 45.9%</td>
<td>None 10.9%</td>
<td>Muslim 7.4%</td>
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<td>Buddhist 4.5%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Roman Catholic 44.8%</td>
<td>None 13.3%</td>
<td>Jewish 13.1%</td>
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<td>Christian n.i.e. 3.0%</td>
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<td>Muslim 9.2%</td>
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<td>Jewish 4.8%</td>
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<td>Buddhist 5.3%</td>
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<td>Muslim 8.6%</td>
<td>Anglican 8.3%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* n.i.e. = not included elsewhere

Data Source: Statistics Canada

* Information on religious affiliation is only collected every ten years; the question is next scheduled for the 2011 Census.
### Table 9: Families and Households by Division – 2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
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<th>% One Parent* Families of Div. Families</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE – PROPORTION OF DIVISIONAL HOUSEHOLDS</th>
<th>HOUSEHOLDS BY TYPE – PROPORTION OF DIV. HOUSEHOLDS</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 Division</td>
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<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

* In approximately 85% of one parent families, women were the lone parent.

Data Source: Statistics Canada
## Table 10: Proportion of Dwelling Types by Division – 2006 Census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Single Detached</th>
<th>Semi-Detached</th>
<th>Row Houses</th>
<th>Apts.-Detached Duplex</th>
<th>Apts. &lt; 5 Stories</th>
<th>Apts. ≥ 5 Stories</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<th>Rented</th>
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<tr>
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<td>3.5%</td>
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<td>19.6%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
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<td>45.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.5%</td>
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<td>25.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.8%</td>
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<td>59.3%</td>
<td>40.3%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10.6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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Data Source: Statistics Canada
### Table 11: 2005 Household Income by Division – 2006 Census

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<tr>
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<th>$10,000-$19,999</th>
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<th>$30,000-$39,999</th>
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<th>$70,000-$79,999</th>
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<th>$100,000+</th>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Data Source: Statistics Canada
II. Crime Trends

The nature and extent of crime are social indicators of the safety and security of the public and are often used for the evaluation of effectiveness of policies and programs to reduce crime. In policing, a significant portion of police activity is spent in the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders. Information about changing crime patterns or types of offenders allows the Police Service to develop strategies to address changing problems, make rational decisions, and plan activities according to, or in anticipation of, crime-related trends.

HIGHLIGHTS

- In 2010, a total of 165,864 non-traffic Criminal Code offences occurred in Toronto, which was a 9% decrease from the 182,159 offences in 2009, a 20% decrease from 2006, and a 17% decrease from ten years ago. The overall number of crimes in 2010 was the lowest in the past ten years.

- Between 2009 and 2010, decreases were noted for all major categories of crimes, including a 1% decrease for violent crime, an 11% decrease for property crime, and an 11% decrease for other non-traffic Criminal Code offences.

- Specific crimes that decreased between 2009 and 2010, include homicide (-2%), assault (-1%), robbery (-5%), robbery of financial institution (-42%), break & enter (-4%), auto theft (-15%), theft from auto (-12%), other theft (-2%), fraud (-29%) and offensive weapons (-17%). The only offences that increased were sexual assault (9%) and drugs (11%).

- Crime in general decreased over the past ten years (-17%), with decreases in all major Criminal Code offence categories, including a 15% drop in violent crime, a 20% drop in property crime, and a 13% drop in other Criminal Code offences. Specific crimes that increased from ten years ago included sexual assault (6%), robbery (5%), fraud (28%), offensive weapons (10%), and drugs (15%).

- The total number of violent crimes in 2010 represented a 1% decrease from 2009, a 9% decrease from 2006, and a 15% decrease from 2001. Of the violent crimes that were reported in 2010, most were non-sexual assaults (72%), followed by robberies (17%) and sexual assaults (7%).

- The number of robberies recorded in 2010 was a 12% decrease from the peak seen five years ago, but a 5% increase over ten years ago. Most of the robberies in 2010 were muggings (40%) and swarmings (22%). The number of robberies involving financial institutions/businesses in 2010 was a large 42% drop from 2009, and a 29% and 15% drop from 2006 and 2001, respectively.

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67 Due to different counting methods and/or different data sources, numbers in this chapter may differ slightly from those in other Toronto Police Service publications. For example, in the Annual Statistical Report, number of sexual assaults also includes non-assaultive sexual offences.
• With respect to the number of crimes per 1,000 population, a trend of decrease was seen over the past ten years. The overall rate of non-traffic Criminal Code offences dropped from 77.2 offences in 2001 to 75.7 offences in 2006, 65.0 offences in 2009, and to 58.6 offences in 2010, the lowest rate in the past ten years.

• Of the average 58.6 non-traffic Criminal Code offences that occurred per 1,000 population in 2010, 11.2 were violent crimes, 33.4 were property crimes, and 14.1 were other non-traffic Criminal Code offences.

• About half (51%) of the crimes that occurred in 2010 were cleared, a drop from 2006 (54%), but a slight increase from 2001 (50%). In particular, other Criminal Code offences had the highest clearance rate (84%), followed by violent crime (71%) and property crime (30%). Over the past ten years, the clearance rate for violent crime dropped and that for property crime improved, while that for other Criminal Code remained relatively unchanged.

• In 2010, 35% of robberies, 25% of non-sexual assaults, and 8% of sexual assaults involved the use of weapons. Over the past five years, the proportion of cases involving use of weapons decreased for assault and robbery, while that for sexual assaults increased.

• Slightly less than a quarter of robberies (23%) involved the use of firearms in 2010. Only a small proportion of sexual assaults (0.5%) and non-sexual assaults (2%) involved the use of firearms. Over the past five years, the proportion of both robbery and sexual assault involving the use of firearms decreased, while that for non-sexual assault remained about the same.

• The number of persons arrested and charged for Criminal Code offences in 2010 was a 2% decrease from 2009 and an 11% decrease from 2006. Compared to five years ago, the number of persons charged in 2010 decreased for most major categories of crime, including a 7% drop for violent crime, a 9% drop for property crime, a 17% drop for other Criminal Code, and a 4% decrease for Criminal Code traffic, while there was a slight 1% increase for drugs. Males in the younger age groups continued to have the highest arrest rates.

• In 2010, 14, 32, and 52 Divisions were the busiest stations in terms of number of crimes to process. In terms of calls for service, 14, 31, and 51 Divisions had the largest proportion of dispatched calls. Divisions 52, 51, and 14 continued to have the highest overall crime rates per 1,000 population. Most divisions had decreases in both number of crimes and the crime rate over the past five years.

• Relative to twenty other Canadian cities with a population over 250,000 in 2009, Toronto’s crime rate ranked eighth in violent crime, seventeenth in property crimes, and fourteenth in overall crimes. In terms of the Crime Severity Index, which weights crime by both volume and severity, Toronto ranked eleventh (medium) in overall crime and sixth (high) in violent crime.

• Between 2005 and 2009, Toronto was one of the twenty cities that had a decrease in the overall crime rate and Toronto’s decrease ranked eighth. Toronto also had decreases in both the violent and non-violent crime rate. The crime severity index for Toronto dropped 14% for all crimes (ranked twelfth among the 21 cities all had a decrease) and 5% for violent crime.
(ranked fourteenth among the 17 cities that had a drop). All cities under comparison had an increase in the per capita cost and Toronto’s increase ranked a bit below the middle (thirteenth) among the cities.

A. NATIONAL CRIME TRENDS

Police-reported crime in Canada continued its downward trend in 2010. Both the volume and severity of crime fell from 2009, down 5% and 6%, respectively. Decreases in various property crimes accounted for the majority of the decline, including theft under $5,000, mischief, motor vehicle theft, and break and enter. Decreases were also noted for homicide, attempted murder, robbery and assault.

The crime rate, which measures the volume of police-reported crime per a specific size of population, is a traditional measure of the level of crime. The 2010 overall crime rate fell 5% from the previous year, reaching its lowest level since the early 1970s. Most of Canada’s census metropolitan areas also reported decreases in crime severity. The Crime Severity Index (CSI), which measures both the volume and seriousness of crime, dropped 6% from 2009, and was at its lowest point since 1998, the first year for which the CSI was made available.

In terms of violent crime, Canada’s Violent Crime Severity Index (VCSI) fell 6%, the fourth consecutive annual decline and the largest drop seen in more than a decade. The decline in the violent crime rate was more modest, down 3%.

Following three consecutive annual increases, the rate of impaired driving offences dropped 6% in 2010. The rate of impaired driving has generally declined since peaking in 1981.

In contrast to most types of crime, in 2010, increases were reported in the rates of child pornography offences (36%), firearm offences (11%), criminal harassment (5%), and sexual assault (5%). Drug offences also increased (10%), driven primarily by an increase in cannabis offences. The overall increase in drug offenses was a continuation of the upward trend that began in the early 1990s.

Both the rate and severity of youth crime decreased in 2010, down 7% and 6% respectively. The severity of violent crime committed by youth decreased 4% from 2009. Declines were also noted in the rates of youth accused in a number of offences, including motor vehicle thefts (-14%), serious assault (-12%), and break and enters (-10%). Robbery was one of the few crimes committed by youth that showed an increase in 2010, up 2%. Youth crime is discussed more fully in the Youth Crime chapter.

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69 A similar trend of decline in major crimes was also noted in the United States, even when crimes, particularly violent crimes, were expected to go up because of the recession: Steady Decline In Major Crime Baffles Experts (2011, May 23). The New York Times. (Retrieved on May 25th, 2011, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us)
**B. Interpretation of Police-Reported Crime Data**

There is a general understanding that official crime statistics do not cover all the crimes that occurred and that the decline in number of police-reported crimes may not be indicative of the real crime picture. The 2009 General Social Survey by Statistics Canada found that only about 31% of criminal victimizations were reported to police, down from the 34% in 2004. Reporting of crime by the public to the police is affected by a number of factors, including: perceived seriousness of the incident; readiness to involve the police; fear of reprisal from the aggressor or other negative consequences of criminal justice intervention; desire to bring justice to the offender; social obligation to report criminal behaviour; and the need to obtain a police report for insurance purposes. Changes in law that limit or broaden the definition of an existing offence will also influence the number of incidents reported to the police. And, proactive policing initiatives targeting specific types of crime, such as prostitution and drugs, will affect official crime statistics as well. Other exogenous and endogenous factors, such as the need to address the issue of terrorism and the diminishing ability of police to detect, investigate, and take reports of less serious crimes due to changing service priorities and dwindling resources resulting from persistent budget constraints, also have an impact on official crime statistics.

**C. Contemporary Policing and Confronting Issues**

Police are often regarded as the primary agent in the control of crime, although in reality the number of crime-related factors that police have a direct impact on may be limited. Starting from the traditional reactive service delivery model, with specific policing programs geared towards enforcement and responding to crime and emergencies, contemporary policing has moved towards a reactive-proactive model focusing more on the risk factors for crime. This shift from the ‘professional’ model of police as a force to fight crime to police as risk-minimizing agents is in response to a changing external environment marked by various crime-related social disorder problems.

This changing environment makes the traditional strategies of crime control, which focus on crime only, increasingly ineffective. The common understanding is that, without a clear focus on crime risk factors, policing will have little effect on crime. The correct identification of these risk factors will provide focus for police to direct their resources to attack the proximate causes of public safety problems. The use of problem-oriented policing and community mobilization strategies are an indication of this focus on risk factors. It is now also recognised that there is no one best method or panacea to fight crime, and police can only prevent certain crime by using certain methods under certain conditions.

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71 The violent crime rate was reportedly up in the United States in 2006. One of the suggested reasons for the increase was the government’s emphasis on the war on terror instead of fighting crime. (Why is the violent crime rate up? (Retrieved February 23rd, 2007, from http://www.gainesville.com))

Capacities and constraints on policing are imposed by the legal/justice system, political and community expectations, knowledge about what works in policing, technology, labour laws, militant police unionism, available resources, and accountability requirements. These provide the general context within which police strive to control crime through initiatives that maximize their impact on a limited number of crime-related factors.

Due to dwindling resources caused by the persistent global financial crisis as well as competing needs to fund other public programs, the gains made by policing in the past, in terms of increased resources made available to police services for on-going and specific programs to address crime and safety issues, benefits to attract quality people to the profession, and improvements in equipment, facilities, and technology to fight crime, may all be in jeopardy. Police budgets are subject to ever more stringent scrutiny under the emphasis on accountability and value for money. Police may become ‘less-equipped’ to deal with the evolving crime environment and specific crime issues, such as cybercrime, gangs, drugs, and crime prevention. Novel means for providing police services in a more cost-effective way are required. Providing adequate and effective services within this context presents definite challenges to police services. Therefore, the major challenges currently confronting policing include:

- dwindling resources for policing, and
- to keep policing effective in combating crime.

In a report reviewing police leadership and training in the UK, the following principles were noted as important for contemporary policing:

- Democratically Accountable: This is about the link between police and civil society, between local police officers and their neighbourhoods. It also speaks to ensuring standards that guide police practice are the product of democratic debate.
- Legitimate: This refers to the emphasis on the importance of police performing their duties in ways that develop and maintain public perceptions of fairness and ethical behaviour. Such an approach is essential in establishing police authority and winning the public’s support for law keeping.
- Evidence-Based: Professional policing should be guided by proven effective practices based on evidence from the past to make it work in the future.
- Capable, Competent, and Cost-Effective: Policing must deliver desired outcomes and do so in a progressively more cost-effective way.
- Nationally (and Internationally) Coherent: When policing is localised for delivery, it is important that policing practices are based on interoperability and national standards for protecting the public.

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73 Extracted from PERF article: American policing in the next decade: A conversation with Chief Bill Bratton; 04/30/2010.

Keeping police effective in combating crime is always a challenge, particularly in the context of persistent budget constraints and meeting changing public expectations. Information and feedback received during the 2011 Scan external consultation meetings can be summarised into three main areas:

- police-community relationship building,
- police reframing contacts with the public, victims, and youth, and
- more emphasis on customer service in police service delivery.

In an article by policing experts, the ideas of community policing, accountability-based management, intelligence-led policing, and co-operation between policing and other criminal justice agencies have been re-affirmed as effective means for reducing crime. The following recommendations are extracted from the discussion:\(^\text{75}\)

- Decentralising policing and truly practising community policing are considered meaningful ways to make policing effective. Enhanced connection (or reconnection) with the community to hear their concerns/priorities and to solve problems at the local level will generate community support and the information required to accurately target criminal activity. This is done through establishing manageable enforcement units run by quality police managers, who are empowered and held accountable for delivering effective police services.

- Reforming crime reporting and crime analysis to facilitate the collection of crime data and production of crime information for analysis to enable intelligence-led or targeted policing.

- Establishing effective oversight systems to guard against corruption, incompetence, and indifference, through a hierarchical system of accountability and performance measures covering all ranks, as well as monitoring mechanisms (e.g. CompStat) and inspection (e.g. Internal Affairs).

- Reforming criminal justice systems to speed up and enhance criminal justice prosecutions. This is to bring sureness and swiftness to the administration of punishment as a deterrent on the one hand, and the timely intervention of other rehabilitative alternatives deemed necessary on the other.

- Co-operation between police departments and other criminal justice partners at various political levels to make a focused, strategic, and relentless attack on crime, criminals, and crime patterns.

\(^\text{75}\) In the article: *Eight Steps to Reduce Crime* by William J Bratton and William Andrews (Americas Quarterly: http://www.americasquarterly.org, 2010.05.19), a number of recommendations were made to effectively reduce crime. The article was centered on community policing, intelligence-led and focused enforcement and accountability systems.
D. Number of Crimes in Toronto

In 2010, a total of 165,864 non-traffic Criminal Code offences occurred in Toronto, which was an 9% decrease from the 182,159 offences in 2009, a 20% decrease from the 206,283 offences in 2006, and a 17% decrease from the 200,172 offences ten years ago in 2001. Figure 2.1 shows the number of reported non-traffic Criminal Code offences in each of the past ten years. In general, crime remained relatively stable between 2001 and 2005 before a slight increase in 2006 and decreases in each of the past four years. In fact, the overall number of crimes in 2010 was the lowest in the past ten years.

With a 9% decrease for crime in general between 2009 and 2010, decreases were noted for all major categories of crimes, including a 1% decrease for violent crime, an 11% decrease for property crime, and an 11% decrease for other non-traffic Criminal Code offences. Table 2.1 shows changes in the number of reported crimes by major offence categories and by specific offences.

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The current information system represents a live database, which allows data entry and search of all primary police databases from one location. While this enhances front-line officers’ access to information in the police system and ability to track and manage cases, the regular updates to the live database require that statistics that were produced and published in the past be revised from time to time. Due to these changes in Service data systems and extraction procedures, coupled with the regular updates to the live database, all crime and arrest/charge data for previous years have been revised/recalculated to reflect the latest available data and for the sake of fair comparison. The crime statistics for the past years, particularly the more recent past years, therefore, may differ from the same statistics published in previous Scans.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence Categories</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>09E10</th>
<th>06E10</th>
<th>01E10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Non-Traffic CC</td>
<td>200,172</td>
<td>206,283</td>
<td>182,159</td>
<td>165,864</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-19.6</td>
<td>-17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>37,077</td>
<td>34,671</td>
<td>32,017</td>
<td>31,593</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property*</td>
<td>117,533</td>
<td>118,691</td>
<td>105,694</td>
<td>94,491</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>-20.4</td>
<td>-19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other CC</td>
<td>45,562</td>
<td>52,921</td>
<td>44,448</td>
<td>39,780</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-24.8</td>
<td>-12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Specific Crimes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide**</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
<td>-1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Assault***</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,131</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-sexual Assault</td>
<td>28,728</td>
<td>25,178</td>
<td>23,029</td>
<td>22,768</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
<td>-20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Robbery</td>
<td>4,942</td>
<td>5,916</td>
<td>5,455</td>
<td>5,210</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery - Fin. Inst.</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>-42.0</td>
<td>-28.6</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;E</td>
<td>16,118</td>
<td>15,615</td>
<td>12,402</td>
<td>11,906</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>-23.8</td>
<td>-26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>14,053</td>
<td>10,307</td>
<td>6,541</td>
<td>5,540</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
<td>-46.3</td>
<td>-60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft from Auto</td>
<td>20,776</td>
<td>18,262</td>
<td>18,492</td>
<td>16,330</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
<td>-10.6</td>
<td>-21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Theft</td>
<td>34,371</td>
<td>34,390</td>
<td>32,626</td>
<td>31,828</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
<td>-7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>8,312</td>
<td>15,605</td>
<td>15,021</td>
<td>10,651</td>
<td>-29.1</td>
<td>-31.7</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offensive Weapons</td>
<td>4,102</td>
<td>6,955</td>
<td>5,432</td>
<td>4,523</td>
<td>-16.7</td>
<td>-35.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>9,841</td>
<td>11,928</td>
<td>10,256</td>
<td>11,359</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mischief offences are included under Property Crime. For the purposes of other reports, mischief offences may be included under Other Criminal Code.
** Statistics reported for homicide reflect offences/charges, not number of victims.
*** Excludes non-assaultive sexual offences.

Source: TPS Offence Database

Most of the specific crimes listed above decreased between 2009 and 2010, including homicide (-2%), assault (-1%), robbery (-5%), robbery of financial institution (-42%), break & enter (-4%), auto theft (-15%), theft from auto (-12%), other theft (-2%), fraud (-29%) and offensive weapons (-17%). The only offences that increased were sexual assault (9%) and drugs (11%).

Crime in general decreased from ten years ago (-17%), with decreases in all major Criminal Code offence categories, including an 15% drop in violent crime, a 20% drop in property crime, and a 13% drop in other Criminal Code offences. Specific crimes that increased from ten years ago were sexual assault (6%). robbery (5%), fraud (28%), offensive weapons (10%), and drugs (15%).

E. Rates For Comparisons

Calculating the number of crimes per 1,000 people provides a rate that is not affected by simple increases or decreases in population size. In terms of the total number of crimes per 1,000 population, a trend of decrease was seen over the past ten years. The overall rate of non-
traffic *Criminal Code* offences dropped from 77.2 offences in 2001 to 75.7 offences in 2006, 65.0 offences in 2009, and to 58.6 offences in 2010, the lowest rate in the past ten years.

Figure 2.2 shows the crime rate by the major offence groups for the past ten years. Of the average 58.6 non-traffic *Criminal Code* offences that occurred per 1,000 population in 2010, 11.2 were violent crimes, 33.4 were property crimes, and 14.1 were other non-traffic *Criminal Code* offences.

![Crime Rate per 1,000 Population](image)

Compared to 2009, the 2010 crime rates for each of the major offence categories decreased, including a 10% decrease in the overall crime rate (non-traffic), a 2% decrease in the violent crime rate, an 11% decrease in the property crime rate, and an 11% decrease in the rate of other *Criminal Code* offences.

The overall crime rate also decreased over five and ten years ago. Between 2006 and 2010, the total crime rate decreased 23%. And, between 2001 and 2010, the total crime rate decreased 24%, with a 22% decrease for the violent crime rate, a 26% decrease for the property crime rate, and a 20% decrease for the other *Criminal Code* offences rate.

While crime rates are usually considered important indicators of public safety, police crime clearance rates can be taken as indicators of police effectiveness in solving crime. Although crimes can be cleared in a number of different ways, crimes are primarily cleared or solved by an arrest made and/or charges laid. The clearance rate here is computed as the proportion of crimes cleared of the crimes that occurred in the period under review. It should be noted that since a crime that happened in a particular year can be solved in a later year, the clearance rates for the most current years are always deflated/lower compared with years in the more distant past. Similarly, the clearance rates for the more recent years are expected to

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77 A small number of cases are cleared by other modes, such as the death of the accused or complainant/witness prior to the laying of charges, etc. For young offenders, under the *Youth Criminal Justice Act*, a number of cases may be cleared by modes other than charges being laid.

78 This computation method is different from that of Statistics Canada (CCJS), which defines clearance rate for crime as the number of crimes cleared in a specific period of time, irrespective of when they occurred, divided by the number of cases occurred for the specific period of time under review.
increase in future years. Figure 2.3 shows the clearance rates for the major offence categories over the past ten years.

![Crime Clearance Rates](image)

**Figure 2.3** Source: TPS Database

About half (51%) of the crimes that occurred in 2010 were cleared. This rate a deflated/lower proportion compared to the same rate for other years, as noted above, was a drop from the 54% clearance rate in 2006, but a slight increase from the 50% clearance rate in 2001. The category of other Criminal Code offences consistently had the highest clearance rate (over 80%) for most of the past ten years, and was 84% in 2010, a drop from five years ago (87%) and ten years ago (86%). Violent crimes consistently had the second highest clearance rate. The rate of 71% in 2010 was the same as five years ago (2006), but a drop from the 77% ten years ago (2001). Property crime continued to have the lowest clearance rate and the 30% clearance rate in 2010 was a drop from the 35% in 2006, but a slight improvement over the 28% in 2001.

**F. Changes in Proportion of Major Offence Groups**

In terms of the composition of crime, property crimes continued to constitute the majority (57%) of the total number of non-traffic Criminal Code offences in 2010. Violent crimes and other Criminal Code offences constituted 19% and 24%, respectively. Figure 2.4 shows each of the three major offence categories as a proportion of the total number of non-traffic Criminal Code over the past ten years.

Compared to five years ago in 2006, the proportion of violent crime in 2010 increased, while that for property crime and other Criminal Code offences decreased. Compared to ten years ago, the proportions of both violent crime and other Criminal Code offences increased, while that of property crime decreased.
After reaching a high of 37,077 occurrences in 2001, the number of violent crimes showed a trend of gradual decrease, ending with a total of 31,593 occurrences in 2010 (Figure 2.5). The total number of violent crimes in 2010 represented a 1% decrease from 2009, a 9% decrease from 2006, and a 15% decrease from 2001.

Of the violent crimes that were reported in 2010, most were non-sexual assaults (72%), followed by robberies (17%) and sexual assaults (7%). The proportions of both non-sexual assault and robbery decreased, while the proportion of sexual assault increased when compared with 2009. The 62 occurrences of homicides in 2010 accounted for only 0.2% of violent crimes for the same year, and was a decrease compared with five and ten years ago.

As shown in Table 2.1, the total number of non-sexual assaults in 2010 was a very slight 1% decrease from 2009, but a 10% and 21% decrease from five and ten years ago, respectively. Most of these non-sexual assaults were minor assaults (66%). The number of sexual assaults in 2010 increased 9% from 2009, and was a 10% and 6% increase from five and ten years ago, respectively.

The number of robberies continued to drop after the peak number of 5,916 occurrences in 2006. The total number of robberies recorded in 2010 was a 5% and 12% decrease from 2009 and 2006, respectively, but a 5% increase compared with ten years ago. Of the total 5,210 robberies recorded, most were muggings (2,060 or 40%) and swarmings (1,162 or 22%). While swarming increased 6% in 2010 over 2009, it decreased compared with five (-21%) and ten years (-12%) ago. The number of muggings represented a slight increase compared with last year and five years ago, but was a much larger 11% increase from ten years ago.

The 130 robberies involving financial institutions and businesses in 2010 was a large 42% drop from 2009, and a 29% and 15% drop from 2006 and 2001, respectively. The number of home invasions recorded in 2010 (261) was an 11% and a 13% decrease from last year and
five years ago, respectively, but was still a 15% increase from ten years ago. A total of 44 occurrences of vehicle jacking was recorded in 2010, the lowest number recorded in the past ten years.

H. USE OF WEAPONS & INJURY OF CRIME VICTIMS

Use of Weapons:

In all years, weapons were more likely used in robberies than in sexual assaults or non-sexual assaults. In 2010, 35% of robberies, 25% of non-sexual assaults, and 8% of sexual assaults involved the use of weapons. The proportion of cases involving use of weapons decreased slightly for assault and robbery over the past five years. While only a small proportion of sexual assaults involved the use of a weapon, the proportion of such cases increased in 2010.

Given the recent focus on gun violence, the use of firearms in committing violent crimes is a major public safety concern. In 2010, only a very small proportion of non-sexual assaults (2%) and sexual assaults (0.5%) involved the use of firearms, while slightly less than a quarter of robberies (23%) involved the use of firearms. Over the past five years, the proportion of both robbery and sexual assault involving the use of firearms decreased, while the proportion for non-sexual assault remained relatively the same. Table 2.2 shows the proportion of robberies, assaults, and sexual assaults by type of weapon involved over the past five years.

Table 2.2
Proportion (%)* of Assaults, Robberies, and Sexual Assaults Involving Use of Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Firearm</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total Weapon</th>
<th>Nil/Unspecified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexual Assault</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistics re-stated for previous years as a result of revised data and extraction parameters.

Source: TPS Database (CIAU)
Gun-related calls from the public decreased 9% in 2010. After increases between 2003 and 2006, and peaking in 2006 when a total of 3,818 such calls were recorded, gun-related calls showed a trend of decline over the past four years. Most of these calls were related to person with a gun and the sound of gunshot; a smaller number was related to shooting. Table 2.3 shows the number of such calls received and attended by the police for selected years over the past ten years. While the number of these calls in 2010 was a decrease compared with five years ago, it represented a moderate increase over the past ten years.

### Table 2.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Person with a gun</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>2,014</td>
<td>1,552</td>
<td>1,432</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>-28.9</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>-21.3</td>
<td>-17.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound of gunshot</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1,506</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
<td>-22.4</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total gun-related calls</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>3,818</td>
<td>3,122</td>
<td>2,847</td>
<td>-8.8</td>
<td>-25.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TPS I/CAD data

### Injury of Victims:

Most injuries to victims occurred in relation to assault. In 2010, about 1 in 2 (52%) victims of non-sexual assaults were injured, representing a slight decrease from five years (52%) and ten years (55%) ago. More than a quarter (28%) of robbery victims were injured in 2010, compared to 29% in 2006 and 31% in 2001. For sexual assaults, 18% of victims were injured in 2010, which was an increase from five years ago (16%), but a decrease from ten years ago (21%). In general, the proportion of victims injured in these three offences decreased over the past ten years.

### 1. THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLES AND BREAK & ENTER

Theft of automobiles and break & enters are crimes that can have a significant impact on the quality of life in the community. The theft of an automobile is a loss of property and means for commuting, thereby limiting mobility and causing other inconvenience to the victims and their families. Break & enter is an invasion of a private home and results in both financial and psychological consequences for victims. Victims are usually left fearful of recurrence or personal harm and constantly anxious about the security of their homes.

In 2010, citizens of Toronto had less than a 1% chance of being the victim of either theft of automobile or break & enter: for every 1,000 members of the population, an average of 6.4 persons were victims of one of these two crimes. This rate was a decrease from the 9.5 persons five years ago and the 11.6 persons ten years ago. Part of the reason for such a decrease could be improved security systems for protecting the home and vehicle.

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79 These statistics are based on a report with data retrieval parameters covering all types of calls, which are slightly different from the statistics based on specific types of calls.
Theft of Motor Vehicles:

Vehicles were generally stolen for thrill-seeking and transportation purposes. They were abandoned/recovered once they had served their purpose. In 2010, a total of 5,540 vehicle thefts were recorded in Toronto, representing a 15% drop from 2009, a 46% drop from 2006, and a 61% drop from 2001. Figure 2.6 shows the number of vehicle thefts over the past ten years. A clear trend of decrease of such occurrences was shown, with larger decreases in the past four years.

Vehicle theft is a crime characterized by a relatively low clearance rate of around 10% for the past few years. In 2010, only about 11% of the motor vehicle thefts that occurred in Toronto were solved or cleared by the police, despite about 65% of the lost vehicles being recovered. The non-recovery rate is regarded as a proxy indicator of the number of vehicles stolen by organised crime groups, which then use the profits so raised to fund other criminal activities.

Break & Enter:

The number of break & enters in Toronto also showed a trend of decrease over the past ten years, although less rapidly when compared with vehicle thefts. In 2010, a total of 11,906 such occurrences were recorded, which was a 4% decrease from 2009, a 24% decrease from 2006, and a 264% decrease from 2001. The clearance rate for these crimes was low, but showed a trend of gradual improvement. In 2010, about 28% of these crimes were solved (cleared) by the police, the highest over the past ten years.

In all years, there have been more residential than commercial break & enters. Residential break & enters constituted 74% of the total number of break & enters in 2010, while commercial break & enters constituted about one-quarter (26%). Figure 2.7 shows the number of break & enters by premise hit for each of the past ten years.

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Both residential and commercial break & enters decreased in 2010 compared to five and ten years ago, with much larger decreases for commercial break & enters. Over the past ten years, the proportion of residential break & enters increased from 62% to 74%, while that for commercial break & enters decreased from 38% to 26%.

**J. DRUG-RELATED CRIMES**

Drug use and drug-related crimes have a complex relationship with crime. According to the findings of a study reported by Statistics Canada, drug-dependent federal inmates were more likely to have committed a gainful crime (theft, break & enter, etc.), and 36% to 46% reported committing the crime to support their substance abuse.\(^{81}\) About 38% of newly-admitted federal male inmates and almost half of provincial inmates were dependent on drugs or alcohol or both. The recent Bill C-30, as discussed in the Legislative Impacts chapter, represents a legislative attempt to control repeat criminal behaviour by imposing court orders on offenders to prohibit their drug and alcohol use.\(^{82}\)

While criminal activity is often used to fund substance abuse at the individual level, drug trafficking can be used to fund the activities and increase the power of organised crime and extremist groups. There is also a strong link between drugs and violent crime in the illegal drug market. Violence is understandably a means for eliminating competition, settling disputes, and/or protecting turf or a shipment of drugs.

In Ontario, cannabis remained the most frequently abused illicit drug. Findings from the Canadian Alcohol and Drug Use Monitoring Survey (CADUMS) revealed that among Canadians aged 15 years and older, the past-year cannabis use was 11% in 2009, a drop from the 14% in 2004, with the average age of drug initiation at 15.6 years for young people aged 15-24

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\(^{82}\) Legislation Enforcing Court Orders Requiring Offenders To Abstain From Drug And Alcohol Use Receives Royal Assent (2011, March 24). *News Release* (Media Relations, Department of Justice, Ottawa, Canada). Bill C-30 allows a judge to impose conditions requiring bodily samples to be provided by individuals under probation orders, conditional sentences, and peace bond provisions for monitoring purposes.
This drop in past-year cannabis use was noted for males (from 18% to 14%), females (from 10% to 7%), young persons aged 15-24 years (from 37% to 26%), and adults aged 25 years and older (from 10% to 8%). It was also revealed that young males were significantly more likely than females to report early use of alcohol, getting drunk, and cannabis use.\textsuperscript{84}

The latest available (2009) Ontario student drug use survey reported a general decline in illicit drug use over the past decade, with 26% of students using cannabis at least once in the past year (compared to 28% in 1999).\textsuperscript{85} Another study on adults revealed that while past year cannabis use among adults remained stable between 2008 and 2009, at about 13%, use of the drug has been steadily increasing since 1977, particularly among women, the 18-29 year-olds and those aged 50 and older.\textsuperscript{86}

Figure 2.8 shows drug offences and drug arrests in Toronto over the past five years. It is important to note that resources available for enforcement and police priorities directly affect the number of drug crimes recorded. Therefore, changes in the number of reported/detected drug offences do not necessarily reflect changes in the number of drug users, or in the number of individuals involved in trafficking, import/export, or production of drugs.

In 2010, a total of 11,359 drug offences and 6,908 drug arrests (persons) were recorded. These numbers represented increases from 2009 – an 11% increase for drug offences and a 10% increase for persons arrested for drugs. They also represented increases over the past ten years, including a 15% increase for drug offences and a 19% increase for drug arrests.

In 2010, on average, 2.5 persons per 1,000 population were arrested/charged for drug offences, compared to 2.3 persons in 2009 and 2.6 persons in 2006. On average, of every 10 persons arrested for drug offences, 8.9 were male and 1.1 were female. Males in the younger age groups (18-24, 25-34, and 12-17 years) were more likely charged for drug offences than other age groups. Males in the 18-24 years age group consistently had the highest drug charge rate: 16.3 persons per 1,000 population in 2010, more than 6 times higher than the overall charge rate of 2.5 persons.

It has been estimated that between 65% and 98% of cannabis production is related to organised crime in Canada.\textsuperscript{87}  Violent crime has always been an integral part of the production, trafficking, and distribution of illegal drugs. A proliferation of marijuana grow operations (MGOs) in Toronto, mostly in residential areas was noted in 2003 and has since become a focus for enforcement, as evidenced by the large number of such grow operations being investigated and dismantled by police in the past few years.\textsuperscript{88}  In 2010, a total of 249 MGOs were processed by the Toronto Police Drug Squad, which was a 19% increase from the 210 cases in 2009, but a 13% decrease from the 287 cases in 2006. The associated number of persons charged in 2010 (193) was a decrease from 2009 (211), but a slight increase from 2006 (188). Between 2002 and 2010, the number of MGOs dismantled by the police increased 207%, which is an indicator that this problem has persisted. Continual effort is required for police to monitor the trend of development so as to minimize the potential security, health and social hazards posed by MGOs.

It has also to be mentioned that the detection, investigation, and dismantling of MGOs have proven to be very time-consuming tasks for police. The legal requirements for obtaining search warrants and the procedures that must be followed to address the health and safety risks associated with the raid, seizure, preparation, and storage of the plants and other properties, all place heavy demands on police time and other resources.

### K. Organised Crime\textsuperscript{89}

Organised crime can be found wherever there is profit to be made. While the public may not be fully aware, many of the most pervasive criminal threats can be specifically attributed to organised criminal groups. Organised crime extends its reach beyond single jurisdictions and underpins many of the most serious threats that exist today. It crosses regional and national boundaries while conducting illicit activities, making any effort of intervention from a single jurisdiction ineffective. It is constantly evolving and adapting to exploit new opportunities. Organised crime comes in many forms, from the visible menace posed by street gangs, which represent lower-level organised crime threats in terms of sophistication, to the more veiled threat presented by more sophisticated groups capable of complex crimes.

The definition of an organised criminal group under Canadian law is relatively vague for the purpose of quantifying the problem itself. According to the *Criminal Code of Canada* (s467.1), a criminal organisation is defined as a group, however organised, that is composed of

\textsuperscript{87} Desjardins & Hotton (2004).
\textsuperscript{88} It has to be recognised that the number of MGOs dismantled by the police is not a sufficient indicator of the extent of the MGO problem; it is more of a police workload or work efficiency measure.
three or more persons in or outside of Canada, and has as one of its main purposes or main activities the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences that, if committed, would likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including a financial benefit, by the group or by any of the persons who constitute the group. It does not include a group of persons that forms randomly for the immediate commission of a single crime.⁹⁰

According to Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), the estimated number of criminal groups in Canada has ranged from 600 to well over 900.⁹¹ Changes in numbers are likely reflective of the degree of fluidity in the criminal marketplace, as well as the impact of other factors, including disruptions by law enforcement, changes in intelligence collection practices, or a combination of these, which also cause fluctuations in the ability to identify criminal groups.

Organised crime groups are subject to the impact of changes in technology and economic/financial and other conditions. Like any business, they operate in a competitive marketplace for profit and so they have to adapt the direction and scope of their illicit activities according to new opportunities and existing conditions of the criminal and legitimate marketplaces, as well as to pressures and changes from enforcement. These networks re-group, merge, or disband on a regular basis in response to any pressures or changes in the operating conditions. For these reasons, many of the hierarchically structured and ethnically, racially, or culturally homogenous traditional organised crime groups have evolved to become what are seen as loosely structured, competitive networks with fluid linkages between members and associates, and with a diverse range of leadership structures. Organised crime groups are increasingly diverse, focused on multiple criminal activities, and not bounded by geographic location.

There is always public demand for unlawful goods, such as illicit drugs, firearms, contraband, counterfeit goods, and services, such as prostitution and illegal gambling. A criminal market is a dynamic system of activities reacting to global shifts in supply and demand and changing according to other dynamics such as competition and enforcement disruptions. The existence of criminal markets forms the breeding ground for organised crime. These criminal markets provide the opportunity for profit-driven organised criminal groups to operate and proliferate. The proliferation of organised crime is, therefore, partly a function of demand and supply: the demand for unlawful goods and services and the supply of such for profit. Jurisdictional differences in legislation or taxation also contribute to the emergence of criminal markets and the shifts in legislation, criminal justice interventions, and global socio-economic events may also change the supply-demand balance, giving rise to opportunities for organised crime.

A wide spectrum of crimes are known to be committed by organised criminal groups, including: sophisticated frauds (such as securities and mortgage frauds), other frauds (such as identity frauds and payment card frauds), money laundering, manufacturing and trafficking of illicit drugs, illicit distribution of pharmaceuticals, smuggling of counterfeit goods and contraband, human and organ trafficking, vehicle and heavy equipment thefts, goods and services that damage the environment (e.g. disposal of hazardous waste, poaching and capturing of rare and endangered species, criminal exploitation of natural resources, etc.), and intellectual

⁹⁰ Definition for organised criminal group is from Department of Justice Canada website (http://laws.justice.gc) (under Criminal Code C46).
⁹¹ Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2011).
Organised criminal groups may also operate legitimate businesses to conceal or facilitate criminal activities, and use them as venues to launder money from the illicit activities.

Criminal groups use various means to achieve their purposes, including technology, bribery, and violence. Innovation in technology has allowed organised crime to commit old crimes in new ways and undertake new activities. These include hacking and ‘spoofing’ websites, and creating tools specifically for crime, such as developing and selling crimeware (e.g. malware and botnets) designed to exploit the Internet in order to steal confidential personal and financial information for profit. Advancement in information technology may also give rise to new criminal opportunities, such as the emergence of smartphones as a source for personal and financial information, and the availability of more personal and business information on the Internet as a result of companies giving users on-line storage and access to such information.

Organised crime groups employ different criminal methods to facilitate their operations. These methods include money laundering to whitewash the criminal proceeds; specialists contracted to perform highly skilful criminal acts; violence to intimidate, silence, or eliminate oppositions/competitors; secure communications to avoid detection (e.g. use of disposable cellular phones and Internet-based communications); and corruption of officials and individuals strategic to the success of their criminal activities. To manage the risks of their criminal enterprises, organised crime groups employ methods to deter law enforcement and mitigate the threats from rivals. Common methods include: off-loading risky activity to subordinates or ‘expendable’ individuals; conducting counter-surveillance on law enforcement and rivals; dealing only with trusted associates; and exploiting lawyers and accountants to facilitate their activities, particularly the laundering of proceeds.

Organised criminal activity has serious and complex social and economic ramifications, regionally, nationally, and internationally. The serious socio-economic harms and threats to the society posed by organised crime groups, though well documented, are not readily known to the public. Financial crimes, including money laundering and manipulation of financial systems and institutions (such as pump-and-dump of stocks, high-yield investment schemes based on misrepresentation, tax avoidance investment schemes, and brokerage account hijacking), usually committed by the more sophisticated and powerful organised crime groups, can distort an otherwise healthy market, resulting in loss of investor and public confidence. Other crimes perpetuated by organised criminal groups, such as insurance frauds, mortgage frauds, mass marketing frauds, vehicle thefts, marijuana grow operations, contraband smuggling, counterfeit goods, intellectual property theft, and payment card fraud can result in the rise of insurance costs, in financial loss to victims, in loss of government tax revenue and profits of legitimate industries, and in other social costs, such as physical and mental suffering of victims and their families. It is also recognised that there is increasing risk that organised criminal groups will become involved in facilitating the movement/smuggling of chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear weapons, posing a serious threat to national and public safety.

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[92 Examples of securities fraud include: illegal market manipulation such as pump-and-dump of stocks, fraudulent high-yield investment schemes, illicit offshore investments and Ponzi (pyramid) schemes (Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2011)).]
Because organised crime can transcend organisational, jurisdictional, and national boundaries and because of the financial resources available to criminal organisations, fighting organised crime is beyond the ability of any single police service. Reducing the harm that these criminal groups inflict on society requires an intelligence-led policing model with integrated intelligence and collaboration at all levels of law enforcement to detect, collect, evaluate, and share criminal intelligence, as well as co-ordinated efforts in enforcement. It is, therefore, essential for the Service to continue to participate and maintain strong partnerships with other law enforcement agencies, governments, and global institutions in order to address the issue of organised crime. Education for the public is also essential to promote their awareness of the problem so as to counter the allure of fraudulent get-rich-quick schemes and to protect investments.

1. Hi-Tech Crime & Identity Theft

All forms of technology can be used other than intended. The current rapid development in information technology has also resulted in added opportunities for crime. The increased application of technological innovations in computer, Internet, and other means of communication has expanded the platform for a variety of social, commercial, and financial transactions to be done electronically. This, together with the expanding availability and use of electronic money systems, are providing increased venues for traditional crimes (such as identity theft and fraud) and opportunities for new technology-based crimes (e.g. cyber extortion and ransom).

Technology-based or high-tech crimes involving a computer as the object of the crime or as the tool used to commit a material component of the offence are broadly called cyber crimes or computer crimes.\(^93\)\(^94\) Crimes that directly target computer devices or networks include computer viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and malware (spreading of malicious code). Crimes facilitated by computer devices or networks include spam, fraud, obscene or offensive content/information, harassment, drug trafficking, cyber terrorism, and cyber warfare.\(^95\) These crimes are characterised by their high level of sophistication, effectiveness in terms of furthering criminal objectives, and the potentially more serious damage to the victim(s). The most common purpose of high-tech crimes is the unauthorised tapping of personal, organisational, and/or financial information for financial gain or other criminal purposes.\(^96\)

The increase in the number and variety of crimes that capitalise on the advancement of technology is proportionate to the rapid increase in the number of Internet users and the expansion of e-commerce globally. Other contributing factors include the rapid growth of credit, debit, and banking cards; careless consumer behaviour; easy availability of personal-financial information and consumer data; escalating online opportunities for theft and fraud; lax business


\(^94\) Computer crime generally refers to criminal activity that involves a computer or network as the source, tool, target, or place of a crime. It can broadly be defined as criminal activity involving an information technology infrastructure, including unauthorised access, illegal interception, data interference, systems interference, misuse of devices, forgery, and electronic fraud.


\(^96\) The terms ‘computer crime’, ‘computer-related crime’, ‘hi-tech crime’, ‘cyber-crime’, and ‘Internet crime’ are often related to the same type of offences, and are used interchangeably in most contexts.
and government security practices in protecting information; the low risk of being caught for perpetrators; and the easy availability of automated hacking tools. The use by criminals of technology that facilitates increasingly secure, anonymous, and rapid communication (via tools like encryption software, wireless devices, disposable cell phones, and re-mailers) also makes these crimes less detectable and helps to conceal the perpetrators’ identities.

The collection and stealing of personal information for use in frauds and other criminal activities represent a lucrative market for organised crime groups. Identity theft/identity fraud is the “unauthorized acquisition, possession or trafficking of personal information, or, the unauthorized used of information to create a fictitious identity or to assume/takeover an existing identity in order to obtain financial gain, goods or services, or to conceal criminal activities.”

Identity theft is also discussed in the Victimisation and Technology chapters. Identity theft enables criminals to use stolen personal information to drain individuals’ bank accounts and obtain fraudulent documentation to commit other crimes, such as applying for credit cards, lines of credit and loans, and opening accounts to facilitate covert money transactions. The unauthorised collection of personal information can occur in a number of ways, including: hacking into computer databases or ‘colonizing’ computers by virus infection via the Internet; obtaining personal information through bribery of database administrators; theft of personal information records or computer hard drives from businesses or government; digging up information from publicly available sources (such as the Internet); dumpster diving (garbage sieving); theft or diversion of mail; payment card fraud; card skimming; or posing as a potential employer, Internet service provider, market researcher, or other service provider to solicit personal information for seemingly legitimate purposes.

Identity theft, particularly of financial data via the Internet, is committed mostly through phishing, pharming, and, most recently, vishing. These techniques deceive victims into supplying personal and financial information under the belief that it is routine practice or necessary for updating records or other legitimate purposes. Both pharming and phishing involve deceptively redirecting Internet users from legitimate financial sites to targeted websites for the purpose of scam, while vishing, similar to phishing, involves the use of Voice-over-Internet Protocol (VoIP) phones to lure people to call to provide personal information.

Identity theft is increasingly a global problem, beyond the constraints of physical geographical boundaries and political jurisdictions, and the perpetrators of identity theft include organised criminal groups, individual criminals, and terrorists. Victims of such thefts may be unaware for long periods of time that their identity information has been wrongfully used, and the full extent of losses from identity theft are not usually known when the crime is first discovered. As a consequence, victims suffer financial loss, damage to their reputation, and emotional distress, and are left with the complicated and sometimes arduous task of clearing their names.

Given current Canadian laws, the extent of identity theft and related crimes is not entirely known. The lack is also partly due to the fact that financial institutions are usually ready to offset the losses of the victims who are their customers and are not ready to disclose such

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98 The common types of identity theft include financial identity theft, medical identity theft, criminal identity theft, driver’s license identity theft, social insurance identity theft, synthetic identity theft (combining parts of different victims), and child identity theft.
information for business reasons. In addition, victims complain to a variety of diverse bodies, including credit bureaux, banks, credit card companies, the government, and police. New legislation on identity theft (Bill S-4) was passed in October 2009, and made the obtaining, possessing and trafficking of identity information for criminal purposes an offence punishable by imprisonment. With the new law, the police and courts have an added tool to address the issue. New legislation to fight high-tech crime also includes the Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act and the Investigating and Preventing Criminal Electronic Communications Act, which aim at providing law enforcement with means to effectively investigate such crime and bring the suspects to justice.99

Law enforcement agencies have started collecting and reporting identity theft statistics only relatively recently. The Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) responded to the problem of identity theft in Ontario in part through the use of the PhoneBusters National Call Centre (PNCC), created in 1993 to fight mass marketing fraud scams, as a central source location for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of identify theft complaint data. According to the statistics from the Centre, now renamed the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC), Canadian identity fraud victims showed an increase in the total number of complaints, but a decrease in total reported dollar loss. A total of 18,146 identity fraud complaints from victims across Canada was reported in 2010, a 23% and 47% increase from 2009 (14,797) and 2008 (12,309), respectively. In terms of money (dollars) lost, a total of $9.4 million were involved, which was a decrease from the $11 million in 2009 and the $9.7 million in 2008.100 These numbers should be considered as only partial indicators of identity theft, as they represent only those identity frauds/thefts that were known to the victims. Also, these numbers include only cases reported to the Centre and so do not necessarily present a complete picture of the extent of the problem. In fact, the Centre estimates that the above statistics represented less than 5% of the actual total occurrences.101

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99 Laws (Bills C-51 and C-52) introduced in the House of Commons in November 2010. The proposed new legislation would provide law enforcement agencies with new, specialised investigative powers to help them take action against Internet child sexual exploitation, disrupt on-line organised crime activity, and prevent terrorism by enabling police to track the communications and data transmissions of suspects of such crime. The legislation would also make it illegal to possess a computer virus for the purposes of committing an offence of mischief. Service providers would be required to include interception capability in their networks to allow authorised interception. From: Public Safety Canada. (2010, November 1). Government of Canada introduces legislation to fight crime in today’s high-tech world. News Release. (Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr20101101-eng.aspx)


M. PERSONS ARRESTED & CHARGED

In 2010, a total of 51,165 persons were arrested and charged for Criminal Code offences, a 2% decrease from 2009 and an 11% decrease from 2006.\textsuperscript{102} Compared to five years ago, the number of persons charged in 2010 decreased for all major Criminal Code categories of crime, including a 7% drop for violent crime, a 9% drop for property crime, a 17% drop for other Criminal Code, and a 4% decrease for Criminal Code traffic, while there was a slight 1% increase for drugs. Figure 2.9 shows the number of persons charged, overall and by various offence categories, for each of the last five years.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{persons_arrested_charged.png}
\caption{Persons Arrested/Charged by Offence Type}
\end{figure}

Figure 2.9

Source: TPS Database

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{persons_arrested_charged_rate.png}
\caption{Persons Arrested/Charged (CC) per 1,000 Population}
\end{figure}

Figure 2.10

Source: TPS Database

\textsuperscript{102} This number represents actual persons/bodies charged for Criminal Code offences. In some cases, multiple charges laid against the same person could cause that person to be counted under more than one offence category. For this reason, the sum of persons charged in the offence categories is always larger than the actual total number of persons charged. This condition applies to the counts of all years under review.
As shown, in 2010, on average, 18.7 persons were charged for Criminal Code offences, compared to 21.7 persons in 2006. Young persons had a 20% decrease in the arrest/charge rate over the past five years, compared to a 13% decrease for adults. More details on and analysis of crimes involving youth are provided in the Youth Crime chapter.

Table 2.4 shows the arrest rates for major Criminal Code offence groups and drug offences in 2010, broken down by gender and age group.\(^\text{103}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Other CC</th>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-17 (Youth)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>17.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
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<td>25.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<td>15.3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>35-44</td>
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<td>13.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 &amp; +</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (sum of all age groups)</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 yrs + (Adult)</td>
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<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TPS Database

\(^{103}\) The sum of the rates of the various Criminal Code offence groups should not be taken as the total charge rate. This total is greater than the actual total number of persons/bodies charged due to multiple charges laid in some cases, which caused the same person to be counted under more than one offence category. The same is true that the sum of the various age groups under an offence group is greater than the actual total number of persons/bodies charged under the same offence group, due to the duplications across the age groups when the multiple charges involved offences committed at different times. Statistics Canada dealt with this issue of duplication by adopting the most serious offence rule in categorizing cases involving multiple charges. Currently, this capability is not available in the TPS statistics production system.
As shown in Table 2.4, in 2010, compared to other age groups, people between the ages of 12 and 34 showed much higher arrest/charge rates for most major offence categories. Young persons (18-24 years) and youth (12-17 years) were the two groups with the highest arrest/charge rates for the major Criminal Code offence categories. Males in these age groups consistently had the highest arrest rates for violent crimes and property crimes. Males aged 18-24 typically had the highest arrest rates for most major offence groups, including drug offences.

Table 2.5 shows the change in arrest/charge rates by age group and gender between 2006 and 2010. As shown, over the past five years, in total, decreases were noted in the charge rate for all offence groups, including violent crime (-11%), property crime (-12%), other Criminal Code (-20%), traffic offences (-8%) and drug offences (-3%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Population (Estimated)</th>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Other CC</th>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12-17 (Youth)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.1</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>-22.0</td>
<td>-24.8</td>
<td>-44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>-22.3</td>
<td>-17.7</td>
<td>-25.3</td>
<td>-21.6</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-12.9</td>
<td>-20.8</td>
<td>-25.7</td>
<td>-42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td></td>
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<td>-12.9</td>
<td>-20.8</td>
<td>-25.7</td>
<td>-42.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-24</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
<td>-23.3</td>
<td>-21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>28.5</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>-23.5</td>
<td>-16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
<td>-23.5</td>
<td>-16.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-34.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>-16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-6.1</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>-17.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
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<td>-11.9</td>
<td>-17.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
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<td>-18.9</td>
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<td>-19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>-26.4</td>
<td>-20.4</td>
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<td>-17.7</td>
<td>-26.4</td>
<td>-20.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>45 &amp; +</td>
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<td>-1.2</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>-2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (sum of all age groups)</td>
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<td>-14.2</td>
<td>-18.2</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>-29.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>-10.8</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
<td>-20.4</td>
<td>-7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>-10.5</td>
<td>-10.0</td>
<td>-19.8</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TPS Database

Youths showed decreases in the arrest/charge rate for all major offence groups, including violent crime (-13%), property crime (-21%), other Criminal Code (-26%), Criminal Code traffic (-43%), and drugs (-5%). A similar pattern of changes was noted for the adult charge rates, including an 11% drop for the violent crime, a 10% drop for property crime, a 20% drop for other Criminal Code, an 8% drop for traffic, and a 3% drop for drug offences. Youth (12-17
years) in general showed much larger decreases than adults in the arrest/charge rate over the past five years. Males continued to constitute the majority (78%) of those arrested/charged for Criminal Code offences in 2010. Males accounted for an even higher proportion (89%) of all the persons arrested for drug offences. A similar pattern was observed in 2006.

N. TRENDS ACROSS POLICE DIVISIONS

Table 2.6 is a comparison of Toronto Police Service divisions in terms of the proportion of crimes, the crime rates, and the workload (number of calls and crimes) per officer. It should be noted that the following analysis is meant to be a description of facts, patterns, and changes; it is not meant to be a comparison of performance or efficiency, for which purpose a much more sophisticated methodology capable of incorporating multiple inputs, outputs, and demographic/environmental factors is required.

Table 2.6  
Crime and Crime Rates: Comparison of Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010 Division</th>
<th>As % of Field Total</th>
<th>Rate of Occurrences</th>
<th>Workload per Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pop Viol Prop Tot Non-Traf. Disp Uniform Officer</td>
<td>Viol Prop Tot Non-Traf. CC</td>
<td>Calls Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIV</td>
<td>11 3.7 3.3 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.6</td>
<td>9.7 31.6 54.5</td>
<td>180.3 32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 3.7 4.5 3.5 4.0 5.2 4.9</td>
<td>13.4 31.2 62.9</td>
<td>193.3 34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 5.1 3.8 3.4 3.5 4.6 4.7</td>
<td>8.2 22.0 39.3</td>
<td>178.9 31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14 5.5 8.6 9.0 8.6 9.0 8.1</td>
<td>17.1 53.8 89.4</td>
<td>203.2 44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22 7.4 6.0 6.9 6.6 6.2 5.8</td>
<td>8.8 30.5 51.0</td>
<td>198.4 47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23 6.0 6.3 5.4 5.6 5.4 5.9</td>
<td>11.6 29.5 53.5</td>
<td>169.7 39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31 7.0 8.8 6.0 7.1 7.4 7.6</td>
<td>13.8 28.3 58.8</td>
<td>179.5 39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32 8.9 6.9 9.2 8.0 5.7 5.8</td>
<td>8.5 33.8 51.2</td>
<td>179.9 57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33 7.3 4.0 4.8 4.4 5.0 4.5</td>
<td>6.0 21.7 34.7</td>
<td>207.8 41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41 6.4 7.4 6.0 6.8 6.7 6.5</td>
<td>12.6 31.0 60.6</td>
<td>190.2 43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42 10.2 5.7 4.9 5.1 5.7 5.8</td>
<td>6.2 16.0 28.9</td>
<td>182.7 37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43 7.7 8.3 6.0 7.1 6.3 6.7</td>
<td>11.7 25.4 52.4</td>
<td>172.6 44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51 3.4 6.4 7.1 6.6 7.2 7.1</td>
<td>20.9 68.7 112.6</td>
<td>187.9 39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52 1.5 5.2 8.1 7.6 5.2 6.5</td>
<td>37.4 176.3 287.5</td>
<td>146.9 49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53 6.7 3.9 6.3 5.2 5.1 4.8</td>
<td>6.3 31.2 44.4</td>
<td>198.1 45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54 5.0 5.3 4.2 4.8 5.5 5.3</td>
<td>11.5 27.8 54.8</td>
<td>194.4 38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55 4.4 5.7 5.5 5.6 5.4 5.6</td>
<td>14.3 41.7 74.1</td>
<td>177.2 42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Total</td>
<td>100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0</td>
<td>11.0 32.9 57.5</td>
<td>184.3 41.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TPS Database; Toronto Urban Development Services

104 The uniform strength of the division, which includes all officers assigned to the division, was used for the computation.
105 An example of a more sophisticated method of comparing efficiency of similar service/production units is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).
In 2010, 14, 32, and 52 Divisions had the largest proportions of crime when compared with other divisions. These 3 divisions together constituted 16% of the Toronto population and 24% of the total number of crimes. They also had 20% of the total number of divisional officers. In terms of calls for service, 14, 31, and 51 Divisions had the largest proportion of dispatched calls, which together constituted 24% of all calls serviced by the divisions.

In terms of the overall crime rate (number of crimes per 1,000 population), 52, 51, and 14 Divisions continued to have the highest rates in 2010; 52 Division also had the highest rates in all three major crime categories, followed by 51 Division. A similar pattern was observed back in 2006. It must be noted, however, that the computation of crime rates takes into account the residential population only. For areas such as the downtown core, which includes parts of 51, 52, and 14 Divisions, frequented by a large transient population on a daily basis (e.g. commuters, tourists, etc.), when the crime rate is computed on the basis of residents only, the rate is inflated. However, there is at present no reliable way to determine and factor in the transient population in the crime rate calculation.

The average number of dispatched calls and crimes per officer are usually regarded as workload indicators for officers, although both are measures of reactive policing only. In 2010, 33 Division had the largest number of calls per officer (208), followed by 14 Division (203) and 22 Division (198). In terms of number of crimes per officer, 32 Division had the largest rate, followed by 52 and 22 Divisions.

Table 2.7 shows the percent change in number of crimes and crime rates for divisions over the past five years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIV</th>
<th>No. of Crimes</th>
<th>Rate of Occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>Other CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>-16.9</td>
<td>-13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>-4.3</td>
<td>-24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
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<td>-17.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>-10.2</td>
<td>-23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>-14.0</td>
<td>-34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td>-27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
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<td>-14.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>54</td>
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<td>-15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>-16.6</td>
<td>-26.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Field Total | -9.3 | -20.1 | -25.7 | -19.7 | -12.7 | -23.0 | -28.4 | -22.6 |

Source: TPS Database; Toronto Urban Development Services.
Between 2006 and 2010, a 20% decrease in non-traffic *Criminal Code* offences was noted for all the divisions, including a 9% decrease in violent crimes, a 20% decrease in property crimes, and a 26% decrease in other *Criminal Code* offences.

Overall crimes decreased in all divisions, with the largest decreases in 42 Division (-31%), 31 Division (-30%), and 52 Division (-25%). Most divisions also showed decreases in all the major offence categories. The largest drops in violent crime were noted in 31 (-22%), 13 (-21%) and 11 (-17%) Divisions. The only divisions showing an increase in violent crimes were 32 and 23 Divisions. With respect to property crime, the largest decreases were noted in 42 (-35%), 31 (-30%) and 43 (27%) Divisions. The largest drops in other *Criminal Code* offences were noted in Divisions 52 (-45%), 41 (-34%) and 31 (-34%).

As previously noted, calculating the number of crimes per 1,000 people provides a rate that is not affected by simple increases or decreases in population size. There was a 23% drop in the overall crime rate per 1,000 population for the divisions in the past five years. All divisions had a decrease in the overall crime rate, with the largest decreases noted in 42 and 31 Divisions. The violent crime rate dropped 13% overall, with the largest drops noted in 31 (-25%) and 13 (-24%) Divisions. The only division having an increase in the violent crime rate was Division 32 (3%), as a result of a 7% increase in such crimes over the past five years. In terms of the property crime rate, the overall divisional rate dropped 23%, with the largest drops of 37% and 33% in 42 and 31 Divisions, respectively. All divisions had decreases in the other *Criminal Code* offence rate, with the largest 47% and 36% drops seen in 52 and 41 Divisions, respectively.

It has to be noted that the number of crimes that occurred is a function of a large number of factors, and policing is among them. Contemporary policing programs, other than reacting to crimes and calls, are diversified to also focus on crime prevention and problem solving at the neighbourhood level. These proactive programs, in turn, have an impact on reducing criminal occurrences and calls for service. The number of crimes occurred and calls managed by the police should therefore be considered as being part of the work demands for police as well as the effect of various policing programs at work.

Statistics regarding the number of crimes, crime clearance, and crime rates by division for selected years over the past ten years are shown in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

O. COMPARISON WITH OTHER CANADIAN CITIES

This section compares the crime rates of Toronto to those of other large Canadian cities. Crime statistics from Statistics Canada are usually published one year after and so only 2009 crime statistics were available at the time of writing. The crime statistics reviewed under this section are incident-based. These statistics are different from those compiled by the Toronto Police Service, which are based on offences or violations of the law. It should be noted that, in the past, counts based on offences have always been larger than the counts based on incidents.

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106 In offence-based statistics, all offences involved in an incident are counted. This differs from Statistics Canada’s incident-based crime statistics, which count only the most serious offence. This affects mainly criminal incidents involving more than one offence.
In 2009, the total incident-based number of crimes (non-traffic) for Toronto was 125,430, compared with the offence-based count of 182,159 crimes for the same year. Incident-based crime statistics are used for comparison with other police services, as they are based on the same parameters of enumeration.

In 2009, of the 21 police services serving a population of more than 250,000, Toronto had the largest per capita cost for policing and the third smallest number of population per police officer (Table 2.8).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Violent Crime No.</th>
<th>Violent Crime Rate</th>
<th>Property Crime No.</th>
<th>Property Crime Rate</th>
<th>Total Crime No.</th>
<th>Total Crime Rate</th>
<th>VCSI*</th>
<th>CSI*</th>
<th>Police Strength</th>
<th>Cost ($)</th>
<th>Pop/Police Ratio</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>2,677,708</td>
<td>35,021</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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<td>46.8</td>
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<td>79.3</td>
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<td>475.4</td>
<td>361</td>
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<td>143.6</td>
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<td>30.9</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>56.5</td>
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<td>43,571</td>
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<td>57,217</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>1,723</td>
<td>652.9</td>
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<td>27,330</td>
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<td>44.4</td>
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<td>34.5</td>
<td>40,566</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>1,277</td>
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<td>Waterloo Reg.</td>
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<td>73.3</td>
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<td>10,598</td>
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<td>28.0</td>
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<td>78.3</td>
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<td>736.3</td>
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Notes:
The number of crimes and crime rates in the above table are based on non-traffic Criminal Code offences, and crime rates are by number of crimes per 1,000 population. The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) of Statistics Canada has revised its crime groupings into two major categories: Violent and Non-violent crimes. Also the traditional category of Violent Crime has been expanded to include more offences, such as extortion and criminal harassment.

(1) Violent crimes include crimes such as homicide & attempts, assaults, sexual offences, abduction, robbery and other crimes against the person under the Criminal Code.
(2) Non-violent crimes include crimes against property and other non-traffic Criminal Code offences.
(3) Non-Traffic Criminal Code crimes
(4) Crime Severity Index (CSI). The CSI for Violent Crime (VCSI) covers all the crimes against the person, and the CSI for Non-violent Crime covers all other Criminal Code and Federal Statutes offences.

* In 2009, CCJS has created a new crime measure: the Crime Severity Index (CSI). It measures crime by both volume and severity based on the average length of custodial sentence awarded per the specific offence.

Source: Website for Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada (ccjsccsj.statcan.ca).
The factors associated with high policing cost in Toronto are many and varied. It must be noted that per capita cost and the population-police ratio are based on residential population. For Toronto, due to various constraints, the computation of these ratios cannot take into account the large transient population (e.g. visitors, commuters, tourists, etc.) also served by the Toronto Police, and thus results in an inflation of these ratios. This, together with other factors such as the city’s ethnically and culturally diverse populations and its position as the centre of business, education, cultural, entertainment, and sporting activities in the Greater Toronto Area, pose special demands on the Police Service. All these certainly impact on the demand for police service, and thus the per capita cost, but cannot readily be quantified for fair comparison with other police services.

Traditionally, crime and victimisation rates are the main crime indicators with respect to volume of crime, police workload, demands on the justice system, and the public’s experiences of crime. Crime rates and related indices can also be taken as a function of various criminal justice and socio-economic components at work.

The new Crime Severity Index (CSI) and Violent Crime Severity Index (VCSI) developed by the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) provide another measure, by taking into account the relative seriousness of individual offences as reflected by the sentences passed by the court. Each crime is assigned a weight depending on its seriousness. As a result, serious crimes have more impact on fluctuations in the Index. This addresses a very basic criticism of the crime rate, which treats all crimes as being equal, irrespective of their seriousness and impact on the public’s perception of safety. The CSI provides answers to questions such as: Is crime more serious over time and across different jurisdictions? These questions are not readily answerable by the traditional measures of crime and victimisation rates. The CCJS has calculated and released the CSI and VCSI statistics for past years back to 1998.

Based on these statistics, in descending order, Toronto ranked eleventh (medium) in overall crime and sixth (high) in violent crime among the 21 large Canadian cities with a population over 250,000 in 2009. In terms of crime rates, also in descending order, Toronto ranked eighth in violent crime, seventeenth in property crimes, and fourteenth in overall crimes (Table 2.8).

As shown in Table 2.9, between 2005 and 2009, all but one of the 21 large Canadian cities under review had decreases in the overall crime rate; Toronto’s 13% decrease in total non-traffic Criminal Code incidents per 10,000 population ranked eighth, in descending order of decrease. Fifteen cities had a decrease in the violent crime rate, and Toronto’s decrease (-7%) ranked eighth. In terms of property crime, all cities under comparison had a decrease and Toronto’s 12% drop ranked ninth. The CSI for Toronto dropped 14% for all crimes, ranking twelfth among the 21 cities that had a decrease. Toronto’s VCSI also dropped 5%, ranking fourteenth among the 17 cities that had a drop in the same index.

All cities under comparison had an increase in the per capita cost and Toronto’s 18% increase ranked a bit below the middle (thirteenth), compared to the largest increase of 55% for Halifax. In terms of the size of population per officer, Toronto was among the 15 cities that had a decrease due to the gain in police strength for the period under review. Toronto had a 6% decrease for the population-police ratio, ranking ninth in terms of magnitude of decrease.
Table 2.9
% Change in Number of Crimes, Crime Rates* (per 10,000 population), Crime Severity Index, Police Strength & Per Capita Cost in Canadian Municipalities with Populations of 250,000 and Over: 2005-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Violent Crime</th>
<th>Property Crime</th>
<th>Total Crime</th>
<th>VCSI*</th>
<th>CSI*</th>
<th>Police Strength</th>
<th>Cost ($ per Capita)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-5.1</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
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<td>-12.1</td>
<td>-10.8</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
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<td>-12.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
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<td>-3.8</td>
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<td>-3.1</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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<td>-17.0</td>
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<td>-15.2</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-17.8</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes:
(1) Violent crimes include crimes such as homicide & attempts, assaults, sexual offences, abduction, robbery and other crimes against the person under the Criminal Code.
(2) Non-violent crimes include crimes against property and other non-traffic Criminal Code offences.
(3) Non-Traffic Criminal Code crimes.
(4) Crime Severity Index (CSI). The CSI for Violent Crime (VCSI) covers all the crimes against the person, and the CSI for Non-violent Crime covers all other Criminal Code and Federal Statutes offences.

Source: Website for Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada (ccjss statscan.ca).
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICE

- Financial constraint, and budget cuts in particular, are issues currently confronting police agencies.\(^{107}\) This together with the need to be effective in crime control, given the limited number of crime causing factors that police can effectively have an impact on, are major challenges. In the face of an ever stronger emphasis on efficiency and accountability, there is a need for police to demonstrate effectiveness in crime control and public safety maintenance with fewer resources. Police agencies will need to go beyond the traditional practices for more cost-effective ways of doing business. The Toronto Police Service must continue efforts to identify and develop innovative methods of policing and service delivery, with particular emphases on productivity (effectiveness) and optimisation of resource deployment (efficiency).

- With more emphasis on accountability, contemporary policing is geared more towards results (in controlling crime) than the maintenance of policing programs for their own sake. For this reason, there is a need to conduct evaluations on both regular programs and innovative strategies in terms of their impact on crime and the community so as to identify those that are effective. Resources should only be directed to those police programs that are demonstrated to work or are promising in terms of its effect on preventing crime. The evaluation function should, therefore, be built into policing programs.

- Policing that focuses on crime risk factors (e.g. hard-core criminals or crime hot-spots) has been found to produce more promising results in controlling crime than other traditional policing programs, such as random patrol. The TAVIS (Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy) initiative in Toronto is based on the same principles. Continued support should be given to the research and development of tools and methodologies that will enhance crime analysis, prediction, and management functions geared towards intelligence-led policing.

- Proactive policing strategies to neutralize risk factors are likely more invasive to the public, and therefore require more community support to minimise any possible backlash. Building police-community partnerships and rapport is essential in winning support from communities that are more affected by the focused or ‘aggressive’ enforcement. Maintaining a delicate balance between proactive, targeted policing and police legitimacy remains a challenge that can and should be supported by community mobilization.

- Appropriate support should continue to be given to addressing community concerns.\(^{108}\) The community often pays more attention to safety, visible public disorder, and quality of life issues that may not necessarily be in line with policing priorities, but which may be instrumental in controlling crime and enhancing quality of life within the community. This balance is particularly difficult to maintain during times of budget cuts and constraints, when police resources tend to be re-deployed to the core policing functions.

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\(^{107}\) The layoff of police officers due to budget cuts has occurred in police services in the United States.

\(^{108}\) It has been pointed out that it is the procedures and manner of criminal justice officials, rather than the fairness or effectiveness of decisions made by them, that is more important in determining public trust in criminal justice. (Sherman, L.W. (2002). Trust and Confidence in Criminal Justice. *NIJ Journal*, No. 248. (Retrieved from www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000248e.pdf)
• To maintain community-oriented policing, continued support should be given to the infrastructure for local problem solving, crime prevention, and community partnerships: the Community Police Liaison Committees, the divisional crime management teams, and the field crime analysis capability are currently the main components of the local problem solving process.

• Continued effort should be directed toward the development of innovative methods of enhancing the public’s access to the police, such as reporting of incidents, providing crime related information, and making inquiries. The recent inauguration of the Toronto Police Service’s Citizens Online Police Reporting System, which enables the public to report specific crimes via the Internet, is an example of efforts in this direction. In addition to making crime reporting easier, initiatives such as this can free up police resources to focus on more serious crimes and emergencies.

• There is indication that organised crime groups are involved in an increasing number and types of crimes, such as computer crimes, identity theft, vehicle theft, drug and human trafficking, and marijuana grow-operations. Police initiatives to address the issue of organised crime, including intelligence-driven enforcement and partnerships with regional, national, and international enforcement agencies, should be maintained and enhanced as necessary.

• Despite a significant 17% decrease in overall crime over the past ten years, specific crimes, including robbery, sexual assault, fraud, offensive weapons, and drugs have increased during this same period. Appropriate police initiatives should be maintained and new initiatives developed to address these crimes.

• The proliferation of marijuana grow-operations requires continual effort from the Service to strengthen partnerships with local, regional, and national police services and other government agencies, to effectively check the supply side of the drug issue. There is a need for police organisations to improve their ability to detect, dismantle, and prosecute such operations. In addition, continued and new partnerships with local agencies and services, such as public utilities and real estate representatives, are required to provide a multi-faceted response to this particular issue.

• About half of the crimes that occurred in Toronto were cleared in 2010 and only 30% of property crimes, which constituted the majority (57%) of all crimes, were cleared. The clearance rates for specific property crimes that affect the community’s perception of safety, such as break & enter, were even lower. Innovative methods need to be constantly developed to deal with these crimes in a more effective manner.

• Education and awareness for the public on organised crime and high-tech crime (including identity fraud/theft) should be maintained or enhanced as a crime prevention measure, particularly to the groups most vulnerable to frauds.

• Young males (12-24 years), who were found to be the most high-risk offending group, should continue to be the focus of police crime prevention programs.
## Appendix

### Statistics* Summary - Population, Crime and Crime Clearance by Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIV</th>
<th>Pop**</th>
<th>Viol</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Tot CC</th>
<th>% Crimes Cleared</th>
<th>Rates (Occurrences/1000 Pop)</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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Notes:
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** Population estimates based on projections from Toronto Urban Development Services.
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Total Non-Traf CC is the total number of Non-Traffic Criminal Code offences.
### Statistics* Summary - Population, Crime and Crime Clearance by Division

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### 2006 Statistics Summary - Population, Crime and Crime Clearance by Division

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**Field Total** | 2,724,784 | 34,671 | 118,691 | 52,921 | 4,337 | 210,620 | 206,283 | 71.3 | 34.5 | 86.6 | 54.1 | 12.7 | 43.6 | 19.4 | 75.7 |

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## Statistics* Summary - Population, Crime and Crime Clearance by Division

### 2004

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**Field Total**

| Field Total | 2,671,781 | 33,136 | 117,373 | 49,733 | 4,403 | 204,645 | 200,242 | 66.4 | 30.7 | 78.9 | 48.6 | 12.4 | 43.9 | 18.6 | 74.9 |

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Criminal Code traffic offences are undercounted due to information system problems.
Total CC is the total number of Criminal Code offences, including violent crimes, property crimes, other Criminal Code offences, and Criminal Code Traffic.
Total Non-Traf CC is the total number of Non-Traffic Criminal Code offences.
## Statistics Summary - Population, Crime and Crime Clearance by Division

### 2001

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<th>Viol</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>Traffic</th>
<th>Tot CC</th>
<th>% Crimes Cleared</th>
<th>Rates (Occurrences/1000 Pop)</th>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Notes:**
- * All statistics are based on 2004 revised divisional boundaries.
- ** Population estimates based on projections from Toronto Urban Development Services.
- Violent crimes include homicide and attempts, sexual assaults, other assaults, sexual offences, abduction, and robberies.
- Property crimes include break and enter, all types of thefts, possession of stolen goods, mischief, and fraud.
- Other Criminal Code offences are the other non-traffic offences not covered by the first two items.
- Criminal Code traffic offences are underecounted due to information system problems.
- Total CC is the total number of Criminal Code offences, including violent crimes, property crimes, other Criminal Code offences, and Criminal Code Traffic.
- Total Non-Traf CC is the total number of Non-Traffic Criminal Code offences.
III. YOUTH CRIME

Concern about youth, crime, and ‘disrespectful’ attitudes has been common throughout history. Nevertheless, this should not minimise the concern and effects of violence and crime by youth in our society nor should it be allowed to act as an easy response and explanation for not taking action. The search for solutions to this social problem demands a commitment to develop a comprehensive response strategy that will address both the individual and systemic factors contributing to this phenomenon. The Service’s community policing and community mobilization provides the necessary approach for reaching creative and effective solutions to youth violence.

HIGHLIGHTS

- To put youth crime in perspective, three issues must be noted. First, a very small proportion of young persons aged 12 to 17 years are involved in criminal activity, and even fewer are involved in violent crimes. Second, youth crime statistics reflect the number of youths arrested for criminal offences, not the actual level of crime involving young offenders; youth crime statistics also do not take into account repeat offending. Third, it is believed that only a portion of youth crime is actually reported to police.

- In the past few years, Statistics Canada has taken steps to better represent the level of youth crime in Canada. In 2003, Statistics Canada reported youth crime as the total number of youths accused of a criminal offence as opposed to the number of youth charged with a criminal offence and, in 2009, applied a Crime Severity Index to youth crime data.

- Statistics Canada reported that in 2009 nearly 165,000 Canadian youths, aged 12-17 years, were accused of committing a criminal offence and that over the past ten years, the national youth crime rate decreased about 6%, from 69.2 youths per 1,000 youth population in 2000 to 64.9 youths per 1,000 youth population in 2009.

- The Youth Crime Severity Index (YCSI) generally declined over the past ten years, decreasing 10% from 2000. Over the same period, the violent YCSI increased 4%, while the non-violent YCSI decreased 19%.

- In Toronto in 2010, 6,828 young persons, aged 12-17 years, were arrested for all types of Criminal Code offences, down 5% from 2009 and 20% from 2006. Youths accounted for 13% of the total number of persons arrested in 2010, but represented only 8% of the population 12 years of age and older.

- Compared to 2006, the number of youths arrested in 2010 for a violent offence decreased 13%. The number of youths arrested for a property crime or other Criminal Code offence also decreased 20% and 25%, respectively.

- Just less than three in four youths arrested in 2010 were male. Notwithstanding some year-over-year variation, the number of youths arrested over the past five years indicated an overall decreasing trend for both young females and young males.
In 2010, 40.3 of every 1,000 young persons in Toronto were arrested for a Criminal Code offence, including 11.5 arrested for a violent crime, 17.1 for a property crime, and 11.7 for other Criminal Code offences. The charge rate for youths was almost double that for adults.

Overall, crimes on school premises remained relatively stable from 2009. Compared to 2006, however, there was a considerable decrease in number of crimes. Assaults and thefts were consistently the most common offences noted and, year over year, accounted for about half of all crimes on school premises. While most students report feeling safe in school, bullying continues to be a significant concern in the schools and community.

In 2010, a total of 814 youths were charged with drug-related offences. The youth charge rate for drug offences was 4.1 per 1,000 youths in 2010, compared to 3.5 in 2009 and 4.3 in 2006.

A. Perspective on Youth Crime

Community perception of youth crime and, in particular, youth violence, is largely influenced by the media saturation of the violent actions of often only a very few young persons. The actual extent of youth crime in Canada and Toronto – traditionally defined by the number and proportion of young people aged 12-17 charged with a Criminal Code offence(s) and, more recently, defined as the number and proportion of young people aged 12-17 accused of a crime – is discussed later in this chapter.

To put youth crime in context, however, three things must be clearly noted in advance. First, as revealed by police statistics, only a small proportion of youths are involved in criminal activity, and even fewer are involved in violent crimes; as youth crime statistics do not take into account repeat offending, offences committed by repeat offenders overstate the number of youths involved in criminal activities. Second, youth crime statistics reflect the number of youths accused of criminal activities, not the actual level of crime involving young offenders. Third, it is generally believed that only a portion of youth crime is actually reported to police. Overall, it is believed that youth crime statistics are most likely understated.

Most experts on the subject of youth crime, however, strongly caution against viewing all youth as potential criminals. In 2010, the 6,828 youths arrested for Criminal Code offences in Toronto represented about 3% of the total youth population (199,133). Assuming that every youth arrested in 2010 was a different individual (i.e. no one youth was arrested more than once in the year), which was very unlikely, on average, only just more than three of every 100 youths in Toronto were arrested for a Criminal Code offence in 2010; about a third of these (about 1 out of every 100 youths) were arrested for a violent criminal offence.

On the other hand, the single greatest impediment to developing a clear picture of youth crime is the basis for the enumeration of youth crimes. Unlike general crime statistics that count the actual number of Criminal Code incidents (or offences) reported to police, youth crime statistics reflect the number of youths arrested for or, more recently, accused of a Criminal Code offence. This method counts the number of Criminal Code offences for which a youth is arrested/accused, rather than the number of Criminal Code offences actually committed by a young person or group of young persons. Notwithstanding the obvious deficiency in this method of counting youth crime, counting youths accused of a criminal offence is used because it remains the most accurate way to categorise an offence as a youth crime. As it is not possible to consistently and reliably identify the offender in a reported crime as a youth – victim is unable to
positively identify the suspect as a youth or the suspect was not seen – youth crime is counted as the number of youths accused/arrested. This manner of enumerating youth crime is consistent across Canada and much of the rest of the world.

The use of statistics on youths accused of a Criminal Code offence, including both youths charged and youths not charged, may still fail to present a full picture of the youth crime problem. First, increases and decreases in the number of youths accused may reflect the performance of the police, rather than the actual level of youth criminal activity. Second, the increasing use of alternative measures, specifically police discretion and pre-charge disposition, will cause youth crime based on charges to be understated, particularly for minor crimes committed by first-time offenders. Statistics Canada’s more recent inclusion of youths accused of a criminal offence but not charged in the determination of youth crime has, to some extent, addressed this particular shortcoming in the enumeration of youth crime. In the absence of a more exact system of enumeration, this method is the most reliable indicator for the volume of youth crime and trend analysis.

Finally, as with general crime statistics, the issue of reported vs. non-reported crime is also a concern in determining the level of youth crime. According to the 2009 General Social Survey (GSS), only about 31% of total victimisation and about 29% of violent victimisation was reported to police in 2009.109 Young people between 15 and 24 years of age were more than twice as likely to be a victim of a violent crime age (284 per 1,000 population aged 15 - 24 years) than the general population (118 per 1,000 population aged 15 years and older) and the least likely to report to police – only 20% of young people reported violent victimisation compared to 29% for the total population.110 Finally, as youth are most often victimised by youths their own age or slightly older, the actual level of crime and, in particular violent crime, involving young offenders is likely to be undercounted.

B. Youth Criminal Justice Act

The Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), which came into effect on April 1st, 2003, provides a clear distinction between violent and non-violent crimes, and between first-time and repeat young offenders. For youths who commit violent crimes or are repeat offenders, the Act prescribes more severe consequences. However, for youths who commit non-violent crimes, the Act promotes rehabilitation through diversion programs. It accomplishes this by creating the presumption that extrajudicial sanctions, rather than court proceedings, will be used for non-violent first offenders by requiring police officers to consider alternate measures – taking no further action, issuing a warning, administering a caution, or referring the youth to a community-based program – before a charge is considered or laid. The Act establishes the principle that extrajudicial measures are often the most appropriate approach to rehabilitate young offenders, and provides that non-judicial measures are not restricted to first-time offenders.

110 Ibid.
C. Youth Crime in Canada

In the past few years, Statistics Canada has taken steps to better represent the level of youth crime in Canada. In 2003, Statistics Canada reported youth crime as the total number of youths accused of a criminal offence – youths who were either charged (or recommended for charging) by police or diverted from the formal criminal justice system through the use of warnings, cautions, referrals to community programs, etc. In 2009, for the first time, a Crime Severity Index was applied to youth crime data. As discussed more fully in the Crime Trends chapter, the new Crime Severity Index (CSI) developed by Statistics Canada provides another measure of crime by taking into account the relative seriousness of individual offences, as reflected in the sentences passed by the court. Each crime is assigned a weight depending on its seriousness. As a result, changes in serious but less frequently occurring crimes have more impact on fluctuations in the index. This addresses a very basic criticism of the crime rate, which treats all crimes as being equal irrespective of their seriousness and impact on the public’s perception of safety.

In 2009, nearly 165,000 Canadian youths, aged 12-17 years, were identified by police as having committed a criminal offence. Of these youths accused of a crime, 42% were charged (or recommended for charging) by police and 58% were cleared otherwise. The proportion of accused youths cleared otherwise in all major Criminal Code categories increased steadily over the past ten years and, in total, exceeded the proportion of youths charged in 2003, the same year the Youth Criminal Justice Act came into effect.

Figure 3.1 shows the national youth crime rate, by offence category, since 2000. Over the past decade, the national youth crime rate – the total number of youths accused of Criminal Code offences per 1,000 youth population – decreased about 6%, from 69.2 youths per 1,000 youth population in 2000 to 64.9 youths per 1,000 youth population in 2009. Of the 64.9 youths per 1,000 population accused of a Criminal Code offence, 34.3 were accused of property crimes, 12.0 of other Criminal Code offences, and 18.6 of violent crimes.

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111 Due to changes in the measuring and reporting of youth crime activity by Statistics Canada, national youth crime data have been restated to reflect the revised statistics reported by Statistics Canada. Some national youth crime data therefore differ from data in previous Scans.

112 An incident is ‘cleared otherwise’ or ‘not charged’ when police have identified at least one accused and sufficient evidence exists to lay a charge, but the accused is processed by other means, including formal measures (e.g. extrajudicial sanctions or Crown caution) or less formal alternative measures (e.g. warning, caution, community referral program).

113 According to Statistics Canada, youth crime is likely still understated, as some Canadian police services do not maintain records for all youths cleared otherwise.

114 While crime rates (in terms of the number of crimes per a specific size of population) are by tradition the standardized measure for comparison, there is recognition that crime rates do not factor in the nature or severity of crime, thus do not reflect the true level of crime. For this reason, in 2006, the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics of Statistics Canada initiated a project to develop a new measure for crime comparison – the Crime Severity Index. The Crime Severity Index takes into account both the number of crimes and the severity of the offence in terms a weight reflecting the incarceration rate and length of sentence.

115 Crime statistics from Statistics Canada are usually delayed by one year; 2009 crime statistics were the most recent data available at the time of writing.

Over the past ten years, there has been a very slight decreasing trend in total, property and violent offences; trending over the past ten years shows a 2% average annual decrease in youth accused of property crimes and lesser average annual decreases for total crime (0.8%), and violent crime (0.1%). On the other hand, other Criminal Code offences trended to a slight average annual increase (0.7%) over the past decade.

Figure 3.2 shows the national Youth Crime Severity Indices (YCSI) for the past ten years. The total YCSI generally declined over the past ten years, decreasing 10% from 2000 and trending to an average annual decrease of about 1%. Since 2000, the violent YCSI increased 4%, while the non-violent YCSI decreased 19%. As discussed previously, the youth crime rate decreased only 6% during the same period. Both the YCSI and the youth crime rate consider the number of youths accused of a Criminal Code offence in relation to the youth population. The YCSI further includes a weight which reflects the seriousness of the offence relative to other offences. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the overall seriousness of offences for which youth have been accused has decreased over the past decade.

Between 2008 and 2009, all YCSI indices decreased. Statistics Canada reports declines in the rate of youth accused for most offences in 2009, including a 6% decrease in robbery, a 5% decrease in serious assaults, and a 4% decrease in break-ins. However, the number of youths
Youth Crime

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accused of homicide increased substantially; in 2009, 79 youths were accused of homicide compared to an average of 56 in the prior ten years. The overall impact of the relatively few additional youth accused of homicide reflects the weight assigned to 1st and 2nd degree murder – 7,042. In effect, one murder has the same impact on the CSI as 102 ‘average’ crimes weighted at 69 or 12 robberies weighted at 583. 117

A recent study by Statistics Canada, based on 2008 youth crime data, examined the location, day and time of youth crimes. 118 The study found that almost one-third (32%) of youth crime occurred in private residences; commercial establishments and open public areas each accounted for another 23%. While only 13% of youth crime occurred on school premises, 23% of all youth violent crime and 31% of youth drug violations occurred on school premises. Six of the eight selected offences reported – assault, sexual assault, robbery, theft under, break and enter and drug offences – were slightly more likely to occur on a weekday as opposed to a weekend; mischief and impaired driving offences were more likely to occur on a weekend. Both violent and non-violent offences were most likely to occur immediately following school hours.

Between 2002/2003 and 2008/2009, the number of cases processed in the youth courts decreased by 23% (from 76,204 in 2002/2003 to 58,379 in 2008/2009). 119 As noted in previous Scans, the youth court caseload has decreased over the past decade due to a steady decline in the number of crimes against property and the impact of the Youth Criminal Justice Act enacted in April 2003 – fewer charges laid by police. Since 2002/2003, there were decreases in youth court cases in all offence categories, including a 32% decrease in the number of cases involving crimes against property and a 11% decrease in the number of cases involving crimes against the person. The three most common types of Criminal Code cases processed in the youth courts in 2008/2009 included theft (14%), common assault (8%), and mischief (7%). 120

In 2009/2010, there were, on average, about 1,793 youth in custody across Canada, more than half (53%) in remand. 121,122 Since 2007/2008, youth in remand have outnumbered youth in sentenced custody; while admissions to and length of remand have remained relatively stable, admissions to sentenced custody decreased 25% over the past five years. In 2009/2010, more than half of all remands were less than one week; remands of one week to less than one month accounted for an additional 25% of remands. Almost seven in ten (69%) youth admissions to remand were related to non-violent offences; the most common reasons (24%) were administration of justice offences (e.g. failure to comply and breach of probation). In consultation, Dr. Anthony Doob of the University of Toronto commented that the bail conditions set by the court on youth are often so restrictive that they set the youth up for failure (refer to

120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Remand is the temporary detention of a person while awaiting trial, sentencing, or the commencement of a custodial disposition; youth can be admitted to remand for several reasons including to ensure attendance in court, for protection or safety of the public, or to maintain the public confidence in the justice system. Unlike adults, youth may not be detained for an offence for which they could not be sentenced to custody if found guilty or for the safety of the youth (i.e. child protection or mental health).
Appendix for summary of the presentation). For example, a condition to not associate with a named person may require that the youth, in order to comply, not attend school. Also, remanding a youth into custody forces the youth to associate with delinquent peers; the implications of delinquent peers are discussed later in this chapter.

D. YOUTH CRIME IN TORONTO

Number of Youths Arrested:

During 2010, a total of 51,165 persons were arrested for Criminal Code offences in Toronto, including 6,828 young persons aged 12-17 years and 44,337 adults. Youths accounted for 13% of the total number of persons arrested in 2010, but represented only 8% of the population 12 years of age and older. The total number of youths arrested for Criminal Code offences in 2010 decreased 5% from the 7,171 youths arrested in 2009, and 20% from the 8,486 youths arrested in 2006. In comparison, the total number of adults arrested for Criminal Code offences in 2010 decreased only 2% from the 45,178 adults arrested in 2009, and 9% from the 48,737 adults arrested 2006. Figure 3.3 shows the number of young persons and adults arrested over the past five years, a clearly decreasing trend. Based on applied trend lines, the dashed lines shown on the graph, year over year average decreases were 5% for youth and less than half that (2%) for adults.

![Figure 3.3 Youths & Adults Arrested - Criminal Code Offences](source: TPS Database)

The number of youths arrested for a violent offence in 2010 decreased 13% from 2006 (2,297 youth in 2010 from 2,624 youth in 2006); the number of youths arrested for a property crime or other Criminal Code offence decreased 20% and 25%, respectively.

As was discussed in relation to national youth crime, not all youths arrested in Toronto for a Criminal Code offence were formally charged. As shown in Figure 3.4, the number of

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123 Due to changes in Service data systems and extraction procedures, all arrest data for 2006 to 2009 have been recalculated to allow fair comparison and may differ from data in previous Scans. Examination of arrest data is based on five years.

124 The use of the term ‘arrested’ in this section means all persons arrested for a criminal offence and/or charged with a criminal offence but not formally arrested (e.g. charged by Summons).
Youths arrested but not charged tended to a slight decrease over the past five years, a decreasing trend of, on average, 3% per year. On the other hand, youths arrested but not charged, as a proportion of all youths accused, has increased slightly from 26% in 2006 to 27% in 2010. This remained well below the national proportion of youths accused of a crime that are cleared otherwise (58%). In 2010, 8% of violent offences, 42% of property offences, and 8% of other Criminal Code offences were cleared otherwise.

![Youth Crime in Toronto](image)

For the purpose of this chapter, youth crime in Toronto will reflect the total number and rate of youth accused of a non-traffic Criminal Code offence whether the youth was charged or cleared otherwise.

Table 3.1 shows a breakdown of youths as a proportion of total persons arrested by the major categories of Criminal Code offences. In general, the proportion of youths arrested by offence categories was much larger than their overall representation (8%) in the total population aged 12 years and over. Notwithstanding their general over-representation in the proportion of total persons arrested, in 2010, the overall proportion (total non-traffic Criminal Code) of youths arrested was unchanged from 2009, but lower than proportions reported in 2006 through 2008. For the most part, the same was also true for the major categories – violent crimes, property crimes, and other Criminal Code offences.

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125 The total number of youths and adults arrested, as discussed to this point, was based on the actual number of persons arrested. In analyses involving the breakdown of data by the major offence categories, the number of youths/adults arrested for total Criminal Code offences may be greater than the number of actual persons arrested. This is because a person may have been accused of more than one type of offence (e.g. a violent crime and a property crime). While the counts in each separate offence category are the actual number of persons arrested for that type of offence, the total Criminal Code count is created by adding the counts for the individual categories and may, therefore, include some duplication.
### Table 3.1
Youths as a Proportion (%) of Total Persons Arrested

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Youths†</th>
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<th>Property</th>
<th>Other CC</th>
<th>Total CC*</th>
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<td>8,486</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8,008</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>7,596</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7,171</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,828</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Actual persons arrested.

* Based on the sum of the major offence categories (includes multiple counts for multiple charges) excluding traffic.

Source: TPS Database

### Number of Youths Arrested – By Gender & Major Offence Categories:

In 2010, of the total actual number of young persons arrested for non-traffic *Criminal Code* offences, 4,927 were male and 1,901 were female. This meant that for every 100 youths arrested for non-traffic *Criminal Code* offences in 2010, on average, about 72 were male and 28 were female, similar to 2006 when 73 were male and 27 were female. Notwithstanding year-over-year variation, trend lines applied against the number of male and female youths arrested over the past five years, indicated a decreasing trend for both male (average decrease of 5% per year) and female youths (average decrease of 4% per year) (Figure 3.5).

![Youth Arrests by Gender - Criminal Code Offences](image)

Table 3.2 shows the change in number of youths arrested, broken down by gender and offence category.
Between 2009 and 2010, the number of arrests of young males and females for Criminal Code offences decreased 3% and 4%, respectively; there was an overall decrease of 4% in the number of youths arrested. However, over the past year there was also an increase in the number of arrests of both young males and young females for violent criminal and drug offences.

Compared to five years ago, the number of male and female youths arrested for a Criminal Code offence decreased 20% and 18%, respectively. The number of youths arrested, both male and female, showed significant decreases across all crime categories and somewhat smaller decreases for drug offences.

Table 3.3 shows the total number and proportion of male and female young offenders arrested for each of the major offence groups.

In 2010, compared to 2006, young females accounted for a slightly higher proportion of all youths arrested in all major crime categories, except violent crime, and for drug related offences. Overall, and relatively unchanged over the past five years, males accounted for just...
over 8 in 10 arrests for violent and other Criminal Code offences and over 9 in 10 arrests for drugs, but only just over 6 in 10 arrests for property offences.

As is evident in Table 3.3, the involvement of males and females varies across the major crime categories; this is also true within the major crime categories. Specific to youth charged with a violent crime in 2010, young females were most likely to be charged with non-sexual assault (67%) followed by robbery (27%) and young males were most likely to be charged with robbery (48%) followed by non-sexual assault (45%). Non-sexual assault and robbery together accounted for about 93% of both young males and young females charged with a violent crime. In 2010, 13 young males were charged with murder. Of those youth charged with a property crime, young females and males were both most likely charged with theft under $5000, but at different rates (88% and 59%, respectively). Young males, compared to young females, were more than ten times more likely to be charged with break and enter and 14 times more likely to be charged with a weapons offence.

The involvement of young females in criminal activities, particularly violent crimes, has drawn much attention over the past decade. Although the involvement of young females in crime remains low overall compared to young males (almost three young males were charged for every young female charged), nationally, serious violent crime among female youths more than doubled over 20 years from 0.6 per 1,000 female youths in 1985 to 1.3 in 2005.\textsuperscript{126} In Toronto, in 2010, the rate of young females charged with a violent crime (4.4 per 1,000 young females) was more than double that of their adult counterparts (1.8 per 1,000 female adults). However, overall, the number of young females charged with a non-traffic Criminal Code offence in 2010 was one of the lowest since 1995, and some researchers suggest that previous increases could be attributed, at least in part, to changes in societal response – a stricter approach – to school-yard fights and bullying, behaviour which may have, in the past, been considered bad as opposed to criminal.\textsuperscript{127,128}

Figure 3.6 shows the number of youths arrested by gender and age in 2010. Generally, the number of youths arrested, whether male or female, tended to increase with age, albeit at different rates. Between the ages of 12 and 17 years, the number of arrests for Criminal Code offences peaked at age 17 years for both males and females. Statistics Canada reports that age-specific rates for persons accused of a crime were highest among the 15-22 year olds, peaking at 17 years of age.\textsuperscript{129} Similar findings were evident in the 2009 Ontario Student Drug Use and Health Survey (OSDUHS) study – delinquent behaviour steadily increased from Grade 7 and peaked in Grade 12.\textsuperscript{130} It is interesting to note, however, that at age 14 years, females accounted for more than 3 in 10 youth arrests (31%), compared to age 17 where females accounted for just over 2 in 10 youth arrests (22%).

Arrest Rates:

Changes in the number of persons arrested can be, at times, due to increases or decreases in the population. In order to control for this effect, rates per 1,000 population are calculated for comparison. The arrest rates for young persons and adults are presented in Table 3.4. More detailed statistics on young persons and adults arrested, broken down by gender and major offence category, are shown in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Viol</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>Tot CC</th>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Viol</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>Tot CC</th>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Change: Youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Viol</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>Tot CC</th>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>-12.9%</td>
<td>-20.8%</td>
<td>-25.7%</td>
<td>-20.2%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% Change: Adult

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Viol</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>Tot CC</th>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
<td>-5.8%</td>
<td>-4.1%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>-10.5%</td>
<td>-10.0%</td>
<td>-19.8%</td>
<td>-13.8%</td>
<td>-2.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the sum of the major offence categories (includes multiple counts for multiple charges), excluding traffic.

Source: TPS Arrest Database
In 2010, on average, 40.3 out of every 1,000 young persons in Toronto were arrested for non-traffic Criminal Code offences, almost double the adult arrest rate (22.5). The overall arrest rate for youths in 2010 decreased 4% from 2009 and 20% from the rate reported in 2006; the 2010 overall arrest rate for adults decreased 4% from the rate in 2009 and 14% from the rate reported five years ago.

Table 3.5 shows the arrest rates per 1,000 population for youths for the past five years, broken down by offence categories and gender. As shown, male youths had a much higher arrest rate than female youths across all major offence categories. In 2010, the overall arrest rate for male youths was almost three times the rate for female youths; the male youth arrest rate for property crime was less than twice that for female youths, but for violent crime, was more than four times the female rate.

### Table 3.5
Youth Arrest Rate - Number of Youths Arrested Per 1,000 Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Viol</th>
<th>Prop</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>Total CC*</th>
<th>Drug</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change (%)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>-6.5%</td>
<td>-3.4%</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>-9.1%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-7.6%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-9.3%</td>
<td>-22.0%</td>
<td>-24.8%</td>
<td>-19.5%</td>
<td>-3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-22.3%</td>
<td>-17.7%</td>
<td>-25.3%</td>
<td>-20.1%</td>
<td>-4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>-12.9%</td>
<td>-20.8%</td>
<td>-25.7%</td>
<td>-20.2%</td>
<td>-4.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the sum of the major offence categories (includes multiple counts for multiple charges), excluding traffic.

Source: TPS Arrest Database

131 Arrest rate shown reflects total Criminal Code based on the sum of the major crime categories, excluding traffic offences. Please refer to Footnote 125. Based on the total number of persons arrested (no duplication by major offence category), the arrest rate in 2010 was 34.3 and 20.4 for youths and adults, respectively; the youth arrest rate was, again, considerably higher than the adult arrest rate.
In 2010, compared to 2009, the youth crime rate decreased in property and other Criminal Code offences, but increased in violent crimes; overall, the total non-traffic Criminal Code arrest rate decreased 4%, reflecting a slight (1%) increase in the arrest rate for violent offences, an 8% decrease in the arrest rate for property crimes, and a 2% decrease in the arrest rate for other Criminal Code offences.

Compared to 2006, the youth arrest rate for overall crimes decreased 20%, a decrease of 20% for both young females and for males. The youth arrest rates in all major crime categories and drug related offences decreased for both males and females over this five year period.

Figure 3.7 shows the youth charge rate, by offence category, since 2006. In 2010, the overall youth charge rate – the number of youths charged for non-traffic Criminal Code offences per 1,000 population – was 40.3 per 1,000 youth population. In 2010, of the 40.3 youths per 1,000 population charged with a non-traffic Criminal Code offence, 17.1 were charged for property crimes, 11.7 for other Criminal Code offences, and 11.5 for violent crimes. A decreasing trend is evident overall and in all major crime categories over the past five years.

![Youth Charge Rate (per 1,000 youths)](image)

**Figure 3.7** Source: Statistics Canada

### E. CRIMES OCCURRING ON SCHOOL PREMISES

Children and youths generally spend a significant amount of their time in and around school premises. There is little doubt that crimes, and violent crimes in particular, occurring on school premises can create an unsafe environment and may have a serious negative impact on learning and other school activities. Further, recent studies have concluded that students’ perception of safety and school climate – student engagement, student’s attachment to school, relationship between students and teachers, level of property damage, etc. – have a considerable influence on self-reported violent delinquency of students in schools across Toronto. An enormous effort by the community, school boards, and police, is being devoted to making schools safer and improving school climate.

---

Table 3.6 shows a breakdown of various crimes occurring on school premises in Toronto over the past five years.\textsuperscript{133}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violent</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>1,233</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
<td>-15.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Criminal Code</td>
<td>1,818</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1,439</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>-11.1%</td>
<td>-29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,862</td>
<td>4,576</td>
<td>4,371</td>
<td>3,963</td>
<td>3,986</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>-18.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TPS Database

Assaults and thefts were consistently the most common offences noted on school premises and, year over year, accounted for about half of all crimes. In 2010, compared to 2009, an increase was noted in property crimes, while decreases were reported in violent and other Criminal Code offences occurring on school property. Overall, crimes on school premises remained relatively unchanged from 2009. Compared to 2006, however, there was a considerable decline in number of crimes: compared to five years ago, overall crime decreased 18%, with notable decreases in all major crime categories. Between 2006 and 2010, the number of assaults decreased 4%; sexual assaults on school property steadily increased (from 108 in 2006 to 198 in 2010) while major assaults steadily decreased (from 251 in 2006 to 183 in 2010). Between 2006 and 2010, minor assaults (-9%), robbery (-16%), offensive weapons offences (-43%), and break and enter (-47%) all decreased.

**Students’ Perception of Safety:**

Perhaps the best indicator of school safety is students’ perception of safety in and around the school – an overwhelming majority of students reported feeling safe in and around their schools:

- the 2010 Toronto Police Service school survey, discussed more fully in the Public Perceptions chapter, found that 89% of Toronto students in Grades 9 through 12 felt very or reasonably safe in and around their school during the day;
- a Toronto District School Board survey of over 100,000 students in Grades 7 through 12 found that 89% of students felt safe inside their classrooms and 69% felt safe outside on school property;\textsuperscript{134} and,

\textsuperscript{133} Data on crimes occurring on school premises may differ from that shown in previous Scans due to updates to the Service’s database. At present, the Service’s live database does not have a cut-off day for data entry; it allows as many updates as required to keep the database current. Crime that occurred in an earlier year but was reported/detected later is an example of the possible reasons necessitating an update and thus revision of statistics reported previously. Statistics on such crimes reported in previous Environmental Scans have been revised, where necessary, to facilitate comparison and trend analysis.

the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health’s 2009 Ontario Student Drug Use and Health Survey (OSDUHS), administered to 9,112 Ontario students in Grades 7 through 12, found that 94% of students felt safe in their schools, up slightly from 93% in 2007.\textsuperscript{135}

While a large majority of students feel safe in schools, there is still cause for some concern. The OSDUHS also found that of the students surveyed, 12% reported that they worried about being harmed or threatened at school. While males and females were equally likely to be worried about their personal safety at school, younger students were more likely to worry than older students and, on a regional basis, students in Toronto (18%) were significantly more likely to be worried than students from the other three provincial regions (10%-12%). Further, 15% of students reported fighting (representing about 156,000 students in Ontario), 7% reported having been threatened or injured with a weapon, and 29%, or about 300,000 students, reported being bullied on school property at least once during the 12 months before the survey.\textsuperscript{136} On a national level, Statistics Canada reported that in 2006 more than one in ten (13%) youth Criminal Code and drug violations (based on the offence location for youths accused of an offence) occurred on school property and most offences that occurred on school premises (73%) occurred during school hours. Reported offences were mostly assaults (27%) and drug-offences (18%). While weapons were involved in about 7% of school crimes, less than 1% involved firearms.\textsuperscript{137}

The International Youth Survey (2006) found that the likelihood of self-reported violent delinquency of students in schools across Toronto was on average 13%, but ranged from 6% of students in some schools to 27% of students in other schools. A 2009 study based on the data from this survey examined the influence of school, the surrounding neighbourhood, and student characteristics to explain the substantial variation in self-reported violent delinquency across the Toronto Schools.\textsuperscript{138} The study found that the likelihood of students self-reporting violent delinquency was largely explained by the characteristics of the student – gender, grade, level of parental monitoring, whether their friends accepted criminal behaviour and whether the student liked school. The study also found that both measures of school characteristics – school capital (student perception of their attachment to the school, relationship with teachers, availability of extra-curricular activities in the school, and their own attitude towards their school) and school disorder (student perception of the level of damage and vandalism, theft, fighting and drug use in the school) – accounted for a statistically significant amount of the variation in student reported violent delinquency between schools in Toronto. The study did not find that school-neighbourhood characteristics – socioeconomic disadvantage (percentage of female lone-parent families, low-income economic families, income derived from government transfers, unemployed and population over 20 years of age without a high school certificate) and police-reported crime in the area within 1 kilometre of the school – accounted for a substantial amount of the variation in average violent delinquency; the author of the report stressed that this does not constitute a finding that neighbourhood characteristics do not influence youth violent delinquency.

The 2009 Ontario Student Drug Use and Health Survey (OSDUHS) noted the influence of school climate, not only on academic performance, but also on skill development, social behaviour including delinquency, and emotional health; since 1999, the survey has included

\textsuperscript{135} Paglia-Boak, et al. (2010).
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{138} Fitzgerald (2009).
questions about school attachment, academic rating, and school safety. In 2009, the vast majority of students reported feeling close to people at school (89%) and part of their school (86%). Overall, 82% of students rated their teachers as excellent and 72% felt their classes were challenging. Further, an overwhelming majority (94%) of students felt safe in their school.\footnote{139}

**Bullying:**

Although once looked upon as a rite of passage, the way children learn socialization skills, and/or an inevitable part of growing up, bullying, including cyber-bullying, is now recognized as a form of violence or abuse among children, often occurring in the presence of or in front of adults who fail to intercede. While there is no widely agreed definition of bullying, two components are consistently present—repeated acts which are intend to be harmful or disturbing (physical, verbal and psychological in nature) and an imbalance of power. The OSDUHS questionnaire explained bullying to respondents as: “…when one or more people tease, hurt, or upset a weaker person on purpose, again and again. It is also bullying when someone is left out of things on purpose.”\footnote{140} While a specific definition is not widely agreed, there is little question that a serious problem exists, and the problem is widespread:

- The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) reported that bullying is perhaps the most widespread, under-reported, and potentially harmful school safety problem.\footnote{141}
- The Centers for Disease Control reported that an estimated 30% of 6th to 9th graders in the US were either a bully, a target of bullying, or both.\footnote{142}
- In the 2010 Toronto Police Service high school survey, almost half (47%) of the students in Toronto reported that they were concerned or very concerned about bullying in/around their schools, up from 36% in 2008. The proportion of students who said they had been bullied or cyber-bullied in the past 12 months increased in each of the past three years, increasing from 12% to 15% for bullying and from 11% to 14% for cyber-bullying.
- The 2009 OSDUHS found that 29% of Ontario students (about 300,000 students in Grades 7 though 12) reported having been bullied since September; 8% of students said that they were bullied on a daily or weekly basis. Females (31%) were more likely than males (26%) to report being bullied in any manner. The study found significant variation in the prevalence of bullying by grade – about one-third of students in Grades 7 through 10 as compared to about 23% of students in Grade 12 reported being bullied, and younger students were more likely to be bullied on a daily/weekly basis. Toronto students (23%) were the least likely to report being bullied, compared to 30% in the other three provincial regions.\footnote{143}
- In the 2006 International Youth Survey, 21% of students in Grades 7 through 9 who self-reported delinquency also reported being bullied.\footnote{144}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Paglia-Boak, et al. (2010).
  \item Ibid.
  \item Paglia-Boak, et al. (2010).
\end{itemize}
• An Angus Reid Public Opinion poll found that 91% of Canadians believed bullying is a very or moderately serious problem in middle and high school and 62% believed bullying should be considered a crime even if no physical violence was involved.\(^\text{145}\)

A study conducted by the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) found that students who reported being bullied were most likely to report insults or name calling and least likely to report physical bullying; these students reported body image, grades, and cultural or racial background as the reason for being bullied.\(^\text{146}\) The OSDUHS found that of all respondents (29% reported being bullied), 24% reported verbal/non-physical bullying, 3% reported physical bullying, and 2% reported theft or vandalism.\(^\text{147}\) The report also noted that females were more likely to be bullied verbally, males were more likely than females to be bullied physically, and males and females were equally likely to be victims of vandalism or theft.

According to the OSDUHS report, one in four students (representing about 260,000 students in Ontario) reported bullying other students at school. About 6% reported bullying others on a daily or weekly basis and 19% reported bullying on a monthly basis. Although there was no significant differences between grades and regions, males (28%) were significantly more likely than females (22%) to report bullying others.

Addressing bullying, like many youth offender/victim offences, is impeded by the low level of reporting. According to the USDOJ study, most students – victims or witnesses – did not report bullying to an adult, thereby concealing the extent of the bullying in schools. The report cited poor response by adults who actually witnessed bullying behaviour as one reason that victims did not report – two-thirds of victims (66%) believed school professionals responded poorly to the bullying problems that they observed.\(^\text{148}\) Some of the other reasons given by victims for not reporting included fear of retaliation, feeling shame, fear they will not be believed, not wanting to worry parents, having no confidence that anything would change as a result and fear of losing their electronic devices.

A survey by the US National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHD) reported that bullying has both long- and short-term psychological affects on both those who bully and those who are bullied.\(^\text{149}\) Victims may experience difficulty in socialization and may develop mental health disorders that can follow them through adulthood. The USDOJ study, in addition to citing similar findings from various studies carried out in a number of countries, also noted that victims were frequently absent from school and were unable to concentrate on school work. Bullying behaviour has been linked to other antisocial behaviour and may be a precursor to criminal behaviour and substance abuse. Having been identified in several studies as a possible contributing factor to shootings on school premises, student suicides, and life-long psychological distress, bullying can no longer simply be perceived as an inevitable part of growing up.

A study on the subject of school-based anti-bullying programs undertaken by the Canadian Crime Prevention Centre, *Bullying Prevention in Schools*, reported long-term effects...
for children who are bullied and children who bully similar to those of the US studies.\footnote{National Crime Prevention Centre. (2007). \textit{Bullying Prevention in Schools}. Public Safety Canada. (Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cp/res/bully-eng.aspx#appa)} For those children who are bullied, the report cited a variety of possible traumatic and long-term effects, such as depression, anxiety, loss of self-esteem, increased levels of aggressive behaviour, headaches, stomach aches, school absenteeism, and in extreme cases can lead to suicide. Some individuals who were bullied as children, reported psychological harm into adulthood including continued distress, self-blame, fear, and internalized problems, such as depression. The study reported that bullying behaviour in children is closely associated with antisocial behaviour in adolescence and adulthood; children who bully may turn into adolescents who sexually harass, become involved in delinquent behaviours, become involved in gang-related activities, or engage in dating violence. The report cited a US study that found that bullies were seven times more likely than other students to carry weapons to school and were six times more likely to have a criminal record by the age of 24. Bullying or abusive behaviour may continue into adulthood (e.g. workplace harassment, domestic abuse, etc.).

From the foregoing discussion on bullying, it is clear that bullying is a serious issue; it is widespread, under-reported, can have serious consequences for both the victims and the offenders, and has varied implications by student characteristics – age, gender and region. A Public Safety Canada report on bullying prevention recognizes the severity and complexity of bullying behaviour and recommends a whole-school approach to dealing with the issue.\footnote{National Crime Prevention Centre. (2008). \textit{Bullying Prevention: Nature and Extent of Bullying in Canada}. Public Safety Canada. (Retrieved from http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cp/res/_fl/2008-BP-01-eng.pdf)} The report highlights prevention program success criteria:

- strong teacher and adult leadership and strong student-teacher bonding,
- clear and consistent behaviour norms,
- adult awareness and involvement,
- effective (focused and intense) supervision,
- involvement of multiple stakeholders – whole school community,
- involvement of youth in program development and delivery,
- target multiple risk and protective factors,
- focus on early, long-term intervention, and
- gender and age specific and focus on social skills.

Programs to specifically address bullying are being implemented globally. A co-ordinated effort by all members of the school community – students, teachers, administrators, parents, etc. – and community partners to raise awareness of the effects of bullying and reduce the opportunities and rewards of bullying, is the key to successfully eliminating or at least reducing school yard bullies.

The Toronto Police Service has identified youth, specifically bullying, as a priority in the Service’s Business Plan in each of the past seven years. The Service has partnered with the schools to provide programs to increase awareness of students and the community about bullying and cyber-bullying through in-school and community presentations, school safety curriculum, and inclusion in existing programs; an increased police presence in the schools (e.g., School Resource Officers) provides additional focused supervision to target bullying behaviour.
**School Resource Officers (SROs):**

In September 2008, with funding from the Provincial government, the Toronto Police Service, together with the Toronto District School Board and the Toronto Catholic District School Board, implemented the School Resource Officer program in 30 schools across Toronto. The mandate of the SRO program was to work in partnership with the school community – students, teachers, school administrators, Boards, parents, surrounding neighbourhood – to establish and maintain a healthy and safe school community. Thirty uniformed police constables were assigned to 30 Toronto secondary schools with specific duties and responsibilities, including:

- be visible and active in the school community,
- facilitate communication and co-operation with school officials, other police officers, courts, and social service agencies,
- participate in crime prevention activities, including identification of school safety issues and the creation and implementation of programs and activities to address those issues,
- participate in activities intended to encourage and support a safe and engaged school community,
- liaise with school officials regarding emergency planning and site security,
- participate in risk assessment and threat assessment activities with school officials,
- provide information and education on the criminal justice system,
- facilitate communication among police, students, school staff, school board representatives, and parents, and
- participate on the school council and other school and community associations.

An evaluation of the SRO program after the first year found that the SRO program had a number of positive effects on schools and students, particularly those students who had interacted with the SROs. Further, the evaluation concluded that the program had the potential to be increasingly beneficial to crime prevention, crime reporting and relationship building within the school community. In September 2009, the program was expanded to 50 schools. The SRO duties and responsibilities have recently been expanded to also include information gathering, problem solving and investigation. Youth engagement, trust, and relationship building remain the primary goals for the program.

**Police/School Board Protocol:**

In 2000, the first formal Police/School Board Protocol was implemented. The Police/School Board Protocol provides guidelines on how police should conduct themselves and their investigations when on school property. Recent revisions to the Protocol include a requirement that principals report all relationship-based violence to police. The revised Protocol also requires that when police need to speak with a student with special needs, the principal provide the officers with information on the nature of the student’s exceptionality and provide support to the police to facilitate effective and appropriate communication with the student. These new provisions will promote early intervention for relationship violence and improved understanding of and police response to special needs students.
Threat Assessment Training:

In a further effort to promote a safe and healthy school community, Toronto Police, together with the Toronto District School Board and Toronto Catholic District School Board, have developed a multi-disciplinary threat assessment procedure for dealing with high-risk student behaviours. Through provincial funding, the Toronto Police Service has offered threat assessment training to police, school and social services staff since 2008; the training provides information on evaluating risk and effective methods of intervention in all forms of violence and threat-making behaviours. At the completion of the program, all Toronto schools will have an increased ability to identify and assess potential threats to school safety. School administrators and School Resource Officers will be trained to assess threats and design interventions and all teachers will be trained to recognize potential threatening behaviours.

F. Drug Use by Youths

Given that drug charges are largely determined by the level of police enforcement, drug charge statistics alone are not a reliable indicator to reflect the extent of the drug problem. As an indicator of drug use among youths, police statistics on youths charged for drug offences should be supplemented by other statistics, such as survey findings on drug use among youths.

Figure 3.8 shows the number of youths, total and by gender, charged with drug-related offences over the past five years. A total of 814 youths were charged with drug-related offences in 2010, compared to 695 youths in 2009 and 852 youths in 2006.

The number of youths charged with a drug-related offence in 2010 reflects an increase of 17% from the number youths charged with a drug-related offence in 2009, but remains below the level reported in 2006. Over the past five years, females accounted for less than 10% of the youths arrested for drug offences, and the number of youths arrested for drugs, both male and female, tended to increase with age.

The youth charge rate for drug offences was 4.1 per 1,000 youths in 2010, compared to 3.5 in 2009 and 4.3 in 2006. As with youth crime in general, the youth charge rate for drug offences was almost twice that for adults (2.8 per 1,000 adults).
As noted earlier, police-reported youth drug offences is not a comprehensive or reliable indicator of drug use by youth and does not indicate the extent of use or what drugs were involved. The Centre for Addiction and Mental Health’s 2009 OSDUHS provided a comprehensive view of youth drug use in Ontario. The findings were based on self-reports derived from surveys administered in schools to over 9,000 students. The findings of the 2009 OSDUHS included the following:152

- Almost one-third of all students (31%) – up from 28% in 2007 – reported no substance use (including alcohol and tobacco) in the past twelve months. Another one in four students (24%) reported using only alcohol in the previous twelve months.
- Alcohol is the drug of choice for students; almost six in ten (58%) students (representing about 591,700 Ontario students in Grades 7 through 12) reported drinking alcohol over the past 12 months. Reported use of alcohol by students increased by grade, from 23% of Grade 7 students to 83% of Grade 12 students. Less than half (45%) of the Toronto students reported drinking alcohol.
- Over the past decade, there was a significant decrease in reported alcohol use; in 1999, 66% of students reported using alcohol in the past 12 months.
- About one in six drivers (17%) in Grades 10 to 12 reported driving within one hour after using cannabis as compared to one in eight (12%) that reported driving within one hour after drinking alcohol. Moreover, students reported being a passenger in a vehicle with a driver who had been drinking (23%) or using drugs (18%). The likelihood of being a passenger with an intoxicated (alcohol or drugs) increased significantly with age.
- One in ten students report personally being injured or injuring some else in the past twelve months as a result of their own drinking.
- About one in four (26%) students reported using cannabis and about 3% of students reported using it every day. Based on the Severity Dependence Scale, 11% of cannabis users (3% of all students) may have a dependence problem. Similar to alcohol, reported use of cannabis increased by grade, from 1% of students in Grade 7 to 46% of students in Grade 12. On a regional basis, Toronto students (20%) were the least likely to report using cannabis.
- Males (42%) and females (41%) were equally likely to report using illicit drugs; interestingly, young females accounted for only about one in ten drug-related youth arrests in Toronto.
- In relation to drugs at school, about 16% of students (representing 152,800 students) reported being intoxicated (alcohol or drugs) at school at least once in the past twelve months; males and older students were more likely to report being intoxicated at school.
- About one in four students (23%) reported that they had been offered, sold or given a drug at school.

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G. Juvenile Delinquency

As was noted in the first section of this chapter, youth crime reflects the number of youths accused of a criminal offence, not the number of offences committed by a youth or group of youths. For the reasons discussed earlier, it is not possible to reliably count the number of police-reported offences committed by a youth until a youth is accused/arrested for the offence. However, a review of self-reported delinquency by youths may provide additional insight into crimes committed by youth.

Both the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health’s OSDUHS and the 2006 International Youth Survey questioned youths as to their level of delinquency. The OSDUHS found that during the 12 months before the survey, 11%, or about 113,000 students, engaged in delinquent behaviour (defined as 3 or more of 11 possible acts), 10% had assaulted someone at least once, 7% had carried a weapon and 1% had carried a gun.153 Theft of goods less than $50, vandalism, and fire-setting topped the list for most prevalent delinquent behaviours at 14% of all youth reporting. The study also found that males were significantly more likely to report having engaged in delinquent behaviour (14% for males as compared to 7% for females); males were more likely to report 12 of the 13 delinquent behaviours, but females were more likely to report running away from home. Further, the report noted that while there was only minor variations between regions (7% in Toronto compared to about 11% in the other three provincial regions), students in Grades 10-12 were more likely than students in Grades 7-9 to report delinquent behaviour (4%-9% for the lower grades compared to 14%-15% for the higher grades.)

Of the 3,200 Toronto students (Grades 7-9) who responded to the 2006 International Youth Survey, 37% reported having engaged in one or more delinquent acts in their lifetime, 20% reported committing at least one delinquent act in the year preceding the survey and 13% reported committing at least one violent act in the year preceding the survey; participate in a group fight in a public place (9%), shop lifting (8%) or carry a weapon (6%) were the most frequently reported delinquent behaviours in the 12 months prior to the survey.154 Similar to the findings of the OSDUHS, males and students in the higher grades were significantly more likely than females and students in the lower grades to report delinquent behaviours (24% for males compared to 16% for females; 14% for Grade 7 students compared to 24% for Grade 9 students). Males were significantly more likely than females to report both violent behaviour (18% for males compared to 8% for females) and delinquent property-related behaviour (15% for males compared to 10% for females). The study notes that half of all students reporting delinquent behaviour engaged in their first delinquent act before the age of 12 years.

This study also considered risk factors generally associated with youth crime – the prevalence of delinquency by socio-demographic characteristics and risk factors, including delinquent friends and peers. Specific to student characteristics and risk-factors, the study found that:

- Socio-demographic characteristics for delinquent and non-delinquent youths differed only slightly.
- Students who reported that their parents were never aware of whom they were with were almost four times as likely to report delinquency (56%) than those who said their parents were always aware of whom they were with (12%).

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153 Paglia-Boak, et.al. (2010).
• Delinquent behaviour was highest among youth who reported using drugs (60%).
• Significantly higher delinquency rates were found in the presence of delinquent peers. Students with delinquent friends (39%), who spent time in public places with friends (27%), or who associated with older youths (42%) were more likely to report delinquent behaviours. Self-reported delinquent behaviours were even more prevalent when illegal activities were accepted by their group of friends (53%) or their group engaged in illegal activities together (57%).
• Students who considered their group to be a gang were more than twice as likely to report delinquency as those who did not (45% compared to 20%).

A further report on the factors associated with youth delinquency – based on the findings of the International Youth Survey – found that delinquent behaviour was associated with a number of factors including school environment, victimization, and family and peer relationships. First, the student’s commitment to and perception of the school were linked to delinquent behaviour. A more detailed discussion of this finding was provided earlier in this chapter. Second, links to delinquent behaviour were noted in relation to the student’s experiences with victimization, including being bullied at school, stolen from, threatened, assaulted, or discriminated against based on religion, language or race; 56% of delinquent youth had been victimised as compared to 36% of non-delinquent youth. Third, the youth’s relationship with family members and friends was an important factor – risk or protective – in the likelihood of delinquent behaviour. A youth’s relationship with parents and the quality of parenting skills had a strong influence on juvenile delinquency. The study emphasised the important influence of friends, and in particular, exposure to a delinquent peer network on the involvement of youth in delinquent behaviour.

The influence of risk and protective factors as they contribute to youth delinquency was underscored in a study by the US Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. A longitudinal study of serious adolescent offenders found that youth who committed serious offences were not necessarily destined to persistent criminal activity; two factors – lower levels of substance abuse and stability in daily routine (living arrangements, attendance at school and/or work) – appeared to distinguish desisters from persisters.

### H. Youth Gangs

Youth gangs continue to be a problem across Canada. For a number of reasons, however the actual extent of the problem is not clear. First, there is still no consensus on what constitutes a youth gang; without a clear definition, some jurisdictions resist labelling youth groups as gangs while others report youth gangs based on a much broader definition. Although definitions vary, most include similar elements: self-identifying as a group (e.g. has a name, identifiable clothing, colours, tattoos, etc.), generally perceived by others to be a group, and are involved in delinquent acts that draw negative responses from the community or law enforcement agencies. Second,
research on the Canadian youth gang problem is limited, with small samples, and without consistency in research methodology.

Without a clear definition of a youth gang and infrequent enumeration, pinpointing the scope of the youth gang problem is difficult. Based on the results of the 2002 Canadian Police Survey on Youth Gangs, Public Safety Canada reported that there were about 434 youth gangs and 7,071 youth gang members across Canada; about half – 216 youth gangs and 3,320 youth gang members – were in Ontario.158 Almost one in four jurisdictions serving both large and small communities reported youth gangs active in their communities – almost six in ten Canadians are served by law enforcement agencies that report active youth gangs within their jurisdiction.159

The 2010 Report on Organized Crime by Criminal Intelligence Service Canada reported that since 2006 there has been an increase in the number of street gangs identified by law enforcement agencies across Canada; the report noted that the increase may be due to new gangs forming, but may also be attributable to higher-level organized crime groups being identified as street gangs, cells from larger gangs being identified as new entities, street gangs splintering into smaller criminal groups, or gangs changing names agencies.160 In the 2007 ODUHS, 4% of students (representing about 41,000 Ontario students) responded yes to “Do you belong to a gang right now?”; boys (6%) and Grade 9 students (7%) were significantly more likely to report that they belonged to a gang, but there was no significant difference among geographical regions.161

Beyond the presence of and membership in youth gangs, is the social impact of gang activities. The question as to whether gang members contribute to delinquency above and beyond the influences of delinquent peers was explored in Gang Membership, Delinquent Peers, and Delinquent Behaviour by the USDOJ.162 The study found that the involvement in violent crime for gang members was, overall, twice that of the youth who associated with delinquent peers. Further studies conducted by the US Office of Justice Programs, Comparing the Criminal Behaviour of Young Gangs and At-Risk Youths and Early Precursors of Gang Membership: A Study of Seattle Youth, reported much the same findings based on self-reported crime by youth gang members and at-risk youths. Youth gang members engaged in more delinquent behaviour than their peers who were not in gangs, were twice as likely to commit a crime, and two to seven times more likely to commit serious violent crimes than at-risk youths.163,164 In general, cross-

sectional and longitudinal studies in Canada and the US have found a strong relationship between levels of offending and gang membership. These findings are based on the disproportionate number of crimes committed by individuals while in the gang, as compared to before and after gang membership, and the on-going influence after separating from the gang.\textsuperscript{165}

In a compilation of the findings of more than 60 longitudinal studies, \textit{The Long View of Crime}, two models emerged to explain the disproportionately high level of offending by gang members. The selection model suggests that youth who are already predisposed to delinquency and violence are more likely to join gangs; on the other hand, the facilitation model suggests that youth who join gangs are no more disposed towards delinquency and violence and it is the influence of the gang environment that promotes increased involvement in delinquency.\textsuperscript{166} The studies did not support the selection and tended to favour the facilitation model; the author suggested that this finding may have important implications in the development of gang prevention and intervention programs.

The propensity of youth involved in youth gangs to commit criminal acts is a concern for all members of the community. In the Toronto Police Service 2010 survey of 9\textsuperscript{th} to 12\textsuperscript{th} graders, almost four in ten (39\%) said they were very or somewhat concerned about gangs in their schools. The 2010 Toronto Police Service community survey found that six in ten community respondents said they were concerned about gangs in their neighbourhoods.

The keys to addressing youth gangs, according to law enforcement agencies and researchers, are to curtail membership in the first instance, assist youth to leave gangs, and increase reporting of youth gang criminal activities. Factors contributing to a youth’s decision to join a gang fall into two categories – attraction and risk factors.\textsuperscript{167} Contrary to public perception, most youths who join gangs want to belong to a gang; youth cite protection, fun, respect, money and friends in the gang as the reason they want to or have joined a gang. Risk factors – attributes which increase the likelihood that a youth will join a gang – break down to four groups: individual (antisocial behaviour, drugs and alcohol use, mental health problems, victimization and negative life events), family (family structure and economics), school (school climate), and peer group (associated with delinquent peers). The Seattle Social Development Project found that the odds of a youth joining a gang between the ages of 13 to 18 years were three times higher than average with two to three risk factors present and thirteen times higher than average with seven or more risk factors present.\textsuperscript{168}

Youth gangs rely heavily on the silence of their victims – if the crime is not reported by the victim there can be no consequences, and their power, based on intimidation, is thereby strengthened. Although it is likely that youths victimised by youth gang members are able to identify the offender, they fail to do so for fear of reprisal. The development and implementation of programs which encourage crime reporting, provide protection for victims, and ensure consequences for offenders, are required to address the current activities of youth gang.


\textsuperscript{168} Hill, et al. (2001).
After years of programming aimed at addressing the direct and indirect problems associated with youth gangs, little has been done to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Public Safety Canada conducted an extensive literary review and discussion of youth gang programs, to develop a comprehensive understanding of what doesn’t work, what does work, and what is promising in addressing youth gang problems. Over the past thirty years, responses to the youth gang problem in the United States and elsewhere can be categorized into three distinct strategies – prevention, intervention, and suppression. Gang prevention programs generally focus on discouraging youth from joining gangs – primary prevention targets all youth, secondary prevention targets identified at-risk youth, and tertiary prevention targets youth involved in criminal activities and/or currently a member of a youth gang. Gang intervention programs specifically target active gangs and gang members. Finally suppression programs, usually through specialized gang enforcement units, target gang members and their criminal activities with aggressive enforcement of laws.

Based on available gang research and program evaluation, the Public Safety Canada report recommended a well planned, comprehensive, and multi-agency approach to address the full range of risk-factors identified in gang-involved youth – factors specific to individual characteristics of the youth, peer group, school, family, and community.

The Toronto Police Service has initiated and participated in a wide range of enforcement and community partnership programs that directly and indirectly have an impact on enforcement, gang membership, and reporting of youth gang activities, for example, the Toronto Anti-Violence Intervention Strategy, the Youth in Policing Initiative (YIPI), School Resource Officers, the Gun and Gang Task Force, Student Crime Stoppers, Student Watch, and so on.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICE**

- It is essential that commitment to the youth community remains a priority for the Toronto Police Service and remains clearly reflected in resource allocation and in the development and application of effective youth service initiatives and programs.

- As it is understood that juvenile delinquency in general and youth crime specifically have a complicated network of root causes embedded in the family and other social institutions, it is also clear that no one agency alone can effectively deal with the problem. The need for a multi-disciplinary approach requires the police, schools, other government departments, and community agencies to work in partnership, each delivering service in their area of specialization that matches the needs of specific young offenders at different stages of delinquency. It is essential that the infrastructure for such partnerships continue to be developed and maintained.

- A formalized process for pre-charge disposition would provide officers with flexibility in terms of alternatives other than charges to address the different needs of specific young offenders. Also, it would better capture information as to the extent of youth crime in

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Toronto. It is essential that resources are sought and allocated to establish and maintain a pre-charge diversion program.

- A clear understanding of the nature and extent of youth crime, youth violence, and youth gangs is necessary for the development of effective initiatives to address such issues. It is important that resources continue to be deployed to enable the development and maintenance of an information system that allows detailed analysis of police arrest and related data for understanding the nature of youth crime. There is a need for analysis that will consistently and reliably answer basic questions about youth crime – who the young offenders are, who they victimised, the circumstances under which the crime occurred, and common factors among young offenders in connection with their delinquency.

- There is an identified need to encourage the reporting of youth violence and, in particular, gang-related violence. The Toronto Police Service must continue to encourage and expand anonymous, low-risk reporting mechanisms across the city.

- There is the need to collect and maintain data to enable evaluation of the Service’s youth initiatives and specific programs, such as diversion, with regard to their effectiveness in addressing crime, crime prevention and recidivism.

- The police must undertake, in conjunction with other stakeholders, a comprehensive communication program aimed at educating the community about youth issues – the positive contribution of youth to our community, the challenges youth face, the community’s responsibility to youth, and stressing, in particular, the relatively few youths that are involved in crime and the even fewer youths that are involved in violent crime. The community’s perception of youth must be changed to more closely reflect the majority of youths rather than the minority of youths who are responsible for youth crime.
### Appendix

**Persons Arrested by Age and Offence Number and Rate (per 1,000 populations)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Grp</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Proj. Pop.</th>
<th>Number Persons Arrested</th>
<th>Persons Arrested/1000 pop</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Viol</td>
<td>Prop</td>
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<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
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<td>12-17</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>101,870</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>2,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>96,370</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>1,509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total+</td>
<td>198,240</td>
<td>2,624</td>
<td>4,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18&amp;+</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>969,750</td>
<td>12,911</td>
<td>13,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,110,645</td>
<td>2,177</td>
<td>5,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total+</td>
<td>2,080,395</td>
<td>15,088</td>
<td>18,841</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the sum of the major offence categories, not including Traffic.
+ The sum of male and female may not add up to the total because gender was not specified in a small number of cases.

Source: TPS Arrest database
### Persons Arrested by Age and Offence
#### % Change in Number and Rate (per 1,000 population)

**One Year**

2009-2010 Change (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Grp</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Proj. Pop.</th>
<th>Number Persons Arrested</th>
<th>Persons Arrested/1000 pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Viol</td>
<td>Prop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-17</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>-6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total+</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>-7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18&amp;+</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total+</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Five Years**

2006-2010 Change (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Grp</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Proj. Pop.</th>
<th>Number Persons Arrested</th>
<th>Persons Arrested/1000 pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Viol</td>
<td>Prop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-17</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
<td>-10.3%</td>
<td>-22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>-20.7%</td>
<td>-16.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total+</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>-12.5%</td>
<td>-20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18&amp;+</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>-7.2%</td>
<td>-9.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total+</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>-6.5%</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Based on the sum of the major offence categories, not including Traffic.
+ The sum of male and female may not add up to the total because gender was not specified in a small number of cases.

Source: TPS Arrest database
IV. VICTIMISATION TRENDS

Understanding trends in victimisation is important to effective proactive policing. Examining issues such as risk and vulnerability to crime can aid in understanding victimisation trends, reducing crime, and easing the fear of crime. Supporting an environment that eases the fear and pressures that victims and witnesses face is critical to reducing crime and to maximising the effects of policing and the justice system. Patterns of victimisation have implications for the protection of and services provided to victims, for the allocation of police resources, and for the success of initiatives directed at reducing crime.

HIGHLIGHTS

- According to the 2009 General Social Survey (GSS) conducted by Statistics Canada, about 7.4 million Canadians, or just over one-quarter of the population aged 15 years and older, reported being a victim of a criminal incident in the previous year. This proportion remained basically unchanged from that reported in 2004.

- The 2009 GSS found that nearly one-third of criminal incidents were reported to the police, down slightly from 2004 and down further from 1999. Rates of reporting to the police were highest for incidents of household victimisation, followed by incidents of violent victimisation.

- Men and women experienced comparable violent victimisation rates in Canada. Both the 2009 GSS and police-reported crime data showed that female victims accounted for half of all victims of violent crimes reported to police in 2009. Similarly, in Toronto in 2010, women and men each accounted for half of the victims of selected crimes of violence.

- Those under 12 years of age and those 65 years of age and older consistently had the lowest victimisation rates in Toronto; for those 12 years and older, the victimisation rate generally decreased with increasing age. In 2010, the victimisation rates for all of the selected crimes for all age groups, except 65 years and older and under 12 years of age, were the lowest of the past ten years.

- In each of the ten years under review, of all the selected violent victimisations against those under 12 and those 12-17 years old, most were physical assaults. However, while the proportion of physical assaults against 12-17 year olds decreased (from 61% in 2001 to 46% in 2010), the proportion of physical assaults against those under 12 increased (from 61% in 2001 to 73% in 2010).

- Physical assaults were also the most frequent violent victimization against those 65 years of age and older, with the proportion increasing from 72% of all violent victimizations in 2001 to 76% in 2010. The Victim Services Program of Toronto also reported a 12% increase of elderly referrals, including Elder Abuse/Neglect, in 2010, compared to 2009.

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170 This chapter focuses on victimisation related to homicide, sexual assault (including sexual offences), assault, and robbery.
• According to the 2009 GSS, 6% of Canadians with a current or former spouse reported being physically or sexually victimised by their partner or spouse in the preceding five years. This proportion was lower than that reported in 1999, but was unchanged from 2004.

• In Toronto, the number of calls for domestic assaults attended by officers increased 2% in 2010 compared to 2009, but decreased 30% compared to 2001. The average time spent by officers attending a domestic assault call increased 40% over the past ten years.

• In 2009, Canadian police services reported just over 20,000 incidents of criminal harassment, representing almost 5% of all violent crimes reported to police. The rate of criminal harassment gradually increased over the past decade.

• The total number of criminal harassment (stalking) incidents reported to the Toronto Police Service increased 75% over the past ten years; almost three in four victims of criminal harassment were female.

• According to Statistics Canada, in 2009, Canadian police services reported 1,473 hate crimes, an increase of 42% from 2008 and up 93% from 2007.

• In Toronto, there were a total of 132 hate/bias occurrences reported in 2010, a decrease of 24% compared to 2009, and 61% lower in 2001. In 2010, as in previous years, Jewish and Black communities were most targeted.

• At present, Canada relies on police-reported data for fraud information through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey. This data, however, do not reflect the true nature and extent of fraud in Canada due, in part, to under-reporting of fraud by individuals and businesses. Mass marketing fraud, identity fraud, and identity theft are believed to be increasing, with young people and seniors as particularly susceptible groups.

• In 2010, while the number of victims assisted over the telephone by the Victim Services Program of Toronto decreased 1% compared 2009, the number of victims served on-scene increased 25%.

• A one-year pilot Child & Youth Advocacy Centre (CYAC) project was launched in Toronto on April 1st, 2011, and involves 22 and 23 Divisions.

A. VICTIMISATION IN CANADA

The General Social Survey (GSS) is conducted by Statistics Canada every five years to collect information on criminal victimisation in Canada.

GSS data is grouped into three main categories: violent victimisation (sexual assault, robbery and physical assault), household victimisation (break and enter, motor vehicle/parts theft, theft of household property, vandalism), and theft of personal property.

According to the 2009 GSS, about 7.4 million Canadians, or just over one-quarter of the population aged 15 years and older, reported being a victim of a criminal incident in the previous
year. This proportion remained basically unchanged from that reported in 2004, when the last victimisation survey was conducted.\(^{171}\)

The majority of criminal incidents reported (70%) in the 2009 GSS were non-violent: theft of personal property (34%), theft of household property (13%), vandalism (11%), break and enter (7%), and theft of motor vehicle/parts (5%). The remaining self-reported incidents were violent incidents: physical assault (19%), sexual assault (8%), and robbery (4%).

According to the 2009 GSS, the rates of violent and household victimisation were similar to those reported in 2004. On the other hand, the rate of theft of personal property increased 16%, up from 93 incidents per 1,000 people in 2004 to 108 incidents in 2009.

Among the nineteen Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) studied by Statistics Canada, the highest rates of violent victimisation were reported in Regina, almost double the rates of other CMAs. Regina also reported one of the highest rates of household victimisation. In contrast, Toronto, Canada’s largest CMA, reported the lowest rate of violent victimisation and was among the lowest for household victimisation.\(^{172}\)

The provincial rate of violent victimisation reported in 2009 was highest in western Canada, led by Manitoba (175 violent incidents per 1,000 people) and Saskatchewan (159 per 1,000). Ontario ranked 6th with 114 violent incidents per 1,000 people.\(^ {173}\)

Demographic and social characteristics – gender, age, marital status, household income, immigrant status, Aboriginal identity, sexual orientation, and number of evening activities – can contribute to an increased risk of victimisation.

According to the 1999, 2004, and 2009 GSS, overall, men and women experienced comparable violent victimisation rates in Canada. In 2009, there were 125 violent incidents per 1,000 men, compared to 112 per 1,000 women. There were some differences, however. In 2009, the self-reported sexual assault victimisation rate for females was just over twice the rate for males (34 per 1,000 women compared to 15 per 1,000 men), while the rates for physical assault and robbery were both lower for women than for men (physical assault: 67 compared to 94 per 1,000; robbery: 10 compared to 16 per 1,000).

Violent victimisation continued to be highest among young people (15-24 years old). In fact, people between the ages of 15 and 24 years were almost 15 times more likely than those aged 65 and older to report a violent victimisation (284 per 1,000 compared to 19 per 1,000). Rates of self-reported violent victimisation were found to be highest among single people and lowest among people that were married (231 per 1,000 compared to 62 per 1,000). People with a household income less than $20,000 experienced the highest rate of violent victimisation, while people with a household income between $40,000 to $59,999 experienced the lowest rate of violent victimisation (147 per 1,000 compared to 105 per 1,000).

Other characteristics that were associated with higher rates of violent victimisation included self-identifying as homosexual, self-identifying as Aboriginal, having some form of activity limitation, and participating in evening activities outside the home.\(^{174}\)

According to the 2009 GSS, rates of violent victimisation were lower for people who identified as a visible minority compared to non-visible minority people (76 per 1,000 compared

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\(^{172}\) Ibid.

\(^{173}\) Ibid.

\(^{174}\) Ibid.
to 124 per 1,000). Immigrants also experienced a lower rate of violent victimisation than non-immigrants (62 per 1,000 compared to 133 per 1,000).

The GSS also collects information about the offender. Respondents who reported they were victimised were asked to specify information about the offender. Based on these results, males accounted for close to nine in ten offenders in all violent incidents. The data also showed that violent crimes were disproportionately committed by young adults: while 26% of violent crimes were committed by those aged 18 to 24, this age group comprised only about 10% of the Canadian population in 2009. These findings were consistent with police-reported crime data, which also showed males and young adults to be over-represented as accused persons.  

B. REPORTING VICTIMISATION TO THE POLICE

Reporting rates continue to be a challenge for many countries, including Canada. According to the 2005 International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), reporting rates have gone down in Canada, Belgium, Scotland, England & Wales, the Netherlands, France, New Zealand, and the US in recent years. The ICVS found that in Canada, an average of 48% of property crime was reported, down from 55% in 1988. The highest reporting rates were found in Austria (70%), Belgium (68%), Sweden (64%), and Switzerland (63%).

According to the 2009 GSS, nearly one-third (31%) of incidents were reported to the police, down slightly from 2004 (34%) and down further from 1999 (37%). Rates of reporting to the police were highest for incidents of household victimisation (36%), followed by incidents of violent victimisation (29%), and thefts of personal property (28%).

Rates of reporting crime tended to differ depending on the type of crime. Of the violent incidents, robberies (43%), including attempted robberies, were most likely to be reported to police, while a high proportion of sexual assaults (88%) were not reported to the police. Break-ins (54%) were the most likely household crimes to be reported, followed by vehicle thefts (50%).

The GSS found that victims may choose not to report their victimisation to police for various reasons. While a ‘sense of duty’ was the most common reason given for reporting to police, the most common reasons for not reporting to police were believing that the incident was not important enough (68%), followed by thinking there was nothing the police could do to help (59%).

Other factors that influenced whether criminal incidents were reported to police include the age of the victim, whether the crime was committed by one offender or multiple offenders, and the location of the incident. For example, with respect to violent crime, older victims were more likely to report the crime than younger victims. Almost half (46%) of violent incidents involving victims 55 years or older were reported to police, compared to 20% of violent

177 Perreault & Brennan (2010).
178 Ibid.
incidents involving victims aged 15 to 24 years. If the violent crime occurred in the victim’s home or close to home, the incident was reported just over half (51%) of the time. On the other hand, if the violent crime took place in a business or public institution, it was only reported 20% of the time.

With respect to household crimes, the greater the value of the stolen or damaged property, the more likely the crime was reported to police. Where the stolen or damaged property was worth more than $1,000, almost seven in ten household incidents were reported to the police. In comparison, only 15% of incidents were reported to police when the stolen or damaged property was valued at less than $100.

Of those Canadians who had reported the incident, most (63%) were satisfied with the action taken by police. This was true regardless of whether the incident was a violent or household crime.\(^\text{179}\)

The Service’s 2010 survey of Toronto residents, presented in more detail in the Public Perceptions chapter, found that 6% of respondents said they were the victim of crime in Toronto in the past year, down from 7% in 2009 and 8% in 2008.

In 2010, most of the respondents who were victimised said they were victims of ‘home broken into’ or ‘car/vehicle theft’, while in 2009 respondents said they were victims of ‘robbery’ or ‘car/vehicle theft’. In 2008, respondents said they were victims of ‘home broken into’ or ‘business broken into’. One-quarter (25%) of these respondents in 2010 said they did not report the crime to police, down from 36% in 2009, but up from 23% in 2008. The most common reason for not reporting in 2010 was ‘not serious enough/minor incident’, the same as in previous years.

The Toronto Police Service continues working towards making the reporting of crime an easier process, where possible; to this end, the Toronto Police Service launched ‘Citizens Online Crime Reporting’ in July 2011. This tool allows the public to report minor criminal offences/incidents – lost property, theft, theft from a vehicle, damage to property, and damage to vehicle – online, 24-hours a day, 7 days a week, at their convenience. The value of the theft or damage must be under $5000, and there must be no known suspects.

Other police services, including York Regional, Peel Regional, Halton Regional, Vancouver, Calgary, Niagara Regional, Belleville and the Metropolitan Police (England), also offer on-line reporting for similar non-emergency type crime.

The Toronto Police Service must continue education efforts focused on the importance of reporting crime and victimisation to police, and the various reporting methods available. In order to reach all community members, programs must make use of all available streams of communication, including social media, presentations, pamphlets and media.

\(^{179}\) Ibid.
C. VICTIMISATION – TOTAL AND BY GENDER

In a recent Statistics Canada report exploring the nature and prevalence of victimization of women, it was found that, overall, females reported rates of physical assault and sexual assault in 2009 similar to those reported ten years ago. Rates of sexual assault were approximately half those of physical assault in both 1999 and 2009. Females were, however, slightly more likely to report being a victim of a robbery in 2009 than they were ten years earlier; rates increasing from 7 per 1,000 to 10 per 1,000 population. Among female victims of violent crime in 2009, only one-third reported the incident to police.

According to both the 2009 GSS and police-reported crime data, female victims accounted for half of all victims of violent crimes reported to police in 2009. The most common offence committed against females was assault level 1 (common assault), making up 46% of all incidents reported to police, followed by uttering threats (13%), assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm (9%), sexual assault (9%), and criminal harassment (7%). Offences committed against males were generally similar: assault level 1 (42%) and assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm (17%) accounted for the majority of incidents.

The report indicated that females were the most common victims of sexual assault, accounting for 87% of incidents reported to police. Other offences that tended to be committed primarily against females included forcible confinement and related offences (76%), criminal harassment (76%), and threatening and harassing phone calls (68%). Males on the other hand, were the most common victims of homicide (74%), attempted murder (75%), aggravated assault (75%), and accounted for just over two-thirds of robbery victims (70%).

The report added that, consistent with the 2009 GSS data, police statistics showed that females were most likely to be victimised by someone they knew. According to 2009 police-reported data, spouses (current or former) and other intimate partners committed more than 41% of violent incidents involving female victims. Other family members and acquaintances accounted for another 42% of violent incidents.

Although men and women experienced comparable violent victimisation rates in Canada (2004 and 2009 GSS), and while they generally perceived the same amount of crime around them, according to a Statistics Canada study, their use of precautionary behaviours to avoid becoming a victim of crime was very different. The study consisted of a sample size of 8,095 working-age people 25 to 54 years of age living in Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) in Canada and represented approximately 4.8 million women and 4.8 million men.

The study found that 17% of women in the study population, compared to only 3% of men, avoided going out alone at night; and 91% of women in the study population, compared 64% of men, used at least one routine precaution (e.g., locking car doors when alone in a vehicle). These precautions, which limited day-to-day activity of victims, were more pronounced in women.

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181 Ibid.
182 Ibid.
Toronto Police Service data indicate that the overall number of victims of selected violent crimes decreased 1%, from 31,229 victims in 2009 to 30,879 in 2010, and decreased 15% from 2001 when there were 36,428 victims.\footnote{This chapter focuses on victimisation related to selected crimes of violence only – homicide, sexual assault (including sexual offences), assault, and robbery.}

Over the ten year period from 2001 to 2010, the number of men who were victims of the selected crimes of violence decreased 22%, while the number of women who were victims decreased 11%. Between 2009 and 2010, the number of victimisations for these crimes also decreased slightly for men (2%), but increased very slightly for women (0.6%).

For the past ten years, men were victims of the selected crimes of violence more often than women; that gap has now closed. In 2010, 50% of victims were women, up from 47% in 2001. Correspondingly, in 2010, 50% of victims were men, down from 53% in 2001.

When changes in population size were controlled by examining the rate of victimisation per 1,000 people, a slow but steady decrease was seen over the past decade. Overall, victimisation by these violent crimes decreased 2% in 2010 to 10.9 victims per 1,000, from 11.1 victims in 2009. The rate in 2010 was the lowest rate in 10 years, and was a 22% decrease compared to 2001, when overall victimisation was 14.0 per 1,000 people.

In each of the ten years between 2001 and 2010, the rate of victimisation for women was lower than the rate for men (Figure 4.1). Between 2009 and 2010, the rate of victimisation for men decreased 3%, to 11.7 in 2010 from 12.0 in 2009, while for women the rate increased 1%, to 10.5 in 2010 from 10.4 in 2009. The 2010 victimisation rate for men was 27% lower than the rate of 16.1 in 2001, while the 2010 victimisation rate for women was 19% lower than the rate of 13.0 in 2001.

With regard to the specific crimes of violence, as shown in Figures 4.2 through 4.4, men were more likely in each year to be victims of assault and robbery, while women were at a higher risk than men to be victims of sexual assault.

The rate of assault against women in 2010 was 7.8 per 1,000 women; this was the same as in 2009 and 24% lower than 10.2 per 1,000 in 2001 (Figure 4.2). The rate of assault against men in 2010 was 8.4 per 1,000 men; this was 2% lower than 8.6 in 2009 and 34% lower than 12.8 per 1,000 in 2001. The 2010 rates were the lowest rates of assault against men in the past ten years.
Women’s rate of victimisation for sexual assault remained unchanged from 2009 at 1.7 per 1,000 women in 2010 (Figure 4.3). The rate in 2010 was a decrease of 6% compared to the rate of 1.8 per 1,000 women in 2001.

The rate of robbery victimisation for men decreased very slightly to 3.0 per 1,000 men in 2010 from 3.1 per 1,000 men in 2009 (-3%), but was unchanged compared to 2001 (Figure 4.4). The rate of robberies against women remained the same at 1.0 per 1,000 in 2010, 2009, and 2001.
Although not shown due to the small numbers involved, men were 3 to 4 times more likely than women each year to be victims of homicide. In 2010, the homicide rate for men remained at 0.04 per 1,000, as in 2009. Over the ten-year period of 2001 to 2010, the homicide rate for men varied between 0.04 and 0.05 per 1,000 men, while the homicide rate for women was 0.01 per 1,000 women in each year.

The 330 shooting victims in Toronto in 2010 were a 2% decrease from the 338 shooting victims in 2009, and an 8% decrease from the 360 victims in 2005. As is found nationally, homicides in Toronto typically involved a firearm. Almost two-thirds (65%) of homicides were shootings in 2005, however, the level decreased to 60% in 2009 and decreased further to 51% in 2010.

D. Victimisation – By Age

As noted earlier in this chapter, the 2009 GSS found that violent victimisation was highest among youth and young adults (between 15 and 24 years of age). In fact, this age group was almost 15 times more likely than those aged 65 and older to report being a victim of a violent crime. Consistent with the 2004 GSS in the 2009 GSS, violent victimisation tended to decrease as age increased. Victimisation rates ranged from 284 incidents per 1,000 for those aged 15-24, to 19 incidents per 1,000 for those over 65 years of age.

The rate of victimisation for theft of personal property, representing over one-third of criminal incidents reported in the 2009 GSS, was also higher for younger age groups. Similar to violent victimisation, the rate of victimisation tended to decrease as age increased.

In Toronto, in cases where the age of the victim was known, before 2003 the greatest number of victims of the selected crimes of violence were aged 25-34 years, while after 2003 it shifted to those aged 18-24 years. When the difference in the size of the population at each age was taken into account, for the past seven years, 18-24 year olds again had the highest rates of violent victimisation.

In 2010, those 18-24 years of age were most likely to be victimised (23.8 per 1,000), followed by 12-17 year olds (21.2 per 1,000). Similarly, in 2009, 18-24 year olds had the highest rate (24.0 per 1,000), followed by 12-17 year olds (22.6 per 1,000). Ten years ago in 2001, 12-17 year olds were most likely to be victimised (32.3 per 1,000), followed by the 18-24 year olds (28.5 per 1,000).

As seen in Figure 4.5, the victimisation rate per 1,000 population in Toronto generally decreased with increasing age. Those under 12 years of age and those 65 years of age and older consistently had the lowest victimisation rates. In 2010, the victimisation rates for all of the selected crimes for all age groups, except 65 years and older and under 12 years of age, were the lowest of the past ten years or remained unchanged from 2009.
As shown in Figure 4.6, for the past ten years, 18-24 year olds had the highest victimisation rate for assault, followed, in the past two years, by 25-34 year olds. Between 2001 and 2008, 12-17 year olds had the second highest victimisation rates for assault. The 12-17 age group showed the most decrease in assault rates over the past ten years.

In 2010, the assault rates for the 12-17, 18-24 and 25-34 age groups decreased compared to the 2009 rates; all other age groups increased slightly. The rates in all of the age groups in 2010 decreased compared to 2001 with the exception of those 65 years of age and older. For those over 65 years, the rate increased slightly, from 1.5 in 2001 to 1.7 in 2010.

As shown in Figure 4.7, in 2010, 12-17 year olds continued to be, by far, the most likely victims of sexual assault. Compared to 2009, in 2010, the rate of sexual assault victimisation increased slightly for all age groups, except those 12-17 and those 45-64. The rate decreased 11% for those 12-17 years and remained the same in the 45-64 age group. Compared to 2001, the rates increased for those age groups between 18 and 64 years, decreased for those under 18 years, and remained the same for those 65 years and older (Figure 4.7).
For the past ten years, 12-17 year olds were also the most likely to be victimised by robbery, followed by 18-24 year olds (Figure 4.8). In 2010, the rate of robbery for the 12-17 years age group, 7.4 per 1,000, was a slight (3%) increase from the 7.2 in 2009, but was the same as in 2001 (7.4 per 1,000). The rate for 18-24 year olds was 5.1 per 1,000 in 2010, an increase of 9% compared to 4.7 in 2009, and 16% higher than 4.4 per 1,000 in 2001.

Those under 12 years of age were consistently the least likely to be victims of robbery, and after a higher robbery rate for 12-17 year olds, the rate generally decreased as age increased. In 2010, those under 12 years of age and those aged 25 and older showed a decrease or stayed the same compared to 2009; the exceptions were for 12-17 year olds and 18-24 year olds, as noted above. Compared to 2001, in 2010, all the age groups except those between 18-24 years old remained the same or showed a decrease in the robbery rate.

In 2010 in Toronto, 40% of robbery victimisations (2,060) involved mugging. This was roughly the same as in 2009 (2,054), but 11% higher than in 2001 (1,856).
showed an increased number of homicides compared to 2009. The number of homicides for the 12-17 years age group doubled from 4 in 2009 to 8 in 2010. When compared to ten years ago in 2001, there were increases in the number of homicides in age groups 12-17 years, 18-24 years, and 45-64 years, but decreases in all others.

![Number of Homicide Victims by Age](chart.png)

**Figure 4.9**  Source: TPS Database

### E. Groups at Risk

**Children and Youth – Violent Crime & Abuse:**

According to Statistics Canada, in 2009, violent victimisation was highest among youth and young adults. More specifically, people between the ages of 15 and 24 years were almost 15 times more likely than those aged 65 and older to report being a victim of a violent victimisation.

In 2009, Canadian police reported almost 55,000 children and youth victims (0-17 years of age) of a physical assault or sexual offence. Of these, about three in ten, or close to 15,000 children and youth, were victimised by a member of their own family. Another 54% were victimised by a friend or acquaintance, and 15% by a stranger. Of the 15,000 children and youth victimised by a member of their own family, approximately 67% were physically assaulted and 33% were sexually assaulted. For every 100,000 children and youth in Canada in 2009, 126 were physically or sexually assaulted by their parent.

Also in 2009, most (81%) very young child victims (under the age of 3) were assaulted by their parent. This compared to 60% of 3 to 11 year-olds and 55% of 12 to 17 year-olds. Overall, police-reported data showed that girls under the age of 18 were more likely than boys of the same age to be victims of family violence.

Sexual offences by family members that were reported to police were four times higher for girls than boys (113 versus 28 per 100,000 child/youth population). This higher rate of sexual victimisation in girls remained true regardless of the victim’s age. However, the Statistics Canada report, *Family Violence in Canada*, noted that the age at which sexual offences were committed by family members against children and youth differed between girls and boys. For

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186 Perreault & Brennan (2010).
girls, the rate of sexual victimisation increased throughout childhood and peaked at 14 years of age. For boys, however, the victimisation rates were highest between 5 and 8 years of age.\footnote{Ibid.}

The study found that the rates of physical assault committed by family members against female and male children and youth (149 versus 140 per 100,000 children and youth population) were more similar than the rates of sexual offences. The rates of physical assault were highest during the teenage years for both girls and boys.

Police-reported data in 2009 show that for both physical and sexual offences committed against children, the majority required minor treatment, such as first aid, whether victimised by a family member or non-family member.

The Internet, while an extraordinary tool, comes with risks and adds another dimension to the dangers of sexual exploitation of children, such as luring through the Internet. Research has shown that Canadian youth engage in risky on-line behaviour, such as sharing personal information over the Internet, emailing or posting photos online, chatting online with strangers, and visiting adult-content websites and chat rooms.\footnote{Ibid.}

With the addition of new child luring offences to the \textit{Criminal Code} in 2002, the number of incidents reported to police increased. Although there is little data available on the full extent of child luring, according to Statistics Canada, during 2006 and 2007, a total of 464 incidents of child luring were reported to police. The number of police-reported child luring incidents in 2006 was 1.5 times greater than in 2005, and, according to trend data from a subset of police services, rose another 31\% in 2007. Adult males under the age of 35 accounted for 58\% of those accused of child luring in 2006 and 2007.

The Statistics Canada research suggested that children and youth may not disclose experiences of online sexual exploitation for many reasons, including being too frightened or embarrassed or not understanding the magnitude of the situation. The Service should continue partnerships with schools and other community organizations to raise awareness of relatively new types of crimes such as child luring through the Internet.

In Toronto, as was seen in Figure 4.5, in cases where the age of the victim was known and when the size of the population was taken into account, those 12-17 years of age were the second most frequently victimised age group for the selected crimes of violence.

In 2010, 12-17 year olds constituted 10\% of all physical assault victims, 28\% of all sexual assault victims, 29\% of all robbery victims, and 13\% of all homicide victims. Compared to 2009, the proportions of young assault and sexual assault victims decreased, while the proportion of young robbery and homicide victims increased in 2010. Compared to 2001, in 2010 the proportion of young victims of assault (14\% in 2001) decreased, however the proportions of young victims of sexual assault (17\% in 2001), robbery (27\% in 2001) and homicide (0 in 2001) increased.

In each of the ten years under review, of all the selected violent victimisations against 12-17 year olds, most were physical assaults, although this proportion decreased from 61\% in 2001, to 49\% in 2009, to 46\% in 2010. After physical assaults, 12-17 year olds were most likely victimised by robbery, followed by sexual assault; they were generally rarely victims of homicide.

\footnote{Ibid.}
Those under 12 years old continued to be less likely than older children to be victimised. In 2010, those under 12 constituted a lower proportion of total victims than 12-17 year olds for each of the violent crimes considered. They constituted 5% of all physical assault victims, 12% of all sexual assault victims, 0.6% of all robbery victims, and 2% of all homicide victims. Compared to 2001, in 2010, the proportion of robbery victims under 12 (2% in 2001) and the proportion of homicide victims under 12 (7% in 2001) showed a decrease; in 2001, these very young victims constituted 12% of all sexual assault victims and 4% of all physical assault victims.

It should be noted that figures related to this age group may be influenced by under-reporting, given the vulnerability of young children and the possibility that those committing the offences may be family members.

In each of the ten years under review, of all violent victimisations against children under 12 years of age, most were physical assaults; this proportion increased from 61% in 2001 to 72% in 2009, and to 73% in 2010. The proportion of violent victimisations that were sexual assaults decreased since 2001, from 35% to 24% in 2009, and to 25% in 2010. In all years, of those victimised in this young age group, relatively few were victims of robbery or homicide.

In Toronto in 2010, the number of child abuse offences reported to the police increased 4% from 2009 and decreased 27% from 2006 (Figure 4.10). In 2010, 2,183 child abuse offences were reported compared to 2,107 in 2009 and 3,011 in 2008. It should again be noted that these figures are undoubtedly influenced by under-reporting.

**Bullying:**

All children and youth should feel safe and protected from bullying at home, at school and in their communities. Given the serious short-term and long-term effects of bullying on children’s physical and mental health, school bullying has increasingly become a topic of both public concern and research efforts.

According to the 2010 Ontario Student Survey Summary Report, released in February 2011, 46% of 2,656 of Ontario students surveyed responded ‘yes’ to the survey question “Have you ever been bullied in school?” These respondents represented 69 of the 72 school boards in Ontario, as well as education authorities and private schools.

The survey revealed that five of the fifteen school boards examined had more than 50% of their respondents reply that they had been bullied at school. Ottawa-Carleton District School

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190 A ten-year comparison was not conducted due to changes in data collection methods and counting of offences in 2005.
191 Data may differ from that shown in previous Scans due to updates to the Service’s database.
Board respondents were most likely to report experiencing bullying (59%), while the York District School Board respondents reported the lowest rate of bullying (36%). The Toronto District School Board and the Toronto Catholic District School Board respondents reported having experienced bullying at rates of 40% and 38%, respectively.

With the overall objective of achieving safe schools, the 2008 changes to the Safe Schools Act included bullying as one of the infractions that may lead to the suspension of a student. The Act also required school boards to develop and implement bullying and cyber-bullying prevention policies.

Also recognizing the seriousness of bullying, in November 2010, as part of the $1.68-million Safe Schools Grants program, the Ontario government launched a new initiative designed to counter bullying. Under this program, police and schools team up to educate students on everything from anger management to safe usage of social networking sites.\(^{194}\)

At the end of each year, the Toronto Police Service’s Corporate Planning unit distributes surveys to all the high schools of the Toronto District and Toronto District Catholic School Boards for students in Grades 9 through 12. In 2010, 15% of students indicated that they had been bullied in the past 12 months, compared to 13% in 2009 and 12% in 2008.\(^{195}\) In 2010, the proportion of students who said they had been cyber-bullied in the past 12 months increased from 11% to 14% between 2008 and 2010. And, the proportion of students who said they were concerned about bullying in/around their school increased from 36% to 47% between 2008 and 2010. A further discussion of bullying is provided in both the Youth Crime and Technology chapters.

**Elderly – Violent Crime & Abuse:**

The seniors segment of Canadian population is growing. In 2009, those aged 65 years and older comprised 13% of the population, up from 9% 30 years earlier.\(^{196}\) As research on elder abuse is relatively new and limited in Canada, and throughout the world, accessing reliable data on the issue is difficult. According to the Ontario Network for the Prevention of Elder Abuse, a non-profit, charitable organization dedicated to raising awareness about elder abuse, between 4% and 10% of seniors are estimated to have experienced abuse. However, as abuse and neglect are often hidden and under-reported, they suggested that these figures are ‘the tip of the iceberg’.\(^{197}\) The reasons given for not reporting the crime include:

- believing that the abusive situation is part of normal life,
- believing they are in the wrong or have caused the abuse,
- being afraid of their future (financial concerns, etc.),
- concern for what would happen to the abuser,


\(^{195}\) Question first asked in 2008.


• having no place to go,
• not wanting to leave family members and pets,
• lack of information regarding accessing services, and
• concern about what the community, neighbours, or family will think.  

As for elder abuse committed against immigrant seniors, as noted in the Demographics chapter, cultural differences and language barriers can compound the issue and decrease their ability to access help.

According to national-level police-reported data, in general, seniors (aged 65 years and older) had lower rates of police-reported violent victimisation than younger age groups. In 2009, the rate of violence against seniors was about 15 times lower than the highest at-risk group – those aged 15-24 years of age. As mentioned above, it is important to note that police-reported data may under-estimate the true rate of violence against seniors as many cases may not come to the attention of authorities. According to the 2009 GSS, in general, about seven in ten violent victimisations were not reported to police.

Police-reported data for 2009 in Canada showed that the rate of family violence against seniors increased by 14% since 2004. Police reported approximately 7,900 senior victims of violent crime in 2009. Where the accused-victim relationship was known, over 2,400 (35%) were committed by a member of the victim’s family. Another 35% were committed by a friend or acquaintance, and 29% were committed by a stranger. Family-related violent crime was more often committed against senior women than senior men. In 2009, family members were responsible for 41% of all victimisations against senior women compared to 23% of victimisations against senior men.

In 2009, common assault was the most common violent offence committed by family members against seniors. This offence represented about half (53%) of all family violence against seniors, followed by uttering threats (21%), major assaults (13%), and criminal harassment (4%). The remaining 9% involved a variety of violent offences including sexual assault, robbery, and extortion.

Family violence perpetrated against seniors also tended to decrease with age. The rate of family violence against the youngest seniors (aged 65-74) was highest at 67 per 100,000, compared to a rate of 42 per 100,000 for seniors 75-84, and 25 per 100,000 for the oldest seniors (aged 85 and over). As it is family members/relatives who often meet the needs of this population, as the population of older adults grows, more seniors will be placed at possible risk of family violence.

In Toronto, as was seen in Figure 4.5, seniors were the age group least likely to be victimised in each of the past ten years. In Toronto in 2010, those 65 years and older constituted 3% of all physical assault victims, 2% of all sexual assault victims, 3% of all robbery victims, and 3% of homicide victims. Compared to 2009, in 2010 there were small decreases in the proportions of victims of robbery and homicide, while the proportion of assault victims and sexual assault victims rose slightly. Compared to 2001, in 2010, proportions decreased for robbery and homicide, but increased for assault and sexual assault. In 2001, persons 65 years and older constituted 2% of all physical assault victims, 0.6% of all sexual assault victims, 4% of all robbery victims, and 13% of all homicide victims.

\[198\] Ibid.
\[199\] Sinha (2011).
In each of the ten years under review, of all violent victimisations against those 65 years of age and older, most were physical assaults; this proportion was 72% in 2001, increasing in 2009 to 74%, and increasing further to 76% in 2010. After physical assaults, older adults were most likely victimised by robbery in all years; this proportion was 23% in 2001 and 2009, and decreased to 18% in 2010. Adults 65 and older were rarely victims of sexual assault or homicide.

Toronto Police Service data showed that 611 people 65 years or older were victims of assault or sexual assault in 2010, which was a 14% increase from the 535 in 2009 and a 12% increase from the 547 in 2001. The Victim Services Program of Toronto reported a 12% increase of elderly referrals, including Elder Abuse/Neglect, in 2010, compared to 2009.

As the senior population increases, legislation such as Bill 21, Retirement Homes Act, 2010, recently passed in Ontario and aimed at the protection of seniors living in retirement homes, will hopefully contribute to minimizing victimisation of seniors.

While older people generally fear being victims of crime such as assaults and robbery, statistics show that, overall, they are less likely to encounter violent crimes than younger age groups. According to the Public Health Agency of Canada, it is telemarketing fraud that is one of the most common types of crime committed against older people. Fraud against seniors is discussed later in this chapter, and also in the Crime Trends and Technology chapters. Nonetheless, as noted in the Demographics chapter, this fear of violent crime is, in itself, a problem, as it can result in self-imposed isolation.

The Toronto Police Service must continue to work with community partners and other government agencies to encourage seniors to report abuse, and to enhance awareness with respect to scams, such as telemarketing fraud, to which seniors are especially vulnerable.

**Domestic Violence:**

Domestic violence is a reality for many Canadian families that cuts across social, economic, and cultural groups. Domestic violence includes physical and sexual violence, as well as emotional and financial abuse committed by a current or former legal or common-law spouse.

According to the 2009 GSS, 6% of Canadians with a current or former spouse reported being physically or sexually victimised by their partner in the preceding five years. This proportion was lower than that reported in 1999, but has remained relatively stable since 2004. While a similar proportion of men and women reported having experienced spousal violence in the previous five years, women continue to report more serious forms of spousal violence than men. For example, in 2009, women who reported spousal violence were about three times more likely than men (34% versus 10%) to report that they had been sexually assaulted, beaten, choked, or threatened with a gun or a knife by their partner or ex-partner in the previous five years.

Factors such as household income and education levels were found to have little influence on spousal violence. Victims and those committing spousal violence were no more likely to be university graduates than to have dropped out of high school. Similarly, the proportions of spousal violence victims across various income levels were very comparable: the

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proportion of victims of spousal violence was between 1% and 2% regardless of household income.

Many victims of spousal violence reported recurring incidents. Just fewer than one-half of victims who had experienced an incident of spousal violence in the previous five years stated that the violence had occurred on more than one occasion. Higher multiple victimisations were experienced by females than males (57% and 40%, respectively).

As in previous GSS cycles, the 2009 GSS found that many victims of spousal violence had been victimised multiple times before they turned to the police. Almost two-thirds of spousal violence victims (63%) said that they had been victimised more than once before they contacted the police. Almost three in ten (28%) indicated that they had been victimised more than 10 times before they contacted police. The most cited reason (82%) for not reporting spousal violence to police was that it was a personal matter that did not concern police, followed by that the incident was dealt with another way (81%), and feeling that the incident was not important enough (70%).

And again as reported in previous GSS cycles, the 2009 data indicated that younger Canadians were more likely to report being a victim of spousal violence than older Canadians. Those aged 25 to 34 were three times more likely than those aged 45 and older to report being physically or sexually assaulted by a current spouse in the previous 12 months.

Three in ten spousal violence victims were injured during the commission of the offence, with females being more than twice as likely as males to report an injury (42% versus 18%). Bruises were the most common injury reported by both females (95%) and males (75%). In addition to physical injuries, victims of spousal violence reported being subjected to emotional and financial abuse. The proportion of Canadians who reported having been victims of emotional and financial abuse remained stable at about 17% in 2009.

There are formal and informal sources of support for victims of spousal violence. Formal services include crisis centres or crisis lines, counsellors or psychologists, community or family care centres, shelters, centres for women/men/seniors, or victim services or victim services or victim witness assistance programs. Informal sources include family, friends or neighbours, co-workers, doctors or nurses, lawyers or spiritual advisors. In 2009, almost seven in ten victims of spousal violence turned to informal sources for support.

**Domestic Violence – Calls for Service & Occurrences in Toronto:**

The Toronto Police Service receives a large number of calls each year for incidents that are initially reported to be domestics or domestic assaults. According to the Service’s communications (I/CAD) database, in 2010, officers attended 17,113 domestic calls, a 3% increase from the 16,659 calls in 2009, but a 4% decrease from the 17,811 calls in 2001. According to I/CAD data, in 2010, the average time spent by officers at these calls was 275 minutes (4.6 hours), about the same as in 2009 where the average time spent was 278 minutes (4.6 hours), but an increase from 2001 where the average time spent was 210 minutes (3.5 hours).

In 2010, according to I/CAD data, the number of calls for domestic assaults attended by officers increased 2% compared to 2009 (from 4,789 in 2009, to 4903 in 2010). The number of domestic assault calls in 2010 was 30% lower than 2001, when there were 6,971 domestic assault calls. Although the number of calls for domestic assaults in 2010 increased compared to

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201 Ibid.
2009, the average amount of time spent by officers at domestic assault calls decreased slightly, from 460 minutes (7.7 hours) in 2009 to 446 minutes (7.4 hours) in 2010. The time spent on domestic assault calls in 2010 was an increase from the 315 minutes (5.3 hours) spent on these calls in 2001.

Not all of the domestic calls attended by police involved criminal offences. The number of domestic violence occurrences in 2010 was a 7% decrease over the number seen in 2009. In 2010, there were 6,359 domestic violence occurrences and charges were laid in 86% of these occurrences (5,468). In 2009, there were 6,822 domestic violence occurrences and charges were laid in 85% of these occurrences (5,826).

In 2010, assault level 1 charges accounted for the majority (77%) of domestic violence charges, followed by uttering threats (22%) and assault with a weapon/causing bodily harm (19%). As in previous years, men represented the majority of those charged (86% in 2010). In 2009, assault level 1 represented 75% of all domestic violence charges, followed by charges for uttering threats (25%), and charges for assault with a weapon/causing bodily harm (18%). In both years, domestics have tended mainly to involve those in married, dating, or common-law relationships.

**Dating Violence:**

As with spousal violence, the Criminal Code does not have specific offences pertaining to dating violence. According to Statistics Canada, 2008 police-reported data (for those aged 15 years and older) indicated that dating relationships accounted for more than one-quarter of all violent incidents and almost one-third of all homicides committed by intimate partners. In 2008, nearly 23,000 incidents of dating violence were reported to police; dating violence represented 7% of total violent crimes in 2008, and just over one-quarter of all intimate partner violence (28%). There was a steady increase in rates of police-reported dating violence for both males and females from 2004 to 2008.

Female victims of dating violence tended to be slightly younger than male victims. Women between the ages of 30 and 34 experienced the highest rates of dating violence (591 per 100,000 unmarried population), while men aged 35 to 39 years of age experienced the highest rates of dating violence (132 per 100,000 unmarried population). As with spousal violence, females accounted for the majority of victims of police-reported dating violence in 2008: more than eight in ten victims of police-reported dating violence were female. This difference decreased with age. That is, the rates of dating violence for men and women aged 15-19 were nearly ten to one (women to men), while the rates for men and women were almost the same for those 55 years of age and older.

And, similar to spousal violence, according to 2008 police-reported data, the most frequently committed violent offence in dating relationships was common assault (level 1) (50%), followed by criminal harassment (14%), and uttering threats (12%). About three-quarters of police-reported incidents occurred in a private dwelling; the most common location was the victim’s home (45%).

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202 The Province changed reporting practices for domestic violence in 2006; given this change, there is no long term examination of data in this Scan.


204 Incidents involving boyfriends and girlfriends living with the suspect at the time of the offence were removed from the sample since these may be considered common-law relations rather than dating relationships.
Criminal Harassment (Stalking):

In 2009, Canadian police services reported just over 20,000 incidents of criminal harassment, representing almost 5% of all violent crimes reported to police. The rate of criminal harassment gradually increased over the past decade.

Although overall violent crime tended to be higher in western Canada, the opposite was true for criminal harassment. The lowest provincial rate of criminal harassment was in Manitoba (22 incidents per 100,000 population); Prince Edward Island reported the highest rates of criminal harassment (82 incidents per 100,000 population).

According to Statistics Canada, the eastern Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) had higher rates of criminal harassment than those in western Canada. In 2009, Kingston reported the highest rate of criminal harassment (224 incidents per 100,000 population) and Winnipeg reported the lowest rate of criminal harassment (16 per 100,000 population). The Toronto CMA’s 2009 rate of criminal harassment was 62 incidents per 100,000, slightly higher than that of 2008 (58 incidents per 100,000 population).

Typically, criminal harassment is most often perpetrated against women. In Canada in 2009, approximately 76% of criminal harassment victims were women compared to 51% of victims of overall violent crime. Approximately 51% of women were harassed by a former or current intimate partner, while male victims were more often harassed by a casual acquaintance (37%).

As reported by Statistics Canada, weapons, such as firearms or knives, were rarely used in incidents of criminal harassment (3%), therefore, injuries to victims of criminal harassment were relatively rare and minor. Most victims of criminal harassment (69%) were harassed at home or at another residence, such as a friend’s home.

Total criminal harassment (stalking) incidents reported to the Toronto Police Service increased 75% over the ten-year period from 2001 to 2010, from 1,602 to 2,802 incidents (Figure 4.11). The number of incidents in 2010 was a 6% decrease compared to the 2,968 in 2009. Also shown in Figure 4.11, criminal harassment in Toronto remained a crime that mainly affected women. Most victims in each of the past ten years were female, although this proportion decreased over the ten-year period, from 80% in 2001 to 72% in 2009, and to 74% in 2010. As at the national level, women in Toronto have tended each year to be harassed by a former or current intimate partner, while men have tended to be harassed by an acquaintance.

Figure 4.11

Source: TPS Database
**Life on the Streets & Victimisation:**

According to the 2009 Street Needs Assessment conducted by the City of Toronto, the number homeless people in Toronto remained stable compared to 2006 (5,086 in 2009 compared to 5,052 in 2006). These numbers included people who were staying outdoors, in shelters, in health care and treatment facilities, incarcerated in Toronto area detention centres from a Toronto court, and in Violence Against Women shelters. The Street Needs Assessment was first conducted in 2006, as part of the Streets to Homes strategy, at the direction of City Council.

According to the 2009 Street Needs Assessment survey, when asked about interactions with police in the past six months, survey respondents overall, other than those in a correctional facility, indicated that 32% had interacted with police, compared to 37% in 2006. Interactions with police by the ‘outdoor’ population, however, increased to 58% in 2009 from 51% in 2006, even though the ‘outdoor’ population decreased 51%, from 818 in 2006 to 400 in 2009. Further information on the homeless population is included in the Urban Trends chapter.

According to a report by researchers at York University and the University of Guelph, homeless young people were victims of crime at rates that society would consider unacceptable for any other group. Over 76% of the street youth population reported at least one instance of criminal victimisation in the previous 12 months and almost three-quarters (73%) reported multiple incidents of victimisation. Only 20% of all respondents reported they had told police about their victimisation.

The study found that street youth aged 16-17 were most prone to victimisation. Three-quarters (75%) of teens aged 16-17 reported violent victimisation compared to 57% of those over the age of 20. Within the street population, they found that young women were more likely to report being victims of crime (86%) than males (72%). In particular, 38% of women reported being a victim of sexual assault and 55% reported at least one incident of partner abuse. Of those who reported an incident of partner abuse, 80% reported more than one incident.

The report added that “while street youth are often portrayed in public discussions as dangerous, threatening and delinquent, this new research highlights the degree to which it is street youth themselves who are clearly vulnerable to crime and violence”.

**F. Hate/Bias Crime**

As discussed in the Demographics chapter, the composition of Canada’s social, cultural, linguistic, and religious landscape is quickly changing. According to the two most recent census years (2001 and 2006), the proportion of visible minorities in Canada grew 27%, while those whose mother tongue was neither French nor English rose 18%. During the same period, the number of same-sex couples, including legally married and common-law partners, increased.

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33%. Also, between 1991 and 2001, the religious make-up in Canada changed, with substantial increases among those who reported Muslim, Hindu, Sikh, and Buddhist denominations.\textsuperscript{210}

According to Statistics Canada, in 2009, Canadian police services reported 1,473 hate crimes, an increase of 437 incidents or 42\% from 2008, and up by 708 incidents or 93\% from 2007. This type of incident accounted for less than 1\% of all crimes reported to police and represented a rate of 5 incidents per 100,000 population.

While the number of violent hate crimes in Canada rose in 2009, the increase in the number of non-violent hate crimes was more significant. The police-reported data show that the majority of hate crimes in 2009 occurred largely among non-violent offences, predominantly mischief (e.g., graffiti, vandalism to religious property), which accounted for more than half (54\%) of all hate crime incidents in 2009. Police reported no hate-motivated homicides in 2009.

Incidents motivated by sexual orientation were more likely than those driven by other motivations to involve violence. In 2009, 74\% of incidents motivated by sexual orientation involved a violent offence, usually assault. In comparison, 39\% of racially-motivated incidents and 21\% of religiously-motivated incidents were classified by police as violent in nature.

Race or ethnicity was the most common motivation for police-reported hate crime in Canada in 2009 (54\%), followed by religion (29\%), and sexual orientation (13\%). These proportions have remained relatively stable since 2006 when such police-reported hate crime data first became available. Blacks were the most commonly targeted racial group in 2009 (272 incidents), representing four in ten racially-motivated incidents reported by police. Proportionally, the largest increase involved hate crimes against Arabs or West Asians. The hate crime rate against this group doubled from 37 incidents in 2008 to 75 in 2009.\textsuperscript{211}

Consistent with previous years, in 2009, about 70\% of religiously-motivated hate crimes in Canada were committed against the Jewish faith. Hate crimes against the Jewish faith in 2009 increased 71\% over 2008, while hate crimes against the Muslim faith (Islam) rose by 38\%.

Consistent with other years, for both victims and persons accused of hate crime, the rate was highest among those aged 12 to 17 years and generally decreased with increasing age. According to police-reported data, hate crimes usually involved males, particularly as accused. In 2009, 92\% of those accused and 73\% of victims of hate crime were male. In comparison, 76\% of those accused and 49\% of victims of overall crime were male.

It is important to note that data collected by the GSS differ from police-reported data. The GSS information is based on perceptions of individuals as to whether or not a crime occurred and what the motivation for the crime may have been. On the other hand, police-reported information is based upon strict legal criteria for incidents that have been substantiated through investigation. In addition, GSS victimisation data may provide information on incidents that may not have come to the attention of police. According to the 2009 GSS, about one-third (34\%) of incidents perceived by respondents to have been motivated by hate were subsequently reported to police.

According to the 2009 GSS, 5\% of all incidents (approximately 399,000 incidents) reported were believed by victims to have been motivated by hate, up from 3\% (about 262,000) in 2004. Race continues to be the most common motivation for the incidents perceived to be motivated by hate.


\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
According to police-reported hate crime data, in 2009, the Toronto CMA reported the highest number of hate crimes at the CMA level, accounting for nearly 30% of the national total. However, when differences in population were taken into account by examining the rate, Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo had the highest rate at 17.9 hate crime victimisations per 100,000 people, followed by Guelph (17.1), Peterborough (14.8), and Ottawa (14.5). The Toronto CMA was 6.9 victimisations per 100,000 people, up from a rate of 5.4 in 2008.  

As shown in Figure 4.12, in Toronto, according to the Hate Crime Unit of the TPS Intelligence Division, there were a total of 132 hate/bias occurrences reported in 2010, a decrease of 24% compared to the 174 hate crimes reported in 2009, and 61% lower than the 338 hate crimes reported in 2001. In 2010, the single communities most targeted were the Jewish community (36 occurrences), the Black community (24), the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) community (19), and the Muslim/Islam community (13).  

As shown in Figure 4.13, mischief has consistently represented the highest proportion of reported hate crime offences since 2001. In 2010, mischief accounted for 75 (57%) offences, followed by 20 assaults (15%), 18 threatening offences (14%), 10 harassment offences (8%), and 2 wilful promotion of hatred (2%) offences. Over the ten year period, the proportion of mischief offences showed the only increase, going from 25% to 57% of all reported hate crime offences. Both threats (25% to 14%) and wilful promotion of hatred (13% to 2%) showed the largest decreases in proportion of hate crime offences over the same period.
The 75 mischief offences in 2010 represented a 15% decrease from the 88 mischief offences in 2009, and the 20 assaults in 2010 were a decrease of 29% compared to the 28 in 2009. The 18 threats reported in 2010 were a 31% decrease compared to the 26 in 2009, the 10 harassment offences in 2010 were a 41% decrease compared to the 17 in 2009, and the 2 wilful promotion of hatred offences in 2010 were a 75% decrease from the 8 in 2009.

Compared to ten years ago in 2001, in 2010 there were decreases in the number of each of these categories. In 2001, there were 72 assaults (a 72% decrease), 86 mischief offences (a 13% decrease), 85 threats (a 79% decrease), 27 harassment offences (a 63% decrease), and 45 wilful promotion of hatred offences (a 96% decrease).

In each of the past ten years, hate offences typically focused most frequently on race and religion: of the 1,752 hate offences recorded since 2001, these two categories together were the targets of almost two-thirds (61%) of offences. Figure 4.14 shows the number of offences targeting race and religion in each of the past ten years.

In 2010, offences within the category of race increased 11% (from 28 offences in 2009 to 31 in 2010), and those in the category of religion decreased 12% (from 59 in 2009 to 52 in 2010).

When compared to 2001, in 2010, there was a 66% decrease in hate offences targeting race (from 90 offences in 2001 to 31 in 2010), while offences targeting religion decreased 55% (from 118 in 2001 to 53 in 2010).

G. Identity Theft/Fraud

Identity theft and identity fraud are global crimes with very personal consequences. Members of the Toronto community can be victims of provincial, national, or international fraud schemes. While developments in telecommunications and computer processing make it easier for companies and consumers to reach each other, they can also scatter personal information more widely, making it easier for criminals to access.

According to data from the 2008 US Bureau of Justice Statistics Supplement to the National Crime Victimisation Survey, 11.7 million people, representing 5% of those age 16 or older in the US, were victims of one or more types of identity theft within a 2-year period. The most common type of identity theft, experienced by 53% of these victims (6.2 million people), was the unauthorized use of an existing credit card account.

The Supplement also reported that about 15% of all victims of identity theft contacted a credit bureau about the incident. Of those who contacted a credit bureau, just over three-quarters

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(76%) placed a fraud alert on their credit report. About 17% of all victims of identity theft contacted a law enforcement agency to report the incident. Almost half of the victims who did not report the theft to law enforcement reported it to a credit card company or bank instead.

At present, Canada relies on police-reported data for fraud information through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Survey. These data, however, do not reflect the true nature and extent of fraud in Canada due to, among other reasons, under-reporting of fraud by individuals and businesses. Incidents may not be reported to police for various reasons, such as private companies employed their own investigative personnel or individuals reported incidents such as credit card fraud to their financial institution only. Canadian police-reported data indicated there were 29,500 incidents of credit and debit card fraud in 2004. In contrast, the Canadian Bankers’ Association reported there were 177,000 incidents of fraudulent use of Visa and Mastercard credit cards alone in 2004.215

The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre (CAFC), jointly managed by the RCMP, OPP and the Competition Bureau Canada, maintains statistics on complaints received with respect to frauds such as telemarketing frauds and mass marketing frauds (MMF) (schemes that target many victims at the same time whether by telephone, facsimile, postal mail, or the Internet). These mass marketing frauds often involved identity crime, including identity theft and identity fraud.216 The 2010 CAFC Annual Statistical Report, based on complaints received by the Centre, reported that:217

- Ontario led on the total reported dollar loss by Canadian complainants targeted by MMF (over $12 million), followed by British Columbia (just over $9 million) and Alberta (about $5 million),
- Canadians between the ages of 50-59 were the most targeted by MMF operations,
- Canadian victims between the ages of 40-49 reported the highest dollar loss,
- ‘Telephone/Facsimile’ was reported as the most prevalent solicitation method used to solicit Canadian consumers,
- Canadian victims of an ‘E-mail/Internet/Text Messaging’ solicitation method had the highest total reported dollar loss, and
- Western Union was the top reported payment method used to receive funds from Canadian victims.

The CAFC Annual Statistical Report also indicated that there was a steady increase in the number of victims of Canadian-based MMF operations compared to 2008 and 2009. In 2010, there was an 18% increase compared to 2009 (2,752 victims compared to 2,335 victims) and a 54% increase compared to 2008 (2,752 victims compared to 1,791 victims). Again, these numbers are an under-reporting of the actual level of identity fraud/theft.

As prolific users of the Internet (chat rooms, instant messaging, social media sites such as MySpace, Friendster and Facebook), youth post a lot of personal information in developing profiles. Given this activity on the Internet, youth are viewed as an emerging group that will increasingly become the target of identity fraud.\(^{218}\)

The CAFC suggests that seniors are another targeted group, particularly susceptible to mass marketing and identity fraud schemes. As the senior generation tended to be more trusting and less likely to end conversations, fraudulent telemarketers built relationships with seniors to gain their trust in order to victimize them. According to the Public Health Agency of Canada, telemarketing fraud was one of the most common types of crime committed against older people. In Canada, two of every five victims of telemarketing fraud were over the age of 60, and of these, 67% were women.\(^{219}\) Ruined family lives, great financial losses, and suicides have resulted from this crime against the elderly.

For victims of identity theft and identity fraud; losses were not just monetary, but personal. In addition to feeling alienated or violated, victims felt fear and/or hopelessness. Also, people whose credit histories were tainted as a result of identity fraud may be denied employment or security clearances.\(^{220}\)

Public awareness and education are critical to reduce identity theft and identity fraud, providing the public with the tools needed to identify and prevent victimisation by constantly evolving fraud schemes. As important, public and private sector businesses and institutions must be aware of the value to criminals of the personal information they possess and must be encouraged to assess and update their security practices at all levels beyond current legislated privacy requirements.

Given the limited data currently available Canada-wide and within the Toronto Police Service, the full extent of identity theft/fraud is not entirely known. The Toronto Police Service should continue to work towards upgrading and enhancing data bases to capture the true extent of identity theft/fraud. The Service must continue to develop partnerships with public and private institutions, such as banks, postal institutions, government departments, credit bureaux, and other police agencies, to combat this global and ever-changing crime with a view of creating centralized sources of data and information sharing.

**H. Victim Resources**

According to the most recent Statistics Canada Victims Services survey, more than 400,000 victims of crime, within a one-year period between 2007 and 2008, sought assistance from the 686 victim service agencies studied.\(^{221}\)

During the one-year period between 2007 and 2008, the types of assistance most often provided by victim services agencies included: general information (95%), emotional support

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\(^{220}\) Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2007).

(93%), liaison with agencies for the client (91%), and information on criminal justice system structure and process (91%). During this period, the types of assistance most often provided by Ontario victim services agencies included: emotional support (98%), public education/prevention (97%), general information (95%), and liaising with other agencies on behalf of the client (94%).

A snapshot study to measure the use of victim services in Canada on a single day in May 2008 was also conducted. The study found that 9,808 victims were served by 728 agencies. About two-thirds (6,578) of those who received services were victims of crimes against the person. Of these, 31% were victims of sexual assault and 59% were victims of other violent crimes, including physical assault. Of all victims served on the day of the study, 61% were female, and 20% were male. (For 19% of victims, respondents were unable to provide a gender.)

The snapshot study reported that 209 victim services providers in Ontario served 3,277 people on a single day in May 2008. Of these, 68% were female and 15% were male. (For 17%, respondents were unable to provide the gender.) Most (84%) of those who received services were victims of crime against the person; of these, 30% were victims of sexual assault and 61% were victims of other violent crimes, including physical assault.

**Victim Services:**

The Victim Services Program of Toronto provides immediate crisis response, intervention, and prevention services to individuals, families, and communities affected by crime and sudden tragedies.

In 2010, the Victim Services Program of Toronto assisted 15,038 victims by telephone, a decrease of 1% compared to the 15,261 victims assisted in 2009 (Figure 4.15). However, the number of victims served by on-scene attendance in 2010 was 3,932, an increase of 25% compared to 2009 when 3,147 victims were assisted on-scene. The 10,154 incidents generated in 2010 was a 2% increase compared to the 9,932 in 2009.

![Responses by Victim Services Program](image)

**Figure 4.15** Source: Victim Services Program of Toronto, Inc.

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222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
The total number of volunteer hours logged in 2010 for Victim Services was 24,641, a 12% decrease when compared to 27,982 hours in 2009.

That the Toronto Police Service provide good assistance and support to victims, alone and in partnership with other community services such as the Victim Services Program of Toronto, is vital for the protection of victims, the engagement of witnesses, and the safety of communities. It will continue to be a challenge for the Service to continue to identify and meet the needs of victims in the city’s various and diverse communities.

**Child and Youth Advocacy Centre (CYAC) Pilot Project:**

Children’s Advocacy Centres (CACs) play an important role in the response to child sexual abuse and other child maltreatment in the United States. First developed in the 1980s, CACs were designed to reduce the stress on child abuse victims and families created by traditional child abuse investigation and prosecution procedures and to improve the effectiveness of the response.\(^{226}\)

Many experts believed that child victims were subjected to multiple, redundant interviews regarding their abuse, interviewed in environments that added further stress to the child, and that the response was hampered because multiple agencies involved did not coordinate their investigations. CACs were created to address these deficiencies by co-ordinating multidisciplinary investigation teams in a centralized, child-friendly setting. CACs employ forensic interviewers, specially trained to work with children and assist children and families to access medical, therapeutic, and advocacy services.

The number of CACs in the United States has grown significantly in the last 20 years. The first CAC was created in 1986; in 1994, there were 50 CACs and by 2006 there were more than 600 CACs established nationwide.

Modeled after similar centres in the United States, there are only four such centres in Canada: the Zebra Child Protection Centre in Alberta, the Child Advocacy Centre Niagara, the Marie-Vincent Foundation in Montreal, and the CAC in Manitoba, which opened in June 2011.

Stakeholders in the City of Toronto have been working toward a Child & Youth Advocacy Centre (CYAC) for many years. Despite the existence of the ‘Protocol for Joint Investigations of Child Physical and Sexual Abuse: Guidelines and Procedures for a Co-ordinated Response to Child Abuse in the City of Toronto’ (Child Abuse Protocol), there was growing awareness that it was often not being followed. Investigations were not co-ordinated, multiple victim interviews were conducted, and referrals were not always made for services.

To address ongoing challenges in providing co-ordinated investigations and treatment services to victims of child abuse and their families, the Investigative Partnership Committee (IPC) was established in March 2005. Its members include the Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, the Jewish Family and Child Services, Native Child and Family Services, and the Toronto Police Service (TPS). In November 2005, the IPC proposed the establishment of a Child & Youth Advocacy Centre (CYAC) for the City of Toronto. A CYAC would be a single location where all professionals involved in the

investigation, treatment, and follow-up of child abuse could work together to ensure that
children’s safety and best interests are the primary focus.

The IPC continued to meet as a group and co-ordinated its efforts with several other
community partners, becoming the Child & Youth Advocacy Committee (CYAC Committee).
In addition to the IPC members, this Committee includes representatives from The Gatehouse,
the Safe-T Program of the Thisletown Regional Treatment Centre, the SCAN Program at the
Hospital for Sick Children, Boost Child Abuse Prevention & Intervention (formerly known as
the Toronto Child Abuse Centre), and the Crown Attorney’s Office.

Although the CYAC Committee is still seeking a location and funding, in the interim, it
was decided that a pilot project would test parts of the CYAC model using The Gatehouse as the
interview site and introducing a Victim Advocate into the system. The pilot project was
launched on April 1st, 2011, and is being evaluated by an external consultant. The Service’s Sex
Crimes Unit is leading and co-ordinating the Toronto Police Service’s role in the one-year pilot
project, which involves 22 and 23 Divisions, with 32 and 33 Divisions as comparison divisions.

Although the report on the pilot project will be provided after April 2012, some insight
into the potential findings of the pilot project may be gleaned from the outcomes reported in the
recent evaluation of the CAC model used in the US. Four sites were evaluated with comparison
communities that did not have a CAC. Key research finding included:\n
- 81% of investigations in CACs were joint police and child protective services
  investigations, compared with 52% in comparison communities;
- 55% of CAC interviews involved police, compared with 43% of comparison community
  interviews;
- 83% of CACs held interviews in centre facilities designed for interviewing children,
  while 75% of interviews in comparison communities were conducted in child protective
  agencies, schools, police stations, or children’s homes;
- 85% of cases in both CACs and comparison communities involved only one child
  forensic interview; and
- 67% to 84% of charges resulted in convictions in both CACs and comparison
  communities. One CAC filed more criminal charges than its comparison community (but
  also dismissed more), and another secured longer jail sentences for offenders. These
  CACs had strong police and prosecutor involvement in cases.

Apart from the pilot project, it critical that the Toronto Police Service ensure that
members continue to follow the Child Abuse Protocol to reduce the stress on child abuse victims
and families.

High Risk Support Services:

Victim Services of Toronto continues to improve programs and services, as demonstrated
by the recent merging of the Domestic Violence Emergency Response System (DVERS)
program and the SupportLink Program.\n
228 The DVERS program provided victims of domestic violence who were at high risk of experiencing violence by an intimate ex-partner with a
personal alarm system. The SupportLink Program provided victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and criminal harassment with cellular phones for 911 access.

Based on identified areas of overlap and duplication, these two programs were merged into the High Risk Support Services, thereby increasing service hours, provision, and resources. In addition to minimizing duplication and overlap, the new High Risk Support Services, streamlined services for clients and referring agencies; when an individual or an agency wanted to enquire about an alarm, a cell phone, or safety planning, they called one number and all services they require were handled by one person.

**Teens Ending Abusive Relationships (Project T.E.A.R.):**

Project T.E.A.R. – Victim Services Toronto’s only early intervention, prevention, and assistance program – was designed to educate students in grades 8-12 in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) about the dynamics of teen relationship violence. Since 2008, the program has delivered a total of 153 presentations to 18,336 students; 88 of those presentations were delivered to 10,000 students in 2010. In striving to ensure that T.E.A.R is accessible to all youth, the presentation was amended to meet the needs of marginalized communities, including students with developmental disabilities and deaf and hard-of-hearing students. The Program was also presented to Aboriginal youth living throughout the GTA through the Tim Hortons Camp, and the Empowered Student Partnership Program (now known as the Student Action Teams) through a workshop.

Partnerships with those communities and other agencies assisting victims, along with the search for efficiencies and effectiveness in Service processes will improve both the scale and reach of services provided.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICE**

- Research shows that children and youth may not disclose experiences of online sexual exploitation for many reasons, including being too frightened or embarrassed or not understanding the magnitude of the situation. The Service must continue partnerships with schools and other community organizations in raising awareness of relatively new types of crimes such as child luring through the Internet.

- The Toronto Police Service must continue to work with community partners and other government agencies to encourage seniors to report abuse and to enhance awareness with respect to scams, such as telemarketing fraud, to which seniors are especially vulnerable.

- Apart from the CYAC pilot project, the Toronto Police Service must ensure that members follow the Child Abuse Protocol to reduce the stress on child abuse victims and families.

- The Toronto Police Service must continue education efforts focused on the importance of reporting crime and victimisation to police, and the various reporting methods available. In

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229 Ibid.
order to reach all community members, programs must make use of all available streams of communication, including social media, presentations, pamphlets, and media.

- Given the limited data currently available within the Toronto Police Service, the full extent of identity theft/fraud is not entirely known. The Toronto Police Service must continue to explore upgrading and enhancing databases to better capture the true extent of identity theft/fraud incidents.

- The Toronto Police Service must continue to develop partnerships with public and private institutions (e.g., banks, postal institutions, government departments, credit bureaux, and other police agencies) to combat identity theft/fraud. Work must be undertaken with a view of creating centralized data sources and extensive capability for information sharing.
V. Traffic

As vehicles travel throughout the city, it is important to understand their influence on public safety and policing. Drivers have a responsibility to operate in a safe manner, and the police have a responsibility to ensure that they do so. Traffic engineering and design, education, enforcement, and strong partnerships with traffic safety organisations are vital to traffic safety. An idea of patterns and trends associated with the movement and volume of traffic will assist in predicting demand for police resources. Emergency vehicles face many challenges navigating city streets, and, in addition to this safety concern, traffic congestion is frustrating to the public, the police, and other drivers. Issues surrounding vehicle and pedestrian traffic continue to be a priority for the larger community.

Highlights

- Every year, almost 1.3 million people die worldwide in traffic collisions and as many as 50 million are injured; nearly half of those killed are pedestrians, motorcyclists, cyclists and passengers in public transport.

- The term ‘accident’ can give the impression that traffic events can not be managed, because they are unpredictable and inevitable. However, traffic events can be analyzed and action taken towards prevention.

- Canada’s Road Safety Vision Plan targeted a 30% reduction in the average number of road users killed or seriously injured between 2008 and 2010. The number of road users killed in traffic crashes in 2009 decreased 9% from 2008 and reflected the lowest death toll on record in Canada in more than 60 years.

- According to the Toronto Screenline count, on a typical 24-hour weekday, 1.3 million vehicles enter the City of Toronto and 1.4 million vehicles exit across the boundaries. Over the period 2002-2010, the total inbound traffic volumes increased by 3%, while the outbound traffic volumes decreased approximately 9%.

- In 2010, there were 54,904 collisions, a slight decrease (3%) from the 56,291 collisions in 2009 and a 25% decrease from the 73,174 collisions in 2001. The number of collisions per year has remained relatively constant since 2004.

- In 2010, the average time spent at a personal injury collision increased slightly (2%) to 264.7 minutes from 260.7 minutes in 2009. The average time spent by officers on a personal injury collision shows a generally increasing trend over the past ten years.

- There were 43 people killed in traffic collisions in 2010, the lowest number in the past ten years, and a decrease of 10% from the 48 killed in 2009, and 23% from the 56 people killed in 2001.

- In 2008, the city of Toronto commenced several pedestrian safety initiatives including the pedestrian scramble pilot project (Barnes’ dance), which gives a walk signal to pedestrians in all directions at the same time, while drivers are stopped in all directions. This project and
others may contribute to safer pedestrian and driver practices at intersections, which may reduce collisions, injuries, and deaths.

- In 2001, Toronto City Council adopted the Toronto Bike Plan, earmarking $73 million over 10 years to develop a comprehensive network of bike lanes and bike routes throughout the city, and to implement several safety systems for cyclists. Most of these systems are now in place and are expected to improve cycling conditions, and reduce collisions involving cyclists.


- In 2010, 2,209 people were charged with drinking and driving offences in Toronto, a 3% decrease from the 2,269 charged in 2009 and a 19% decrease from the 2,741 charged in 2001. Generally, the number of persons charged with drinking and driving offences has followed a downward trend since 2001.

- According to recently published studies released by the Canadian Centre in Substance Abuse, drug-impairment may also be a contributing factor to collisions and fatal road crashes. The overall pattern of findings indicate that the use of drugs by drivers is an issue distinct and separate from that of alcohol use and requires a different approach to prevention, education and enforcement.

A. THE GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

Roads are the most complex and most dangerous public systems that people use every day. Road traffic injuries are a major public health problem and a leading cause of death and injury around the world. Each year, nearly 1.3 million people die and as many as 50 million more are injured or disabled as a result of road crashes. Low- and middle-income countries have higher road traffic fatality rates (21.5 and 19.5 per 100 000 population, respectively) than high-income countries (10.3 per 100 000). Over 90% of the world’s fatalities on the roads occur in low-income and middle-income countries, which have only 48% of the world’s registered vehicles.

As well as creating enormous social costs for individuals, families, and communities, road traffic injuries place a heavy burden on health services and economies. Because motorization has increased and will continue to do so, preventing road traffic crashes and the injuries they inflict will become an increasing social and economic challenge, particularly in developing countries. If present trends continue, road traffic injuries will increase dramatically in most parts of the world over the next two decades.

The greatest effect will be on the most vulnerable citizens, such as pedestrians, cyclists, and drivers of motorized two-wheelers and their passengers. According to the *Global Status Report on Road Safety*, launched by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2009, these

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vulnerable citizens account for approximately 46% of global road traffic deaths. The report finds that significantly more action is needed to make the world’s roads safer. It is estimated that road traffic crashes cost:

- US $518 billion globally,
- US $65 billion in low-income and middle-income countries,
- between 1% and 1.5% of gross national product in low-income and middle-income countries, and
- 2% of gross national product in high-income countries.

Traditionally, motor vehicle accidents have been viewed as random events that are an inevitable result of road use. While the term ‘accident’ can give the impression that traffic events cannot be managed because of unpredictability and inevitability, traffic events can be analysed and action can be taken towards prevention. The fundamental perception among traffic safety professionals around the world has shifted toward a new understanding of road safety. According to the WHO, this road safety paradigm shift is based on the following assumptions:

- Road collisions are largely preventable and predictable; it is a human-made problem that can be improved with rational analysis and counter-measures.
- Road safety is a multi-sector and public health issue and all stakeholders, including government services and health institutions, need to be responsible for activity and advocacy toward prevention.
- Common driving errors and common pedestrian behaviour should not lead to death and serious injury, and traffic safety systems need to cope effectively with demanding conditions.
- The vulnerability of the human body must be a parameter for speed management and road design.
- Traffic collisions is also a social equity issue; equal protection to all road users should be an aim of protection since non-motor vehicle users bear a disproportionate share of the risk of death and injury.
- Technology should fit local conditions and address research-based local requirements.
- Local knowledge must inform the implementation of local solutions to traffic concerns.

**Traffic Safety Models:**

There are several world-wide approaches and advances in understanding the behavioural, vehicle-related, and road-related factors that affect the number and severity of traffic casualties. Many of these approaches have been based on the Haddon Matrix, a conceptual model developed by William Haddon in 1970. The Matrix is an analytical tool that is used to assist in developing ideas for injury prevention. As such, it provides a compelling framework for understanding the interaction between three factors (human, vehicle and the environment) during

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231 Ibid.
232 Ibid.
the three phases of a crash event (pre-crash, crash and post-crash). The Haddon Matrix is shown in Table 5.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Factors</th>
<th>Vehicle/Equipment Factors</th>
<th>Environmental Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-Crash</strong> (crash prevention)</td>
<td>- information</td>
<td>- roadworthiness (e.g. mirrors, tire quality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- attitude (e.g. experience, risk-taking behaviours)</td>
<td>- lighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- impairment (e.g. alcohol, medications, fatigue)</td>
<td>- brake condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- handling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- speed capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crash</strong> (injury prevention during crash)</td>
<td>- use of restraints (e.g. seat belts)</td>
<td>- occupant restraints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- impairment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- physical characteristics (e.g. age, stature, bone density)</td>
<td>- crash protective design (e.g. fuel system integrity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-Crash</strong> (life sustaining)</td>
<td>- physical characteristics (e.g. age, pre-existing medical conditions)</td>
<td>- ease of access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- first aid skill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- access to medics</td>
<td>- fire risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Health Organization

William Haddon’s model has led to substantial advances in the understanding of the behavioural, road-related, and vehicle-related factors that affect the number and severity of casualties in road traffic. Building on Haddon’s insights, the ‘systems’ approach seeks to identify and rectify the major sources of error or design weakness that contribute to fatal and severe injury collisions, as well as to mitigate the severity and consequences of injury by: reducing exposure to risk; preventing road traffic collisions from occurring; reducing the severity of injury in the event of a collision; and reducing the consequences of injury through improved post-collision care.

Evidence from some highly-motorized countries shows that this integrated approach to road safety produces a marked decline in road deaths and serious injuries, but that the practical realization of the systems approach remains the most important challenge for road safety policymakers and professionals. The development of traffic safety policy involves a wide range of participants representing diverse interests, including police, legislators, government departments (transportation, justice, health, planning, and education), members of the public, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and media. Historically, governmental responsibilities for traffic safety fall within the transport ministry with other government departments having some responsibility for key areas.

Road safety is best achieved when all the key groups identified share a culture of road safety, where the providers and enforcers of road traffic systems (vehicle manufacturers, road traffic planners, road safety engineers, police, educators, health professionals, insurers, etc.) take

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234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
responsibility for ensuring that their products and services meet the highest possible standards for road safety. Road users take responsibility by complying with laws, informing themselves, engaging in safe road behaviour, and engaging in discussion and debate about road safety issues.

The World Health Organization sets out four interrelated steps that will assist road safety professionals and policy makers to identify issues and risks, and develop and implement intervention programs:

- **Surveillance** – This phase determines the magnitude, scope, and characteristics of the problem. In the case of road traffic injuries, this step includes obtaining information on the demographic characteristics of the people involved, the temporal and geographical features of the incident, the circumstances under which it occurred, and the severity and cost of the injuries.

- **Risk Factor Identification** – This phase identifies factors that contribute to the risk of injury or disability and determines the potentially modifiable factors. This step may also be used to define populations at high risk for injuries and to suggest specific interventions.

- **Intervention Development and Evaluation** – This step determines what works: assessing, measuring, pilot testing, and evaluating interventions.

- **Implementation** – This phase determines how to implement proven and effective interventions, and evaluate their effectiveness.\(^{236}\)

### B. CANADA’S NATIONAL ROAD SAFETY PLAN

Since 1996, Canada has had a road safety vision of having ‘the safest roads in the world’. Jurisdictions, under the auspices of the Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators (CCMTA), along with other key stakeholders, such as police and road safety organizations, have been working towards this vision through the direction of road safety plans. Road Safety Vision 2001, Canada’s inaugural national road safety vision and plan was adopted by the Council of Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety in 1996. Under this plan, fatalities decreased by 10%, while serious injuries declined 16% despite steady increases in the road user population.

In October 2000, Road Safety Vision 2010 was approved by the Council of Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety. It retained the vision and strategic objectives and added an overall national target and sub-targets. The quantitative targets were intended to provide road safety stakeholders with broad-based benchmark data of key road safety indicators, against which intervention efforts could be measured. The national target called for a 30% decrease in the average number of road users killed and seriously injured during the 2008-2010 period over comparable 1996-2001 baseline figures. The sub-targets’ proposed reductions

ranged from 20% to 40%, to address the specific areas of occupant restraints, impaired driving, commercial vehicle safety, vulnerable road users, speed and intersection safety, rural roadways, young drivers and high-risk drivers.\textsuperscript{237} It was expected the achievement of these targets would further reduce Canada’s road fatality total to fewer than 2,100 per annum by 2010. A review indicated that, in 2007, fatalities were 6% lower than the baseline, while serious injuries were almost 15% lower.

Canada’s Road Safety Vision 2010 has also played a pivotal role in raising the profile of traffic safety concerns among the enforcement community. In their efforts to help achieve the objective of the vision, the enforcement community, for the most part, changed its traffic services delivery model, from a random patrol enforcement strategy to a team service delivery model where data analysis is combined with education and enforcement strategies to address key causal factors through targeted enforcement.\textsuperscript{238}

In January 2011, the Ministers Responsible for Transportation and Highway Safety approved a new five-year Road Safety Strategy under which Canada will continue to strive to have the safest roads in the world. The strategy will be used by individual jurisdictions to develop federal/provincial/territorial action plans to address key highway safety concerns and priorities for their respective and unique situations. Road Safety Strategy 2015 will carry on the progress that has been achieved in reducing fatalities and serious injuries on Canada’s roads. The provisional number of fatalities for 2009 was 9% lower than the number of road users killed in traffic collisions during 2008, and was 25% lower than the 1996-2001 baseline figure. This was the lowest death toll on record in Canada in more than 60 years\textsuperscript{239}.

The new Road Safety Strategy is the result of a broad collaborative effort between all levels of government, public and private road safety stakeholders, and the enforcement community. The result of these partnerships is a multi-tiered approach to road safety. It provides each province and territory with a wide variety of solutions to address key road safety risks – initiatives that are focused on road users, the vehicles they use, and the roadway infrastructure on which they operate. The Canadian Council of Motor Transport Administrators (CCMTA) will lead the implementation of the strategy and support stakeholders in the process.\textsuperscript{240}

The unveiling of Road Safety Strategy 2015 coincides with the National Year of Road Safety in 2011, an ambitious undertaking which aims to raise public awareness and promote road safety activities nationwide. The Canadian Global Road Safety Committee, whose membership is made up of injury prevention and road safety professionals, is leading this initiative.\textsuperscript{241}


\textsuperscript{238} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{240} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
C. CITY OF TORONTO – TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW

The city of Toronto is the 5th largest city in North America by population and it covers an area of 641 square kilometres, stretching 43 kilometres from east to west and 21 kilometres from north to south. There are approximately 10,033 different streets with 5,389 km of roadway; these streets, expressways, ramps and laneways cover approximately 27% of the city’s area. According to the 2006 Census, there were 1,141,301 vehicles registered to 979,330 households, approximately 1.2 vehicles per household. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide general transportation information for the City of Toronto.

Table 5.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Road Class</th>
<th>Toronto and East York (km)</th>
<th>Etobicoke and York (km)</th>
<th>North York (km)</th>
<th>Scarborough (km)</th>
<th>City-wide (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Expressway</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Arterial</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor Arterial</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collector</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>3,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (km)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,149</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,534</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,349</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,357</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,389</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Toronto, Transportation Services

Table 5.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transportation Network Facts</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sidewalks</td>
<td>7,945 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Control Signals</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subway Routes</td>
<td>68 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus Routes</td>
<td>7,199 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streetcar Routes</td>
<td>304 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedestrian Crossovers</td>
<td>585</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flashing Beacons</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Audible Pedestrian Signals</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Red Light Camera Locations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bike Lanes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bike Trails</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bike Routes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Toronto, Transportation Services

D. TRAFFIC CONGESTION

A study conducted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted that traffic congestion in the Toronto region costs Canada $3.3-billion in lost productivity a year – the result of urban sprawl, decades of underinvestment in public transit by Ottawa, and a disjointed system. In the first review of its type into the region’s economy, the OECD says transit services in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area have not kept pace with

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243 Ibid.
population growth. And with 71% of commuters still dependent on the automobile, Toronto has one of the highest rates of car use in cities of the organization’s 30 member countries.244

But there are a number of plans that have been or will be implemented to alleviate some of the effects of congestion in the city. The most discussed strategy is to reduce the demand for vehicular traffic through the increased use of public transit, more cycling and pedestrian activity, and by encouraging car pooling to reduce single occupancy vehicles.245 Additionally, strategies to make more efficient use of the space available through improved signal timing, modified no-parking and no-stopping regulations, and by better managing disruptions due to construction, special events, and utility work are being considered.

While the strategy to reduce the demand on roads is considered by many to be the best option, it is also extremely challenging. To get more people to take public transportation or to have more people carpool requires a major shift in people’s attitudes. The city continues to make efforts to improve the flow of people in the city. Bus, bike, and HOV lanes place the priority on public transit, cycling, and carpooling, allowing traffic to move more efficiently.246 The Service can support these initiatives through traffic enforcement, particularly HOV lanes, and providing safety initiatives that promote safe driving, cycling, and transit use.

E. CITY OF TORONTO – VOLUME COUNTS

Motor Vehicles:

The city’s Transportation Services Division has undertaken traffic volume data collection (Screenline Program) each year since 2002. The purpose of this program is to provide an approximation of all vehicles incoming to and outgoing from the city of Toronto on an average weekday, and to illustrate traffic volume (distribution by road class and hourly volume distribution) and the traffic volumes changes year over year. Collecting and analyzing this type of information can assist in infrastructure planning, developing transportation policies, monitoring travel trends, and in assessing the potential influences of transportation changes. It can also provide baseline information for future projections. The 2010 Screenline report summarized the traffic volume information and provided a comparative analysis for the findings from 2002 to 2010.247

The Screenline Program is conducted in June every year and collects traffic volumes at all access points at the city’s boundaries. The Screenline Program collects traffic counts continuously over a threeweekday period (Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday). In this report, weekday volume is the average traffic volume of this three-day period.248 Key findings of the report include that on a typical 24-hour weekday in 2010, 1.3 million vehicles entered the city of Toronto and 1.4 million vehicles exited across the boundaries. (It is important to note that the highway volumes are not available on a yearly basis; the total volumes entering and exiting the

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246 Ibid.
248 Ibid.
city on highways reflect the latest highway counts available.) It was reported that traffic volumes across boundaries have been relatively steady over the period between 2002 and 2010, and hourly volume distributions have shown only minor changes over time.

In this study, weekday volume was the average traffic volume of this three-day period. As shown in Table 5.4 below, between 2002 and 2009, the inbound traffic volumes increased 3% (average increase of approximately 0.5% per year), and the outbound traffic volumes increased approximately 9% (average increase of approximately 1% per year).

### Table 5.4
**Traffic Trend: All City Roads, Highway Volumes Included**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inbound</th>
<th>Outbound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Change (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1,272,955</td>
<td>1,267,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,314,451</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Toronto Transportation Services, 2010

As shown in Table 5.5 below, traffic volume on Toronto roadways, excluding highways, showed some fluctuation year over year, but has been relatively steady over the past nine years. Between 2002 and 2010, the inbound traffic volumes for all City roads, excluding highway, increased 4%, while the outbound traffic volumes decreased approximately 3%.

### Table 5.5
**Traffic Trend: All City Roads, No Highway Volumes Included**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inbound</th>
<th>Outbound</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Change (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>668,838</td>
<td>697,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>646,852</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>664,103</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>678,096</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>687,606</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>683,939</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>660,515</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>673,540</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>696,106</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Toronto Transportation Services, 2010

**Bicycles:**

In September 2010, the city of Toronto conducted its first Bicycle Count along four screenlines in the downtown core: between Bloor Street West, Spadina Avenue, Queens Quay Boulevard, and Jarvis Street. The number of people on a bicycle who crossed a screenline were counted on 34 streets for one 12-hour time period, on a day without precipitation. This Bicycle Count provided data on how many cyclists are riding on downtown streets, when and where they
are riding, and other characteristics about cyclists such as helmet use, gender, sidewalk riding, and whether the cyclist was transporting a passenger.

Between 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. on a typical weekday in September 2010, 19,162 cyclists entered Toronto's downtown core, and 15,241 exited the core. The western screenline at Spadina Avenue had the highest bicycle volume, carrying 45% of all cyclists travelling to and from the core. The majority (62%) of cyclists were male, 46% wore a helmet, and 95% rode on the street rather than on the sidewalk. Very few (0.3%) of counted cyclists were passengers (e.g. in a child seat or trailer). With the new bicycle rental stands in the downtown area, there may be more cyclists on city roads, particularly in the summer.

F. Traffic Collisions

Traffic collisions in the city affect not only the people involved in a collision, but also other drivers and pedestrians, services, the economy, and the environment. Understanding when, where, and to whom traffic collisions occur, can assist in the effective and efficient deployment of traffic programs and resources. Data from both reportable and non-reportable traffic collisions is necessary for a comprehensive analysis of traffic collisions.249

The Toronto Collision Clock 2009 provides interesting data on collisions in Toronto.

As shown in Figure 5.1 there were 54,904 collisions in 2010, a 3% decrease from the 56,291 collisions in 2009 and a 25% decrease from the 73,174 collisions ten years ago in 2001. Notwithstanding some year over year variation, the number of traffic collisions has been relatively stable since 2004. New initiatives may be needed if the number of collisions is to be reduced further.

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249 Reportable’ collisions are those resulting in either property damage of $1,000 or more, or personal injury, or both. The reporting of such collisions to the police is mandatory under the Highway Traffic Act. ‘Non-reportable’ collisions are those resulting in property damage only, where the damage is less than $1,000. The reporting of such collisions to the police is not mandatory under the Highway Traffic Act. However, many of these collisions are reported to the police for insurance purposes.
Figure 5.2 shows that the number of property damage collision calls attended by police in 2010 increased slightly (1%) to 15,532 from the 15,338 attended in 2009, but decreased 40% from 2001, when 25,726 events were attended. After ten years of steady decline in the number of property damage collision events attended, the numbers in 2009 and 2010 were the lowest. Of the total number of collision events attended in each of the past ten years, on average, just under six in ten (57%) were property damage collisions. In 2010, 51% of collision events attended involved property damage only.

In 2010, the average time spent on a property damage collision was 104.8 minutes (1.7 hours), relatively unchanged (-0.4%) compared to 105.2 minutes (1.8 hours) in 2009 and a decrease of 8% compared to 114.1 minutes in (1.9 hours) in 2001 (Figure 5.3). It should be noted that in 2000, the average time spent was only 80.2 minutes (1.3 hours). The significant increase in average time spent per property damage collisions beginning in 2001 was most likely due to a revision in the Service’s Collision procedure in early 2001 that directed officers to investigate reportable collisions at the scene, regardless of criteria that might allow for referral to the Collision Reporting Centre (CRC). The slight increase in 2007 and longer than average waiting times since then may be attributable to a number of factors, including lack of policing experience, lack of exposure to traffic investigations, more complicated collision investigations, etc.

Recent trends in the number of personal injury collision and average time spent investigating a personal injury collision are shown in Figures 5.4 and 5.5. As seen in Figure 5.4, and in contrast to the decreasing trend seen in the number of personal damage collision events, the number of personal injury collision events attended increased in 2010 to 14,795, a 7% increase from both the 13,849 personal injury collision events in 2009 and the 13,822 in 2001. However, the total number of personal injury collisions attended has remained relatively stable since 2004.
As seen in Figure 5.5, the average time spent on a personal injury collision has shown a trend of continued increase since 2001. In 2010, the average time spent at a personal injury collision increased slightly (2%) to 264.7 minutes (4.4 hours) from 2009 when the average time was 260.7 minutes (4.3 hours). The 2010 average time reflected an 12% increase from the 237.5 minutes (4.0 hours) in 2001. As previously discussed, factors that could be contributing to this trend include officers’ lack of policing experience, lack of exposure to traffic investigations, insufficient training, and more complicated investigations. The increase in time spent at both property damage and personal injury collisions may indicate less efficient methods of investigating traffic collisions.

There were 5,686 Fail-To-Remain events attended by police in 2010. This represented only a very slight increase from the 5,666 events attended in 2009 (0.4%), and only a very slight decrease from the 5,707 events attended in 2001 (-0.4%). As shown in Figure 5.6, the majority of Fail-To-Remain events involved property damage, rather than personal injury collisions; generally about eight in ten Fail-To-Remain events were property damage collisions. In the last ten years, Fail-To-Remain property damage collisions have averaged about 4,500 collisions. With the exception of 2005, the Fail-To-Remain collisions involving personal injury have increased every year since 2001, increasing by almost a half (46%) from 913 events in 2001 to 1,336 such events in 2010.

**Service Vehicle Collisions:**

As shown in Table 5.6, there were 608 Service vehicle collisions in 2010, the lowest level in the past five years. The data in this table reflect all fully completed Service vehicle collision reports received by Professional Standards and input into Professional Standards Information System. It is noteworthy that in 2010, members with less than five years of service accounted for 42% of Service vehicle collisions and members with between six and ten years of service...
accounted for a further 21%. It should be noted the majority of the uniform members are within those length of service ranges and are most likely to be assigned to a position where they spend a large portion of their shift driving, e.g. Primary Response. Over the past few years, a concerted effort on the part of Police Vehicles Operations staff and unit training sergeants has been made to reduce Service vehicle collisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Service</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1 year</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 5 years</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 - 10 years</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 15 years</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 20 years</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 25 years</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 30 years</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 30 years</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Driver*</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The term ‘no driver’ refers to incidents where Service vehicles were hit while parked.

Source: TPS Professional Standards – Risk Management Unit

**Traffic Fatalities:**

In 2010, 43 people were killed in traffic collisions in Toronto, a decrease of 10% from the 48 killed in 2009 and a 23% decrease from the 56 killed in 2001 (Figure 5.7). The 43 people killed in 2010 represented the lowest number of traffic deaths in ten years and the continuation of a remarkable downward trend since an extraordinary level (97 traffic fatalities) experienced in 2002.

As seen in Figure 5.8, of the 43 traffic fatalities in 2010, pedestrians (20) and cyclists (2) accounted for slightly more than half. Over the past ten years, pedestrians and cyclists have accounted for between five and seven in ten traffic fatalities.
The involvement of senior pedestrians in serious traffic events has been an on-going concern for Toronto Police. In 2010, six seniors lost their lives in pedestrian collisions, the lowest number of senior fatalities since 2001. In 2010, seniors accounted for 30% of pedestrian fatalities compared to 61% in 2009 and 41% in 2001 (Figure 5.9).

Toronto, in comparison to several other Canadian cities, has the highest cyclist collision rate per 100,000 population, followed by Vancouver and Montreal (Table 5.7). However, it should be noted that as shown in Figure 5.8, the number of cyclists killed in traffic collisions has remained between zero and three since 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total Collisions</th>
<th>Collision Rate per 100,000 Population</th>
<th>Cyclist Collisions</th>
<th>Cyclist Collision Rate per 100,000 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>2,645,980</td>
<td>54,894</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>1,896,206</td>
<td>35,406</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>1,042,892</td>
<td>39,542</td>
<td>3,792</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td>870,800</td>
<td>15,638</td>
<td>1,796</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmonton</td>
<td>752,412</td>
<td>29,072</td>
<td>3,864</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winnipeg</td>
<td>665,028</td>
<td>14,726</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>578,041</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>504,559</td>
<td>3,314</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transport Canada 2011
G. SAFETY SYSTEMS FOR PEDESTRIANS

In October 2007, City Council adopted the staff report, Sustainable Transportation Initiatives: Short-term Proposals.250 The report contains several proposals for short-term initiatives to improve transportation in Toronto, including pedestrian-focused initiatives. These initiatives include:

- Pedestrian Countdown Signals – Signals indicate how much time is left in the green light phase for pedestrians to cross the intersection. These timers have been installed at intersections in conjunction with a city project to convert traffic signal heads to LED lighting.

- Pedestrian Scramble Pilot Project (Barnes’ dance) – Pedestrian signal gives a walk signal to pedestrians in all directions (priority phase) at the same time, including diagonally, while drivers are stopped in all directions. The primary advantage is that pedestrians can cross the intersection without any conflicting motor vehicle movements. City Council identified four intersections for implementation: Bloor and Bay; Bloor and Yonge; Yonge and Dundas; and Bay and Dundas.251 The pilot project commenced in August 2008, at Yonge/Dundas. It was determined that on a typical weekday, over an eight hour period, approximately 58,000 pedestrians and 36,000 vehicles passed through this intersection. Through an on-site survey in November 2008, it was determined that 89% of pedestrians surveyed were in favour of the priority phase.252 The project will be evaluated in 2011.253

- Leading Pedestrian Interval Phase – This signal system provides an advanced walk signal, so that pedestrians begin to cross the street before vehicles get a green signal. The Leading Pedestrian Phase has been initiated at the intersection of University Avenue and Adelaide Street West. More intersections will be identified for this initiative in the future.

- Accessible Pedestrian Signals (APS) – This signal system uses audible signals to assist pedestrians who are blind or visually impaired. At present, there are 451 APS signalized intersections; the city plans to retrofit 27 additional signalized intersections with APS in 2011.254

- Pedestrian Crossover Enhancement Program – This program is in place to improve pedestrian crossovers throughout the city. Enhancements that are underway or planned

253 Ibid.
include zebra-striped pavement markings, flashing beacons, and signs. In 2010, 300 intersections had zebra crosswalk markings installed.

Pedestrian Pilot Projects:

The city has a number of guidelines, programs, and projects that focus on improving pedestrian environments such as the pedestrian priority intersections that are described above, Discovery Walks, the WalkIntoHealth program, and the Live Green Initiative. There are two additional strategies that have been initiated in the last two years:

Toronto Walking Strategy:

The Toronto Walking Strategy is an integrated approach that brings together several city divisions and agencies to create physical and cultural environments that encourage walking. The aim of the Walking Strategy is to build a physical and cultural environment that supports and encourages walking, including vibrant streets, parks, public squares, and neighbourhoods where people will choose to walk more often. By envisioning a city where high-quality walking environments are seamlessly integrated with public transit, cycling, and other sustainable modes of travel, the Strategy sets out a plan that will produce tangible environmental, health, and social benefits for residents and visitors to Toronto. The Walking Strategy was adopted by Toronto City Council in 2009 and supports Toronto’s sustainable transportation initiatives that call for new ways to think about transportation and to help the City meet emission reduction targets set in the Climate Change, Clean Air and Sustainable Action Plan. In addition, the program also supports Toronto Public Health’s “Call to Action” for healthier, active living. After an extensive public consultation program and discussion with external organizations and relevant City divisions and agencies, the Toronto Walking Strategy includes policies, infrastructure, and programming to help create a rich culture of walking in Toronto.

Pedestrian Zone Pilot Project:

The implementation of Pedestrian Zone pilot projects in locations with significant pedestrian activity is an important element identified in the city’s Walking Strategy. In September 2010, the City of Toronto, in partnership with Ryerson University and the University of Toronto, implemented a Pedestrian Zone pilot project at four locations: two at Ryerson University and two at the University of Toronto, St. George Campus. The city has supplied chairs, tables, and umbrellas, which will be further supplemented by the universities.

An additional location for a Pedestrian Zone pilot project has been identified by the North York Community Council. On May 25th, 2011, the Community Council authorised the temporary closure of a short section of Orchard View Boulevard at Yonge Street. The road closure includes the installation of planters and benches to prevent vehicle access into Orchard View from Yonge Street. The pilot project that aims to create a safer urban environment for

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255 Ibid.
local residents will run from June to Thanksgiving, 2011.\textsuperscript{257} The community was invited to get involved in designing the urban park to maximize participation. The farmer's market at Eglinton Park has been permitted to relocate to this area. Meanwhile, the impacts on traffic from the closure will be measured. Toronto now joins cities around the world that have been “pedestrianizing” streets to improve the public realm and the safety of their streets.

\section*{H. Safety Systems for Cyclists}

In 2001, Toronto City Council adopted the Toronto Bike Plan (Bike Plan), earmarking $73 million over 10 years to develop a comprehensive network of bike lanes and bike routes throughout the city. The Toronto Bike Plan makes recommendations for improving cycling conditions and encouraging cycling in six key program areas: building bicycle friendly streets policies; expanding the bikeway network; improving bicycle safety; promoting cycling for everyday travel; providing secure bicycle parking; and improving the links between cycling and transit.\textsuperscript{258} An update on the development of the Bike Plan, as well as a discussion of bicycle trends and their implication for the city, is included in the Urban Trends chapter. The Bike Plan report contains several recommendations intended to make Toronto streets more bicycle friendly.\textsuperscript{259} Some of these recommendations have already been implemented, including:

\begin{itemize}
\item Bike Lanes – A dedicated space for cyclists where motorists are not allowed to park, stand, or drive; many downtown streets already have designated Bike Lanes. Based on recommendations from a study under the Municipal Class Environmental Assessment, Toronto City Council approved the installation of bike lanes on Jarvis Street; the centre reversible lane on Jarvis Street was removed and bicycle lanes were established in July 2010.\textsuperscript{260} In July 2011, City Council voted to remove the bicycle lanes on Jarvis Street.\textsuperscript{261} The lanes will be removed in about one year to allow for the creation of lanes on an alternate north-south route.

\item Sharrows – These are pavement markings used in traffic lanes to indicate the ideal cyclist position in the lane (away from the curb and parked cars) and to remind drivers to share the road. The city first began using sharrows in 2007 in a pilot project in selected locations. Sharrows have been painted on College Street, Spadina Avenue, and Bay Street, and will be painted on many other roads that are heavily used by cyclists.\textsuperscript{262}
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{259} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{260} City of Toronto. (2010). \textit{Jarvis Streetscape Improvement Environmental Assessment Bloor Street East to Queen Street East.} (Retrieved on April 12\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www.toronto.ca/involved/projects/jarvis/documentation.htm)


• Contra-Flow Bike Lanes – These allow cyclists to travel in the opposite direction of motorized traffic on one-way streets. Cyclists riding in the same direction as motorized traffic should not ride in the contra-flow bike lane.263

• Bike Boxes – These are used at intersections to designate a space for cyclists to wait in front of cars at a red light, and to proceed first when the light turns green. When the traffic signal is red, cyclists enter the bike box through a bicycle lane, and motorists stop at a regular stop bar behind the painted area for cyclists. At bike box locations, cyclists and motorists are prohibited from making right turns on a red light. When bikes clear the intersection ahead of cars, they are more visible, and less likely to get struck by right-turning vehicles.264

• Bicycle Actuated Signals – The pavement at these intersections is marked with three white dots. To activate the traffic lights (from red to green), cyclists must come to a complete stop over the white dots. More than half of the existing 1,880 intersections have traffic control signals that are semi-actuated. At a semi-actuated intersection, the traffic signal does not automatically alternate between green indications on the main street and the local cross street. Instead, the signals will remain green on the main street until a vehicle or a pedestrian arrives at the cross street. The presence of a vehicle is detected on the cross street by a detector loop embedded in the pavement. The majority of detectors are not set at a sensitivity level to detect the presence of a bicycle. This forces cyclists to either wait for a motor vehicle to arrive in order to actuate the detector, or to dismount and depress the pedestrian push button.265

• Bikeway Network Route System – This will help cyclists navigate bicycle-friendly routes in the city. The System includes bikeways that are numbered and marked with pole-mounted signs along the street or path at intersections and decision points. The Bikeway Network Route System is organized so that north-south routes end in an odd number and east-west routes end in an even number. Numbering begins at the south and west boundaries of the city.266

1. RED LIGHT CAMERAS

In January 2010, the Province of Ontario increased the fine for red light running from $180 to $325, recognizing the frequent and serious consequences of this offence. There are over 150 cameras being rotated among 180 intersections in five participating municipalities; in Toronto, 87 cameras are rotated among 114 intersections.267 As can be seen in Table 5.8, the number of charges for running a red light in Toronto have increased dramatically. While this may be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that more red light cameras have been installed, the apparent trend of increasing charges should be monitored.

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263 Ibid.
264 Ibid.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
Table 5.8
Red Light Camera – Charges Laid, Toronto Sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># of Charges Laid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>13,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>15,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>17,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>25,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>38,515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Toronto, Transportation Services

Statistics collected from the participating municipalities suggest that collisions resulting in deaths and personal injuries have been reduced by more than 25% and those resulting in property damage are down almost 18% as a result of red light camera enforcement.\(^{268}\) Taking a closer look at the City of Toronto locations, the number of angle collisions (those most indicative of red light running) causing death, injury, or property damage have been reduced by over 60% where cameras are operating.

While apparently reducing some types of traffic collisions, red light cameras may possibly be the cause of others. In 2008, a research study in the United States reported that red light cameras increased the number of collisions as drivers attempted to stop abruptly.\(^{269}\) The authors suggested that cities should instead pursue engineering improvements to enhance intersection safety for drivers. Some of the recommended engineering countermeasures included: improving signal head visibility generally by increasing size, adding signal heads, or installing back plates to protect signals from sun glare; setting appropriate yellow light time intervals to clear the intersection or safely stop; adding a brief all-red light clearance interval to allow traffic to clear prior to the release of cross-traffic; adding intersection warning systems; coordinating traffic signals to optimise flow and eliminate interruptions; removing on-site parking near intersections to increase visibility of pedestrians and traffic; repairing malfunctioning lights; and avoiding unnecessarily long cycle timings. After re-engineering, the next steps would be education campaigns and traditional police enforcement.

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\(^{268}\) Ibid.

J. AGGRESSIVE & DISTRACTED DRIVERS

Distracted drivers have in recent years become more of a concern, both for the police and for the public. With the busy pace of life in a large urban city and growing number of in-vehicle technologies, vehicles are no longer mere modes of transportation, but have become boardrooms, offices and entertainment hubs. Cellular phones and personal data assistants (PDAs) are now commonplace in many vehicles; however, using these devices while driving can be distracting and lack of focus on driving, traffic flow, and the environment, even if only briefly, can have serious consequences.

In an effort to increase police ability to deal with distracted drivers, the provincial government enacted new legislation. On April 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2009, Bill 118, \textit{Countering Distracted Driving and Promoting Green Transportation Act}, received Royal Assent, amending the \textit{Highway Traffic Act} and the \textit{Public Vehicles Act}.\textsuperscript{270} The Act, discussed more fully in the Legislative Impacts chapter, prohibits the use of electronic hand-held devices (this includes cell phones, iPhones, smart-phones, BlackBerrys, iPods, MP3 players, DVD players, laptop computers, eBook readers and portable games) while operating a vehicle.\textsuperscript{271} This Act was implemented in October 2009 and, after a public awareness program, enforcement commenced on February 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2010. In the one year since commencing enforcement of the Distracted Driving legislation 16,708 charges were laid.

![Table 5.9](image)

### Distracted Driving Charges laid by Toronto Police Service

February 2010 – February 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Charge</th>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Number of Charges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drive - display screen visible to driver</td>
<td>78(1)</td>
<td>377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive - hand held communication device</td>
<td>78.1(1)</td>
<td>16,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive - hand held entertainment device</td>
<td>78.1(2)</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>16,708</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* As of 2011/02/01

Source: TPS Traffic Services

K. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF TRAFFIC

According to the 2010 Toronto Police community survey, with regard to traffic within the city, drivers, passengers, and pedestrians said that they felt somewhat safer in 2010 than they did in 2009, while cyclists, said they felt less safe (Figure 5.10). Almost three in four (72\%) of drivers in 2010 said they felt safe, up from 65\% in 2009, but unchanged from 2001. As passengers, 80\% said they felt safe in 2010, up from 76\% in 2009, but again unchanged from 2001. As pedestrians, 76\% said they felt safe in 2010, up very slightly from 74\% in 2009 and 75\% in 2001. And finally, as cyclists, 52\% said they felt safe in 2010, down from 59\% in 2009, but well above the 35\% who felt safe as cyclists in 2001. It should also be noted that the proportion of people who said ‘don’t know/not applicable’ for the question on cyclist safety decreased from 35\% in 2001, to 15\% in 2009, but rose to 26\% in 2010.


\textsuperscript{271} Ibid.
Generally, in 2010, people were more concerned about aggressive driving, speeding, and red light or stop sign running in their neighbourhoods, when compared to 2009. In 2010, 66% of people indicated that they were concerned about aggressive/bad driving in their neighbourhood, up from 60% in 2009, but down from 75% in 2001. With regard to speeding in their neighbourhood, 65% in 2010 said they were concerned, up from 55% in 2009, but down from 70% in 2001. And, 63% indicated concern for red light or stop sign running in their neighbourhood in 2010, up from 55% in 2009, but down from 66% in 2003. Similarly, more people were concerned about parking in their neighbourhood in 2010, as 65% said they were concerned about parking, up from 59% in 2009 and 45% in 2001.

1. **Highway Traffic Act**

Since 2008, the number of *Highway Traffic Act* (HTA) charges laid in Toronto each year has remained relatively constant. As shown in Figure 5.11, there were 638,806 HTA charges in 2010, a 2% increase in the overall number compared to the 623,712 offences in 2009, but more than double (a 127% increase) the 281,732 offences in 2001.

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272 Question first asked in 2003.
273 The 2005 totals may have been affected by the Toronto Police Association’s job action during contract negotiations in October and November of that year.
274 POA numbers have been revised for the ten year period to reflect a change in 2009 in the source of the data.
Closer examination of five common HTA charges laid when investigating traffic collisions are shown in Figures 5.12 and 5.13. The number of charges for speeding decreased 4% in 2010 compared to 2009, but increased 10% from 2002. The number of all other charges increased in 2010 when compared to 2009 including: Follow Too Close and Careless Driving, Fail to Signal Lane Change, Unsafe Lane Change. All but Unsafe Lane Change were lower in 2010 than in 2001.

M. IMPAIRED DRIVING

The magnitude of the problem of impaired driving is reflected in a survey of Canadians which found that almost one in five (19%) Canadians — an estimated 6.6 million — know of a family member or close friend who has been the victim of a drinking and driving collision that they did not cause. Drinking and driving has a huge impact on the lives of Canadians, including serious injuries, the cost of health care, and the loss of family members and friends. An estimated 13% of Canadians (about 4.6 million people) know of a family member or friend who was drinking and driving and caused a collision where they were at fault. It is important to note that Canadians were asked about family members or close friends only, so these numbers likely underestimate the problem.

In 2008, the most recent year for which national data are available, 790 Canadians were killed in a traffic collision involving a drinking driver. As shown in Figure 5.14, the number of fatalities in a traffic collision involving a drinking driver in 2008 was lower than in any of the previous ten years.

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275 Accurate data for Highway Traffic Act charges for speeding is not available for 2001 and earlier.
277 Ibid.
278 Ibid.
Campaigns:

The Toronto Police Service is a community-oriented organization with strong partnerships, and one which values the roles that other organizations can play in dealing with social and safety issues. Impaired driving is an issue that continues to present a challenge for the Police Service, government agencies and departments, and community organizations alike. Partnerships, strong working relationships, and an awareness of the efforts of each of the partners are all vital to reducing impaired driving in the future.

RIDE:

The RIDE enforcement campaign began in 1977 as ‘Reduce Impaired Driving in Etobicoke’ and evolved into ‘Reduce Impaired Driving Everywhere’. Led by the policing community, RIDE is a year-round provincial campaign of police spot checks with a significant public awareness component.279

During the holiday season in 2010, over 1,700 officers dedicated over 5,100 hours to the Holiday RIDE program in Toronto. Table 5.10 details the Festive RIDE statistics for 2009 and 2010. Compared to 2009, 1,035 fewer vehicles were stopped during the 2010 holiday season and although more drivers were actually tested in 2010 compared to 2009, fewer charges were laid and fewer suspensions were issued.

Table 5.10
Festive RIDE 2009 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles Stopped</td>
<td>99,850</td>
<td>98,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drivers Tested</td>
<td>1,715</td>
<td>1,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issued 90 Day Suspension</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issued (Warn Range) Suspension</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Drinking/Driving Charges</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Toronto Police Traffic Services

Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD):

Formed in 1990, MADD Canada continues to assist in heightening awareness of drinking and driving issues. The Project Red Ribbon (‘Tie One on For Public Safety’) national campaign is delivered by MADD Canada during the December holiday season. The program asks people to display a ribbon on their vehicle, personal item, etc., to show a commitment to driving sober, and as a reminder of the importance of drinking and driving issues. The program has grown to be one of MADD’s most effective and popular awareness initiatives. Some newer initiatives include the multimedia presentation ‘Mind Control’ for high school students and ‘Ace’ for elementary school students, which attempt to encourage prevention by emphasizing to youth the importance of not drinking and driving. These programs join a variety of other public awareness programs, and videos presented by partners, students, the community, and police.

Arrive Alive, DRIVE SOBER:

This province-wide public awareness campaign runs throughout the year, and has been hosted by Ontario Community Council on Impaired Driving (OCCID) since 1989. The program focuses on the summer months and aims to increase awareness of the injury and death caused by impaired driving.

iDRIVE:

This youth road safety program was developed by the Ministry of Transportation in partnership with the OCCID, Ontario Students Against Impaired Driving (OSAID), and the Student Life Education Company. The program is intended to increase awareness among drivers under the age of 25 about the consequences and risks associated with aggressive and unsafe driving habits, including impaired driving.

Ontario Students Against Drunk Driving:

This registered charity is the largest teen volunteer program focused on risk reduction in the province. This program reaches more than 300,000 students annually, and over the past 10 years has graduated over 20,000 youth leaders who now live, work, and drive in many communities throughout Ontario. OSAID have over 350 chapter groups in Ontario secondary schools. Every year about 5,000 OSAID students run school events, presentations, and community activities aimed at their peers and focused on safe and sober driving.280

SMARTRISK Heroes:

This internationally-recognised Canadian non-profit injury prevention organisation was founded in 1992, and involves a road show that encourages young people to take smart risks. The program combines a large-scale DVD presentation with a live talk given by a young injury survivor. The goal is to assist youth to see the risks in everyday living and to manage those risks so that they can enjoy life responsibly.

1-888 TAXIGUY:

This program was formed in 1998 by Taxiguy Inc. and Molson Canada, and works with the OOCID, BACCHUS Canada (the Alcohol Education Group-the post-secondary division of The Student Life Education Company), and other government groups. It is available in 250 Ontario cities and towns, and encourages people to take a cab home after drinking by calling a toll free number that links the person to a partner taxicab company.

Drinking & Driving Enforcement:

Each year, about 16,000 people are convicted of drinking and driving in Ontario – about two people each hour. About one-quarter of the province’s annual road fatalities are alcohol-related.281 In June 2007, Bill 203, Safer Roads for a Safer Ontario Act, received Royal Assent. In addition to targeting street racers, the legislation also targets drinking and driving. The new legislation creates escalating administrative sanctions for repeat drinking drivers who measure in the ‘warn’ range of 0.05 to 0.08 blood alcohol concentration. The first instance invokes a three-day suspension, a second will invoke a seven-day suspension and remedial measures course, and a third or subsequent instance will suspend a driver’s licence for 30 days, require a remedial course, and require ignition interlock for 6 months. The Act also includes measures to increase installation of interlock ignitions for convicted offenders, and allows the use of civil forfeiture laws to seize vehicles from repeat offenders.282

In 2010, there were a total of 2,209 persons charged with drinking and driving offences in Toronto. This reflected a decrease of 3% from the 2,269 charged in 2009 and 19% from the 2,741 charged in 2001.283 On average over the past ten years, about 2,100 people have been charged with drinking and driving each year; only slightly more than one in ten of those charged each year are female. In general, the number of persons charged with drinking and driving offences has followed a downward trend since 2001.

![Persons Charged with Drinking & Driving](image)

**Figure 5.15**

Source: Crime Information Analysis Unit

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283 Drinking and driving numbers have been revised for the ten year period to reflect a change in the source of the data from COPS to CIPS in 2003.
Drug-Impaired Driving:

Like alcohol, many drugs can affect the physical and cognitive processes necessary to operate a vehicle safely, posing a serious risk to the driver and other road users. According to recently published studies released by the Canadian Centre in Substance Abuse (CCSA), drug-impairment may also be a contributing factor to collisions and fatal road crashes.\textsuperscript{284} The 2010 Roadside Survey randomly selected 2,840 vehicles among night-time drivers from five BC cities. Drivers were asked to provide voluntary breath and oral fluid samples to test for the presence of drugs and alcohol. The survey found that 7% of drivers tested positive for drugs and 10% had been drinking. Cannabis and cocaine were the two most frequently found drugs. It also found drug use to be more evenly distributed across all survey nights and times, rather than just on weekends and at late-night hours as was the case with alcohol.\textsuperscript{285}

The second study, \textit{A Comparison of Drug and Alcohol-involved Motor Vehicle Driver Fatalities}, focused on the characteristics of fatally injured drivers and the circumstances of fatal collisions involving those who tested positive for alcohol, drugs, or a combination of drugs and alcohol. CCSA researchers examined more than 14,000 driver fatalities. Results indicated that 33% of fatally injured drivers were positive for drugs compared to 37% who were positive for alcohol.\textsuperscript{286} The overall pattern of findings indicated that the use of drugs by drivers is an issue distinct and separate from that of alcohol use by drivers and needs a different approach to prevention, education, and enforcement to reduce the number of fatal crashes involving drivers that use drugs. The researchers noted that the two studies provide a baseline for starting to close the gap between the years of research related to alcohol-impaired driving compared to that on drugs and driving.\textsuperscript{287}

In Canada and internationally, the scope of the drugs-and-driving issue is just beginning to be understood. The objective is to continue engaging in research that ultimately guides the development of evidence-based prevention, policy, and enforcement efforts across Canada and possibly extending abroad. The release of the studies is timely as it falls on the heels of a resolution sponsored by the US (supported by Canada) to address drugs and driving; the resolution was accepted by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). The resolution highlighted a CCSA-led international symposium on drugs and driving to be held in Montreal, Quebec, on July 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2011. In an effort to improve overall road safety, CCSA continues to work closely with the US White House Office of National Drug Control Policy, the US National Institute on Drug Abuse, the US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction to bring together the latest research and policy initiatives to build on the drugs-and-driving resolution presented to the CND and address the issue at an international level.\textsuperscript{288}

The Federal government has been considering the effects of drug-impaired driving since 1999, when a report entitled \textit{Toward Eliminating Impaired Driving} was released by the House of


\textsuperscript{285} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{287} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{288} Ibid.
Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. The report recognized the contribution that drug impairment can make to some fatal motor vehicle collisions, and that the extent of drug-impaired driving has been underestimated because police have no easy means to test for drugs under current legislation.\(^{289}\) The Committee pointed out several obstacles to implementing better measures for detecting drug-impaired and for obtaining evidence necessary for successful prosecution. The Committee approved Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) testing, but noted that the provinces have ultimate control of training. In addition, the Committee emphasized the need to consider the Charter implications of any drug testing, as the tests may be more intrusive and time consuming than alcohol testing.\(^{290}\) The Committee made two recommendations in the 1999 report: that section 256 of the *Criminal Code* be amended to allow a justice to authorize the taking of a blood sample for alcohol or drugs; and, that the Minister of Justice consult with the provinces to develop legislative proposals for obtaining better drug-impairment evidence.\(^{291}\)

A report by the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs in 2002, found that between 5% and 12% of drivers may drive under the influence of drugs, and this percentage increased to 20% for men under 25 years old. Furthermore, although cannabis in low doses had little effect on driving skills, and may have led to more cautious driving, it had a negative effect on decision time and trajectory, making it difficult for drivers to stay in their lanes. In addition, a significant percentage of impaired drivers tested positive for both cannabis and alcohol, which together increase the negative effects.\(^{292}\)

Responding to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights’ 1999 recommendations, in 2003, the Department of Justice’s Working Group on Impaired Driving emphasized the need for a legislated system that would allow police to demand that drivers suspected of being drug-impaired submit to testing. The Working Group outlined two main options: the first was to set a legal limit on drugs, recognizing that a zero limit may not be appropriate, as it may catch drivers who had cannabis in their system from weeks earlier and were not currently impaired; the second was to legislate in relation to the ability of police officers to demand drug tests, essentially outlining what has become Bill C-32, *An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Impaired Driving)*. A report by the House of Commons Special Committee on the Non-medical Use of Drugs, published in 2003, called for Parliament to develop a strategy to address drug-impaired driving.\(^{293}\)

While a number of Bills (e.g. Bill C-16/Bill C-32) were tabled and defeated due to elections calls, and/or end of sessions, in February 2008, Bill C-2, *An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and to make consequential amendments to other acts (Tackling Violent Crime Act)* received assent. The Bill groups together five Bills that had previously been proposed, including Bill C-32. Bill C-2 expanded drug enforcement capabilities by giving police the authority to demand physical sobriety tests and authorizes peace officers (who are trained as Drug Recognition Experts) to: test whether a person is impaired by a drug, or a combination of alcohol and a drug; and, to take samples of bodily fluids to confirm the presence of the impairing drug.


\(^{290}\) Ibid.

\(^{291}\) Ibid.

\(^{292}\) Ibid.

\(^{293}\) Ibid.
Furthermore, the Bill makes offences for refusing tests, increases penalties for both drug and alcohol impaired driving, and deals with evidentiary issues at court.294

The Service currently has 12 Service members trained as Drug Recognition Experts (DREs). The current training for DREs is intensive, and is conducted outside of the Toronto Police Service in conjunction with the RCMP, OPP, York Regional Police, and Peel Regional Police.295 It will be a challenge to ensure that a sufficient number of officers are trained and competent as Drug Recognition Experts, especially as it is preferred that a DRE is also a qualified Breath Technician. Further, officers must be trained to conduct standard field-side sobriety tests. These sobriety tests are based on physical and mechanical observations; therefore, court and evidence must be impeccable and still may be open to robust scrutiny. The Service will likely continue to be challenged to maintain a sufficient number of Drug Recognition Experts.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICE

• The Service should continue to develop traffic intervention/enforcement programs with the contribution of various community and city partners, and with the knowledge gained from data and well-thought out research and evaluation. A solid understanding of the traffic issues that are based in fact, and are promoted at the federal, provincial, and local level will assist in assigning priority to traffic related issues.

• As traffic congestion and environmental responsibility demand action, the Service must promote activities that contribute to active transportation (people–powered movement), by supporting both internal strategies, such as car-pooling or cycling to work, and by managing traffic congestion through traffic programs and enforcement.

• The Service should continue to contribute to safe roads, safe walking routes, safe cycling, and safe parks, so that concerns of community members considering alternate forms of transportation, as opposed to a personal car/vehicle, can be eased.

• The Service needs to be aware of traffic engineering initiatives that ease congestion and make intersections safer for pedestrians and drivers, and should continue to consider projects associated with new initiatives (such as pedestrian crossings, HOV lanes) and strict enforcement of offences associated with newly re-designed intersections and roadways.

• The Service must assess and continue to monitor the increasing officer time spent on property damage and personal injury collisions, and look at where efficiencies can be gained in such traffic investigations.

• The Service must continue to address the educational needs of pedestrians and cyclists in traffic safety initiatives, including the importance of proper driving and cycling habits and


295 Information from Traffic Services, April 2011.
pedestrian safety considerations when crossing roadways. Additionally, the Service should continue to implement and support safety initiatives for these exceptionally vulnerable groups in order to reduce injuries and deaths due to traffic collisions.

- The decrease in charges laid in relation to drinking and driving may indicate an encouraging trend; however, the Service and its government and community partners should continue to provide awareness, prevention, and social sanction initiatives.

- The Service must continue to aim educational initiatives and enforcement at offences under legislation that result from distracted driving in order to decrease the number of factors that contribute to collisions.

- The Service must develop programs specific to the dangers of drug use and driving in an attempt to reduce the practice of driving while impaired. Although there are budgetary considerations, the Service must ensure that a sufficient number of officers are trained and competent in the position of Drug Recognition Expert and receive the required training necessary to conduct standard field-side sobriety tests.

- The Service must develop appropriate computer software and/or hardware systems and must continue to monitor trends that will allow analysis of collision locations across the city, to lead to more effective targeted enforcement during peak hours.
VI. CALLS FOR SERVICE

Information on what types of calls for service are received and how the Service responds to those calls provides a foundation for decisions relating to the allocation of resources, including personnel, and to the development of service delivery options and priorities to meet the needs of the communities served.

HIGHLIGHTS

• A total of 1.93 million calls from the public for police assistance were received in 2010, a 7% increase from 2009 and 8% and 3% increases from five (2006) and ten years (2001) ago, respectively.

• While the number of calls received via the non-emergency line continued to drop over the past few years, calls received via the emergency line increased. Compared with ten years ago, the number of calls received via the emergency line increased 11%, while called received via the non-emergency line decreased by 3%.

• In 2010, 57% of the calls were received through the emergency line, with the rest (44%) received via the non-emergency line. These proportions represented an increase for the emergency line and a decrease for the non-emergency line over the past ten years.

• Fewer than half (47%) of the calls received in 2010 were dispatched for police response, which was the same as the proportion of calls dispatched in 2006 (47%) and a very slight increase from 2001 (46%).

• The number of dispatched calls in 2010 (902,355) was a 3% increase from 2009, and 8% and 4% increases from five and ten years ago, respectively.

• Despite some improvement in response time for Priority 1 calls, response time in general increased (deteriorated) compared with ten years ago.

• The average time required to service a call decreased slightly in 2010, but remained a significant increase (40%) from 2001. For Priority 1 calls, the increase was 98% over the ten year period.

• Over the past ten years, despite an 18% decrease in overall calls attended and a 45% decrease in Priority 1 calls attended, the total time commitment in responding to these calls showed a 15% increase for all calls and a 9% increase for Priority 1 calls. The total time for servicing calls increased significantly as a result of increased average service time and number of officers dispatched per event. Adequately staffing the Primary Response and other police programs while delivering timely responses to emergencies will remain a serious challenge for the Service.

• There is a need to identify ways to stabilize the increasing service time for calls so that the drain on resources from such increases can be halted. Training to increase officer productivity and enhanced supervision and resource deployment are possible alternatives.
There is also a need to identify reasonable response time standards for calls from the public. The impacting factors should be taken into account so that more realistic and achievable standards can be established to guide operation.

A. Calls Received and Method of Response

Responding to the public’s calls for service in a timely manner is a core function of policing. Most of the emergency and non-emergency calls from the public to the Toronto Police are received via the Communications Centre. Those that are made directly to local police stations are also captured into the central records system.

After consistent increases between 2001 and 2003, decreases in number of calls for police assistance were noted between 2004 and 2007. The total number of calls remained at about 1.8 million for two years in 2008 and 2009. In 2010, a total of 1,926,577 calls were received by the police, which was the second highest number of calls recorded over the last ten years. This represented a 7% increase from 2009, an 8% increase from 2006, and a 3% increase from 2001. Of the total number of calls recorded, 57% were received through the emergency line (9-1-1) and 44% were received through the non-emergency line. These proportions represented an increase for the emergency line and a decrease for the non-emergency line over the past five and ten years.

In 2010, a total of 1,089,570 calls were received via the emergency line, representing a 13% increase from 2009 and a 19% increase from 2006. Calls received via the non-emergency line amounted to a total of 837,007 in 2010, a 0.4% drop from 2009 and a 4% drop from 2006. Over the past ten year period, between 2001 and 2010, the number of calls received through the emergency line increased (11%), while those received through the non-emergency line decreased (-3%). Figure 6.1 shows the number of calls received via the emergency and non-emergency lines in each of the past ten years.

![Figure 6.1: Calls Received by TPS Communications Centre](image)
Statistics captured by Communications Services indicated that cellular phone calls constituted about 55% of the calls received through the emergency line. This proportion was an increase from the 50% in previous years. Among them are the about 200 to 300 daily calls known as ‘pocket dials’, when cell phones in pockets or purses mistakenly dial 911, often without owner being aware. It usually takes longer to process cell phone calls because of the need to identify the locations of the callers and to confirm the emergency; the call line location shown in Figure 6.1 and discussed previously is for calls made through the conventional lines only.

It is important to emphasize that not all calls for service require a police response. The call-taker, after confirming the nature of the incident, will determine the appropriate mode of response, which could range from providing the information or advice required, referring the caller to other emergency services such as ambulance and fire, dispatching a police unit to attend the incident, or a combination of these responses.

Calls requiring police intervention are dispatched to a police unit for response. In 2010, there were a total of 902,355 calls involving at least one police unit being dispatched, representing a 3% increase from 2009, and 8% and 4% increases over the last five and ten years, respectively. These dispatched calls constituted 47% of the total calls received in 2010, which was the same as in 2006 (47%) and a very slight increase from 2001 (46%). Figure 6.2 shows the changes in the number of dispatched calls over the past ten years.

![Figure 6.2](image)

**B. RESPONSE TIMES**

Police performance in responding to the public’s calls for service is usually assessed in terms of (though not confined to) the timeliness of response, i.e. rapidness of response. Police response time in this respect is defined as the lapse of time between the time the call is sent to the dispatcher (received) and the time police officers arrive at the scene of the incident. Police arrival time is captured by the central Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system when officers acknowledge their arrival time via their mobile workstation (MWS).

Information regarding officer arrival time has been recorded in the CAD data since 1996. Field officers are required to press the ‘at scene’ button of their MWS when arriving at an incident scene, to acknowledge their time of arrival. However, operational and practical issues...
Compliance rates are based on statistics from TPS I/CAD Query and Reporting System, Report 24.

Priority 1 calls are the highest priority emergency calls, typically involving situations requiring immediate response, including a person at risk or a crime in progress.

Computation based on statistics from I/CAD Report 24, covering only cases with response time (MWS/MDT entered) from 0 to 60 minutes, i.e. 97.3% of total Priority 1 cases in 2010.

The median is the middle value of a group of values arranged in ascending or descending order.

Based on statistics from TPS I/CAD Query and Reporting System, Report 24.

Includes only Priority 1 to 3 calls having valid officer arrival time (entered via MWS); based on I/CAD Report 24.
As shown in Figure 6.3(a), the lines representing the 2006 and 2010 Priority 1 emergency calls are very similar and largely overlap each other – that is the performance for these two years was relatively the same. The 2006 and 2010 lines are ahead of the 2001 line during the first 11 minutes of response time, meaning that a larger proportion of calls were being responded to within that time frame (i.e. being responded to more quickly). Of the Priority 1 calls responded to in 2010, 85% were covered/responded to within 19 minutes, similar to 2006, but an increase compared to the 17 minutes in 2001.

The line showing the response times for Priority 2 and 3 calls (other emergency calls) for 2006 and 2010 were also very similar and both were behind that of 2001 (Figure 6.3(b)). That is, the response time for Priority 2 and 3 calls did not change much in the past five years, but worsened over the past ten years.
For the non-emergency or low priority calls (Priority 4 through 6), the median response time for those calls having valid MWS-entered arrival time increased (deteriorated) from 26 minutes in 2001 to 37 minutes in 2006, and to 36 minutes in 2010. It was also found that 65% of Priority 4-6 calls received a police response within 60 minutes, which was similar to the 64% in 2006, but a significant deterioration from the much higher 78% in 2001.

The above findings revealed that while there were some improvements for Priority 1 calls in terms of compliance rate (pushing the at-scene button) and an increased proportion of calls being responded to during the first 11 minutes of the response time, the overall trend of increase in response time for low priority calls continued.

There is a need to identify reasonable, realistic and achievable standards to serve as guide for more effective management of calls. Standards must take into account a number of relevant factors, including police staffing level, officer performance/productivity, other operational constraints and feasibilities for enhancing performance.

C. Service Times

Service time is the time spent by police to service a call, from dispatch to clearance of the call. Service time per call has a direct impact on police resource requirements for responding to calls from the public.

Given the relatively ‘fixed’ police resources assigned to the primary response function, the longer the time spent on servicing calls, the more police resources will be stretched and the longer will be the pending time for calls in general. An analysis of service time for calls revealed that the average service time for calls increased significantly over the past ten years (Figure 6.4).

Average service time is the average time spent by officers in responding to and at a call. Over the past ten years, the number of calls attended has decreased, in general and for Priority 1 calls. Despite the decrease in service time noted in 2010, Figure 6.4 shows a clear trend of

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302 Service time refers to officer(s’) time on a call, the difference in time between the ‘dispatch time’ of an event and the ‘closure time’ of an event, as defined by the TPS Computer Aided Dispatch Query & Reporting User Reference, pp. 14, 26, 27. All service time statistics used in this analysis were derived from I/CAD Query Report 52.
increase in service time for calls. Over the past ten years, the number of calls attended decreased 18% overall and 45% for Priority 1 calls. In contrast, the average service time for all calls increased 4% and 40% over the past five and ten years, respectively. The increases for Priority 1 calls were even more significant – 13% and 98% over the past five and ten years, respectively. The total time spent by officers on servicing calls showed a 15% increase over the past ten years. The increase in service time has more than offset the savings from the decreased number of calls serviced.

The average service time for Priority 1 calls, due to their emergency nature and the level of investigation required, is generally much longer than that for other calls. In 2010, the total number of Priority 1 emergency calls constituted 9% of all the calls serviced and took up 23% of the total service time for calls. As shown in Figure 6.4, for Priority 1 calls in 2010, the average service time (per event) was 470.1 minutes, representing a 13% increase from 2006 and a 98% increase from 2001, though a 2% decrease from 2009. The average number of officers dispatched per event also increased from 3.5 in 2001 to 4.6 in 2006, and to 4.9 in 2010.

Table 6.1 shows the average service time of major types of calls (i.e. calls that took up 2% or more of the total service time) attended by the police in 2010, and the change in service time compared with 2006.

Table 6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Type</th>
<th># Attended</th>
<th>Average Service Time (Min/E*)</th>
<th>Service Time%**</th>
<th># Attended</th>
<th>Average Service Time (Min/E*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown Trouble</td>
<td>17,925</td>
<td>266.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Check Address</td>
<td>44,663</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>17,113</td>
<td>275.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person Injured Accident</td>
<td>14,795</td>
<td>264.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>13,234</td>
<td>242.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>4,343</td>
<td>616.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-2.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B&amp;E</td>
<td>8,946</td>
<td>270.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-21.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Ambulance***</td>
<td>18,942</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionally Disturbed Person</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>202.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute</td>
<td>19,561</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Just Occurred</td>
<td>8,066</td>
<td>267.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Assault</td>
<td>4,903</td>
<td>445.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspicious Event</td>
<td>13,403</td>
<td>155.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>-26.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted Person</td>
<td>6,841</td>
<td>266.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total of above</td>
<td>203,551</td>
<td>202.1</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total calls/events</td>
<td>471,062</td>
<td>177.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average service time per event in minutes.
** Total service time of call type as a proportion (%) of the total service time for all calls.
*** There was a large increase in number of requests from medical staff for police assistance after police ceased attending to calls of solely medical complaint.

Source: I/CAD Report 52

Statistics based on TPS I/CAD Report 52.
As shown in Table 6.1, most of the listed major types of calls showed increases in average service time over the past five years. These calls together constituted 43% of the total number of calls attended by the police in 2010, and took up 49% of the total service time. The increase in service time also applied in general to other calls, which caused the average service time per call to increase by 4%, although the number of calls attended decreased 3%.

As noted previously, over the past ten years, the average servicing time for calls increased 40% and the total officer time spent on calls increased 15%, even though there was an 18% reduction in calls attended. The increases for Priority 1 calls were even more drastic, with a 98% increase in the average servicing time and a 9% increase in the total officer time spent on Priority 1 calls, against a 45% decrease in number of calls attended.

The reduced number of calls attended did not result in any savings of total officer time spent on calls. On the contrary, the total time spent on calls increased significantly as a result of increased servicing time and an increased number of officers dispatched per event. The average number of officers dispatched per event increased over time, from 2.2 officers in 2001 to 2.4 in 2006, and to 2.5 in 2009 and 2010. The increase for Priority 1 calls was even more notable, from 3.5 officers per call in 2001 to 4.6 in 2006, and to 4.9 officers in 2010.

This trend of increase, if not addressed, will be a serious drain on police resources. Since responding to calls from the public is a major police function, managing a significant increase in service time for calls, without a commensurate increase in resources or the remedy of other management measures to enhance productivity or optimize resource deployment, will necessarily be at the cost of other police programs. This means that the officers’ time for other non-call related functions will have to be reduced to address the increasing demand from calls.

There are many factors that have a possible impact on the service time for calls, including:

- the nature of call (seriousness and complexity);
- change in enforcement, investigation and/or other working procedures/practices as a result of changes in legislation, etc.;
- the training and experience of the officer(s) in handling calls; and/or
- supervision by field supervisors.

There is a need to identify ways to stabilize the increasing service time for calls so that the drain on resources can be halted. Without addressing these issues, appropriately and adequately staffing the Primary Response and other police programs, while delivering timely responses to emergencies, will remain a serious challenge for the Service. The increasing response and service times for calls can be regarded as an indication of the need to for a formal analysis that will assist with:

- setting service standards to justify resource requirements, measure performance, and guide resource deployment;
- enhancing officer performance in answering calls; and
- enhancing efficiency of resource deployment.

304 It should be noted that the decreased number of calls attended (based on I/CAD Report 52) was partly due to the improved method of identifying duplicated calls for the same event, the more accurate categorization of emergency calls, and initiatives in managing calls via alternative modes of response.
The first need is about the appropriate way to determine reasonable service standards, by taking into account the impacting factors so that realistic and achievable standards can be established. The second has to do with training and supervision that will enhance officer effectiveness in processing calls. And the third is about optimizing use of resources in relation to workload, mostly via software application in designing shifts.

**RECOMMENDATIONS POLICE SERVICE**

- The increased number of calls received through the emergency line and the possible misuse of the emergency line for non-emergency issues may have exerted pressures on the call-taking function. Initiatives to divert non-emergency calls from the emergency line should continue.

- Responding to the public’s calls for service is one of the primary policing functions and the effectiveness and efficiency of response are often used to evaluate police performance. Efficiency indicators include the resources required per call (service time) and the extent to which resources are optimally deployed, i.e. ensuring the use of resources is maximised under given operational constraints. Effectiveness indicators include the timeliness of response, usually in relation to a service standard, and the quality of the response. Regular review of this function is necessary to ensure that response to calls is as timely, efficient, and effective as possible, and to provide direction for any required program changes.

- There are indications that police response time has deteriorated over the past ten years, resulting in longer response times and a smaller proportion of calls being responded to within a short duration, despite some minor improvements in the past two years. These results seem to indicate that efforts should be directed towards stabilising/reducing pending and response times.

- Service time per call is an efficiency indicator that measures the cost of service. Despite a small decrease in the average service time for calls in 2010, increases in service time over the past ten years were large, particularly for Priority 1 calls. The large increase in service time for most major types of calls over recent years means a significant rise in servicing cost, i.e. resources required per call. Increases in service time reduce resources available, which in turn has an impact on response time. While changes in service time for calls can be due to various legitimate reasons, the lack of service time standards may be among the many factors contributing to the increased service time. There is need for such standards as a means for field supervisors to better monitor officer performance and curb further increases in service time.

- Research in the areas of service standards for response time and service time, and on mechanisms to enable optimal deployment of resources is critical and should continue so that relevant service standards, performance indicators, and deployment mechanisms can be identified and developed to enhance police performance and evaluation in these areas. Service standards for both response time and service time are also considered essential components for the development and justification of staffing models and projection of resource requirements.
• The trends of increasing service time and response time present challenges to adequately staffing the Primary Response function to provide timely response to emergencies. As far as work productivity is concerned, training and supervision are factors to be considered for enhancing officers’ performance in servicing of calls. Adequate and relevant training will enhance officers’ work competence in processing calls and cut down on the service time required. Consideration should also be given to the development of tools that will enhance field supervisors’ ability to monitor officer performance. They should be designed to assist field supervisors in identifying and resolving problems in a timely manner.

• The compliance rate of officers in acknowledging their arrival time at calls affects the validity of findings in any performance evaluation using such data. There has been significant improvement over the past ten years for calls in general, with the compliance rate now above 70%. Continued effort should be directed to improving the compliance rate of officers responding to calls, particularly the low priority calls, so as to enable more accurate evaluation of response time, which is essential both for monitoring Service performance and for staff deployment analysis.

• Staff deployment has implications for police response time. Police response to calls is affected by officer availability (supply) and the pattern of calls for service (demand), that is, the extent to which officers are available when demands arise. The match between this supply and demand can be used as a general indicator of the efficiency of resource deployment. Analysis of this match under all quantifiable operational constraints is necessary for the identification of both means and opportunities to enhance the operational efficiency in staff deployment and thus response time.
VII. Technology & Policing

The modern police service deals with both the benefits and consequences of technology. Technology can provide police services with valuable tools that enhance the safety of its members and the service provided to the community. However, technology provides the means and opportunity for individuals and criminal organizations to commit faceless and borderless crimes. Reducing vulnerability to cyber-crime by protecting and educating the organization and the community, and assessing and keeping current with technology is an important way for the Service to remain at the forefront in the fight against technological crime.

Highlights

- According to the 2009 Canadian Internet Use Survey, 21.7 million Canadians used the Internet for personal reasons – an increase of 2.5 million from the 2007 data. Ontario ranked higher than the national average with 81% of the population using the Internet.

- More than half of Canadian households used laptop computers and over one-third used wireless handheld devices to access the Internet. However, a digital divide continued to exist between Canadians on the basis of age, income, education, and community size.

- Cyber-bullying is the electronic version of in-person bullying among youth. According to the Centre for Safe and Responsible Use of the Internet, cyber-bullying, like in-person bullying, can result in long-term mental health illnesses.

- Social media has become an integral part of Web 2.0 and a popular tool for communication and information. In 2009, Toronto Crime Stoppers online tips increased over 180% from 2007 with the integration of technology and social media. However, social media is also used as a tool to facilitate and promote criminal activity, including incidents such as ‘flash robs’.

- Losses due to credit card fraud appear to be decreasing, possibly due to the implementation of chip-and-pin technology. Debit card fraud, on the other hand, has increased.

- In 2010, cybertip.ca received over 8,600 reports regarding 14,000 incidents of online sexual child exploitation, the highest levels experienced since the organisation’s inception in 2002.

- A recent challenge to the Service’s 9-1-1 system was the phenomenon of ‘pocket-dialling’. The 200 to 300 pocket dials received each day accounted for nearly 10% of all 9-1-1 calls.

- In 2010, Canada was the first country to implement an enhanced emergency call system on a national level. This technology allows the caller’s location to be pinpointed to a latitude and longitude co-ordinate.
A. INTERNET USE

The Internet is one of the most rapidly evolving forms of technology, allowing for instantaneous information access and communication. With the development of smartphones, netbooks, and wireless Internet connections, access to the Internet is escalating on a global scale, with 2.1 billion people using the Internet world-wide. As shown in Table 7.1, since 2001, the growth of Internet users around the world increased almost five-fold. The number of users in North America – the area with the highest proportion of penetration – more than doubled over the period. It is interesting to note that the proportion of users in Canada and the United States was similar (79% and 78%, respectively), and the number of users in both countries more than doubled in the years since 2001 (112% and 157%, respectively).

### Table 7.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1,037,524,058</td>
<td>4,514,400</td>
<td>118,609,620</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2527%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3,879,740,877</td>
<td>114,304,000</td>
<td>922,329,554</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>707%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>816,426,346</td>
<td>105,096,093</td>
<td>476,213,935</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>353%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>216,258,843</td>
<td>3,284,800</td>
<td>68,553,666</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>1987%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>347,394,870</td>
<td>108,096,800</td>
<td>272,066,000</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>152%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America/Caribbean.</td>
<td>597,283,165</td>
<td>18,068,919</td>
<td>215,939,400</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>1037%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania/Australia</td>
<td>35,426,995</td>
<td>7,620,480</td>
<td>21,293,830</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>179%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORLD TOTAL</td>
<td>6,930,055,154</td>
<td>360,985,492</td>
<td>2,095,006,005</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>480%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Demographic numbers are based on data from the US Census Bureau.
** Internet usage information comes from data published by Nielsen Online, by the International Telecommunications Union, by GfK, local Regulators, and other reliable sources.

Source: Internet World Stats

According to the 2009 Canadian Internet Use Survey conducted by Statistics Canada, 80% of Canadians 16 years of age and older (21.7 million people) used the Internet for personal reasons, an increase from the 73% reported in the 2007 survey. Three-quarters (75%) of these 21.7 million Canadians accessed the Internet on a daily basis. The proportion of users in Ontario (81%) was higher than the national average, and ranked third nationally behind British Columbia (85%) and Alberta (85%).

While Internet usage and accessibility increased among Canadians, a digital divide continued to exist between certain demographic groups (i.e., age, population, education, and income). Almost all Canadians between 16 and 34 years of age (97%) accessed the Internet,

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305 Smartphone refers to a mobile device offering computer functionality, including, but not limited to, the Apple iPhone, Google Android, and RIM Blackberry.
compared to 41% of Canadians 65 years of age and older. Internet use was higher in areas with a population greater than 10,000 (83% versus 73%), which indicated a gap in the rate of Internet use on the basis of community size.

To examine Internet usage by income, Canadians were divided into four groups based on annual household earnings.\(^308\) The vast majority (94%) of people from households with an income of at least $85,000 used the Internet, compared to only 56% of households with an income lower than $30,000. Comparisons of Internet usage based on level of education showed that usage by Canadians with a university degree (95%) was almost double that of Canadians without a high school diploma (51%). It was suggested, however, that in all instances – age, population, education, and income – the divide is narrowing.

Canadians moved towards mobile and portable Internet access, and most households (54%) used more than one type of device to go online.\(^309\) More than half (64%) of Canadian households used laptop computers and over one-third (35%) used wireless handheld devices to access the Internet. Similar to the 2007 data, e-mail (93%) and general browsing (75%) were the most popular Internet activities.\(^310\) Notable increases from 2007 were observed in the following activities: searching for medical information (from 59% in 2007 to 70% in 2009), downloading movies/TV shows (from 8% to 20%), posting online journals, photos, and participating in discussion groups (from 20% to 27%), and searching for government information (from 51% to 57%).

Of all Canadians aged 16 and older, 41% were concerned about Internet privacy. About one in four seniors (27%) had no privacy concerns, which was slightly higher than the average of 25% of all Canadians who had no privacy concerns. This lack of concern may put seniors at a higher risk of victimisation and make them more vulnerable to cyber crimes. This issue is discussed further in the Victimisation chapter.

With the Internet rapidly evolving and a greater number of Canadians using the Internet daily, it will be a challenge for the Toronto Police Service to keep up. The Service must be cognisant of the Internet’s loosely regulated nature and the often relatively easy access to personal information, both of which can provide opportunities for Internet-related crimes and offences.

**Cyber-Bullying:**

According to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, about one-third of Ontario students were bullied at school.\(^311\) Cyber-bullying is a form of bullying that allows the bully to remain anonymous. Occurring in the context of a peer-group, cyber-bullying involves the use of information and communication technologies to support deliberate, repeated, and hostile behaviour intended to harm others.\(^312\) While online bullying shares the basic characteristics of

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\(^{308}\) Ibid.
\(^{310}\) Statistics Canada (2010).
bullying (i.e., unequal power, hurtful actions, and repetitive behaviour), it introduces new attributes – the most important of which is the limitless forms the bullying can take on and the capacity for instant dissemination of words and images through e-mail, instant messaging, cell phones, and social media.\textsuperscript{313} The most common behaviours are name calling, rumours/gossip, and threatening.

Although online bullying may take place after school hours, it can lead to long-term psychological effects that may affect a youth’s behaviour at school, including: low self-esteem, depression, anger, school avoidance, and, in some cases, school violence or suicide.\textsuperscript{314} Furthermore, adults can also be the victims of online bullying; 84% of Ontario teachers reported being the subject of comment by cyber-bullies.\textsuperscript{315}

In a study conducted by Kids Help Phone, of the 70% of survey respondents who were victims of cyber-bullying, 38% reported another online bullying incident within the three months following the first event. Similar to offline bullying, Internet bullying is not a one-time occurrence.\textsuperscript{316}

There remains a debate among youth about the correct course of action to take when being cyber-bullied. According to Kids Help Phone, of the 43% of youth who took no action when bullied, 50% did not report it because they felt it would not help and 35% thought the bullying would get worse if it was reported.\textsuperscript{317}

Reporting of cyber-bullying by victims and bystanders will continue to be a challenge that the Service must overcome in order to promote a positive and safe school environment. Through education, awareness, and intervention, the Service must work with the community, educators, and parents to maintain online respect and to combat the dangers and implications of cyber-bullying. Bullying and cyber-bullying are also discussed in the Youth Crime and Victimisation chapters.

\section*{B. Social Media}

Social media are technological platforms that facilitate virtual communities of interest and the rapid dissemination of information among its members. The consumers of social networking information products are a combination of contacts, open user groups, and/or the general public. The concept of social media is an integral part of what is known as Web 2.0: the use of web-based applications to create and share information on a global level in a seamless manner.\textsuperscript{318}

The evolution of communication progressed rapidly with the introduction of social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and MySpace. Facebook is one of the most-trafficked websites in the world and the most popular for social networking. More than 500

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[316] Kids Help Phone (2007).
\item[317] Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
million active users spend over 700 billion minutes per month on Facebook.\(^{319,320}\) The average Facebook user is connected to 80 community pages/groups and has approximately 130 friends.

This widely-used communications technology has taken on a significant role, not only for individual and personal use, but for organisational communication and outreach initiatives. As an outlet for the rapid dissemination of information, social media has extremely beneficial uses for law-enforcement agencies: it can help to identify strategies for crime prevention, help increase crime reporting, and create positive public perception and engagement.

While the relationship between the community and the Toronto Police Service is generally positive, a divide continues to exist between some demographic groups (e.g., youth) and the Service, that social media can aid in bridging. Building trust with youth through the use of communications technology can be useful in the promotion of public safety and in the appeal for information on ongoing investigations (e.g., homicides, robberies, missing persons, etc.).

In 2008, Toronto Crime Stoppers implemented software that allowed tips to be sent from mobile devices and on-line.\(^{321}\) The results of this campaign were seen in 2009 when Toronto Crime Stoppers received over 10,300 anonymous tips by telephone, online, though social media, and through text messaging. The almost 1,000 tips per month was a huge increase from the 350 tips per month in 2007.\(^{322}\) This success was attributed to social media relationships and making use of available technology.

In May 2011, there were 53 social media accounts – 29 Twitter, 22 Facebook, and 2 YouTube – associated to the Toronto Police Service, representing both individuals and units.\(^{323}\) The information shared through these accounts includes: community safety bulletins, crime prevention information, event promotion, links to partner organisations, and general police and community information. These accounts are used to interact directly and quickly with the community – to build partnerships and create opportunities for dialogue.

In July 2011, the Toronto Police Service launched a social media strategy in a further effort to engage with the community and improve public trust, by providing a forum in which important discussions can take place.\(^{324}\) The initiative integrates social media into the daily work life of designated police officers, enabling them to respond quickly to community and speak on behalf of the organisation in an official capacity.\(^{325}\) It is expected that by November 2011, 177 TPS members from 27 units, adhering to strict Service procedures, will be using corporate social media accounts following the completion of a social media course. In order to effectively engage with the public, the Service must continue on its path of fully embracing the use of social media. The Service must meet the ongoing challenges of maintenance, monitoring, risk assessment, and promotion of the use of appropriate social media and security practices.

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\(^{320}\) Includes users who used the site in the last 30 days, as of May 2011.


\(^{323}\) Information provided by TPS Corporate Communications Unit, as of May 2011.


Cyber-Vetting:

Cyber-vetting is the assessment of a person’s suitability to hold a position using information found on the Internet to help make that determination. Through social media and various Internet searches, potential employers can screen candidates by looking up their ‘online footprint’. In a research study conducted by the Microsoft Corporation, it was found that 70% of US recruiters and human resource professionals decided not to hire a candidate(s) because of information they found online.\(^\text{326}\)

Ambiguity exists as to the legality of cyber-vetting and where privacy rights become a consideration. Another point of uncertainty is what behaviours should be subject to cyber-vetting. The purpose of cyber-vetting in law enforcement is to ensure the person being considered for employment is trustworthy and that they behave/have behaved in a manner consistent with law enforcement policies.

The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) recognized that caution must be exercised when implementing a cyber-vetting policy. They recommended that the following legal, ethical, and practical issues be considered in the development of a cyber-vetting policy.\(^\text{327}\)

- failure to consider case law when cyber-vetting may lead to violations applicable to freedom of speech, and
- employers might limit their acquisition and retention of talent by overreacting to trivial indiscretions, and/or applying cyber-vetting practices that are irrelevant for predicting future behaviour.

Crime Facilitation:

Online social networking sites combined with virtual marketplace bulletin boards provide opportunities for facilitating criminal activities, such as terrorism, frauds, and organized crime, with each group using social media in unique ways. Online bulletin boards, such as Craigslist and Kijji, can be used to create professional-looking, but false, press releases and promotional material, which often lead to financial-related crimes.\(^\text{328}\) Social networking (e.g. Facebook and Twitter) can be used to trade lists of victims and recruit accomplices, radicalise extremist or gang-related ideologies, and incite terrorism.\(^\text{329}\) Furthermore, video sharing websites (e.g. YouTube) allow for potential urban gangs to attempt to establish legitimacy by creating music videos that are used to advertise gang activities and connect with potential recruits.

As social media advances and expands, it will become more and more difficult for the Service to filter social media websites for criminal-related activity.

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\(^{327}\) Ibid.


Flash Robs:

Flash mobs involve a group of people who are organised through various mass communications (e.g. texting, instant messaging, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) to come together at a specified time and place to perform some action. Flash robbers are that concept applied to robberies or thefts – participants invade a store, quickly take what they want, and leave before police can arrive. While flash robbers have occurred in US cities, in July 2011, a convenience store in Ottawa was believed to be the first Canadian target of a flash rob.\footnote{Flash mobs not so cute when they rob stores. (2011, August 5). Toronto Star.} Some experts have attributed the rise in this crime to the networking power of the Internet and social media’s power as an organisational tool.\footnote{Flash Robberies: Teenage Flash Mobs Swarm and Rob Convenience Stores. (2011, June 20). The Huffington Post. (Retrieved on August 8\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/20/flash-robberies-video_n_880589.html)}

\section*{C. Technological Crime}

Cyber-crime is a national and international concern that has a serious impact on law enforcement. According to the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, there are two main categories of cyber-crime. The first category is when the computer is the \textit{tool} of the crime; these types of crimes include criminal harassment, child exploitation, fraud, and intellectual property theft. The second category is when the computer is the \textit{object} of the crime, where the crimes are specifically related to computer technology and the Internet, including the unauthorized use of computer systems (hacking), creating and disseminating malicious software (malware), and defacing websites. In addition, computer-supported crime includes the use of computers for criminal communication and document or data storage.\footnote{Kowalski, M. (2002). \textit{Cyber-Crime: Issues, Data Sources, and Feasibility of Collecting Police-Reported Statistics}. (Catalogue no. 85-558-XIE) Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Statistics Canada. (Retrieved June 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 2011, from http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/Statcan/85-558-X/85-558-XIE2002001.pdf)}

\textit{Fraud and Identity Thefts:}

Fraud techniques have progressed, moving from telephone and postal mail schemes to technology-related financial crimes. Technology enables criminals to perform their activities anonymously, transfer funds quickly, and target a large geographic range of victims. The most popular current technology-related fraud schemes are payment card fraud, securities fraud, and identity theft. Fraud and identity theft are also discussed in the Crime Trends and Victimization Trends chapters.

\textbf{Payment Card Fraud:}

Payment card fraud involves the theft of debit/credit cards, skimming, counterfeiting, applications for payment cards, fake deposits, and card-not-present frauds. An individual’s personal financial data can be obtained through wireless technology, such as Bluetooth, which allows for the extraction and transmission of card information that is then relayed to card...
manufacturing factories. Through virtual marketplaces and bulletin boards (e.g., Craigslist and Kijiji), fraudsters can access victims and buy/sell data.

In 2009, losses due to payment card fraud amounted to $500.7 million, a 2% decrease from $512.2 million in losses in 2008.\(^{333}\) A reduction in the level of credit card skimming at point-of-sale terminals may be attributed to the recent transition to microchip payment cards by Canadian banks. However, microchip technology cannot protect against payment card fraud if Canadian card data is used in locations that have not yet implemented microchip technology (e.g., the United States). While credit card fraud decreased, debit card fraud increased 36% from 2008 to 2009.

**Securities Fraud:**

Securities fraud, or investment fraud, involves the intentional misrepresentation of the returns of a security in order for the fraudster to receive financial gain through illegal market manipulation, high-yield investment schemes, illicit offshore investments, and/or Ponzi schemes.

In Canada, those involved in securities fraud have high-level criminal capabilities (i.e., organized crime groups) and are predominantly based in urban financial centres in British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario.\(^{334}\)

Hybrid market manipulations are large criminal schemes that, due to their size, generate profit and facilitate tax evasion and money laundering, while concealing criminal activity. This sophistication shows that criminal groups were modifying their activities to evade detection by law enforcement agencies and keep up with the changing technology.

While anyone can be a victim of securities fraud, four traits put people at a higher-risk of victimisation:

- over-confidence – people who are confident in their investment decisions without sharing decision making,
- frequent traders – those who trade on a weekly basis,
- risk-oriented – those who believe the riskier the investment, the greater the return, and
- highly educated – of the fraud victims surveyed, nearly 50% had a post-secondary education.

According to Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, 38% of Canadians have been approached with a fraudulent investment; of these, 33% were targeted through e-mail. In 2009, 38% of fraud victims invested $5,000 or more, an increase of 6% since 2006.\(^{335}\) Fraudsters use psychological tactics to build trust, including: high pressure sales pitches, a fake financial address, and professional-looking websites. This allows individuals to be susceptible to repeat victimisation.

Technological fraud has had a large social impact on Canadians. According to a study conducted by the Canadian Securities Administration, among victims who lost $10,000 or more, 60% reported higher stress levels and 49% experienced increased feelings or displays of anger.\(^{336}\)

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\(^{333}\) Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2011).

\(^{334}\) Ibid.

\(^{335}\) Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2011).

The most prevalent issues were related to mental health – about one in five victims reported experiencing depression (22%) or feelings of isolation (20%). Victims of fraud also hesitated to report the crime to law enforcement. Reasons cited for this were: embarrassment, too much trouble, and the fraudster was based offshore or bankrupt.\(^\text{337}\)

**Identity Theft:**

Three main methods are used in disguising identity – modification of a current identity, creating a fictitious identity, or theft of someone else’s identity (living or dead). Assuming stolen identities allows criminals to avoid detection of their true identities while performing illegal activities.

The core group victimised by identity theft are people between the ages of 18 and 24. This group was vulnerable because it took them longer to realize their information was compromised, meaning that they were being defrauded for a longer period. On average, it took youth 132 days to detect fraudulent activity, while it took older adults an average of 49 days.\(^\text{338}\)

In 2009, there were over 11.1 million identity theft (also known as identity fraud) victims throughout North America. Identity fraud includes, but is not limited to, stealing a credit card number or opening a bank account in someone else’s name. These thieves generally crossed international boundaries and were linked to organized crime rings in overseas places, such as Russia and Spain.\(^\text{339}\)

**Organised Crime:**

Organised crime relies heavily on frauds, or white-collar crime. The stock market is attractive to organised crime as it can be used to launder money and conduct illicit market manipulation.\(^\text{340}\) In order to successfully execute a securities fraud, organised crime members rely on coercing or exploiting financial professionals (e.g., lawyers, brokers, fund managers, accountants, etc.) because of their specialized skills.

Organised crime groups turned to technology to aid fraudulent activities using new technology such as hacking, spoofing, crimeware (malicious software designed to steal confidential financial information), and keylogging (hidden software monitoring victims’ keystrokes to collect passwords). Using e-mail, cell phones, instant messaging, and Global Positioning Systems, organised crime groups have accessed large amounts of data and transferred funds quickly and securely.

According to the 2010 Report on Organised Crime prepared by Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, some organised crime networks were almost exclusively online, with members rarely meeting in person. These individuals use advanced forms of malware and botnets (networks of compromised Internet-connected computers) to steal private data while concealing criminal activity. These ‘e-criminals’ contracted hackers to exploit computer software

\(^{337}\) Ibid.
\(^{339}\) Ibid.
\(^{340}\) Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (2011).
vulnerabilities and adapt to law enforcement techniques and software security defences, thereby facilitating cyber-attacks for profit.341

As technology evolves, it is expected that the scope of organised crime groups will also adapt and develop accordingly.

**Piracy:**

Piracy involves the illegal upload of computer software and media (e.g., movies, music, etc.) and may also be referred to as intellectual property theft. Although the US government placed Canada on the 2009, 2010, and 2011 ‘Priority Watch List’ for intellectual property theft, Canada was ranked among the lowest countries in the world for piracy; in 2010, pirated software accounted for 28% of all software used in Canada, a decrease from 35% of software used in 2006.342 As the quality of counterfeited and pirated products improves, it will be increasingly more difficult for the Service to identify genuine products and combat piracy.

**Swatting:**

Swatting involves making a false emergency call to draw a response from law-enforcement, usually a SWAT team, to an unsuspecting household; these calls usually pertain to hostage situations, violent murders, or bombs about to detonate. The caller uses spoofing techniques – Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone numbers – to disguise the origin of the 9-1-1 call. While it is possible to determine the origin of the call, it has become increasingly more difficult to do so due to the fragmentation of the telecommunication industry.343 This phenomenon has been popular in the United States and occurrences of swatting have started to appear in Canada. The most recent incident occurred in Toronto in July 2011.344

**Cyber-Terrorism:**

The use of computers for terrorist activities has become increasingly more common in recent years. Cyber-terrorism involves unlawful acts and threats of attack against computers, networks, and information, for political or social reasons.345 In 2009, researchers from the University of Toronto discovered a cyber-terrorism cell called *Ghostnet*. In the two years of its operation, approximately 1,300 computers were infiltrated in 103 countries, including computers belonging to embassies, foreign ministries, and other government offices, as well as the Dalai Lama’s Tibetan exile centres in India, Brussels, and New York.346 *Ghostnet* operated through e-mail dissemination, releasing a program that allowed the terrorist to have real-time control of the...
computer, including access to audio-visual components. It enabled the terrorist to record communication, thus gaining valuable intelligence information.\textsuperscript{347}

**Child Exploitation:**

Child exploitation involves child pornography (images and material), online luring, child exploitation through prostitution, traveling to sexually exploit children, and child trafficking. The advancement of technology has influenced the way child-related offences are committed and material is distributed. To combat, prevent, and report incidents of child exploitation, cybertip.ca was founded by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection. During 2010/11, cybertip.ca received over 8,600 reports, relating to over 14,000 incidents of child sexual exploitation – the highest reporting year since its inception (Figure 7.1).

According to the Canadian Centre for Child Protection, the top five risks to Canadian children online were:\textsuperscript{348}

- sexual offenders targeting online games that have chat rooms, including console and computer games,
- sexual offenders hijacking instant messaging accounts and coercing children to send partially clothed images of themselves,
- offenders using 3D animated characters (avatars) to engage in conversation with youth,
- offenders targeting social media websites where youth are encouraged to create online diaries, and
- youth sending nude images to peers without understanding the images could be posted online.

The Child Exploitation Section (CES) of the Toronto Police Service Sex Crimes Unit works with other police services and government agencies to investigate incidents of child exploitation. Through the promotion of education and awareness, the Service must continue to work with the community to expose and prosecute sexual predators, to improve the safety of children.

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\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{348} Cybertip.ca. *Top 5 Risks to Canadian Children on the Internet.* (Retrieved on June 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2011, from http://www.cybertip.ca/pdfs/fact_sheet_pdfs/English/Top_5_Risks_en.pdf)
D. Policing Technology

Data Management:

Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) and information sharing among police agencies is mission critical. Records Management Systems (RMS) allow for the storage, retrieval, retention, manipulation, archiving, and viewing of information, records, documents, and files about every aspect of policing and crime reporting. An RMS should include crime/arrest reports, criminal records and contacts, personnel records, and crime analysis data.

According to the US National Criminal Justice Service, an effective RMS can be integrated with other police systems, such as Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD), to increase efficiencies and prevent duplicate information. This enables a police service to conduct advanced crime analysis, employ strategic and tactical decision making, and deploy resources proactively. Business intelligence software, such as COGNOS, can also be integrated with the RMS to effectively query and capture crime statistics and report information.

In 2007, the Toronto Police Service formed the Information Management Process Assessment and Review Team (IMPART) to identify the gaps and inefficiencies that existed within the Service’s information systems. As a result of this review team, the Operational Support and Systems Group (OSSG) was created to address the identified concerns and implement the recommendations developed by IMPART – the most significant of which was the development of a new RMS.

The goal of the new Integrated Records and Information System (IRIS) project was to integrate the functionality of existing TPS systems, such as Enterprise Case and Occurrence Possessing System (eCOPS), Criminal Information Processing System (CIPS), Field Information Reports (FIR), the Repository for Integrated Criminalistic Imaging (RICI), Unified Search, and the Property Evidence Management System (PEMS) to reduce duplicated data and data entry. The IRIS project is currently being evaluated by the City of Toronto and the Toronto Police Services Board, prior to being approved for implementation. Financial limitations impede the implementation of the project.

As a leader in policing, the Service must have an effective RMS; however, it can be quite costly to design, implement, and train members. It is important for the Service to find cost-effective ways to upgrade its records management systems in order to stay up-to-date with other police services in Canada.

Crime Reporting:

In 2010, the Service implemented on-line reporting of traffic violations. In July 2011, a pilot-project was initiated for on-line reporting system of all lost property and crimes under $5000, where the suspect is unknown and the incident is not a domestic-related incident. This system allows the public to electronically complete a report that is then reviewed, acknowledged, and then entered into the RMS by a member of the Central Alternate Response Unit (CARU). An assessment of this pilot project must be completed before the value of the project can be determined; however, this type of reporting is expected to result in a decrease in non-emergency

calls for service and an increase in minor crime statistics due to the ease of reporting. The availability of on-line reporting may also encourage youth to report crimes that they might otherwise not report. As discussed in the Youth Crime chapter, youth are the least likely to report criminal victimisation.

**Communications:**

As a solution to the large volume of non-emergency calls being answered at 9-1-1, the City of Toronto introduced 3-1-1, in 2009, to provide information and referrals for non-emergency city-related issues, such as by-law enforcement, graffiti, or general questions. While this has reduced the volume of non-emergency calls to the Toronto Police Service, the number of emergency calls steadily increased. Call volumes are discussed in detail in the Calls for Service chapter.

The proliferation of cellular phones contributed significantly to this increase. A recent challenge to the Service was ‘pocket dialling’, which occurs when a cellular phone or mobile device dials 9-1-1 without the user’s knowledge, often when the keypad is left unlocked in a pocket or a purse. On average, the Toronto Police Service received almost 300 pocket dials a day, accounting for nearly 10% of all calls. While there were no instances of real emergencies being neglected, pocket dials take up resources and could affect the amount of time it takes to answer calls for legitimate emergencies. Through recent public awareness campaigns and dialogue with wireless companies, the Service advised the public about the implications of pocket-dialling; however, the results of this campaign have yet to be assessed.

In 2010, Canada was the first country to implement an enhanced emergency call system on a nation-wide basis; wireless companies were legislated to implement Enhanced 9-1-1 (Phase II) systems. Upon receiving an emergency call, Enhanced 9-1-1 (E911) works with CAD and uses Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite location and triangulation of cellular towers to estimate the longitude and latitude co-ordinates of a wireless phone. The cellular phone location is provided with an approximate metre radius and a certainty percentage. Accuracy of location depends on factors such as a clear line of sight between a wireless device and a satellite, and the distance between the cellular towers used for triangulation. The accuracy of the location may be as close as a few metres, or as far as a kilometre. With the continued rapid development of wireless technologies, it is expected that E911 systems will improve and locations will be more precise in the years to come.

A further communications challenge for the Service is outdated radio technology. Improvements to radio systems, similar to the RMS, can be costly and time-consuming to implement. Nevertheless, effective radio communications are vital for officer and public safety and as a result, the Service should examine options to upgrade their radio platform.

**Crime Management:**

The Service is currently a leader in developing and evaluating crime management strategies such as the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) project, the in-car camera project, Crime Mapping and Analysis Portal (CMAP), e-ticketing, and Internet reporting. Many

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challenges exist as the value of these projects continues to be assessed, including the influence on public safety, privacy concerns, and public accountability for monetary costs and allocation of resources.

**Recommendations for Police Service**

- As more youth are using the Internet for personal reasons, it is important for the Service to be aware of the dangers of cyber-bullying, particularly because it continues to be under reported. The Service must partner with the community, educators, and parents to educate youth on the dangers of cyber-bullying and maintaining online respect.

- Social media is becoming more popular throughout Canada. It is important for the Service to continue to use social media to communicate and build trust with the community. This can be achieved by promoting outreach initiatives and continuing to use social media for the rapid dissemination of public safety alerts and public appeals for information.

- As cyber-vetting becomes an increasingly more popular hiring filter, the Service must develop an effective cyber-vetting strategy to ensure that employees’ off-duty behaviour is consistent with law-enforcement policies.

- Technology-related crimes continue to be underreported. The Service must find a way to collect and communicate information on technology-facilitated frauds and identify cyber vulnerabilities. This will allow the public to be more aware of information security and, perhaps, decrease victimisation.

- The Service must develop strategies to deal with new types of criminal activities facilitated by technology and social media, such as flash robs and swatting.

- Criminal organisations are modifying their methods to avoid detection by law-enforcement agencies. The challenge for the Service will be to develop training that will enable members to keep up-to-date with changing technologies and how they are being exploited by criminals.

- Upgrading current police systems is critical for public and officer safety as well as public accountability. A centralized Records Management System (RMS) is of the utmost importance in law-enforcement. The Service must look at ways to implement a centralized RMS database or upgrade the current RMS to increase efficiencies. The challenge for the Service, particularly in an environment of financial constraint, will be to find a way to modify the current RMS and upgrade equipment such as radio systems in a cost-effective manner.

- The Service should be aware of public accountability with respect to the allocation of resources and monetary costs of police-related technology.
VIII. Police Resources

Changes in the nature and scope of police services needed and police services demanded require constant adjustment by this Service. In addition, the Toronto Police Service continues to strive to reflect the diverse community we serve. These factors affect the composition and organization of the personnel who deliver police service, how they are managed, and their priorities. Human resources are central to the organization and all external and internal trends have an impact, to some degree, on the recruitment, orientation, maintenance, and development of these resources.

Highlights

- In 2010, the total strength of Toronto Police Service was 7,792 members, virtually unchanged from 7,797 members in 2009, and an 11% increase from the 7,000 members ten years ago.

- Between 2009 and 2010, uniform strength decreased very slightly from 5,846 to 5,838 officers, while civilian strength increased very slightly from 1,951 to 1,954 members. Over the past ten years, uniform and civilian strengths increased 11% and 13%, respectively.

- Over the past decade, the number of police officers, including recruits, per 100,000 people in Toronto increased from 203 officers in 2001 to 206 officers in 2010.

- The median age of uniform officers in December 2010 was 39.5 years, relatively unchanged from 2009. On the whole, Toronto Police uniform workforce tended to be younger than the national workforce and just slightly younger than other Canadian police services.

- In 2010, one in three (33%) uniform members had 20 or more years of service, while just under half (45%) of uniform members had less than ten years of service. The average uniform length of service was 14 years.

- The median age of Primary Response constables was 35.9 years in 2010, compared to 38.2 years for all constables. In 2010, the median length of service for Primary Response constables was 4 years, compared to 9 years for all constables.

- In 2010, 216 officers separated from the Service; of these officers, 173 officers retired and 43 officers resigned. Of the officers that resigned, 18 resigned to join other police services.

- During 2010, 38.9 non-traffic Criminal Code offences were reported per constable, a 7% decrease from the 42.0 offences per constable reported in 2009 and a 27% decrease from 53.0 reported in 2001.

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351 Uniform strength includes all police officers and 202 cadets-in-training. Civilian strength includes all permanent, full-time civilian members with the exception of cadets-in-training and parking enforcement personnel. (As of December 31st, 2010, the Human Resources Directorate reported 409 Parking Enforcement personnel, 335 part-time or temporary personnel, 623 Auxiliary personnel, and 739 school crossing guards; none of these positions are included in the total civilian strength.)

352 Primary Response officers are those officers in the divisions who provide response to calls for service, crisis intervention, targeted patrol/enforcement, short-term problem solving, etc.
• In 2010, eight in ten (80%) uniform members were assigned to Divisional Policing Command and specific Operational Support units (i.e. Traffic Services, Marine Unit, Mounted Unit, TAVIS Rapid Response Teams, Community Oriented Response, and Emergency Task Force). The number of officers assigned to visible, front-line uniform duties in these units increased 10% over the past ten years.

• The representation of the community in the Toronto Police Service was closer than in the past – in 2010, 20% of Service members were visible minorities, 1% were Aboriginals, and 29% were female.

• The proportional representation of women, Aboriginals, and visible minorities within the uniform strength increased dramatically over the past ten years. While the total uniform strength increased 11% over the past ten years, the proportion of female officers increased 32%, the proportion of Aboriginal officers increased 38%, and the proportion of visible minority officers increased 86%.

• Similar to the proportional representation in the overall uniform strength, women, Aboriginal and visible minority officers had a marked increased presence in supervisory and senior ranks in 2010, compared to ten years ago.

• In the face of an aging population poised to retire and/or restructure their work-life, a shrinking youth cohort entering into the workforce, increased overall competition for workers, and a diminishing interest in a policing as a career, the Toronto Police Service will continue to face on-going and increasing challenges in recruiting, training, and retaining police officers.

A. WORKFORCE DEMOGRAPHICS

Throughout the 1980s and very early 1990s, the total strength of the Service increased each year and peaked at 7,551 members in 1991. Between 1991 and 1997, total strength decreased, on average, about 2% per year due to a moratorium on hiring between 1994 and 1997. With the resumption of hiring in 1998, Service strength increased 6% in the three years between 1997 and 2000. Over the past ten years, however, total strength both increased and decreased year over year, with a general increase over the period. Overall, in the past 25 years, the total strength of the Service increased 12%, reflecting similar increases in uniform (12%) and civilian (13%) strengths; it is interesting to note that compared to 25 years ago, almost all of the gains in Service strength have occurred over the past ten years (Figure 6.1).
In 2010, the total strength of Toronto Police Service was 7,792 members, virtually unchanged from 7,797 members in 2009, the highest staffing level ever reported. However, the total strength in 2010 reflected an 11% increase from the 7,000 members ten years ago.

Between 2009 and 2010, uniform strength decreased very slightly from 5,846 to 5,838. Over the past ten years, however, uniform strength increased 11% from 5,264 officers, with an 9% increase in senior officers, a 9% increase in supervisory officers, and an 11% increase in police constables and cadets. As of December 31st, 2010, the Uniform Establishment of the Toronto Police Service was 5,587 uniform police officers.

Between 2009 and 2010, civilian strength also increased only very slightly, from 1,951 to 1,954 members. Overall, civilian strength increased 13% over the past ten years from 1,736; however, the increase was driven almost solely by an increase in the number of Court Security Officers. The number of Court Security Officers increased 68% between 2001 and 2010 (from 274 to 459); staffing in all other civilian positions increased by only 2% over the same period (from 1,464 in 2001 to 1,495 in 2010).

Nationally, both the number of police officers and civilian members of police services increased in each of the past ten years, increasing 21% for police officers (from 57,076 in 2001 to 69,299 in 2010) and 37% for civilians (from 19,982 in 2001 to 27,344 in 2010). Over the past 25 years, the number of police officers and civilian members of police services increased 39% (35% for police officers and 50% for civilians). Similar to the Toronto Police Service, nationally, overall increases were reported during the late 1980s, decreases in the 1990s, and much of the overall gain, compared to 1986, was reported in the past decade. As a proportion of total national police personnel, however, the Toronto Police Service slipped from 10% in 1986 to 9% in 2001 to 8% in 2010; uniform and civilian positions showed similar decreases in proportion.

The civilian:officer ratio for the Toronto Police Service was about 1:3.0 in 2010 – the same as in 2009 and 2001. Nationally, the civilian:officer ratio was 1:2.5 in 2010, compared to

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353 Uniform Establishment refers to the number of uniform personnel believed necessary to most effectively fulfil operational requirements, is approved by City Council, and is fully funded in the operating budget. The TPS hiring strategy targets an average annual uniform strength equal to the Uniform Establishment, but, at any time, actual staffing may be above or below this level, depending on the timing of separations and hires.

354 As of September 2008, the Service targeted a uniform strength in excess of the Uniform Establishment; these additional officers are assigned to the provincially funded School Resource Officer Program.

1:2.9 a decade ago; the shift reflected an increase in the number of civilians over the past ten years (37%) and a somewhat smaller increase in the number of police officers (21%) over the same period. The civilian:officer ratio in other Greater Toronto Area (GTA) police services ranged between 1:2.3 in Peel Region to 1:2.7 in Durham and York Regions in 2010.\(^\text{356}\)

**Officer to Population Ratio:**

The number of sworn police officers per 100,000 population may be used as a very general indicator of potential workload and performance efficiency.\(^\text{357}\) Over the past decade, while the number of police officers per 100,000 Toronto residents both increased and decreased year over year, there was an overall increase of 2% from 203 officers per 100,000 in 2001 to 206 officers per 100,000 in 2010. This increase reflected a 9% increase in population and an 11% increase in officers (including cadets-in-training) over the past ten years.\(^\text{358}\)

Statistics Canada reports that nationally there were, on average, 203 officers per 100,000 population in 2010; this was a 10% increase from the 184 officers per 100,000 population reported in 2001 (Figure 6.2).\(^\text{359}\) Despite the record high number of police officers reported in 2010, the national rate of police officers per 100,000 Canadians is lower than that reported between 1975 and 1981 when the rate reached as high as 206.\(^\text{360}\)

![Police Officers per 100,000](image)

In each of the past ten years, the number of police officers per 100,000 residents in Toronto was higher than the national average, but the gap narrowed considerably in the past few years. Also, the number of officers per 100,000 population in Toronto remained well below other large urban centres, such as Montreal (235 officers), Halifax (228 officers), Victoria (235 officers) and Vancouver (223 officers). However, Toronto had considerably more officers per

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\(^{356}\) Ibid.

\(^{357}\) The officer to population ratio considers only Toronto residents and the number of sworn police officers in the Service. As it does not include transient populations (e.g. tourists, business commuters, visitors, etc.) or levels of crime, its usefulness is limited to trending and general comparison to other police services.

\(^{358}\) The number of uniform officers used in this calculation included both sworn police officers (5,636 in 2010) and cadets-in-training (202 in 2010). Therefore, the 206 police officers per 100,000 population in 2010, as reported above, is somewhat overstated. Based on actual number of sworn officers only on December 31\(^\text{st}\), 2010, the number of officers per 100,000 population dropped to 199; Statistics Canada reported officers per 100,000 population based on the actual number of sworn officers reported on May 15\(^\text{th}\), 2010 (5,774), and the population from the 2006 Census, unadjusted for growth over the five years since the census.

\(^{359}\) Statistics Canada (2010).

\(^{360}\) Ibid.
100,000 population than surrounding GTA regional police services, including Durham (149 officers), York (140 officers), and Peel (148 officers).³⁶¹

**Age & Length of Service of Uniform Members:**³⁶²

Clear trends of an aging Toronto Police uniform workforce were evident between 1980 and 2000. In 1981, more than four in ten (41%) officers were under the age of 30 and almost eight in ten officers (77%) were under 40 years of age. Ten years later, in 1992, officers between the ages of 20 and 40 accounted for only 60% of the Service, and by 2001, they accounted for less than 50% of the uniform workforce. Uniform age characteristics over the past ten years, however, were more consistent – a slightly decreased proportion of officers under the age of 30 years, and a slightly increased proportion of officers over the age of 50 years; officers between the ages of 30 and 49 years accounted for a solid two-thirds of officers in each of the past ten years (Figure 6.3).

Over the past decade, officers between the age of 30 and 49 years consistently accounted for the majority of the uniform strength. Within these two age groups, however, there was a shift. Between 2001 and 2010, the proportion of officers between 30 and 39 years of age steadily increased from 34% to 38%, while the proportion of officers between 40 and 49 years of age decreased from 36% to 32%. The proportion of officers over the age of 50 years increased slightly, from 16% in 2001 to 18% in 2010, and those under the age of 30 decreased from in 14% 2001 to 13% in 2010.

Officers of the Toronto Police Service and other Canadian police services were on average, younger than the national workforce (Figure 6.4). In 2006, 57% of the Canadian workforce was between the ages of 25 and 49, compared to nearly 80% of Canadian police officers and 82% of Toronto police officers (2010). On the other hand, 27% of the Canadian workforce was over the age of 50; only 16% of Canadian police officers and 17% of Toronto Police officers (2010) were aged 50 or older. Statistics Canada reported that for the first time ever, the median age of the Canadian workforce surpassed 40 years in 2006, increasing from 39.5 in 2001 to 41.2 in 2006; the median age of the workforce in the Toronto region was 40.6

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³⁶¹ Ibid.
³⁶² Cadets-in-training are not included in age/service analysis.
In comparison, the median age of Canadian police officers and Toronto police officers (2010) was 39 years and 39.5 years, respectively. It is interesting to note that while the median age of the Canadian workforce grew 5 years from 1991 to 2006, the median age of Canadian police officers grew only 2 years during the same period.

The relatively constant proportion of officers under the age of 30 years, given the unusually high hiring levels over the past few years, is largely explained by the age characteristics of new recruits. The average age of recruits hired over the past ten years was about 28 years: more than three in ten recruits (31%) were over the age of 30 years, and only 16 officers hired in the past ten years were under the age of 20 years. Prior to the resumption of hiring in 1995, the average age of a recruit was about 22 years and fewer than 3% of recruits were over the age of 30 years.

The length of service of uniform members gives some indication of the level of experience in the uniform workforce. As shown in Figure 6.5, the distribution of years of service changed somewhat over the past decade.

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364 The median is the middle value of a group of values arranged in ascending or descending order.


366 Average age characteristics of those hired in previous years is based on the age and hire date of currently serving uniform members; due to internal recruiting and separations, the statistics may not exactly reflect the age of all recruits hired in specified years, but are close approximations.
In 2010, one in three (33%) police officers had more than 20 years of service compared to almost one in two (44%) ten years ago. On the other hand, almost one in two officers (45%) had less than ten years service in 2010, compared to one in four officers (25%) in 2001. Over the past decade, the most frequent service level shifted from 25-29 years in 2001 to 0-4 years in 2010; over this period, the average length of service decreased from 17 years to 14 years.

It is interesting to compare the relative length of service distributions over the past ten years, as shown in Figure 6.5. It is possible to pinpoint periods of unusually high and low levels of recruitment/hiring and trace their impacts over time. For example, the unusually high level of recruiting in the late-1970s and early-1990s was still evident in the 25-29 years service level in 2001. Over time, however, as members separated and moved toward retirement, this peak flattened. In contrast, the hiring moratorium in mid-1990s was clearly evident in the 5-9 years service level in 2001 and the 15-19 years service level in 2010. Also evident was the flattening of peaks prior to the completion of a 30-year career. In 2001, 1,113 officers had 10-14 years service compared to only 899 officers with 20-24 years service a decade later; almost one in five officers (19%) hired between 1990 and 1994 separated from the Service in the past ten years.

While the Service has traditionally enjoyed a high level of corporate loyalty – members serving a full career in the same organization – there are some indicators that this may be less likely in the future. Broader social trends suggest that workers are increasingly less likely to remain in a single organization and are more likely to pursue multiple careers. This trend is, to some extent, evident both in those joining and those separating from the Service. The age characteristics and prior work experience of the Service’s more recent recruits – older with diverse employment backgrounds – suggests that new members moved from other careers to enter policing. On the other hand, the age and service characteristics of members separating from the Service, together with information gathered from exit interviews, has indicated that they were moving to employment elsewhere, even those retiring from the Service with 30 or more years service.

Figure 6.6 presents a profile of uniform officers by both age and length of service. It illustrates a somewhat tri-modal distribution including officers in their 20s and 30s with less than ten years experience, officers in their 40s with 20-24 years experience, and older, more experienced officers with more than 30 years experience. It also illustrates current recruiting practices – older officers in their forties and fifties with less than five years experience.
Police managers face a significant challenge in managing officers from two distinct and very different age groupings – officers with diverse and often conflicting demands on the organization. Officers over the age of 40 – the tail end of the second half of the baby-boomer generation – require continued opportunities for challenge and development in a job they have performed for more than 15, 20, or 30 years.

Workers under the age of 40, on the other hand, are generally more likely to be better educated, more diverse, completely technologically literate, more individualistic, more self-interested, less loyal or committed to the workplace, question their superior officers, and communicate differently (e.g. communicate using technology, and information is visual and/or brief, concise, and to the point). With a higher level of education, strong desire for work-life balance, and knowledge of their worth in the labour market, younger officers have increased expectations for rapid promotion and organizational accommodation for work-life balance. More and more, the Service – all employers, for that matter – will experience increasing demands for shorter workweeks, more flexible work hours, work from home capability, and increased leaves.

As reported in previous Scans, Primary Response officers were, and continue to be, in general, younger and less experienced than the average constable. In 2010, almost four in ten (38%) police constables were assigned to Primary Response in the divisions. The median age of Primary Response constables was 35.9 years compared to 38.2 years for all constables. Further, 29% of the Primary Response constables were under 30 years of age, compared to only 18% for all constables (Figure 6.7).

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368 Primary Response included only constables assigned to Primary Response platoons in the divisions; it did not include constables assigned to other uniform divisional functions such as Traffic and Community Response. Primary Response officers were those officers in the divisions who provided response to calls for service, crisis intervention, targeted patrol/enforcement, short-term problem solving, etc.
When each division was examined separately, the age distribution of Primary Response constables in most divisions closely resembled that of the overall Primary Response constable distribution, with average ages similar to the overall average age for Primary Response officers (35.9 years). However, there was some variation between divisions: the average age of Primary Response constables in 52 Division was 42.2 years, but only 33.5 years in 31 Division.

As would be expected, the length of service for Primary Response constables was also found to be lower than the Service average for all constables (Figure 6.8).

The median years of service for Primary Response constables in 2010 was 4 years, compared to 9 years for all constables; more than half of the Primary Response constables (54%) had less than five years experience.

**Retirements & Resignations:**

Over the past ten years, a total of 2,692 officers separated – retired or resigned – from the Toronto Police Service. Based on the current established uniform strength, this level of separation represented a 48% turnover in uniform staff over the past ten years. In 2010, there were 216 separations, down from the 240 separations in 2009, fewer than half the 474 separations experienced in 2001, and still much lower than the ten year average of 269 per year.
It should be noted that over the past ten years, almost two-thirds of separations (65%) were retirements (Figure 6.9).\textsuperscript{369,370}

Over the past ten years, a total of 1,755 uniform officers retired from the Service. After a record high level of retirements in 1996 (due to early retirement and retirement incentive packages), followed by a record low level in 1997, retirements consistently increased in each year until 2001, when the level started dropping again. Since 2003, however, the number of retirements has slowly, but steadily, increased. The unusually high number of retirements in 2001 reflected the end of a period of aggressive retirement incentives and a reduced pension factor; the reduced pension factor was effective until the end of 2005.\textsuperscript{371}

In 2010, 173 officers retired from the Service, a 16% increase from the 149 officers who retired in 2009, but very close to the ten year average of 176 retirements per year. The average length of service of retiring members in 2010 was 34.3 years and retiring members were, on average, 55.9 years old. As of December 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2010, a total of 465 officers – 8% of the total uniform strength – were eligible to retire and a further 100 officers will be eligible to retire during 2011. Further, of the 101 uniform senior officers, almost two-thirds (63%) will be eligible to retire by the end of 2011.

As is evident in Figure 6.9, the number of resignations each year since 2000 has been somewhat more stable than retirement levels. The 43 resignations in 2010, however, were a marked decrease from the 91 resignations in 2009 and the ten-year average of 94 resignations per year. The number of resignations in 2010 was similar to the number of resignations in the early to mid-1990s, when resignations ranged between 40 and 49 per year. This may be partly attributable to an economy that had fewer non-policing employment opportunities than in the past ten years, but is likely more reflective of less aggressive recruiting by other police services.

As shown in Figure 6.10, officers that separated from the Service to join other police services accounted for more than half (52%) of all resignations over the past decade. It is interesting to note that between 2005 and 2008, the number and proportion of officers leaving to

\textsuperscript{369} The 43 resignations in 2010 include 4 deaths and 2 termination of services.
\textsuperscript{370} The numbers of separations reported in previous Scans have been revised to include cadet-in-training resignations in the uniform separation levels.
\textsuperscript{371} To determine eligibility for retirement without penalty, the member’s age and length of service, added together, must equal or exceed the eligibility factor; this factor was reduced to 75 for uniform members for a period of time, but returned to 85 in 2005.
join other police services generally increased, then decreased in 2009 and again in 2010 during a more difficult economic period.

![Officer Joining Other Police Services 2001-2010](image)

**Figure 6.10** Source: TPS Human Resources

Officers who separated to join other services in 2010 were, on average, 34 years old with 6 years experience – very valuable officers to this Service. Although the Toronto Police Service hired some officers from other services and some former TPS members returned, this is only a small portion of the number of TPS officers who resigned to join other services.

**Workload:**

During 2010, 38.9 non-traffic Criminal Code offences were reported per constable in Toronto, a 7% decrease from the 42.0 reported in 2009.\(^{373}\) For more than a decade, this crime to strength ratio decreased; however, the rate of decrease noticeably increased in the past four years. The decrease in the crime to strength ratio from 2009 reflected an 8% decrease in the number of reported non-traffic Criminal Code offences slightly offset by a 0.5% decrease in the number of constables. The 2010 ratio, the lowest level in the past 25 years, was also a 27% decrease from the 53.0 Criminal Code offences per constable reported in 2001, reflecting a 16% decrease in the number of reported non-traffic Criminal Code offences and a 12% decrease in the number of constables (Figure 6.11).

\(^{372}\) Uniform officers in this section do not include cadets-in-training.

\(^{373}\) Number of non-traffic Criminal Code offences were revised for years 2005 through 2009, due to regular updates to the Service’s live database. Crime data are revised to reflect the latest data available and for the sake of fair comparison.
Nationally, Statistics Canada reported that since 1991, *Criminal Code* incidents per police officer generally decreased, consistent with a drop in the overall crime rate; in 2009, there were 32.1 incidents per officer (one of the lowest rates in 30 years).

It should be noted that in addition to investigating *Criminal Code* offences, police officers spent considerable time training, working with the community, and attending court. Community policing requires police officers to be more involved with the communities they police – problem solving, crime prevention, and community mobilization are both time and labour intensive.

**Resource Deployment:**

In 2010, eight in ten (80%) uniform members – slightly less than the 81% in 2009 and the same as the 80% in 2001 – were assigned to Divisional Policing Command and selected Operational Support units (i.e. Traffic Services, Marine Unit, Mounted Unit, TAVIS Rapid Response Teams, Community Oriented Response, and Emergency Task Force). The number of officers assigned to visible, front-line uniform duties in these units (i.e. not plainclothes, administration, investigative, etc.), including supervisors, increased 10% over the past ten years (from 3,377 to 3,719 officers), but decreased very slightly (0.5%) from 2009 (from 3,739 to 3,719 officers) (Figure 6.12). The increase in uniform officers on the street between 2001 and 2010 reflected a 15% increase in supervisory officers (from 491 in 2001 to 565 in 2010) and a 9% increase in constables (from 2,886 to 3,154). In 2010, there were 7.2 uniform constables for every uniform sergeant assigned to a visible uniform function.

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374 Statistics Canada (2010).
375 Statistics Canada calculates *Criminal Code* incidents per sworn police officer, not including recruits, as opposed to the Toronto Police Service calculation of *Criminal Code* offences per sworn police constable; for comparative purposes, *Criminal Code* incidents per police officer for the Toronto Police Service in 2010 was 32.2 incidents per officer.
376 Uniform officers in this section do not include cadets-in-training.
377 The constable:sergeant ratio target range, as recommended in the Beyond 2000 Restructuring Task Force Final Report, based on research and information provided by a cross-section of Canadian and American police agencies, was between 8:1 to 10:1.
B. WORKFORCE DIVERSITY

Toronto has a highly diverse community that is still growing. As noted in the Demographics chapter, recent projections from Statistics Canada suggest that by 2031, the proportion of the Toronto CMA identifying as visible minority could increase to 63%. Achieving a workforce that reflects the community, and continues to reflect the community, will be a long-term challenge for the Service. It is the stated intention of the Toronto Police Services Board and the Toronto Police Service that the organization will continue to strive to reflect the community it serves through the use of equal opportunity employment practices.

Based on the 2006 Census, the Toronto community was comprised of: 47% visible minority, 0.5% Aboriginal, and 52% female. The representation of the community in the Toronto Police Service was closer than in the past – in 2010, 20% of Service members were visible minorities, 1% were Aboriginals, and 29% were female. As is evident in Figure 6.13, the Service is almost halfway to its goals of community representation.

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378 Uniform officers in this section include cadets-in-training.

379 The civilian position category – Parking/Bylaw – was not included in the Service composition profile because it was not included in the determination of Total Service Strength. The overall composition profile for this position category generally exceeded the overall Service diversity profile – 1.3% Aboriginal, 32% visible minority, and 26% female.
The Service will continue to actively pursue a representative workforce. The Service recognises the immense benefits and necessity of providing a policing service which is cognizant of and sensitive to the cultural, ethnic, religious, and lifestyle choices of community members; on the other hand, the Service also recognises the potential challenges of a diverse workforce, both within the workforce and in the community. While advancements in workforce diversity are to be commended, both Service and community leaders have identified the requirement to address, through the education and training of all Service members, the need to harmonise potentially conflicting beliefs inherent in cultures, religions, ethnicities, and lifestyle choices.

**Uniform Composition:**

The diversity composition of police officers in Toronto in 2010 was still largely weighted in favour of males and whites; females accounted for 18% of uniform members, and Aboriginals and visible minorities accounted for 1% and 20%, respectively. Women and visible minorities were not as well represented in the uniform ranks as in the Service overall; on the other hand, Aboriginals were better represented in the uniform strength than in the Service overall.

While the uniform strength of the Toronto Police Services clearly did not reflect the community, the representation of women, Aboriginals, and visible minorities increased dramatically over the past ten years, especially when compared to the overall growth of the Service. As discussed earlier, the overall uniform strength increased 11% over the past ten years. In comparison, over the same period, the proportion of female officers increased 32% (from 14% in 2001 to 18% in 2010), the proportion of Aboriginal officers increased 38% (from 0.8% to 1%) and the proportion of visible minority officers increased 86% (from 11% to 20%) (Figure 6.14).

![Employment Equity Composition](image)

**Figure 6.14**

It is important to the Service that uniform strength represent the community and, over time, as overall uniform strength moves closer to community representation, so should the representation by rank. In 2010, while the representation of the uniform strength was more reflective than it had been in the past, the cadet-in-training and constable ranks were more closely representative of the community than the supervisory or senior officer ranks (Figure 6.15).
As is evident in Figure 6.15, the representation of females, Aboriginals, and visible minorities was higher in the constable/cadet ranks than in supervisory and senior ranks; in other words, as rank increased, the proportion of female, Aboriginal, and visibility minority officers decreased. The composition of the police constable/cadet rank reflected the achievements of the targeted recruiting strategies in recent years. However, similar to the proportional representation in the overall uniform strength, women, Aboriginal, and visible minority officers had an increasing presence in supervisory and senior ranks over the past ten years. The proportion of females and visible minority officers in senior ranks about doubled in the past ten years, increasing from 8% in 2001 to 14% in 2010 for female officers, and from 5% to 12% for visible minority officers. Similarly, the proportion of female, Aboriginal, and visible minority officers at supervisory levels at least doubled over the past ten years, increasing from 5% in 2001 to 12% in 2010 for visible minority officers, from 0.2% to 0.6% for Aboriginal officers, and from 9% to 17% for female officers.

A recent review of the participation by and success of identified groups in the promotional processes over the past six years showed that although women were slightly less likely to participate in promotional processes, women, visible minority, and Aboriginal officers were at least as likely or even slightly more likely to be successful in the promotional process, compared to male or non-visible minority officers. The review noted that a significant number of female and visible minority officers, including Aboriginal officers, hired in the past four years were not a 1st Class Constable at the time of application and were, therefore, not eligible to apply for promotion; it is expected that greater representation of identified groups will be evident in the future.

While men continued to dominate police services across the country, the gender gap narrowed. Twenty-five years ago, almost all Canadian police officers (96%) were male. In every year since 1985, however, the proportion of female officers steadily increased, from 4% in 1986 to 19% in 2010.380 The Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics (CCJS) reported that, in 2010, women accounted for almost one in five Canadian police officers (19%), the same as in 2009, but a 40% increase from 2000. The Police Sector Council predicts that over the next decade, however, the proportion of female officers is not likely to increase more than one or two percent.381

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380 Statistics Canada (2010).
The overall representation of women officers in the Toronto Police Service (18%) was slightly below the national (19%) average, and the same as the provincial average (18%). However, female officers in Toronto were better represented at senior and supervisory ranks than the national average. Nationally, in 2010, women accounted for 9% of senior officers, 15% of supervisory officers, and 21% of police constables. In the Toronto Police Service, women represented 14% of senior officers, 17% of supervisory officers, and 19% of police constables and recruits. A review of the presence of women in policing and at senior ranks, in relation to the 1998 IACP mandate for action specific to women in policing, noted that a 0.4% annual increase in recruitment of women and a 0.8% annual increase in the promotion of women across a province as large as Ontario was disappointingly low. The report recommended an approach which would ensure that the concerns of women within the organisation are fully understood, and addressed systemically.

C. Resource Challenges

Recruiting and retaining officers, as was discussed in detail in the Police Resources chapter in the 2008 Environmental Scan, will continue to be a critical challenge to police managers. Given the age demographics of the Service’s current workforce, changing attitudes towards work and corporate loyalty (i.e. trend is away from a career for life), constantly changing demands and increasing complexity of the job, a shrinking youth cohort, decreased interest of youth in policing as a career, and growing community diversity, the Toronto Police Service will continue to face challenges in the pursuit of recruiting the right applicants, likely for many years in the future. Further compounding existing recruiting challenges to the Toronto Police Service, will be the almost certain significant reductions in the Service’s overall strength – uniform and civilian – over the next few years.

Recruiting:

Canadian police chiefs rated ‘attracting the next generation of talent’ as the number one issue to be faced in five to ten years. To date, the Toronto Police Service has not experienced a shortage of competent applicants, due in large part, to the Service’s enormous effort at recruit outreach. However, a number of factors may limit the Service’s ability to attract a sufficient number of competent applicants in the future.

As mentioned previously, there are a number of factors that will whittle away at the number of competent applicants from which to recruit. The first limitation on the applicant pool will be the definition of competent. With the increasing complexity of the job and community demands for policing services, required competencies will continually expand to match the job requirements; competencies such as multiple language skills, computer literacy, life maturity, post-secondary education, etc., which were once considered an asset, may well be bona-fide requirements in the future. Second, a shrinking youth cohort in Canada – the birth rate in the late 1990s was 25% lower than in the 1960s – will curtail the number of applicants in all job sectors. In 1983, there were almost four young people (20-34 years) entering the labour market for every

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person 55 years or older exiting the labour market; by 2006, the number entering the market dropped by more than half to 1.9 new workers. This trend is expected to continue through 2025.384

Further eroding the number of future applicants is an apparent lack of interest of youth in policing as a career. A May 2010 survey of almost 1,600 youths, conducted by Ipsos Reid on behalf of the Police Sector Council, found that only 3% of the youths surveyed said they would be most interested in pursuing a career in policing, down from 4% and 5% in similar surveys conducted in 2005 and 2007, respectively. In a separate report based on the 2007, 2009, and 2010 survey findings, Ipsos Reid reported a number of notable trends – threats and opportunities – pertaining to future recruitment of police officers, including:385

- a pattern of falling interest in policing as a career was evident;
- decreasing proportions of respondents who strongly agreed that policing is an option only after all other options were exhausted (27% in 2007, 17% in 2009, and 15% in 2010) suggested that policing is more a ‘middle of the pack’ career choice;
- youth perception of police and the role they play in the community trended downward;
- year over year, respondents consistently rated bona-fide occupational requirements – conditioning level, mobility, physical attributes, and academic achievement – as opposed to ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation as perceived attributes of potential and current police officers;
- the decreasing proportions of respondents who strongly agreed that (a) the ethnic make-up of a police force should be an accurate reflection of the community they serve (36% in 2007, 24% in 2009, and 19% in 2010) and (b) they believed that some cultural communities view policing as a negative career choice (34% in 2007, 24% in 2009, and 20% in 2010) were an indication that the ethnicity of police officers is much less relevant to youth;
- views held in regard to perceptions of policing as a career (profession as opposed to a job, dangerous, interesting work, opportunity to help others, not conducive to work-life balance, long hours, high stress, etc.) held steady, with the exception of support from family and friends, which decreased from 39% in 2007 to only 23% in 2010; and
- although the general view on the how long the hiring process would take trended upward in 2010, it was still well below the 6-18 months experienced.

Retention:

As the availability of competent recruits diminishes, the emphasis will shift to retaining currently serving officers. The results of the 2007 Ipsos Reid survey of serving police officers reported that 71% of respondents said that policing was a good career, 73% would choose policing as a career again, 78% were satisfied with their job, and 83% planned to stay for life. These results would suggest that retention is not a concern. Notwithstanding the apparent satisfaction and loyalty to policing and individual policing organisations, retaining skilled officers is still likely to be a challenge for police services across Canada through 2020.

At the end of 2010, 600 Toronto Police Service officers – more than 10% of the uniform strength – were eligible to retire with 30 or more years of service. By 2020, fully one-third of current members will be eligible to retire. Officers that retired from the Service in 2010 were on average 55 years old with a median length of service of 35 years, thus maximizing their pension entitlements. Regardless of satisfaction with their job and desire to continue working, officers, in general, tend to retire when their pensions are maximized. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many officers seek other employment after retirement from policing.

Recent trends indicate that older workers are remaining in the workforce and are doing so for a variety of reasons, many to do with financial considerations. Recent studies by TD Bank Group and Scotiabank indicated that Ontario boomers are not financially prepared for retirement. Based on a survey of 1,000 Canadians conducted by Environics Research in December 2010, the TD Waterhouse Boomer Happiness Index reported that of boomers aged 45-64, two-thirds worry that they won’t have enough money to last through retirement, and almost half worry they will lose their family home as a result of their inadequate savings.

A recent study suggests that strategies that encourage or enable experienced workers to defer retirement and remain on the job may have increasing importance to the labour supply. The study found that 33% of recent retirees said they would have continued working under different circumstances. More than one in four recent retirees indicated that they would continue to work if they could reduce their work schedules (e.g. shorter weeks, shorter days, more vacation, etc.) without affecting their pension.

The retention of younger workers will also present challenges to organizations over the next decade. Younger workers are generally less likely to expect to stay in a career, let alone with a single organization, for 30 years, and the number of youth entrants into the workforce will diminish. The competition for young, educated, and experienced workers will, therefore, increase, putting pressure on employers to offer competitive salaries and benefits, and adapt working environments to better suit the needs of younger workers, particularly in regard to the importance they place on work-life balance. Police services will have to focus on changing the perception that policing can not be compatible with a work-life balance, but more importantly, they will have to actually adopt, where possible, practices more in keeping with best practices to promote a work-life balance – shorter work weeks, flexible hours and home-based work – for the benefit of both the employee and the organization.

It is important to note that the Service will face the same retention issues with civilian staff – work-life balance, corporate loyalty, job challenge, etc. Further, the very limited availability of civilian career development and career path, may pose a significant challenge to the Service in retaining skilled civilian staff.

**Reduction:**

Notwithstanding the foregoing discussion, Toronto Police managers will face a somewhat more pressing challenge in the shorter term. If city-defined 2012 budget targets are to be met, policing in Toronto must be delivered with a very significantly and quickly reduced level of resources. That is fewer people, less premium pay (e.g. for overtime) per member, and fewer

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dollars for training, development and equipment. Realistically, there can be no expectation to ‘do more with less’; the realistic expectation will be to ‘maintain with less’.

At present, there is no clear indication of the magnitude, timing, or manner (e.g., layoffs, attrition, or a combination of both) of staffing reductions. In addition to 10% reductions in premium pay and non-fixed accounts, the Service has made a commitment to not hire in 2011 or 2012. In the first six months of 2011, through attrition alone, the overall Service strength decreased by 123 officers and 49 permanent full-time civilians. It is not unreasonable to expect a staffing reduction of in excess of 500 officers and 150 civilians by year-end 2012 if hiring is not resumed; however, attrition alone, without incentives, will not achieve budget targets.

Further, in July 2011, the Toronto Police Services Board offered a retirement incentive for up to twelve uniform and six civilian pension-eligible senior officers, to be effective no later than August 31, 2011. In the event of a full uptake on the package, as is expected, 12% of all uniform senior officers will separate from the Service on a single day. As the underlying objective of the retirement incentive is cost savings, these vacated positions will not be back-filled. Therefore, the Service will enter a critical management period with that many fewer experienced senior managers.

To actually fully achieve the City’s target budget reduction of about $84 million in 2012 from the 2011 police budget, staffing reductions could reach as high as 15% of the current strength, effective January 1, 2012.  It is interesting to note that a loss of 15% in Service strength would reduce the Service strength to a level below that of March 1998 when the Service emerged from a series of aggressive retirement incentives and a three-year moratorium on hiring, effectively the lowest strength level in over 25 years. In addition, the reduction of civilian positions would, in effect, further significantly reduce policing service delivery as police officers would have to take up the clerical and administrative duties currently performed by civilian members.

Although the extent to which the Service will experience staff reductions is not known, there are serious consequences to significant reductions in a short period of time, particularly in light of the future recruiting challenges discussed previously. Reduction gained through attrition, particularly those accelerated by incentives, result in significant organisational losses in experience, expertise, and skilled management. On the other hand, staff reductions gained through layoffs and hiring freezes tend to result in gaps in the staffing distribution. The gap will be most noticeable immediately in the availability of Primary Response officers, in ten years, when the Service requires experienced training and supervisory officers, in 20 years, when talented management is sought out, and so on. The impact of gaps in service distribution as a result of past staffing reductions is evident in Figure 6.5.

Regardless of the level or timing of staffing reductions, the challenge for police managers remains the same – to maintain services with fewer resources. As with any service provider – private or public – the challenge is to most effectively match the supply of available resources to

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388 It important to note that the cost of literally hundreds of Toronto police officers is shared, to varying extents, with the Province on the condition that uniform strength is maintained at a contractually agreed level. Therefore, the actual cost saving from the reduction of hundreds of uniform positions is offset by a corresponding loss of provincial grant revenue.

389 It should be noted that considering legislated requirements and provisions within collective agreements, it is unlikely, if even possible, to achieve layoffs effective January 1st, 2012. Any delay in the effective date of layoffs would necessitate an increase in the number of layoffs to achieve the 2012 target budget. As is evident from the incentive offered to senior officers, voluntary separation provides a more timely, albeit more costly, result.
provide a service, to the demand for those services, or at least to minimize the gap between supply and demand. This may be achieved by optimizing the effectiveness and efficiency of personnel deployment to deliver a service (supply) and/or managing customer expectations for service (demand). On the supply side of the equation, optimal deployment, service delivery prioritization, and staff development/training will be critical challenges for the Service over the next few years. On the other side – demand – managing service delivery expectations, prioritization of service provision, and public education will be the challenges to be met.

The need for police services to do more, or at least maintain, with less is not new; unfortunately, that means that the benefits and efficiencies to be gained from the easier fixes have already been realised. In response to decades of calls for cost savings and reductions, the Service has realised a number of cost and service efficiencies, including technology-based enhancements, civilianization, intelligence-led policing, on-line and call-in reporting, community mobilization, etc.; the search for efficiencies in police service delivery is an on-going task for the Toronto Police Service and will certainly continue to be so in the future.

Typically, achieving a significant efficiency requires a considerable investment in time and money; although efficiencies can produce significant long-term savings, they are often initially quite costly and require significant time to implement. For example, the implementation of an effective Records Management System which incorporates all corporate and operational functionalities and capabilities in a single system would offer enormous efficiencies and increase effectiveness in service delivery, investigation, and administration. However, the cost of implementing the system is, at present, prohibitively high and efficiency and effectiveness gains would not likely be realised immediately. Increased efficiency at an individual worker level typically involves an increased level of experience, intensive training and specialization, and improved tools, or some combination thereof. Again, time and/or money are necessary to achieve a noticeable improvement in individual worker efficiency.

It is important to note that simple deferrals of costs (e.g. failure to maintain vehicle and technology life-cycles), as was practiced in previous periods of fiscal constraint, are not efficiencies and often result in inefficiencies in the short-term and enormous financial burdens in the future. The management of resources – seeking efficiencies and deployment optimization – in the face of an increasingly complex demand for policing services is a core responsibility of all police managers.

As noted previously, the challenge remains to minimize the gap between supply and demand; if supply is to be reduced, then so must demand be reduced. It is interesting to note that this same concept is the underpinning of the consultant’s recommendations in the city’s core services review – manage demand expectations. The consultant’s report does not prescribe efficiencies – doing more with less – but rather recommends reducing services – doing less with less. The recommendations of the consultant’s (KPMG) report are discussed more fully in the Financial Resources chapter.

The concept of managing public expectations is not new to the Toronto Police Service, or to many other municipal police services. However, the degree to which steps must be taken to achieve a level of public demand for services appropriate to available resources may well be beyond the current experience. In an article titled Managing the Demand for Police Services or How to Control an Insatiable Appetite, the authors specifically discuss the growing need to
address the demand side of the delivery of policing services.\textsuperscript{390} The report argues that modern police services, having successfully marketed themselves as “omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent”, have, in effect, established themselves as the symbol of stability and order for the majority of citizens, and citizens increasingly look to police for all manner of assistance, some well outside the mandate of policing. The report highlights the very difficult task of managing an often unreasonable level of demand for police services, while maintaining police legitimacy and the respect with which they are regarded by the public.

The authors define the problem as daunting – to continue to meet expectations, reassure the public that things are under control, discourage potential offenders, provide quality service, meet the needs of citizens, and at the same time encourage the public to reduce its appetite for police service. In many jurisdictions, public service providers encourage members of their communities to take some responsibility for their affairs; this is particularly true of social issues surrounding retirement income and health insurance. It is interesting to note that the community mobilization model of policing adopted by the Toronto Police Service encourages the public to take some level of responsibility for the affairs of their communities and neighbourhoods.

The article discusses the application of a classic model for rationing scarce resources – one frequently applied in health services – to manage demand for police services. The model includes five mechanisms for rationing police services: deterrence, deflection, delay, dilution and denial.

- While it is not acceptable to discourage the public from contacting police for minor matters, the model suggests deterring a demand for service by educating the public of the actual or opportunity costs of police attendance at a minor incident (e.g. minor damage to property of low value). Going one step further, a nominal fee-for-service may be considered; and, where the service is as a direct result of the irresponsible action of the individual, a full cost recovery might be considered.

- Deflection attempts to manage the demand caused by the convenience of calling police, especially the 911 emergency line, as members of the public who require assistance typically call police first. The model suggests police politely but firmly refuse all non-emergency calls through the 911 system. For non-police related service requirements, callers may be referred to the most appropriate agency to deal with their service requirement, many of which have 24-hour lines, just not as easy to remember as 911.

- While most police services measure their performance on response time, the authors argue that while an immediate response to life-threatening events and crimes in progress is critical, police response to a break and enter reported hours after it occurred, may be better managed by appointment at the mutual convenience of the police and homeowner. The article pointed to findings of a survey which indicated that if the expectations of the caller were set to an appropriate level and subsequently met by police, there was no detrimental effect on the caller’s satisfaction with police response.

- Dilution refers to the management of the public’s expectation of what will occur when the police respond to their calls for service; the service provided will better reflect the

severity or value of the crime and the probability that the crime will be solved, rather than what the public may see on television.

- Denial of services is simply that police may be disinclined to respond to certain calls for service, providing little more than an acknowledgement. Denial includes strategies such as defining deviance down (ignoring behaviour which would otherwise have gotten the attention of police) or diversion tactics (managing low level low visibility crime through police caution or diversion from prosecution). The authors caution, however, that denial of service can be a risky strategy, and in some instances tragic.

Public education and well considered policy development will be critical challenges for the Service in any effort to manage the public’s demand for policing services.

D. WORK ENVIRONMENT

Work environment is believed to be directly related to employee job satisfaction, stress, turnover, and psychological health – a positive workplace promotes happier, healthier, and more productive workers. On the other hand, a negative workplace may give rise to lost efficiency, absenteeism, high staff turnover, grievances, severance packages, and lawsuits. In an increasingly competitive labour market that sets work-life balance and job satisfaction as high priorities, the work environment – positive or negative – cannot be underestimated by employers.

A recent study by the Center for Mental Health and Research at the Australian National University revealed that “a badly paid, poorly supported, or insecure job, can be as harmful or worse for mental health than being unemployed”. The study, based on longitudinal data from more than 7,000 people of working age in Australia, considered employment status, levels of anxiety, depression, happiness, and feelings of calm in the four months preceding the survey to assess mental health. Overall, researchers found that unemployed respondents had poorer mental health than those who were employed, but that mental health was dependent on the psycho-social quality of the job. Respondents in lower quality jobs showed a greater decline in mental health than those who were unemployed. It is not surprising that unemployment may take a toll on mental health, but the findings of this study run contrary to the generally held belief that ‘any job is better than no job at all’.

Bill 168, Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Act (Violence and Harassment in the Workplace) 2009, aimed at further protecting workers from violence and harassment in the workplace, was enacted in 2009. The Toronto Police Service has comprehensive processes in place for workplace violence and harassment, and training for Service personnel is currently being developed. The provisions and employer requirements – the development of prevention policies and risk assessment – are further outlined in the Legislative Impacts chapter.

Findings of the Toronto Police Service 2010 Personnel Survey revealed that eight in ten members who responded to the survey agreed (45%) or somewhat agreed (35%) that, in general, they were satisfied with their work environment. Nine in ten members (90%) indicated that they

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were, in general, satisfied with their job and slightly more (93%) said they felt their job was
meaningful. Although about one in four respondents said that during the past year, they felt they
had been discriminated against by another Service member (27%), and almost four in ten said
that they believed that there was a lot of discrimination within the Service (39%), almost eight in
ten respondents believed that their workplace was adequately protected from harassment and
discrimination (76%).

**Wellness:**

Initiated in 2007, the Service’s Wellness Strategy was created to address specific
employee health indicators, including cardiovascular disease, diabetes, obesity, nutrition, fitness,
stress, and work-life balance. The purpose of the program is “to develop a sustainable, evidence
based, employee driven and management supported wellness model to improve the health and
productivity of all Toronto Police Service employees”. 392

To date, wellness initiatives have included nutritional counselling, weight loss clinics,
chronic disease education, a meditation/stress management program, fitness program/peer pin
training network, and psychological services. In 2010/2011, the Service launched a two-year
Work/Life Balance Program intended to create several awareness programs incorporating stress
resilience, mental health, setting priorities, relaxation, and personal empowerment.

Managed by a central Global Wellness Committee and supported by sub-committees
encompassing the entire Service, the Wellness Strategy and its many programs have been
communicated both internally and externally through presentations in conferences, published
articles in magazines, and on the newly-launched Wellness Intranet website. The Service has
also incorporated health training into various training modules facilitated by the Toronto Police
College.

In addition to having achieved Level 3 (Level 4 is the highest level attainable) of the
National Quality Institute (NQI) rating, the Service won awards such as the Ontario
Psychologically Healthy Workplace Award, and the prestigious Corporate Health and
Productivity Management Award. As a leader in wellness within the policing community,
Service members are often invited to speak about the Wellness Strategy at external events.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICE**

- The co-existence of diverse employee groups – young, inexperienced officers, older recruits
  with diverse prior employment experience, and older, more experienced officers – creates
diverse and often conflicting employee needs. The Service will be required to address job
content, training and development, lateral and vertical mobility, attrition, physical, emotional
and personal (family accommodation, child care, retirement counselling, etc.) challenges for
very different types of employees with very different priorities.

- The current overall age and service distribution illustrates the need for a constant annual
recruit hiring level. If possible, the Service must target a more consistent intake of recruits
year over year, in order to avoid gaps in available staffing requirements and massive turnovers
in a future short time period.

392 Toronto Police Service Intranet Wellness website.
• Staff development will become a serious issue in the next few years. As experienced officers separate, there will be a critical need to quickly develop and promote qualified personnel to fill supervisory, management, and specialized positions, and to ensure that all officers, particularly new officers, are given proper direction, coaching and supervision.

• The age and service distributions of Primary Response officers, in particular, show a large number of officers with little or no policing experience. The Service must ensure that these officers receive the necessary training, direction, and supervision they need to carry out their functions effectively and efficiently.

• With regard to recruiting and retaining personnel, the Service will continue to compete for workers in a shrinking market where other employers are offering flexible plans to accommodate employees’ desires to balance home and work life. Accommodation offered by other organisations, unless matched, could have a notable impact on the Service’s ability both to attract new recruits and to retain existing personnel.

• The increasing competition for new employees and the growing need to retain existing employees will necessitate raising the standards of the workplace environment; the organisational requirement to ensure a healthy and accommodating workplace must increase in order to promote employee effectiveness and reduce employee absenteeism and separation.

• Continued communication and partnership with the City’s diverse communities will assist the Service with crime prevention and problem solving, and reaching target communities for recruiting purposes.

• As new avenues for service delivery efficiencies are depleted or too costly to implement in the short term, police managers must turn to managing the expectations and demands of the public for policing service. Public education and considered policy development will be critical to effectively and appropriately manage public demand for policing services.
IX. URBAN TRENDS

Urban environments present unique challenges to police, and a dynamic understanding of the creation and transformation of modern communities, in both socio-economic and urban development terms, is essential to understanding the elements and resources of the city. The jurisdiction of the Toronto Police Service encompasses the largest urban area in Canada. Involving communities in the response to policing issues, and empowering communities to resist crime, involves creating strong partnerships and awareness of urban issues. Adapting to urban growth and socio-economic change involves alliances among the public, private, and voluntary sectors of society. With urban knowledge and community partnerships, an assurance can be made to protect public safety while at the same time ensuring the delivery of efficient policing.

HIGHLIGHTS

- Canada is facing a series of urban challenges including: economic competitiveness, environmental degradation, urban infrastructure decay, inadequate transportation systems, inadequate housing, and meeting the needs of vulnerable groups.

- According to *Toronto’s Agenda for Prosperity*, much of Toronto’s infrastructure is now at, or beyond, the end of its useful life and is in need of urgent renewal, replacement, and expansion.

- The City of Toronto is working towards accommodating the residential growth expected to occur by 2031, with a number of key areas marked for growth in the Official Plan.

- Toronto is one of the most diverse cities in the world and one of the safest major metropolitan areas in North America. It was ranked the #1 city in North America for best quality of life and top city region of the future by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) magazine, and ranked 3rd in North America in the 2010 Mercer Human Resources Quality of Living Survey.

- Community revitalization projects in the city are important in bringing a renewed excitement and community ownership to a number of older neighbourhoods. However, large developments have and will require the uprooting of community members, involve large construction challenges, and require important partnerships.

- Toronto is the official host city of the 2015 Pan/Parapan American Games that will take place in July and August of that year. The Games are projected to draw approximately 10,000 athletes and officials, and up to 250,000 visitors.

- There is increased interest in expanding public transit as the federal, provincial, and municipal governments have recognized the economic, social, and environmental costs of traffic congestion in major urban areas.

- In May 2009, the Service’s Police Transit Unit became operational. These officers provide coverage primarily on foot within the transit system between 6 a.m. and 2 a.m. daily.
• The removal of the TTC Special Constable status effective February 1st, 2011, meant that uniformed TTC security staff no longer have peace officer’s powers of arrest; however, they continue to act as trespassing, security and bylaw enforcement officers.

• Private security continues to grow. With many public policing agencies across North America facing severe financial constraints, partnerships with private security in a variety of areas are being explored.

• There have been a number of new cycling-related developments in the city and new bicycle planning trends in North American cities. In response to the achievements of the first years of the Toronto Bike Plan implementation and these new trends, six new goals for the period 2009-2011 were presented in the report Toronto Bike Plan – New Strategic Directions.

• According to the key findings from the City of Toronto 2009 Street Needs Assessment, the overall number of Toronto homeless has remained relatively stable; there were a minimum of 5,086 homeless people staying outdoors, in shelters, in health care/treatment facilities, incarcerated in Toronto-area detention centres, and in Violence Against Women shelters. The ‘outdoor’ homeless population, however, decreased from the 2006 survey.

• Toronto’s position as a global destination continued to rise in 2010. According to the latest statistics, 2010 was a record-breaking year for Toronto Tourism, showing a significant rebound from the prior year and important growth in key international markets.

• Toronto hosts many special events that showcase the city, attract world-wide tourist audiences, promote the city as a vibrant place to live, work, and visit, and provide the settings for the Service to strengthen ties with Toronto’s diverse communities. However, these events also challenge the Police Service and its resources.

• The Enhanced Emergency Preparedness Initiative includes partnerships between the Toronto Police Service, the Toronto Office of Emergency Management (OEM), the Toronto Fire Service (TFS), and Emergency Medical Services (EMS), along with a group of broader external agencies and community stakeholders at municipal, provincial, and federal levels.

A. NATIONAL URBAN TRENDS & CHALLENGES

Canada’s city regions are central to the country’s economic, social, cultural and environmental development. They play a pivotal role in economic growth, generating nearly 60% of Canada’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Two-thirds of the Canadian population lives, works, and/or plays in these city regions.

The roles and responsibilities of cities have changed substantially due to urbanisation, cultural diversity, the concentration of innovation and production, the aging population, the resurgence of social problems, and growing income disparity. These factors exert increasing pressure on the quality, variety, and delivery of municipal services, which must constantly adapt.

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in order to maintain residents’ quality of life and to attract and welcome new immigrants. Of particular concern is the urgent need for significant funding to provide citizens with high-quality municipal infrastructure, transportation, and public transit systems. Moreover, citizens expect a sufficient supply of affordable housing, accessible education and training, adequate human services, a vibrant arts and cultural scene, and a healthy, safe and protected environment.

Canadian municipalities spend $12-15 billion annually on infrastructure; 80% of the infrastructure investment is aimed at system repair, renewal, and operation. Across Canada, 59% of city infrastructure is more than 50 years old, while 30% is more than 80 years old. In light of this, the current investment in infrastructure is insufficient to meet municipal infrastructure needs and is unsustainable over the long term.\(^{394}\) The rapid expansion of new technology and innovation in infrastructure place additional pressures on municipalities; implementing cutting edge solutions must be balanced with the need to repair and maintain existing systems. Municipalities are thus faced with a growing concern over how to finance infrastructure maintenance, repairs, and replacement while also remaining open to innovation and technology.

Concerns around financing municipal infrastructure go hand in hand with concerns regarding its development. The development of infrastructure across the country has been characterised by methods that are not always efficient, poor decision making processes, and practices that vary greatly locally and regionally. These variations and inconsistencies limit the capacity of municipalities to create and maintain safe and healthy communities and environments.\(^{395}\)

**B. Ontario’s Vision**

In the *Places to Grow Act, 2005*, the Government of Ontario recognised that in order to accommodate future population growth, support economic prosperity, and achieve a high quality of life for all Ontarians, planning must occur in a rational and strategic way. Additionally, it was noted that building complete and strong communities, making efficient use of existing infrastructure, and preserving natural and agricultural resources will contribute to maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of growth. Identifying where and how growth should occur will support improved global competitiveness, sustain the natural environment, and provide clarity for determining the priority of infrastructure investments. Only an integrated and co-ordinated approach to making decisions about growth across all levels of government will contribute to maximizing the value of public investments.\(^{396}\)

The *Growth Plan for the Greater Golden Horseshoe, 2006*, approved under the *Places to Grow Act, 2005*, is a framework for implementing the Government of Ontario’s vision for building stronger, prosperous communities by better managing growth in this region to 2031. It

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395 Ibid.

aims to curb urban sprawl and to protect farmlands and green-spaces. Additionally, it intends to reduce traffic gridlock by improving access to a greater range of transportation choices.  

C. TORONTO: A PLACE TO WORK AND LIVE

Toronto is one of the most diverse cities in the world and one of the safest major metropolitan areas in North America. Toronto was ranked first in North America for best quality of life, and top city region of the future by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) magazine. The city ranked third in North America (16th worldwide) in the 2010 Mercer Human Resources Quality of Living Survey.  

Toronto also ranked first among Canada’s big cities in Corporate Knights’ fourth annual Sustainable Cities Report, which measures the relative sustainability of 17 Canadian cities, considering the ability of individuals and communities to flourish without contributing to the progressive degradation of the human and natural systems, including ecological integrity, economic security, governance and empowerment, infrastructure and built environment, and social wellbeing.  

Toronto’s economic diversity is apparent as the third largest biotechnical centre in North America, the third largest screen-based arts centre, the third largest financial centre by employment (behind New York and Chicago), the third largest information technology centre, and the second largest food production centre. In addition, Toronto is home to the head offices of five of Canada’s six national banks, 90% of Canada’s foreign banks, and Canada’s largest stock exchange. Toronto is the second fastest growing employment region in North America, is home to an educated and productive labour force of more than 1.3 million people, and home to over 70,000 businesses, four universities, four colleges, and about 400,000 full-time students.  

Toronto Infrastructure:

In January 2008, the Mayor’s Economic Competitiveness Committee published Toronto’s Agenda for Prosperity. It was noted that much of Toronto’s current success is the result of decisions made 30 to 50 years ago. However, much of Toronto’s infrastructure is now at, or beyond, the end of its useful life and is in need of urgent renewal, replacement, and/or expansion. Gridlock is a daily grind on the city’s productivity and liveability. In addition to the cost and risk of breakdowns, road closures, and delays, older infrastructure is inherently more expensive to maintain and even more expensive to repair. Toronto must increase the rate of investment in the city in order to sustain its achievements in the future. The success of the city core with its concentration of legal, financial, and other high-order business support services, and

401 Ibid.
the amenities that attract talented workers from global destinations, are essential to the future. Furthermore, long-term growth and global competitiveness requires a balanced, symbiotic relationship between the core city and the surrounding region.402

**Real Estate:**

As illustrated in Figure 9.1, the average price of a Toronto home in 2010 reached $431,463, a 9% increase from $395,460 in 2009 and a 72 % increase from the average price of $251,508 in 2001.403

![Average Price of Single-Family Homes (TREB Service Area)](chart.png)

Figure 9.1  Source: Toronto Real Estate Board

As shown in Figure 9.2, the real estate market in Toronto continued a general 7 year trend peaking in 2007 at a record level of 93,193 homes sold. In 2008, however, sales decreased by 20% to 74,552, possibly attributable to the onset of the recession in that year. In 2009, sales increased 17% to 87,308 homes sold and in 2010 decreased slightly (1%) to 86,170 homes sold. 404

![Number of Single-Family Home Sales (TREB Service Area)](chart2.png)

Figure 9.2  Source: Toronto Real Estate Board

**Rental Housing:**

Between 2000 and 2008, the Toronto region experienced a net loss of 17,308 rental homes, a drop of 6%. There was a significant decline in units at the lower end of the rental market (rent less than $800), but growth in those at the upper end (rent more than $1200).405

Following the upward creep of monthly rental costs in the 1990s, a moderate rate of increase was experienced in the years since 2000. Over the past decade, average monthly rental costs in the Toronto region rose from $914 in 2000 to $1,017 in 2010, an 11% increase.406 In fall 2010, the average rent for all unit types in the Toronto region ranged from $899 per month in Durham, to $1,048 in Halton.

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402 Ibid.
404 Ibid.
406 Ibid.
Vacancy Rates:

Vacancy rates are based on the results of the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation rental market survey conducted each October; the survey includes buildings with six or more rental homes, but not rental condominiums and units in houses. A residential vacancy rate of 2% to 3% is generally considered a balanced market.\textsuperscript{407} In 2010, the vacancy rate for rental apartments in Canada was 2.6%, down from 2.8% in 2009. The average rate for the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) was 2.9% for the 9 years from 2001 to 2010. In the Toronto CMA, the vacancy rate declined from 3.1% in 2009 to 2.1% in 2010 – of a total 306,091 rental apartments, on average, 6,421 rental apartments were vacant.\textsuperscript{408}

D. GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT

The \textit{Planning and Conservation Land Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006}, provided additional tools for the implementation of provincial policies, and gave further support to sustainable development, intensification, and brownfield development.\textsuperscript{409} In addition, the Act gave residents and local councillors more input on growth and development in their communities.

The City of Toronto continues to work towards accommodating the residential growth expected to occur by 2031; the Official Plan identifies a number of key growth areas. These priority growth areas include the Downtown and Central Waterfront, the Avenues, the Centres, and the Employment Districts. The Downtown and Central Waterfront areas accommodate over 400,000 workers, thousands of students, shoppers, and tourists, and have the largest concentration of office towers in Canada. The Avenues are the important corridors along major streets throughout the city, outside the downtown area. The Centres are the key focal points for transit located in Scarborough, North York, Etobicoke, and at Yonge-Eglinton. Finally, the Employment Districts are comprised exclusively of lands where the Employment Areas land use designation applies. The city is encouraging future development in these areas in order to accommodate the forecast growth, to maximize the use of existing infrastructure, and exploit and support development opportunities while protecting the current residential areas.\textsuperscript{410}

E. PUBLIC SPACES & COMMUNITY REVITALIZATION

New development to accommodate the forecasted growth in Toronto must go hand in hand with the revitalization of existing neighbourhoods, communities and public spaces. The city is currently involved in a number of revitalization projects across the city to promote attractive, liveable communities, and public spaces. The objective is to create communities

\textsuperscript{407} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{408} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{410} City of Toronto. \textit{How Does a City Grow}. (Retrieved on April 28\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www.toronto.ca/planning/pdf/grow.pdf)
which are sustainable, safe, more energy efficient, close to services and amenities, and easily accessed by roads and public transit.

It is important to note, however, that revitalization has both short- and long-term implications for policing. Traffic concerns as a result of lane restrictions due to construction and street closures as a result of special events, security issues resulting from international events, increased presence and movement of people throughout the city or congregating in areas of special interest, and community composition and demographic changes in neighbourhoods due to relocation of residents from and to community revitalization areas all affect the demand for policing services and the types of services required.

**Waterfront Revitalization Projects:**

The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Project is a tri-government partnership established to revitalize Toronto’s waterfront. The governments of Canada, Ontario, and Toronto established the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, now known as Waterfront Toronto, to plan and expedite the revitalization, streamline various legislative and approval processes, and to implement the long-term waterfront plan and funding strategy. The waterfront revitalization budget includes $1.5 billion in start-up funding for planning, design, infrastructure construction, and residential/commercial development in three areas – East Bayfront, Queens Quay/Central Waterfront, and the West Don Lands. The revitalization also includes strategic projects in the Mimico and Port Union areas.

Large scale, long-term planning initiatives, including the Western Waterfront Plan and the Lower Don Lands Plan, have been completed. Environmental Assessments have been completed for East Bayfront Transit and the Queens Quay Revitalization. This latter project will transform Queens Quay between Parliament Street and Spadina Avenue into a lakefront boulevard by replacing two lanes of traffic on the south side of the street with a linear park. Based on the recommendations included in the Environmental Assessment, Queens Quay will become a two lane street with east/west traffic on the north side and streetcars running in a dedicated right-of-way on the south side of the street.

City Council has also approved a plan to preserve the Canada Malting silos on Toronto’s waterfront; site improvements will provide safe waterfront access to Ireland Park. 411 Additional construction is well advanced throughout the waterfront, including First Waterfront Place, Sherbourne Park and George Brown College, and Wave decks in the Central Waterfront. An affordable housing development is under construction in West Don Lands. 412

Waterfront Toronto and the city are currently completing a comprehensive Environmental Assessment and Integrated Urban Design Study to determine the future of the Gardiner Expressway and Lake Shore Boulevard, from Jarvis Street to east of the Don Valley Parkway. The assessment team is scheduled to report its findings in 2013, and the project is expected to be completed by 2015. If the section of the Gardiner Expressway east of Jarvis Street is removed, it is possible that the rest of the elevated expressway will eventually be demolished. 413

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412 Ibid.
**Yonge Street Revitalization:**

A recent, privately funded study examined the section of Yonge Street between Dundas and Gerrard Streets and it appears that this section is poised for dramatic change. On the northeast corner, Ryerson University’s new student centre will be constructed, and a 75-storey condominium that will add more than 900 residential units to the neighbourhood is currently under construction. Primaris, a major retail landlord, purchased properties on both sides of the street, including a heritage building at Yonge and Gerrard Streets.

As with projects such as New York’s transformation of Broadway or, closer to home, the revitalization of Kitchener’s downtown, the study offers a solution to the growing numbers of pedestrians and recommends more street closings for special events. The study noted that more than 53,000 pedestrians use Yonge and Dundas in an eight-hour period, making it the country’s busiest intersection; foot traffic outnumbered cars by more than two to one. The study also proposes new northern entrances for the crowded Dundas subway station and setbacks for upper stories of new developments to keep the current scale at street level. The study envisions sidewalk cafes and street vendors, mid-rise buildings, heritage storefronts, and the reduction of one traffic lane each direction.

**2015 Pan American Games – Venues:**

The Pan/Parapan American Games (Pan Am Games) are a multi-sport event held every four years between competitors from all countries of the Americas. Toronto is the official host city of the 2015 Pan Am Games, which will take place from July 10th to 26th, and August 7th to 14th. The Toronto 2015 Pan Am Games Organising Committee is responsible for planning, organising, promoting, financing, and staging the Games, with support from the City of Toronto, the Government of Ontario, the Government of Canada, the Canadian Olympic and Canadian Paralympic Committees, and 16 other municipalities in the Greater Golden Horseshoe.

With 42 participating nations and 48 sports, the Pan Am Games are the world’s second-largest international multi-sport event after the summer Olympics. Training and competition venues for the 2015 Games will be located in 17 municipalities across the Greater Golden Horseshoe.

The Pan Am Games offer a unique opportunity to enhance Toronto’s international reputation; source new markets, customers, and suppliers for Toronto businesses; develop new community, sport, and affordable housing infrastructure; showcase Toronto’s diversity, talent, assets, and cultural strengths; and forge strong partnerships with our neighbours in the region and the governments of Canada and Ontario.

Modest venue upgrades are planned for the Etobicoke Olympium, accessing roadways, Centennial and Birchmount parks, and Nathan Phillips Square. The Pan Am Aquatic Centre/Canadian Sport Institution Ontario facility to be constructed at the University of Toronto, Scarborough campus, and the Athletes’ Village, which will be located in the West Don Lands, will be major construction initiatives. Infrastructure Ontario (IO) is the lead provincial agency

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415 Ibid.


417 Ibid.
for the Pan Am venues and the Athletes’ Village, and has a very aggressive schedule for delivery of the Games in 2015. City approvals for design and construction were expedited to meet the Village construction start of 2011. Waterfront Toronto is responsible for designing and building the infrastructure for the Village on behalf of IO.

As development takes place, specifically in the downtown core, there will be interruptions to traffic flow, and, therefore, co-ordination between Police Service planners, city planners, the community, and private developers will be needed. Co-ordination and communication should work to limit the impact of construction for the public and police. Additionally, the influx of approximately 10,000 athletes and officials and up to 250,000 visitors, which the Games are projected to draw, will also likely challenge the TPS and GTA police services with traffic congestion and security issues. The Ontario Provincial Police will have central control of all security measures. The Toronto Police Service must be alert to the potential vulnerabilities and challenges, and be prepared to address them, ensuring that sufficient resources are available to meet these challenges.

**Other Public Spaces Revitalization Projects:**

Union Station, a critical piece of transit infrastructure for Toronto, will be revitalized and provide an improved experience for rail passengers. The station will be supported by a new underground York St. pedestrian connection between Union Station and Wellington St. W.\(^{418}\)

Toronto City Council approved the Mayor’s Tower Renewal Initiative designed to make the city’s aging apartment towers more energy efficient and to use this as a catalyst for development to help revitalize communities. Council also approved steps to establish a Tower Renewal Corporation. The corporation administers financing and co-ordinates incentive programs for high-rise apartment building renewal in Toronto.\(^{419}\)

Toronto City Council also took steps to establish the planning and zoning framework needed to proceed with the revitalization of the Yonge Street-Eglinton Avenue area, specifically the southwest quadrant of the intersection. The revitalization includes transit infrastructure, office space, green development, and improvement of the public realm. The north-west corner will also be rezoned for redevelopment of the site.\(^{420}\)

Funding was approved by Toronto City Council for the construction and furnishing of the Allstream Centre, a new conference centre at Exhibition Place. The Centre will enable Exhibition Place to better compete to host major North American events.\(^{421}\) The construction of 1,239 additional seats at the soccer stadium at Exhibition Place was also approved.

**Community Revitalization Projects:**

Community revitalization is more than the replacement of social housing units. It is an opportunity to create attractive, liveable communities by improving public transit, roads,


\(^{419}\) Ibid.

\(^{420}\) Ibid.

\(^{421}\) Ibid.
community facilities, parks, schools, and access to local social services. This holistic approach focuses on physical, social, and economic infrastructure improvements to build safer, stronger, and healthier neighbourhoods, while significantly enhancing the quality of life for the residents. The City of Toronto, in partnership with Toronto Community Housing (TCH), initiated community revitalization initiatives in a number of social housing communities.

Regent Park’s revitalization began in 2005 and will continue into the next decade. The plan creates a mixed-income community for approximately 12,500 people in 5,115 units, adding more than 700 additional affordable housing units. Phase one, completed in 2008, replaced 418 apartments with over 700 eco-friendly and energy efficient homes. Phase two is still in progress and once it has been completed, the other phases will follow at two-year intervals, until all six phases are complete. All residents that were relocated from the community will have the right to return once the new residences are completed.

Lawrence Heights is a Toronto Community Housing Corporation neighbourhood located in the heart of the Lawrence Avenue – Allen Road area. Constructed in the 1950s, Lawrence Heights contains more than 1,200 rent-garanteed-to-income social housing units serving 3,715 tenants. Many of these buildings are in need of significant capital reinvestment to provide quality housing for its tenants. The need for re-investment is a challenge, but also an opportunity to redevelop and revitalize the community while achieving significant city-building benefits for Toronto.

Since 2008, the City of Toronto has worked with Toronto Community Housing, the Toronto District School Board, community residents and other stakeholders, including the Toronto Police Service, on a revitalization plan for the Lawrence – Allen area, with a focus on the Lawrence Heights community. The goal of revitalization is to deliver better housing and parks, improve community safety, and create more social, recreational, and economic opportunities for residents. In July 2010, Toronto City Council endorsed, in principle, the Lawrence Allen Revitalization Plan and directed staff to prepare a new Secondary Plan, as well as the detailed guidelines and strategies that will support it. Community input at this stage will contribute to the refinement of the Revitalization Plan required to create these documents. This will continue the community consultation process which has been ongoing since 2008.

Large community revitalization projects can bring a sense of pride for returning residents and new residents in the area. It is important that the Toronto Police Service continue to cultivate current relationships and develop new ones, so that the community feels supported and confident that not only will the buildings be revitalized, but also the partnership with the police.

**F. Public Transportation**

There is an increased interest in expanding public transit in Toronto as the federal, provincial, and municipal governments have long recognized the economic, social and environmental costs of traffic congestion in major urban areas. Congestion is crippling many

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Canadian cities. In a new study and survey of major world cities by the Toronto Board of Trade, Toronto and Montreal had the longest commute times, longer even than London or New York City.\textsuperscript{425} Toronto’s otherwise stellar reputation is tarnished by a persistent traffic congestion problem – an outcome that affects not only labour attractiveness, but also productivity and economic performance. Toronto, with an average 80-minute round-trip commute, was ranked worst among all metropolitan regions. Even after adding commute time data for Paris and Tokyo, Toronto still ranked last among the 21 CMAs. Evidence from the “transportation lens” of the study highlighted under-investment in commuter rail infrastructure as a key factor.\textsuperscript{426}

According to \textit{The Living City Report Card}, the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA) was more dependent on the car than most other comparable city regions.\textsuperscript{427} This over-dependence was both an enabler and product of sprawl, and the lack of efficient alternative forms of transportation had significant environmental impacts. Emissions from transportation have substantial negative effects on air quality. Despite improvements driven by a decrease in energy consumption and a change in the grid mix, a steady increase in vehicle kilometres travelled offset some of these gains. Since 2005, GTA gasoline and diesel sales decreased, likely as a result of economic conditions, higher fuel prices, and improved vehicle fuel efficiencies. Over the same period, however, total passenger (gasoline-powered) vehicle kilometres travelled was estimated to have increased by about 2\%, or one billion kilometres, increasing traffic congestion and the associated environmental impacts.\textsuperscript{428}

Community and business leaders called on all levels of government to work together to address transportation issues in the GTHA. There was a widespread consensus that incremental change is not sufficient and that the transportation system of the GTHA needs to be dramatically transformed to meet the needs of the 21st century. In Canada’s economic heartland, the transportation system needs to be effective, integrated, and multi-modal, and it needs to be funded in a sustainable way. This is fundamental to the health of the economy, the environment, and quality of life.\textsuperscript{429}

In response to this widespread concern, in 2006, the Government of Ontario established the Greater Toronto Transportation Authority (GTTA) under the \textit{Greater Toronto Transportation Authority Act}. The GTTA, which became known as Metrolinx in December 2007, was given the mandate to develop and implement an integrated multi-modal transportation plan for the GTHA. Metrolinx is also responsible for the development of an Investment Strategy and Capital Plan, co-ordination of a transit vehicle purchasing co-operative, and programs such as BikeLinx and the Smart Commute Initiative. The \textit{Act} also includes provisions for Metrolinx to assume responsibility for GO Transit in the future.\textsuperscript{430}

National concern over increasing traffic congestion and its damaging effects have prompted several important events. In March 2007, the federal government announced its commitment to provide significant federal funding in support of public transit. The FLOW

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{426} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{428} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{430} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
program is the federal/provincial transportation action plan for the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), designed to reduce congestion, cut commute times, help clear the air, and help drive the GTA economy. Specifically, FLOW funds will support a number of GTA transit initiatives, including the planning and expansion of York Region’s VIVA bus system, Brampton Transit, Mississauga Transit, and Durham Region Transit to improve connections with Toronto’s transit system.\(^{431}\)

While major positive steps have been taken over the last few years, the real work of recovering from decades of underfunding transit and transportation infrastructure in the GTA is just beginning. The provincial *Growth Plan for the Greater Toronto Golden Horsehoe* and Metrolinx’s *Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) – The Big Move: Transforming Transportation in the Greater Toronto and Hamilton Area (GTHA)* provide the necessary framework for integrated land use and transit and transportation improvements. Implementation has begun, although some parts of the plan have been challenged and serious concerns about long-term funding remain. Full implementation of the RTP will have an important positive impact on the environmental health of the region; however, the funding mechanisms need to be confirmed to ensure this impact is realized.\(^{432}\)

Despite a significant provincial commitment, the RTP remains more than 75% unfunded. Only about $10 billion of the $50 billion capital costs of *The Big Move* have been funded so far. In a report titled *Reaching Top Speed - Infrastructure: Unleashing Ontario’s Ability to Grow*, the Toronto Board of Trade noted that there is no long-term plan in place for the remaining $40-billion needed to see *The Big Move* fully constructed. Operating costs associated with these transportation projects could add another $50-billion to the price tag.\(^{433}\) The key challenge is a chronic lack of long-term, reliable funding sufficient for transit and transportation capital and operating requirements, without which the RTP implementation is seriously at risk. The Toronto Board of Trade suggested that measures such as road tolls, parking surcharges, and regional sales taxes should be considered to finance GTA transportation improvements.\(^{434}\)

As a large organisation, the Toronto Police Service uses many resources that can have a significant effect on the environment. It is important that the Service continues to address environmental concerns by assessing the ecological impact of new technology, facilities, and equipment, and by operating in an environmentally respectful way. Environmental concern will continue to rise, as new generations learn of the significant contributions that are needed to lessen the effects of past environmental neglect and exploitation.

**Toronto Transit Commission:**

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) is responsible for providing public transit in the City of Toronto. Under the *City of Toronto Act, 2006*, the TTC is the sole operator, with certain defined exceptions, of a local public passenger transportation system within the City of Toronto.\(^{435}\)

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\(^{432}\) Ibid.


\(^{434}\) Ibid.

The TTC engages in collective bargaining with multiple bargaining agents to establish terms and conditions of employment. Work stoppages involving these parties, and the resulting disruption of transit services, give rise to serious public health and safety, environmental, and economic concerns. Given these serious concerns, legislation ending or preventing TTC work stoppages was enacted five times between 1974 and 2008. Upon request of Toronto City Council, the Ontario Government recently voted in favour of the *Toronto Transit Commission Labour Disputes Resolution Act* (Bill 150), which declared the TTC an essential service and provides for binding arbitration by a neutral third party where a collective agreement cannot be reached through bargaining. Bill 150 received Royal Assent on March 30th, 2011.

**Expansion and Development:**

In March 2008, a $303.5 million contribution agreement was signed by the federal government, the City of Toronto, and the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC). The federal contribution allowed for improvements in the following areas: subway infrastructure (new trains; improvements and repairs to tracks, tunnels, escalators, elevators, fire ventilation, and radio systems), streetcar infrastructure (repairs to tracks and dedicated streetcar lanes), and bus infrastructure (new hybrid buses and bus rapid transit links for the York University area).

Initially, a number of major projects, plans, and upgrades had been planned for the TTC for the future. The *City of Toronto Official Plan*, the *TTC Ridership Growth Strategy*, the *Building a Transit City Plan*, and *Transit City Platform (2006)*, were refined and merged into one high-level plan for light rail in Toronto: *Toronto Transit City – Light Rail Plan*. This long-term plan was based on developing a large network of electric light rail lines, each on its own right-of-way, spanning the city and connecting with the city’s existing and planned rapid transit routes.

However, in March 2011, the Government of Ontario and City of Toronto reached an agreement on a revised transit plan for the city and announced that the Toronto’s transit system would, instead, receive 39 kilometres of new subway and light rail track in a $12-billion expansion. The plan includes an investment of $8.4 billion to build an underground light rapid transit line along Eglinton Avenue (spanning 25 kilometres from Black Creek Drive to Kennedy station), and to acquire 130 new light rail transit cars. In the meantime, the city is planning to move ahead with an extension to the Sheppard subway line at a cost of approximately $4 billion. The subway extension will run 14 kilometres from Downsview subway station to the Scarborough Town Centre. Also included is the introduction and operation of an enhanced bus

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service between the new Finch West subway station and Humber College. Construction of the Eglinton rapid transit line and the Sheppard subway extension should be completed by 2019.\textsuperscript{441}

An extension of the Spadina subway line has been studied since the early 1990s and continues today. In 2001, the \textit{Rapid Transit Expansion Study} looked at the long-term needs of Toronto’s transit system to the year 2021, and concluded that the TTC should expand beyond the borders of the City of Toronto into York Region.\textsuperscript{442} Since then, several changes to land use and transportation plans have prompted a call for improved surface transit speed, reliability, and capacity in the short-term and subway expansion in the long-term. However, as the Spadina subway extension would take years to complete and development in the area of the proposed Spadina line expansion necessitated a quicker response to the transit concerns of the emerging population, a new plan was proposed. Bus-Only Lanes between Downsview station and York University, to accommodate York region and GO transit systems as well as the TTC in the near future, are planned to provide high-speed and reliable transit.\textsuperscript{443}

Excavation and tunnelling for the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension began in late spring 2011 and are scheduled for completion in late 2015. This extension will provide a critical expansion of the existing TTC subway system across the municipal boundary of the City of Toronto and the Regional Municipality of York (York Region). The extension will be 8.6 km in length and will run from Downsview Station, north west through York University in the City of Toronto, and north to the Vaughan Corporate Centre in the Regional Municipality of York. There are six stations sites planned.\textsuperscript{444}

\textbf{TTC Ridership:}

A continuing trend of increase in TTC ridership supports the sociological and environmental concerns expressed in the various governmental initiatives. As shown in Figure 9.3, in 2010, ridership on TTC vehicles (surface and subway) increased 1\% from 471.2 million in 2009 to 477.4 million. The number of riders in 2010 represented a 14\% increase over the 419.6 million in 2001.\textsuperscript{445}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{TTC_Ridership.png}
\caption{Figure 9.3 Source: Toronto Transit Commission}
\end{figure}

Ridership is affected by a combination of factors including employment level, demographics, retail trade activity, travel and tourism patterns, service levels, transit fares income levels, gasoline/automobile prices, vehicle parking availability and rates, and traffic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{441} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{444} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{445} Personal communication. Statistical Co-ordinator, Corporate Security, Toronto Transit Commission. (2011, June 6).
\end{itemize}
congestion. Historically, Toronto employment levels have been one of the most significant indicators in determining TTC ridership. Over the long term, changes in Toronto employment levels have tracked quite closely to TTC ridership changes as shown in Figure 9.4.  

![Figure 9.4](Image)

**Figure 9.4**  
Source: Toronto Transit Commission

Favourable weather conditions in the winter of 2009 and 2010, as well as economic uncertainty for riders, may have contributed to the slight increase in ridership in recent years. The major service improvements implemented in late 2008 may have also contributed, as the service on the streets is now much more closely matched to the service hours of the subway, giving riders more choice in transit options. It should be noted that the June 2010 levels reflected the loss of an estimated 6,548,000 rides due to the G20 summit.

As is further discussed in the Traffic chapter, increased ridership and expansion projects can produce many positive effects, by reducing traffic congestion and the effects of congestion on health and the environment. However, increased ridership might increase the need for additional policing services for the TTC, resulting in an increased need for police officers in locations associated with the TTC. In addition, large development projects will require input from the Service in the area of design, so that Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design principles are incorporated, and to ensure that other policing issues, such as safe and efficient access to TTC property, radio compatibility, and so on, are considered. Furthermore, during major transit construction projects, traffic in the city will undoubtedly be affected, which could result in a number of challenges, including the delivery of policing service through congested roads and problems arising from frustrated drivers. It is vital that divisions and Traffic Services

are aware of major projects, have input into them, and work to control the effects of the construction as effectively and efficiently as possible.

At its meeting on December 16th, 2010, City Council considered the report from the Deputy City Manager and Chief Financial Officer, *2011 Budget Process*, which indicated a projected $774 million funding gap for 2012 (discussed further in the Financial Resources chapter). It was agreed that an ambitious program to find significant cost savings should begin immediately after City Council adopted the 2011 capital and operating budget. It was also noted that TTC needs exceeded its assigned 2011-2020 debt targets by $2.1 billion; in addition, several projects with total project costs in excess of $5 billion gross were below the affordability line – that is, they were not included in the 2011-2020 Approved Capital Plan.\(^447\) The TTC 2012 budget shortfall was estimated to be $39 million and in order to begin addressing this shortfall the TTC Board has approved an advertising contract with Pattison Outdoor Advertising. This contract, which also includes print ads inside transit vehicles, vehicle “wraps,” and in-station advertising, would bring in $324 million in revenue to the transit body. Additionally, it was voted that corporate sponsorship should also be considered, giving companies the opportunity to sponsor and name individual subway stations. The sponsorship wouldn’t change the station name completely; the street name would remain in the title so as not to confuse riders.\(^448\)

**TTC Safety:**

In May 2009, the Toronto Police Transit Patrol Unit (TPU) became operational. The unit – 78 constables, 8 sergeants, and 2 staff sergeants – provides coverage throughout the transit system, primarily on foot, from 6 a.m. to 2 a.m. daily. In the first 6 months of operation, TPU officers were responsible for 258 criminal arrests, with 495 charges laid. Offences committed included firearms offences, drugs, sexual assault, domestic assault, fraud, fail to comply, and outstanding warrants.

As shown in Figure 9.5, in 2010, the TTC annual crime rate was 0.64 offences per 100,000 riders, a 30% decrease from 0.92 offences per 100,000 riders in 2009, but a 9% increase from the rate of 0.59 offences per 100,000 riders in 2001. According to the TTC, the total number of reported criminal offences decreased 2% from 2008 to 2009, and further decreased 29% between 2009 and 2010, although the ridership increased by 1% in 2010. The decrease in reported criminal offences may be attributed to the presence of officers of the Transit Patrol Unit, and/or to the continued roll-out of CCTV cameras; both of which may have had a deterrent effect. This trend, however, should be closely monitored as it may also be attributable to the possibility that people are not bothering to report crimes as often as in the past.


The next generation of TTC subway trains arrived at Wilson complex and were officially unveiled in October 2010. The Toronto Rocket, built by Bombardier Transportation, is a ‘six-car-fixed’ design with open gangways, which will enable riders to walk freely from one end of the train to the other. The new trains have enhanced safety features, including: closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras, two-way passenger alarm systems between riders and operators, built-in ramps for easier evacuation, electronic subway maps, and better lighting.  

**Go Transit:**

GO Transit is Canada’s first, and the Province of Ontario’s only interregional public transportation service in the GHTA, and in May 2009, GO Transit officially merged with Metrolinx. GO trains and buses serve over 5 million people living throughout the GTA, and connect downtown Toronto with communities as far as Hamilton, Milton, and Guelph to the west; Orangeville, Barrie, and Beaverton to the north; Niagara Falls to the south; Stouffville, Port Perry, and Uxbridge to the northeast; and, Oshawa, Bowmanville, Newcastle and Peterborough to the east. 

The annual ridership in 2010 was 57 million passengers. The typical weekday ridership was 217,000 passengers – 180,000 of these customers rode on the train system, while 37,000 took the bus on other routes across the network. Almost all (96%) train commuters rode to and from Union Station, and 70% of all bus passengers traveled to and from the City of Toronto. GO connected with all 16 municipal transit systems in its service area, with co-ordinated services and discounted fares available to GO riders transferring to and from many of the local systems. During rush hours, GO Transit moved as many people into and out of downtown Toronto as eight congested expressways (equal to about 48 highway lanes). More passengers on an annual basis travel through Union Station than all of the passengers travelling though Toronto’s Pearson airport.

When regular traffic is moving slowly, GO vehicles can now use shoulder lanes on the Don Valley Parkway between Lawrence Avenue to just north of York Mills Road. When traffic

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451 Ibid.

452 Ibid.
slows down to speeds lower than 60 km per hour, the buses can use the lanes to bypass congestion, at speeds not exceeding 20 km per hour over the speed of regular traffic. This initiative is another important step in efforts to make Toronto a transit-friendly city.\(^{453}\)

Some of the major long-term projects for the future of GO Transit include providing convenient and easily accessible parking, which directly affects the level and frequency of ridership and the quality of the transit experience for GO transit customers. In 2009, over 5,000 new parking spaces were added and new multi-level parking structures opened at Whitby and Aurora GO Stations, as well as several additional surface parking lots. Since 2010, construction has been underway at Ajax, Centennial, and Erindale GO stations, with design already started for Oakville, Clarkson, and Pickering stations. And almost all GO stations now have areas for bicycles; the bike storage program is 95% complete.\(^{454}\)

**Air Rail Link (ARL):**

In July 2010, the Ontario Government requested Metrolinx to build, own, and operate the Air Rail Link (ARL), which will provide transportation from Union Station to Pearson Airport. The ARL will be an important link for business people and travellers, and will be ready for the 2015 Pan American Games.\(^{455}\)

**PRESTO:**

In May 2010, GO Transit rolled out the new PRESTO fare card; PRESTO allows commuters to travel between multiple transit systems in the GTA, using a single payment system. In March 2011, as part of the new Toronto Transit Plan, the city and the TTC agreed to work with Metrolinx to implement PRESTO across the TTC system.\(^{456}\)

The benefits associated with increased capacity and transit reliability out-weigh the potential for traffic disruption due to transit construction and frustration that can be associated with it. As more people find it convenient to commute by GTA or GTHA-based transit, it will be increasingly important that the Service remain aware of the effect of investigations conducted on or in the area of transit systems. Commuter frustration with delays resulting from police investigations on trains or affecting the tracks may become an increasing issue for the Service. Millions of people will continue to travel into and out of Toronto on transit and it will remain a challenge to ease the consequences of construction, congestion associated with construction, and police-related investigations in an efficient manner.

**G. Special Constable Services**

**TTC Special Constables:**

In May 1997, the Toronto Transit Commission and the Toronto Police Services Board entered into an Agreement that designated certain employees of the TTC responsible for law enforcement and security as special constables. In accordance with the Agreement, TTC special constables...
constable activities were reported on an annual basis. The report outlined the enforcement activities of their peace officer powers, for the purpose of enforcing the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, and police officer powers for the purpose of enforcing the Liquor Licence Act, the Trespass to Property Act, and Section 17 of the Mental Health Act, for incidents that occurred on or in relation to TTC property and vehicles.

As of December 31st, 2010, the TTC employed 74 special constables. According to the TTC Special Constable Services 2010 Annual Report, TTC special constables made 350 arrests in 2010 relating to both criminal and provincial offences, a 60% decrease from the 868 arrests in 2009. In addition, in 2010, workload for TTC Special Constables decreased as they completed 531 TPS General Occurrences, 379 TPS Records of Arrest, and 3,628 Person Contact Cards, compared to 822 TPS General Occurrences, 978 TPS Records of Arrest, and 4,781 Person Contact Cards in 2009. The decrease in workload for the TTC special constables was most likely due to the creation of the TPS Transit Patrol Unit, which had approximately 80 officers deployed.

The use of force options available to TTC special constables were a foam stream oleoresin capsicum spray (pepper spray), a collapsible baton, and handcuffs. The TTC use of force policy was consistent with that of the Toronto Police Service and the provincial Use of Force Model. In 2010, there were 7 incidents that involved TTC special constables using oleoresin capsicum spray, 1 more than the 6 incidents in 2009, and 3 fewer than the 10 incidents in 1999, the first year the spray was authorized.

In October 2010, the Toronto Police Services Board approved a report which recommended terminating the Agreement, effective February 1st, 2011. The removal of the special constable status meant that uniformed TTC security staff no longer had peace officer powers of arrest; however, they continue to act as trespassing, security, and bylaw enforcement officers.

Toronto Community Housing:

Toronto Community Housing (TCH) provides homes for approximately 164,000 people, in about 58,500 housing units. TCH operates a Community Safety Unit (CSU) with about 135 staff members, including special constables, provincial offences officers, parking enforcement officers, and a Strategic Safety Team. As of December 31st, 2010, the TCH employed 83 special constables who operated out of the CSU.

In 2010, TCH special constables reported 24,996 calls, service requests, and investigations relating to TCH property, a 22% increase compared to 2009 when TCH special constables investigated or assisted in 20,441 investigations on or in relation to TCH property. TCH special constables arrested and/or charged 155 individuals relating to both criminal and

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458 Ibid.
provincial offences in 2010, a decrease of 52% compared to the 326 individuals arrested and/or charged in 2009.\textsuperscript{461}

\textit{University of Toronto Police:}

The University of Toronto (U of T) is the most diverse and largest university in Canada and the United States (by enrolment). About 15,000 new students are enrolled each year. The special constables of the U of T provide service to a total community of about 70,000 students. Beyond community policing and law enforcement, these campus police provide safety and security plans, systems, and services, based largely on CPTED principles.\textsuperscript{462}

As of December 31\textsuperscript{st}, 2010, the University of Toronto employed 29 special constables at the St. George campus and 14 special constables at the Scarborough campus. In 2010, the St. George Campus special constables arrested and investigated 358 persons relating to both criminal and provincial offences, and issued 157 Form 9s (notices to appear in court) and provincial offences tickets (POTs). This was a 10% increase from the 326 persons arrested and investigated and a 39% increase from the 113 Form 9s and POTs in 2009. In 2010, the Scarborough Campus special constables arrested and investigated 38 persons relating to criminal and provincial offences, and issued 13 Form 9s and POTs. This was a 24% decrease from the 50 persons arrested and investigated, and a 44% increase from the 9 Form 9s and POTs in 2009.\textsuperscript{463}

In November of 2009, a new unit, Security Systems and Services was created on the U of T Scarborough Campus. This unit’s primary responsibilities include the campus alarm systems and supervision of the campus building patrollers. Other initiatives include: the U of T Scarborough Campus (UTSC) Patrol, which is carried out by licensed security guards overseen by UTSC, to provide safer alternatives to walking alone at night; the Lone Workers Program, designed to allow staff and faculty on campus to ‘check in’ with UTSC police services while working after hours; the Anti-Graffiti Program, which is designed to raise awareness of graffiti on campus among community members through advertising and enforcement; and, the Student Crime Stoppers Program, in which UTSC police work in partnership with the university community and the Toronto Police Service to encourage students to come forward with information regarding criminal activity.

Special constables, as well as security and bylaw officers, provide valuable safety and crime prevention services to a number of residents and visitors in the city. These officers also support the Toronto Police Service by providing policing to locations that might not receive such attention without an increase in municipal police resources and allowing the Service to deploy resources elsewhere. The Police Services Board is authorized under Section 53 of the Police Services Act of Ontario to appoint special constables, subject to the approval of the Solicitor General. The Service’s role with regard to special constables extends to include their hiring, training, and co-ordination. A future challenge for the Service will be to assist in determining force options available to special constables, if special constables expect a level of protection for

\textsuperscript{461} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{463} Ibid.
themselves beyond what is currently authorized, and the public accountability that must accompany any increase in force options. The Service will need to consider the how to address the safety concerns of special constables without blurring the line between municipal policing and special constables.

It is important that the Toronto Police remain committed partners with the special constables throughout the city. By supporting the special constables in training, operations, and through improvement initiatives, the communities that they serve will benefit from their response.

H. PRIVATE SECURITY

The field of security in Canada, including private security and public policing, is changing. While crime rates generally declined and a majority of Canadians reported feeling satisfied with their personal safety, employment numbers for security-related occupations have continued to grow. The rising number and severity of terrorist incidents and natural disasters in the world, the shrinking government budgets for law enforcement, the trend towards reliance on markets and private provision of government services, the rising number of 9-1-1 calls, the regulations requiring additional security, increased exposure to legal liability, and poor publicity have all led to increased demand for private security.

Much literature on the topic of private security suggests an adversarial relationship between public and private security, however, this is not necessarily the reality. It has been suggested that the relationship between public and private police is more often complementary rather than adversarial, and that it is increasingly difficult to identify policing tasks and responsibilities that are the exclusive preserve of public rather than private police. Early analysis of private policing suggested that the respective roles of public and private police were determined by the geographical domains in which they worked: the policing of public places was the responsibility of public police and was to be undertaken in the ‘public interest’, while the role of private police was confined to the protection of private property in the interests of its owners. It has been argued that this generalisation is no longer true, as public police obtain more and more power and technological possibilities to intrude on private property and private relationships, and more and more public life is policed by private security. Some developments have been noted that could be considered as revealing the close co-operation that is developing between private and public policing:

- Private security and risk management professionals have been involved in setting up new systems for the exchange of sensitive information, not only between enforcement agencies, but also between them and corporate risk management professionals and databases (vehicle crime, plastic card crime, intellectual property).

466 Ibid.
Selective funding has been granted by parts of the private sector for specialist squads and databases (e.g. arts and antiques). (Private funding can introduce new priorities into public enforcement, towards prevention rather than law enforcement, for example.)

And, there are strong cultural and professional ties between security specialists in the private sector, in public enforcement agencies, and other public agencies, due to occupational mobility between the sectors and an increasing convergence of common interests.467

Current developments in the area of private policing might be better presented as the continuation of a long-term trend extending back several decades rather than a seismic shift occurring in the last years of the twentieth century.

According to the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services, Private Security and Investigative Services Branch, as of February 2010 in Ontario, there were more than 530 licensed agencies providing private security services.

As shown in Figure 9.6, the estimated number of licensed individuals as of December 2010 was 50,623 security guards, 1,790 private investigators, and 3,125 dual license holders, for a total of 55,538 licenses. The number of security guards in 2010 represented a 16% decrease from the 66,367 licensed individuals 2009. This decrease may be explained by the new requirements for mandatory training and testing of new license applicants, as well as the mandatory testing of existing license holders, as outlined below.468 However, there were still 75% more licensed security guards in 2010 than in 2001.

In 2005, the Ministry introduced The Private Security and Investigative Services Act. The Act set out to modernize and help inspire public confidence in the industry by establishing a code of ethics, setting standards for uniforms and vehicles, and requiring all practitioners in the industry to be trained and licensed.469 Regulations for private security uniforms and vehicles came into force in August 2009. They include Uniform Regulations, which define acceptable features for security guard attire to enhance the overall professionalism of security guards and ensure that the public can differentiate private security from police officers, and Vehicle

Regulations, which define acceptable markings on security vehicles to enhance public safety by making it easy for the public to identify security vehicles.\textsuperscript{470}

In April 2010, a regulation came into force that requires those who apply to become security guards or private investigators, who have not been issued a license before this date, to undergo a mandatory training program and pass a test before being licensed.\textsuperscript{471} In July 2010, another regulation came in to force which requires existing security guard or private investigator license holders to pass a mandatory test prior to the expiry of their current license. Since then, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services has been monitoring the effectiveness of the basic training and testing program, and recently set up a working group with participants from the Ontario private security industry and the Ministry of Training, Colleges & Universities. The overall objective of the working group is to ensure the basic training and testing program supports the government’s commitment to professionalize the industry, and to protect public safety. The key areas of focus for this group are:

- to review, and if necessary update, the Ministry’s training and testing program to ensure the testing component is appropriate and relevant for the industry, and
- to provide a Ministry-endorsed test preparation document to complement the curricula for security guard and private investigator training.\textsuperscript{472}

The Ministry expects to report on the findings of the working group in 2011.\textsuperscript{473}

Private security can support public policing in a number of ways. The focus of private security is in part defined by the mandate and objectives of their client, and primarily concerned with protection and prevention to reduce opportunities for loss and disorder. One of the main sanctions available to private security, acting on behalf of their client, is the ability to restrict access to private property.\textsuperscript{474}

In addition, private security has the ability to collect extensive intelligence information from their interaction with the public. A challenge and opportunity exists for the Service, to strengthen co-operation and partnerships with private security, which may increase access to important information that may not be currently shared; information that could prove valuable in improving the Service’s, investigations and intelligence gathering.

In particular, responding to national security threats requires timely information. Investigators and intelligence agencies have struggled to break down some of the walls that prevent information sharing and collaboration. With over 80% of Canada’s critical infrastructure either privately or provincially owned, national and local authorities, let alone private firms and public agencies, have had challenges sharing their information.

\section*{1. Recent Trends in Outsourcing Policing Services}

In the recent period of economic depression in North America, the drive for fiscal restraint has hit many police departments hard and has forced them to cut services and

\textsuperscript{470} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{471} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{472} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{473} Ibid.
commence layoffs. That, in turn, has persuaded many worried police authorities in the United States to search for viable alternatives. Some police services are hiring civilians to take the place of uniformed officers in desk jobs. Others are outsourcing core functions by contracting with private security firms. For example, in Southfield, Michigan, the police service began contracting in mid-2008 with the security company G4S to operate a holding facility for prisoners before they are transported to the county jail, a task previously managed by the county sheriff’s department. The Oakland Police Department in California contracted armed private guards in 2009 to patrol one troubled neighbourhood instead of hiring more police officers. And, the Schaumburg, Illinois Police Service contracted out their internal affairs investigations.

Those moves are part of a longer term trend, according to economist Simon Hakim, who directs Temple University’s Center for Competitive Government, which studies innovative practices and privatization in government. Hakim notes that in the 1970s, there were 40% more police officers than private security guards in the US. By 2009, those positions had flipped, with about 60% more private guards than public police officers.

Hakim suggests that partnerships between police and private companies make good sense. In such arrangements, police still handle most investigations and arrests, but highly specialized tasks, like investigating identity theft, Internet fraud, or counterfeit goods, can be contracted out to firms with specific expertise. For example, in 2010, the companies Coach, Chanel, and Oakley contracted with Stumar Investigations for an undercover probe of merchants selling counterfeit goods in the Philadelphia area. Once Stumar had completed the background investigations, they turned their files over to the police to make the arrests. Additionally, Hakim argues that contractors can manage more straightforward tasks like transferring prisoners and providing security in public buildings. In Florida’s Hernando County, for example, private security guards from G4S took over courthouse security from sheriffs’ deputies in 2009, a move expected to save between $142,000 and $176,000 a year.

**J. EMERGING TRENDS IN URBAN TRANSPORTATION – CYCLING**

**The Toronto Bike Plan:**

In 2009, the City of Toronto contracted Ipsos Reid to repeat a survey that was conducted in 1999 as part of the City’s Cycling Master Plan. The overall purpose of the 2009 survey was primarily to understand changes in the prevalence and attitudes toward cycling in the city over the past 10 years. According to the survey, Toronto saw a small but significant increase in cycling over the past 10 years, as the number of cyclists increased from 48% to 54%. This increase was attributed to more people cycling for practical day-to-day purposes. Those who rode a bike to commute to work or school, for the majority of their errands, or to visit friends increased from 20% to 29% between 1999 and 2009. While the increase in utilitarian cycling

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476 Ibid.
477 Ibid.
479 Ibid.
occurred principally outside of the downtown core, Central Toronto (downtown) still housed the highest proportion of utilitarian cyclists (36%).

In 2001, the City of Toronto implemented the Toronto Bike Plan, and made recommendations for improving cycling conditions and encouraging cycling in six key program areas: expanding the bikeway networks; improving bicycle safety; promoting cycling for everyday travel; providing secure bicycle parking; and improving the links between cycling and transit. Since the Bike Plan’s adoption in 2001, progress has been made in implementing the Plan’s recommendations in all six program areas. Key Bike Plan achievements include an expanded Bikeway Network from 166 km to 403 km, installation of bike racks on 53% of TTC bus routes, increased and more secure bike parking, and the establishment of a bike station in Union Station. The Bike Plan bicycle safety programs are discussed in the Traffic chapter.

Based on these achievements, new cycling-related developments in the city, and new bicycle planning trends in other cities, six new goals for 2009-2011 were presented in Toronto Bike Plan – New Strategic Directions. The report included recommendations for the launch of the Toronto Public Bicycle System by spring 2010, the expansion of the downtown bikeways and network trails, more secure parking facilities, the development of a comprehensive research and evaluation program, and the creation of a promotion and communication strategy.

**Public Bicycle Programs:**

Perhaps the most significant and innovative cycling trend is the advent of technologically sophisticated public bicycle programs (also known as Bike Share). Public bicycle systems are a form of bicycle sharing that is available in numerous cities in Europe and that have attracted considerable attention in North America. Most public bike systems allow riders, for a nominal fee or free of charge, to take a bike from a given location and drop it off at another location. This allows people to have all the benefits of a bicycle, without having to purchase one, store one, or bring one into town.

As noted previously, the establishment of a public bicycle program was identified as one of the city’s cycling infrastructure priorities in Toronto Bike Plan – New Strategic Directions. Public bicycle programs have significantly increased the number of trips made by bicycle in cities that launched major programs. For example, in the first season of operation, May – November 2009, Montreal’s BIXI program recorded 1.15 million bicycle trips, almost 11,000 annual subscribers, and 113,000 single-day users. Of the single-day users, 60% (67,000) were visitors to Montreal.

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480 Ibid.
In May 2010, Toronto City Council approved the BIXI Toronto program, which launched on May 3rd, 2011. Toronto citizens and visitors now have year-round access to the 1,000 rental bikes, 80 BIXI stations, and 1,500 docking points set up in the downtown core.485

**Bikeway Network:**

In a report to City Council, the City of Toronto Transportation Services Division recommended that as part of the Bikeway Network Program, the focus in 2010 should be on expanding both the on-street bikeways in the downtown area and the off-street bikeway trails in the North York and Scarborough Districts. In addition, Transportation Services sought the authority to undertake a pilot project to install and evaluate protected bicycle lanes on University Avenue and Queen’s Park Crescent, between Richmond Street and Wellesley Street.486

**City of Toronto Bicycle Volume Count:**

In September 2010, the City of Toronto conducted its first Screenline count for bicycles along four screenlines in the downtown area: Bloor Street West, Spadina Avenue, Queens Quay Boulevard, and Jarvis Street. As shown in Figure 9.7, the number of people on a bicycle who crossed a screenline were counted on 34 streets for one 12-hour time period, on a day without precipitation. This bicycle count provides data on how many cyclists are riding on downtown streets, as well as when and where they are riding. It was noted that on a typical weekday 19,162 cyclists enter Toronto’s downtown core, and 15,241 exit the core. The western screenline at Spadina Avenue had the highest bicycle volumes, carrying 45% of all cyclists travelling to and from the core.487

**Cycling & Transit:**

Bicycles, with some conditions and restrictions, are allowed on GO Trains, TTC, Island Ferries, and Via Rail trains. The entire GO bus fleet and buses on 53% of TTC bus routes are equipped with bike racks; as part of the Bike Train Initiative, selected Ontario Northland and VIA Rail Canada passenger rail trains were also equipped with bike racks. And more and more secure bike racks and lock-up facilities are being installed in transit hubs, such as Union Station and outlying GO Transit Stations. The first bicycle station – secure indoor bicycle parking,

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485 Ibid.
change room, vending machine for emergency bike repairs and energy bars – is now open in Union Station.

**Electric Bicycles (e-bikes):**

Beginning in October 2006, the Province of Ontario conducted a three-year pilot program to test the safe integration of electric power-assisted bikes (e-bikes) on Ontario roads. In October 2009, electric bikes (both those resembling conventional bicycles and those resembling motor scooters) became permanently allowed on roads and highways where conventional bicycles are currently permitted. Riders must follow the same rules of the road as set out in the *Highway Traffic Act* (HTA) that currently apply to cyclists, with some exceptions. In order to operate an e-bike, riders must be 16 years of age or older and must wear an approved bicycle or motorcycle helmet.

**Segways:**

The Segway Human Transporter, also known as a Segway, designed for one person, is a self-balancing, electric-powered transportation device able to turn in place, with a top speed of 20 km/h. In October 2006, the Province of Ontario began a five-year pilot project to evaluate the use of the Segway on roads, sidewalks, and paths for Canada Post letter carriers, police officers, and persons with a mobility disability aged 14 and older. The Ministry of Transportation will provide an update on the pilot project in October 2011.

**K. STREETLIFE – HOMELESSNESS**

In recent years, poverty in countries across North America and Europe has become more concentrated and entrenched in particular areas within large cities. Homelessness is a reality for some people in Toronto, and city services, including the Toronto Police Service, must be aware of its extent and significance. Given their situation, the homeless are relatively likely to come into contact with police, as victims, as witnesses, through enforcement activities, and in general communication.

According to the key findings from the City of Toronto 2009 Street Needs Assessment, the overall number of Toronto homeless has remained relatively stable. There were a minimum of 5,086 homeless people staying outdoors, in shelters, in health care and treatment facilities, incarcerated in Toronto-area detention centres, and in Violence Against Women shelters. This represented a slight 1% increase from the 5,052 homeless people in the same locations in 2006. The count of the estimated ‘outdoor’ homeless population was 400, and this represented a decrease of 51% over the 2006 ‘outdoor’ homeless population estimate of 818.

Although the average number of people staying in family shelters on a given night decreased by 45% since the peak in 2001, occupancy in the family shelter system is subject to widely varying ups and downs – decreasing by 59% between 2001 and 2005, and increasing by 43% between 2005 and 2009. The number of families staying in the family shelter system was

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489 Information on the homeless population can also be found in the Victimisation chapter.

felt to be strongly influenced by international geopolitical circumstances and federal immigration policy, which has contributed to a substantial increase in the number of refugee households in the family shelter system in recent years. This is believed reflected in the 9% increase in the number of people staying in shelters on the night of the Street Needs Assessment since 2006.491

The Street Needs Assessment survey asked all individuals about their interactions with police and corrections over the past six months. Of all survey respondents, other than those in a correctional facility, 32% indicated they had had an interaction with police, 12% indicated they had an interaction with corrections, and 13% indicated they had an interaction with probation or parole. As in 2006, those staying outdoors were more likely to interact with police and corrections.

Overall, the 2009 findings were taken to demonstrate that progress has been made on Council’s Housing First plan to end homelessness in the City of Toronto, as outlined in the Housing Opportunities Toronto (HOT) Affordable Housing Strategy.492 The City of Toronto continues to measure the needs of the homeless population with a ‘snapshot’ assessment of homelessness in the city conducted every three years. The next study is scheduled for 2012.

**Harm Reduction:**

Harm reduction, a set of strategies focused on reducing the health, social, and economic harms associated with drug abuse, has become an aspect of several City of Toronto initiatives, strategies, and practices. For instance, the Toronto Drug Strategy (TDS), which was adopted by City Council in 2005, is a long-term, comprehensive plan to address alcohol and drug issues, and includes prevention, harm reduction, treatment, and enforcement components. A key priority for this initiative has been a focus on early intervention and prevention with children and their families.

Strengthening Families for the Future (SFF) is a prevention program for families with children between the ages of 7-11 and who may be at-risk for substance use issues, depression, violence, delinquency, or school failure.493 SFF has been cited by Health Canada and others as one of the best interventions of its kind. The Centre for Addiction & Mental Health (CAMH) secured funding to expand delivery of this program in Toronto, and the TDS Secretariat supported CAMH in finding community partnerships to deliver SFF with a focus on the City of Toronto’s thirteen priority neighbourhoods. In addition, Toronto Public Health staff are facilitating some of the SFF sessions. Each session accommodates about eight families.

In May 2006, *The Works* (needle exchange program) in Toronto Public Health began delivering a further harm reduction initiative entitled The Safer Crack Use Program.494 This program is offered through a fixed location, mobile service, street outreach, and to increase the reach of this program, through contractual arrangements with 24 community-based agencies across Toronto. The program has four key components: distribute new equipment to reduce sharing and the potential for crack smoking-related injuries and disease transmission; educate and counsel to reduce risk behaviours associated with smoking crack; make referrals to health and social services; and, build capacity with service providers to identify and respond to crack

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491 Ibid.
492 Ibid.
494 Ibid.
smoking-related issues faced by clients. In an effort to increase awareness about the Safer Crack Use Program, Toronto Public Health, in conjunction with the Toronto Police Service, developed and provided in-service training to front-line officers in divisions with high rates of crack smoking. In order to ensure that the program is meeting its goals, an evaluation of the Safer Crack Use Program is in the final stages of preparation. Program-related recommendations arising from the evaluation have already begun to be implemented.\textsuperscript{495}

Harm Reduction is also a major component of a number of safer bar initiatives, with an initial focus on the Entertainment District, which were implemented when the TDS Secretariat partnered with the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario (AGCO), the Toronto Police Service, Toronto Public Health, the City’s Community Safety Secretariat, and CAMH. Actions included bringing in a speaker from CAMH to deliver several sessions of their ‘Risk Management Workshop for Licensed Establishments’ workshop. This workshop provides concrete information on how to develop and enforce bar policies for staff and patrons. The workshop also promotes the CAMH Safer Bars program, which is an evidence-based violence prevention initiative geared to licensed establishments.\textsuperscript{496}

Harm reduction policies and initiatives have become more wide-spread and welcomed by government agencies, and, therefore, the Service should continue to become increasingly supportive and involved in such strategies. To balance the societal needs and remedies to drug use with the rules of law will be a challenge to the Service, and will require partnerships with local agencies, lawmakers, and openness to new initiatives.

\section*{1. Social Housing}

As noted previously, Toronto Community Housing (TCH) provides homes to approximately 164,000 low and moderate-income tenants in 58,500 households in Toronto, including seniors, families, singles, refugees, recent immigrants to Canada and people with special needs.\textsuperscript{497} Given the city’s current financial state, and in order to deal these fiscal challenges, several suggestions have been put forward relating to TCH.

One of the suggestions dealt with the possibility of privatizing Toronto’s social housing portfolio. The objective and expected benefit would be to maintain the same level of service to tenants, but to do so at a lower cost to the city. Selling a number of single-family homes owned by the TCH was also been discussed, with the funds put towards a $600 million repair backlog, which is projected to reach $1 billion in the near future.\textsuperscript{498} In June 2011, Toronto City Council acted upon this suggestion and authorised the sale by TCH of 22 of its houses on the open market; Council directed TCH to invest the proceeds into the renovation of some of its other

\textsuperscript{495} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{496} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{497} Toronto Community Housing. (2011). About Us. (Retrieved on April 16\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www.torontohousing.ca/about)
social housing units in Toronto. TCH will honour commitments made to tenants who live in the 22 houses and will relocate households affected to other suitable units in the TCH portfolio.\textsuperscript{499}

An additional suggestion discussed was a voucher system, whereby low-income tenants are given a subsidy they can use to rent an apartment in a privately-owned building of their choosing. This approach to public housing is currently fashionable in the US: over the last 15 years, hundreds of housing projects in the States have been demolished and in their place, housing authorities have built mixed-use, mixed-income developments, providing the former tenants with vouchers.\textsuperscript{500} Under this system, families who earn 50\% or less of the median income in their neighbourhood are eligible. They are expected to pay up to 30\% of their income on rent and utilities, and the voucher covers the balance, up to a specified local maximum.\textsuperscript{501}

\textbf{M. TOURISM \& TRAVEL TO TORONTO}

Despite the recession and a formidable Canadian dollar, Toronto’s position as a global destination continued to rise in 2010. According to recent statistics, 2010 was a record-breaking year for Toronto Tourism, showing a significant rebound from the prior year and important growth in key international markets. Data released in January 2011 by Tourism Toronto showed that in 2010 approximately 25.3 million people visited Toronto, made up of approximately 9.8 million overnight visitors and 15.4 million same-day visitors.\textsuperscript{502} As shown in Figure 9.8, this represented a 13\% increase from 2009 and a 57\% increase from 2001. The estimated number of visitors in 2008 and 2010 represented the highest number of visitors in the past ten years.


501 Ibid.

According to Tourism Toronto, in 2010, hotel occupancy across the Toronto region increased to 68%, which was an increase of 10% over 2009, giving Toronto the fifth highest growth rate and the sixth highest total occupancy rate in North American tourism ratings. Roughly 33% of all visitors to Toronto in 2010 came from outside Canadian borders, mostly from Europe and Asia. In 2010, the number of US visitors remained steady compared to 2009, but air arrivals to Toronto from the US increased for the past nine consecutive months and grew by 8% in 2010, while the number of people driving over the border declined by 4% for the year.\(^5\) This trend can likely be attributed to the spike in gas prices. The sharpest increase in Toronto’s 2010 visitor numbers came from the emerging economies of China, India, and Brazil. In 2010, 197,000 Indian and Chinese tourists came to Toronto, an increase of more than 25% over 2009. Brazilian travelers to Canada more than doubled in 2010. With an average travel bill of $1,114, they were also Toronto’s highest spending visitors. The vast majority of visitors, however, still came from across Ontario.\(^6\)

Tourism Toronto notes that while the historically weak Canadian dollar may have attracted discount travellers in the past, the city has successfully refocused its image as a cultural hub that offers a variety of attractions appealing to ‘sophisticated urban travellers’. An important indicator of a thriving tourism industry is the continuing development by well-respected hotel brands. Adding to the recent openings of the Thompson Toronto, Le Germain Maple Leaf Square, and Ritz-Carlton Toronto, the are the imminent openings of luxury hotels Trump Toronto, Shangri-La, and the new Four Seasons.

Tourism Toronto reports that visitor spending in the city increased approximately 10% between 2009 and 2010: $4.3 billion were spent in 2010, compared to approximately $3.9 billion in 2009 (Figure 9.9). Overnight visitors accounted for majority of overall spending in both years (about 80%). In 2010, $3.3 billion of the total $4.3 billion was spent by overnight visitors, compared to the $1 billion spent by same-day travellers.\(^7\)

Lester B. Pearson Airport:

The Lester B. Pearson International Airport has evolved from a two-runway airport in 1938 to the busiest airport in Canada, and is among the 30 busiest airports in the world. Additionally, Toronto Pearson is Canada’s largest airport, the fourth largest entry point into North America, and the only airport in Canada with scheduled freighter service to Europe, Asia, the US, and Latin America.

In 2010, a total of 31.8 million passengers travelled through Toronto Pearson, a 5% increase compared to 2009. Although passenger activity in the domestic traffic segment was essentially unchanged in 2010 compared to 2009, there was a marked improvement in passenger activity in the trans-border and international segments with increases of 7% and 10%,\(^8\)

\(^{5}\) Ibid.
\(^{6}\) Ibid.
\(^{7}\) Ibid.
\(^{8}\) Ibid.
respectively. During 2010, air carriers operating at Toronto Pearson increased (on a net basis) service on a total of 57 routes representing either new destinations served or increases in capacity on existing routes, compared to 2009. Additionally, Toronto Pearson’s cargo operations have been ranked fourth best in North America, according to the 2011 Air Cargo Excellence Survey by Air Cargo World. Toronto Pearson handled 482,518 metric tonnes of cargo in 2010, making it Canada’s busiest cargo airport.

Over the past ten years, the Greater Toronto Airport Authority (GTAA), which operates the airport, has been redeveloping the airport to meet future travel and cargo demands. The 10-year development project that began in 1998 to meet the growing needs of the airport was completed in January 2007. By 2020, it is estimated that 50 million passengers and 637,000 aircraft movements per year will use the airport. Furthermore, by 2030, the projections estimate 66 million passengers and 801,000 aircraft movements. Released in February 2008, a new airport master plan – Taking Flight – represents the GTAA’s plan for 2008-2030.\(^{506}\)

The main purpose of the plan is to outline the long-term development of the airport facilities that will be required to manage the projected increase in passengers and traffic. Some future developments areas include the completion of the apron in the vicinity of Terminal 2 and construction of a 7,500 space parking garage by 2013, and, beyond 2013, Pier a new terminal complex, expansion of Terminal 1 parking, and a sixth runway.\(^{507}\)

**Airport Security:**

The Government of Canada recently announced changes to passenger screening at airports to increase convenience for the travelling public while still maintaining the current high level of security. These new initiatives are a result of a recently completed review of the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) and also reflect the investments in aviation security stemming from the Air India Inquiry Action Plan. New equipment and lane configurations will also be implemented at the security screening checkpoints to enhance the flow of passengers and bags. With the new equipment, CATSA staff will be able to automatically separate suspicious bags from cleared bags, allowing for more efficient processing of travellers and their baggage.\(^{508}\)

The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) is an American law that requires all travellers, including citizens from Canada and the US, to present a valid passport or other approved secure document when travelling to, through, or from the US within the western hemisphere. Negotiations between Canada and the US have resulted in some flexibility with regard to the new passport rules, however. Canadian citizens are required to present a valid passport, NEXUS, or FAST (Free and Secure Trade) card, or other acceptable document, when seeking to enter the US. Canadian citizens 15 years of age and under, and Canadian citizens 18

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507 Ibid.

years and under who are travelling with a school or other organised group, under adult supervision, only require proof of citizenship to enter.\textsuperscript{509} CATSA introduced full body scanning as a new security measure for secondary screening at Toronto Pearson Airport in 2010. This imaging technology efficiently detects metallic and non-metallic threats, including weapons, explosives, and other items that a traveler may be carrying on his/her person.\textsuperscript{510} Passengers selected for the secondary screening have the option of choosing a physical search or the full body scanner. A trained, certified screening officer examines the full-body scanner images from a separate room. The officer has no direct view of the passenger before, during, or after the screening process, and receives no personal information that could associate the image to a particular person. To further protect passenger privacy, the images are deleted after they are viewed. The screening officer who assists the passenger during the scanning process never sees the image the scanner produces.\textsuperscript{511}

Although Pearson Airport is not directly policed by the Toronto Police Service, it is an important gateway to the City of Toronto. As concern over illegal activity, terrorism, and illegal goods entering the country increases, it is important that the police services remain vigilant of the country’s entry points – especially one of the busiest.

\textbf{Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport:}

The Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport, formerly known as Toronto City Centre Airport or the Toronto Island Airport, is operated by the Toronto Port Authority (TPA) and is one of Canada’s busiest airfields. In past years, the airport has experienced annual movements of 100,000 to 160,000 people. The operation of the airport is governed by a tripartite agreement between the Toronto Port Authority, the Federal Government, and the City of Toronto.\textsuperscript{512} The airline has experienced rapid growth and the addition of international destinations has significantly increased traffic.\textsuperscript{513} In 2010, 1.2 million passengers used the airport, a 47\% increase over 2009. In 2011, the TPA estimates another significant increase in passenger traffic to 1.5 million. A draft federal regulation to expressly allow the construction of a pedestrian tunnel to the airport was published in Ottawa in July 2011.\textsuperscript{514} The plans to construct the pedestrian tunnel will work in conjunction with, and accommodate, the city’s own infrastructure upgrade to water mains to the Toronto Islands. The TPA Board of Directors has approved an agreement to be brought before City of Toronto Council. The agreement would allow for a straight-line route for the proposed pedestrian tunnel, which is more convenient for mobility-impaired passengers and would save $2.5 million in construction costs. In addition, joining the projects would potentially save taxpayers $10 million on the Island water main and sewage project, and avoid duplication of costly and disruptive

\textsuperscript{511} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{512} Toronto Airport Authority. *Airport Information*. (Retrieved on April 30\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www.torontoport.com/airport_facts.asp)
\textsuperscript{514} Ibid.
construction work in downtown Toronto.\textsuperscript{515}

**Toronto Port Terminal:**

The majority of all commercial non-US origin trade enters Canada through a marine port. Containers are compact, off-loaded from vessels, and can be moved quickly by rail or truck to a number of Canadian and US destinations. The Toronto Port Terminal operations occupy 50 acres of land and include seven marine berths, a marine terminal building with 150,000 square feet of storage, a container distribution centre with 100,000 square feet of heated storage, rail service by Canadian National and Canadian Pacific, and a container yard with handling equipment.\textsuperscript{516}

The size and traffic, including the large port workforce, creates difficulties for security, and criminal elements operating within marine ports have been identified at the three major container ports in Vancouver, Montreal, and Halifax. The criminal presence at marine ports often goes unnoticed by port employees, and criminal activities may only involve a small number of key employees. A number of large drug seizures have highlighted concerns about organised crime and vulnerability at Canadian ports, including a seizure of 35 kilograms of heroin at the Montreal Port in April 2011.\textsuperscript{517} Heightened security awareness is vital, as additional concerns are raised about the potential of marine ports to act as conduits for illegal individuals, goods, or materials that could support acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{518}

With the development and expansion taking place in the port area and along the waterfront, the Port Authority may be a challenged to inspect and manage cargo and goods, creating increased opportunity for the proliferation of illegal goods and organised crime activity. Service units responsible for these policing service areas, including the Marine Unit and Detective Services units, must continue to be alert to the potential vulnerabilities and challenges and be prepared to address them; the Service, in turn, must ensure these units have the resources they require to carry out these responsibilities.

N. \textbf{Special Events}

In celebrating its richness and diversity, Toronto hosts many special events and demonstrations, especially in the summer months. These events showcase the city, attract worldwide tourist audiences, promote the city as a vibrant place to live, work, and visit, and provide the settings for the Service to strengthen ties with Toronto’s diverse communities. Large annual events include: the Scotiabank Caribbean Festival, Pride Week, the Canadian National Exhibition, the Toronto Jazz Festival, the Toronto Marathon, the Toronto International Film Festival, the Honda Indy, the Santa Clause Parade, and New Years Eve celebrations, as well as various community, neighbourhood, and cultural events.


\textsuperscript{516}Toronto Port Authority. \textit{Facilities}. (Retrieved on May 25\textsuperscript{th}, 2011, from http://www.torontoport.com/port_facilities.asp)


\textsuperscript{518}Ibid.
These events also challenge the Police Service and its resources. Effective planning of the police response to events is required to ensure the effective and efficient management of people, traffic, and police resources, and is paramount to the safety and success of the events and the promotion of Toronto.

Demonstrations are an important reality in a democratic society, and although generally peaceful, they can also cause a strain upon police personnel and resources. Unlike scheduled special events, the unpredictability of some demonstrations presents challenges for the Service in the areas of crowd management and community safety. Demonstrators’ emotions are often high and it is important that the police continue to ensure peace while at the same time protecting the safety and rights of all people.

It is important to ensure that close ties are kept with city officials, community stakeholders, and event planners to ensure that the safety of the public and police is maintained and that policing services are delivered to everyone throughout Toronto in an efficient and timely manner. The effective and efficient deployment of on-duty personnel, off-duty paid duty personnel, and Auxiliary and volunteer members, is important to managing both city-wide and community-specific events and demonstrations.

The Service must be aware of the strain that can occur for police divisions throughout the city as their personnel are temporarily re-deployed for the large events in other areas. During both internal and public consultations for the Scan, concerns were raised that the deployment of on-duty officers for special events meant that community problems or concerns were temporarily not able to receive adequate police attention. A balance must be found that allows the Service to continue to support community special events that are important to the vibrancy of the city, while also assuring the public that regular policing services will not be neglected.

O. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The primary function of Public Safety and Emergency Management unit (PS&EM) is to oversee the internal emergency preparedness of the Toronto Police Service, and the Service’s capability to mitigate, plan/prepare, respond to, and facilitate the recovery from, all emergencies and disasters that may affect Toronto.

The Enhanced Emergency Preparedness Initiative commenced in Toronto shortly after terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. The Initiative includes partnerships with the Toronto Office of Emergency Management (OEM), Toronto Fire Service (TFS), and Emergency Medical Services (EMS), along with a group of broader external agencies and community stakeholders at municipal, provincial, and federal levels. The primary focus of this Initiative involves a number of areas. The following sections provide an overview of some of the major developments in these areas in 2009 and 2010:519

*Emergency Management Planning – Unified Command and Joint Planning:*

The PS&EM – Emergency Management section provides 24/7 support for emergency events and works in co-operation with other emergency service providers to facilitate a unified response to emergency situations as they arise within the boundaries of the City of Toronto. The

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implementation and development of an Emergency Preparedness Committee (EPC) has served as the corporate focal point for emergency preparedness, operational continuity, training, and other capacity building initiatives. Since 2008, significant advances have been made and new initiatives have been undertaken to enhance the TPS state of emergency preparedness, including:

- monthly review, and inclusion in the central repository, of After Action Reports;
- audit and testing of unit operational continuity plans on a weekly basis;
- testing and improvement of communications strategies to ensure the effective flow of information both internally and externally;
- improving Service-wide incident management system response capability;
- maintaining an up-to-date list of critical infrastructure and corporate services sector properties and facilities;
- review of the relevant Service procedures;
- providing opportunities for intelligence briefings and sharing of information regarding emergency preparedness;
- developing relevant Memorandums of Understanding for Joint Forces Operations and community mobilization opportunities and partnerships; and
- expanding relevant training programs.

**Emergency Preparedness Training:**

The Toronto Police Service adopted the Incident Management System (IMS) several years ago and is currently providing assistance with the development of a Provincial IMS standard that will be implemented province-wide. IMS training has been expanded to include all part-time Public Order unit members, and is included in Provincial Statutes and Supervisory training courses at the Toronto Police College.

PS&EM also continues to participate in a variety of joint training and education opportunities, including joint emergency management training with the Office of Emergency Management. Service personnel are provided with the Provincial Basic Emergency Management (BEM) Certificate upon completion of the required courses. Additionally, PS&EM members have now been accredited by Emergency Management Ontario as instructors in this program. The program has been significantly expanded with monthly offerings to TPS members at PS&EM.

**Communications, Command and Control:**

PS&EM has acquired Crisis Management Information System (CMIS) software. This software will enhance the ability of the Service to manage command, control, and communication aspects of emergency events and large-scale planned events much more efficiently. The system will allow at-site or remote monitoring and management of events through a secure Internet connection based on positions and identified individuals. Access can be gained from any computer with Internet access. It is anticipated that many other City of Toronto agencies, led by the Office of Emergency Management, will be considering the purchase of this software to allow them more effective integration with the Service in all areas of disaster response and management.
**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) – Joint Team:**

The three emergency services components (TFS, EMS, and TPS) of the Joint CBRNE Team now operate from a single location. This allows for greater communication and consistent operations among the three agencies.

**Heavy Urban Search and Rescue (HUSAR) – Joint Team:**

The Heavy Urban Search and Rescue Team is a Toronto Fire Services-led initiative that is comprised of representatives from all emergency services and Toronto Water. The Service is represented by members from PS&EM and Police Dog Services. The team is supported by the Provincial Emergency Response Team from the Ontario Provincial Police.

**Public Health Emergencies, Preparations and Response:**

PS&EM continue to liaise with Toronto Public Health in order to mitigate any public health emergencies, including pandemic influenza. In conjunction with the Service’s Occupational Health & Safety unit, the Emergency Management section has provided information to first responders in relation to public health emergencies on the PS&EM intranet site. This includes the reproduction of materials provided by the Provincial Ministry of Health and Toronto Public Health. The introduction of the H1N1 pandemic influenza into Canada provided the opportunity for PS&EM and other TPS units to finalise and test the Pandemic Procedure and response plan, which consists of immunization, sanitizing, and response protocols.

Members of PS&EM also provide subject matter expertise with respect to respiratory protection, workplace sanitizing, and response. And, PS&EM, in partnership with Occupational Health & Safety secured additional training for all Service members through the Toronto Police College. Hand sanitizing stations were installed in all Service facilities where public access is permitted. As well, the first stage of the new respiratory protection program was undertaken with designated members ‘fit’ tested for respiratory protection.

**Critical Infrastructure/Counter Terrorism:**

PS&EM, the Service’s Intelligence Division, and the Toronto Office of Emergency Management (OEM) continue to work together to identify, document, and analyse specific city and Service critical infrastructure sites. Once identified, education, information sharing, and the implementation of target hardening activities can be taken to ensure the risk to these sites is minimised. The goal is to ensure that key operations and economic activities are protected, in addition to ensuring that core city services are maintained or restored as quickly as possible in the event critical infrastructure is affected by an emergent situation.

In 2010, the Counter Terrorism/Critical Infrastructure section, in partnership with the Emergency Task Force, Communications Services, and the Intelligence Division launched the Toronto Operational Response Information System (TORIS). Sixty-eight participants from various critical infrastructure sectors expressed interest in this initiative; to date, 17 have submitted their site information. Ultimately, the database developed with TORIS will allow the Service to enhance public safety by using this information (i.e. access, egress, and presence of hazardous materials) to make timely and accurate decisions when responding to an event. This,
along with joint training opportunities and partnerships, will enhance the Service’s counter terrorism capacity and response in the community.

**Operational Response:**

The PS&EM unit has been involved in responses to hazardous material situations throughout 2009 and 2010. The unit continues to monitor reportable nuclear events from the Pickering and Darlington Nuclear Generating Stations, as prescribed by the Provincial Nuclear Emergency Response Plan and the Provincial Liquid Emergency Response Plan. Since 2006, the number of calls for service received by TPS Communications in relation to hazardous events inclusive of CBRNE remains at a daily average of 5.

According to the Service’s I/CAD database, Service members attended 1,097 hazardous events in 2010, 2% more than the 1,071 hazardous events attended in 2009, but 4% fewer than the 1,139 attended in 2001 (Figure 9.10). These events consisted of chemical hazards, explosions, and natural gas leaks. In each year, the majority of calls were natural gas leaks. The relatively high number of hazardous event calls in 2008 (1,234 calls) can most likely be attributed to the public’s heightened concern regarding hazardous events created by the Sunrise explosion in August of that year. In addition to these hazardous events, the PS&EM unit dealt with 95 CBRNE events in 2010.

![Hazardous Events Attended](image)

**Figure 9.10 Source: TPS I/CAD**

In June 2006, a report entitled *Emergency – Municipalities Missing From Disaster Planning* was produced for the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) by the National Security Group. The report recommended that the Federation of Canadian Municipalities ask the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police to advise them on inter-jurisdictional policing challenges and to ensure that its police service members participate in studies and exercises. Services should be advised to seek federal funding through the new Public Safety National Exercises Program (NEP), which consists of training courses and operation centre exercises relating to the National emergency Response System.

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520 This data is retrieved from the I/CAD system through an analysis of event types. The analysis of events includes only the events that were identified as a chemical hazard, explosion, or natural gas leak; it does not capture reports that may have involved a hazardous material, but which were coded differently.

Acting on those recommendations, the Service initiated training exercises for first responders, such as lockdown training at several schools in Toronto. Additionally, PS&EM participates in a variety of joint training opportunities, including emergency management training with the Office of Emergency Management. Additionally, as noted previously, in order to enhance Service business continuity in the event of an incident, PS&EM randomly tests 2 or 3 units per week by telephone to ensure that the unit’s operational continuity plan can be effectively executed should the need arise. Operational and facility deficiencies are identified and then addressed.

The Toronto Police Service continues to recognize the importance of emergency preparedness and the value of effective emergency management practices to the organization, other emergency service providers, and external stakeholder agencies. The overall goal of emergency preparedness is to provide the framework within which extraordinary arrangements and measures can be taken to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Toronto, should an emergency occur. The Service should continue to strive to find new and innovative methods that engage and mobilize available resources in the event of an emergency situation, to restore the Service, the community, and the province to a state of normalcy as quickly and efficiently as possible.

**Recommendations for Police Service**

- The Service must remain aware of development throughout the city, and plan its services in concert with city planners, and public and private developers, to ensure that policing issues such as CPTED and traffic disruption are included in emerging development plans. Deployment and allocation of Service resources must take into account potential demands.

- With increased interest in expanding public transit as the federal, provincial, and municipal governments recognize the economic, social, and environmental costs of traffic congestion in major urban areas, the Service must be involved with the planning of and support of TTC projects. Such involvement will ensure that the Service is aware of and able to address the impacts of expansion, both during construction and after.

- Due to the increasing trend in cycling and the uses of other transportation modes, Service should continue to provide information and enforcement regarding the applicable sections of the *Highway Traffic Act* and relevant city by-laws.

- It is important the Toronto Police remain committed partners with the organizations that use special constables throughout the city and support them in training, operations, and improvement initiatives.

- The Service must strive to understand the extent, origins, and significance of issues related to the homeless and those on the street, as police officers often come into contact with many groups and individuals at risk.

- Private security partnerships offer an opportunity for the Toronto Police to gather important intelligence information from community-level workers. It is important that the Service
assess their relationship with security firms to determine how to create or improve these partnerships.

- The Service must be prepared to deal with the increased challenges and vulnerabilities that may arise with increased traffic at the airports and the port, including the concern of organised crime activities.

- The Service must be aware of the strain that can occur to police divisions throughout the city as their personnel are temporarily re-deployed to large events within the division or in other areas of the city. A balance must be found between the deployment of on-duty personnel, off-duty, paid duty personnel, and Auxiliary and volunteer members to these events and the requirement to meet regular policing demands. It is important to ensure that police divisions are able to efficiently and effectively provide service to the public during city-wide or community-specific special events.

- The overall goal of emergency preparedness is to provide the framework within which extraordinary arrangements and measures can be taken to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of Toronto, should an emergency occur. The Service should continue to strive to find new and innovative methods that engage and mobilize available resources in the event of an emergency situation, to restore the Service, the community, and the province to a state of normalcy as quickly and efficiently as possible.
Public Perceptions

The police provide a necessary service for the public, and the police, in turn, depend on the public for support. The importance of this interdependence is reflected in ongoing efforts to improve police-community relations. Public perceptions of police performance and personal safety are major indicators of the effectiveness of police services and strategies and of the success of the deployment of Service resources. Trends in these indicators can, therefore, be useful in establishing Police Service priorities.

**Highlights**

- According to the telephone survey conducted for the Toronto Police Service at the end of 2010, most people (93%) felt their neighbourhoods were safe, up slightly from both 2009 and 2001 (90% in both years). In past years, Toronto residents were more likely to say their neighbourhood was safe than they were to say the city in general was safe. In 2010, however, almost everyone (97%) said that they felt Toronto in general was very or reasonably safe.

- While most Toronto residents said they felt safe in their neighbourhoods, people were also more concerned about crime and disorder issues in their neighbourhoods in 2010 than they were in either 2009 or 2001.

- Over the past decade, the Toronto Police Service has generally enjoyed strong support from the community. The proportion of Toronto residents who said they were very or somewhat satisfied in 2010 (95%) was an increase from both 2009 (88%) and 2001 (93%).

- While people have generally felt that police-community relations were good over the past decade, there was improvement in 2010. In all years, Toronto residents have felt that relations between police and the people in their neighbourhood were better than relations between police and people in the city in general, or between police and members of minority communities. This latter category has shown the greatest increase.

- Fewer Toronto residents in 2010 said that they believed Toronto police officers targeted members of minority or ethnic groups for enforcement: 18% in 2010, up slightly from 16% in 2009, but down from 23% in 2001.

- Of those who’d had contact with police during the past year, most people in 2010 (93%) said they felt the officer(s) treated them with respect during the contact. This was an increase over the proportion in 2009 (83%), but similar to that seen in 2001 (90%). Similarly, the officers were rated as being more polite, more helpful, and more professional than in previous years.

- According to the results of the Service’s annual survey of high school students, most students, in each of the past ten years said they felt safe in and around the school at any time of the day, with the proportion increasing slightly in recent years (89% in 2010, 86% in 2009, 85% in 2001).

- When asked over the past ten years about the most serious policing problem in and around their school, drugs and fighting were usually the top two answers. In 2010, bullying/cyber-bullying...
tied with fighting as one of the two most frequently noted problems. Robbery has been the third most frequently identified problem since 2008.

- Most students do not feel that their school or school grounds are generally violent places, and the proportion of students feeling this way has increased over the past ten years. In 2010, 80% of students said that their school wasn’t violent, up from 76% in 2009 and 67% in 2001.

- In 2010, 64% of students said they would feel comfortable talking to police about crime or a problem at their school, up only slightly from 63% in 2009, but down from 67% in 2001.

- Compared to ten years ago, far more students in the past two years have felt positive about the relationship between police and the students in their school. More students in 2010 and 2009, compared to 2001, felt that the relationship between police and students was good or excellent (46% in 2010, 47% in 2009, and 36% in 2001).

- Over one-third (38%) of the high school students in 2010 said that their school had a School Resource Officer (SRO). There was no difference in feelings of safety at school between students in SRO schools and students in non-SRO schools: most students in both groups felt safe. Students in SRO schools were, however, more likely than students in non-SRO schools to say they felt comfortable talking to police about crime or other problems at the school, and to say that the relationship between students and the police was excellent or good.

A. General Community – Toronto

Fear of crime and perceptions of safety are important indicators of the way people feel about their cities and neighbourhoods. They can also be indicators of confidence in police and how well people feel their police services are performing, and can shape the demands they place on those police services. The perceptions of safety can be influenced by many things, including personal experiences, the experiences of family, friends, or neighbours, and media reports about the ‘crime problem’ in the city or their neighbourhood. Perceived disorder or incivility (physical and social) in the neighbourhood can also affect feelings of safety. When people become sufficiently uneasy about incivilities like littering, drug use, public drinking, and the like, they may begin to feel that their neighbourhood is unsafe.  

In the final quarter of each year, the Toronto Police Service typically contracts for a community telephone survey of 1,200 Toronto residents; in 2010, 1,207 Toronto residents were surveyed. In each year, the survey focuses on the respondent’s perception of crime and personal safety, satisfaction with the delivery of policing services to their neighbourhood and in Toronto in general, and, where the respondent has had contact with the police in the past year, satisfaction with the service provided.

The results of the community survey were examined for all respondents, as well as by gender, by age group (18-34, 35-64, 65 and older), by whether or not they self-identified as a

523 The community survey conducted for the Service is a randomly selected sample of adult residents.  For a survey of 1,200 adults, the results are considered accurate within ±2.8%, 95 times out of 100.
member of a visible minority group, and by where they lived (a city-defined priority neighbourhood or another part of the city).

**Perceptions of Safety:**

There has been little change in how safe people feel in their neighbourhood over the past decade (Figure 10.1). Most people (93%) felt their neighbourhoods were safe in 2010, up slightly from both 2009 and 2001 (90% in both years). There was no significant difference in this perception between men and women, between young and old, between those who identified as visible minority and those who did not, or between those who live in priority neighbourhoods and those who do not.

 Asked about any change in crime in their neighbourhood, almost two-thirds (65%) of Torontonians in 2010 felt that the level of crime had not changed over the past year. Age and whether or not people lived in a priority neighbourhood were both significantly related to perceptions of change in crime. Those aged 18-34 were more likely than the older age groups to say that crime had decreased, while the older age groups were more likely to say that the level of crime had not changed. And, those who lived in the priority neighbourhoods were significantly more likely to say crime had increased in their neighbourhood over the past year, while those who lived in non-priority neighbourhoods were significantly more likely to say that crime had decreased.

In past years, Toronto residents were more likely to say their neighbourhood was safe than they were to say the city in general was safe. In 2010, however, almost everyone (97%) said that they felt Toronto in general was very or reasonably safe. This proportion was a notable increase from the 86% who said Toronto was safe in 2009 and the 88% who said Toronto was safe in 2001. Similar to the perception of safety in neighbourhoods, the perception of safety in the city in general in 2010 was not significantly related to gender, age group, visible minority identification, or by the area people live in.

As in 2009, when asked about the most serious policing problem in their neighbourhood, the most common responses in 2010 were guns, drugs, vandalism, or robbery. This was a change from 2001, when people felt the most serious policing problems in their neighbourhoods were break & enters, traffic/parking, or drugs. It should also be noted that while 21% of respondents in 2001 said that there were no serious policing problems in their neighbourhoods, this decreased to 18% in 2009 and 12% in 2010.

For Toronto in general rather than their neighbourhoods, people considered guns the most serious policing problem each year since 2005, although the proportion declined steadily from 52% in 2005 to 27% in 2009, and to 22% in 2010. This may be related to the relatively large number of shooting victims and shooting homicides in 2005, called ‘the year of the gun’ in the media; there were fewer shooting victims and shooting homicides in 2010 compared to levels seen in 2005.

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524 All significant comparisons noted in this chapter relate to a Pearson $\chi^2$ with $p\leq0.05$. 
While most Toronto residents said they felt safe in their neighbourhoods, people were also more concerned about crime and disorder issues in their neighbourhoods in 2010 than they were in either 2009 or 2001. The proportions of residents who said they were concerned about various issues are shown in Table 10.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>2001 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned</th>
<th>2009 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned</th>
<th>2010 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Safe/Secure</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Hanging Around</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeless People/Panhandlers</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litter/Garbage</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Harassed on the Street</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TPS survey

While level of concern about crime and disorder issues was not related to gender, visible minority identification, or living/not living in a priority area in 2010, it was significantly related to age. Those aged 18-34 were more concerned than the two older age groups about litter, drugs, prostitution, and being harassed on the streets in their neighbourhoods. And, those under 65 years of age were more concerned about vandalism in their neighbourhoods than those 65 and older.

Survey respondents were also asked how likely they felt it was that they would be the victim of certain types of crime during the next year. In 2010, people felt they were more likely to be victims of all these crimes in the coming year than they had in 2009 (Figure 10.2). And, compared to 2001, people in 2010 either felt they had the same or greater chance of being victimized in the coming year.
However, as noted in the Victimization chapter, slightly fewer people in 2010 than in 2009 said that they had actually been the victim of a crime in the past 12 months (6% in 2010, 7% in 2009). In 2010, people had generally had their car/vehicle stolen or their home broken into. In contrast, in 2009, people reported most frequently that they had their car/vehicle stolen or been robbed. More people said that they had reported their victimization to police in 2010 (75%) than in 2009 (64%). In both years, the most common reason given for not reporting was that people didn’t think the incident was serious enough.

In 2010, perceived likelihood of victimization by the various crimes during the next year was significantly related to age, gender, and visible minority identification:

- men were more likely than women to feel that they would have their car or motor vehicle stolen;
- both men and those aged 18-34 were more likely to feel that they would have something else stolen;
- both men and those who said they were not visible minority were more likely to feel that they would have their home or business broken into;
- those aged 18-34 were more likely than the other age groups to feel that they would be sexually assaulted; and
- men were more likely than women to feel that they would be harassed on the street.

There was no significant relationship between perceived likelihood of victimization and where people lived (i.e. in the priority neighbourhoods or in other areas of the city). Actual victimization in the previous 12 months was also not significantly related in 2010 to gender, age, visible minority identification, or area of the city. There were also no significant differences in whether or not the victimization was reported to police.

Although, as noted previously, people were more concerned about crime and disorder issues in 2010, in keeping with the general feelings of safety, when asked if there was any place in their neighbourhood where they would be afraid to go during the day, most people in each year said there was not. The proportion of people who said there was somewhere in their neighbourhood where they’d be afraid to go during the day showed very little change in 2010 from 2009 or from 2001. About one in ten people in each year said there was a place in their neighbourhood where they were
afraid to go during the day (11% in 2010, 12% in 2009, and 10% in 2001). This fear was significantly related to age in 2010: those aged 18-34 were more likely than the other age groups to say there was somewhere in their neighbourhood where they’d be afraid to go during the day.

There was a change – for the better – in the proportion of people who said that there was a place in their neighbourhood where they would be afraid to go at night. While 45% in 2001 said there was some place in their neighbourhood they’d be afraid to go at night, just under one-third felt this way in 2009 (30%) or 2010 (32%). This perception was not significantly related in 2010 to gender, age, visible minority identification, or area of the city.

Compared to ten years ago, fewer people in recent years have also said that worry about crime kept them from doing things they’d like to do (14% in 2010 and 15% in 2009, compared to 31% in 2002 when the question was first asked). Again, this perception did not differ significantly between the groups examined.

**Perceptions of Police/Policing:**

As with perceptions of safety, the perceptions of police and police delivery of services can be influenced by many things, including personal experiences or the experiences of family, friends, or neighbours, and media reports relating to police in the city, province, or country.

Over the past decade, the Toronto Police Service has generally enjoyed strong support from the community (Figure 10.3). The telephone survey of Toronto residents in late 2010 found that almost all were satisfied with the Service overall. The proportion of those very or somewhat satisfied in 2010 (95%) was an increase from both 2009 (88%) and 2001 (93%). The lowest proportion – 85% – was seen in 2004.

While there were no differences in overall satisfaction with the Police Service by gender, visible minority identification, or area, there was a significant relationship between satisfaction and age. Those 65 years of age and older were more satisfied with the Service than the younger age groups; those aged 18-34 were the least satisfied.

Most people in Toronto have also been satisfied with the delivery of police service in their neighbourhood over the past decade, although there has been some decrease in recent years (Figure 10.4).\(^{525}\) In contrast to the increase in satisfaction with the Service overall in 2010, the proportion of those very or somewhat satisfied with delivery of service to their neighbourhoods in 2010 (75%) was a decrease from both 2009 (81%) and 2001 (86%).

\(^{525}\) The proportion for 2009 is an estimate, due to problems with data collection in that year.
And, as with satisfaction with the Service overall, while there were no differences in satisfaction with the delivery of police service to neighbourhoods by gender, visible minority identification, or area, there was a significant relationship with age. Again, those 65 years of age and older were more satisfied with service delivery than the younger age groups; those aged 18-34 were the least satisfied.

In 2010, while fewer people were satisfied with the number of officers patrolling their neighbourhood than in 2009, far more were satisfied than had been in 2003 when the question was first asked. In 2010, 87% of Toronto residents said they were satisfied with the number of police patrolling their neighbourhood in cars, down slightly from 90% in 2009, but up from 77% in 2003. And, 81% were satisfied with the number of officers patrolling their neighbourhood on foot or on bikes in 2010, down from 84% in 2009, but up considerably from 51% in 2003.

In contrast to the decline in perceptions related to service delivery to neighbourhoods in general, with regard to specific policing activities in their neighbourhoods, perceptions were more positive in 2010 than they had been in 2009 (that is, more people rated the police as ‘good’) and only ‘being approachable’ did not show improvement over 2001 (Figure 10.5). The one area that showed the greatest improvement over 2001 was ‘providing services to ethnic/racial groups’.

Perceptions of these specific police services were significantly related to both age and identification as a visible minority. In 2010, those 65 years or older and those who did not identify as a visible minority were more likely to say the police do a ‘good’ job of being visible in their neighbourhood. Those 65 or older were also more likely to say the police do a ‘good’ job at being approachable/easy to talk to. There was no difference in ratings between men and women or between those who live in priority neighbourhoods and those who do not.

Those who responded to the telephone survey were also asked how well they felt the Police Service overall did in a variety of policing tasks. All results are shown in Table 10.2. In accord with the positive results noted earlier related to satisfaction with the Service overall, most people in 2010 thought the police did very or fairly well in addressing all the responsibilities asked about. Except for ‘policing major events in the city’, which did not change, more people in 2010 than in 2009 felt the police did very or fairly well at the responsibilities listed. In both years, people were most positive about the Service’s ability to police major events in the city.
Table 10.2
Perceptions of Police Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009 police do ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ well</th>
<th>2010 police do ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ well</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policing major events in the city</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with gun crimes</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigating child abuse/exploitation</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigating hate crimes</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with youth violence</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with victimization of youth</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with organized crime</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with gangs</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigating crimes committed against members of minority communities</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting victims and witnesses</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing drug laws</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing crime and disorder</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consulting with the public</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving public safety and security</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with traffic collisions</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with traffic congestion</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing traffic laws</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with aggressive cycling</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with speeding</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with aggressive/dangerous drivers</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Question was first asked in 2003

Source: Toronto Police survey

With regard to differences in 2010 between the groups examined, perceptions of police effectiveness in certain areas were significantly related to both age and to whether or not someone lived in one of the priority neighbourhoods. Those 65 years or older were more likely to say the police do well at supporting victims and witnesses, enforcing drug laws, and improving public safety and security. Those not living in a priority neighbourhood were significantly more likely to say the police do well at dealing with gun crimes. There was no difference in ratings between men and women or between those who identified as visible minority and those who did not.

Over the past decade, Toronto residents have generally felt that relations between police and the people in their neighbourhood were better than relations between police and people in the city in general, or between police and members of minority communities (Figure 10.6). However, perceptions of all three relationships have improved in recent years, and the proportions of people who said they believed the relationships were excellent or good were higher in 2010 than in 2009 or in 2001 or 2003 when the questions were first asked. In 2010, people were more likely than in prior years to say they felt that the relationship was excellent or good:
• between police and people in their neighbourhood (78% in 2010, 75% in 2009, and 69% in 2001);
• between police and people in the city in general (75% in 2010, 69% in 2009, and 57% in 2003); and
• between police and members of minority communities (68% in 2010, 59% in 2009, and 36% in 2003). This category showed the greatest increase.

Figure 10.6
Source: TPS survey

With regard to differences in 2010 between the characteristics examined, a significant effect was again noted for age: those 65 years or older were more likely to say that relations between police and the people in their neighbourhood were excellent or good. Age was not a factor in the perceptions of relations between police and people in the city in general or of relations between police and members of minority communities. There were no differences in perceptions of any of the relationships by gender, identification as a visible minority, or area lived in.

Since 2007, survey respondents have been asked how sensitive to different cultures they believe Toronto police officers are when they provide services to the community. The proportion of people who said officers were very/somewhat sensitive increased considerably in 2010: to 83% in 2010, from 73% in 2009, 73% in 2008, and 74% in 2007. Those who did not identify as a visible minority were significantly more likely than those who did identify as a visible minority to believe officers were sensitive to different cultures. This belief was not related to gender, age group, or area lived in.

Fewer Toronto residents in 2010 said that they believed Toronto police officers targeted members of minority or ethnic groups for enforcement: 18% in 2010, up slightly from 16% in 2009, but down from 23% in 2001. The 2009 proportion was the lowest seen in the past decade; the highest proportion (33%) was seen in 2006.

More people in 2010 than at any time in the past decade said that they believe that Toronto police are trustworthy: 92%. This was an increase from 74% in 2009 and 79% in 2002 when the question was first asked. The lowest proportion was seen in 2008, when only 69% of people said that they believed Toronto police were trustworthy. In all other years, the proportion ran between 85% and 89%.

Responses to these two questions were not affected by gender, age group, identification as visible minority, or the area lived in.
General Community Respondents who had Contact with Police during Past Year:

While the good opinion and confidence of the general community is vital to the Service, the perceptions of those who had contact with an officer are an even more important indication of police ability to provide a high quality service.\textsuperscript{526}

Over the past decade, most of those who said they’d had contact with police during the past year said that they were satisfied with police during that contact (Figure 10.7). Of those in 2010 who’d had contact with police, 83% said they were satisfied with the police during that contact, up from 71% in 2009 and 80% in 2001.

For those who were not satisfied, the most frequently reported reason has changed over the years. In 2010, the largest proportion said they weren’t satisfied because the officer(s) took too long to arrive. In 2009, the largest proportion weren’t satisfied because they felt the officer(s) didn’t listen to them, while in 2001, they said they weren’t satisfied because the officer(s) failed to understand their situation.

Considerably more people in 2010 (38%) said that the contact had changed their opinion of the police, compared to 2009 (24%) and 2001 (17%). Reflecting a positive experience, two-thirds of these people (67%) in 2010 said that their opinion became more positive as a result. This proportion was again higher than the 40% in 2009 and the 58% in 2001 who said their opinion of police became more positive because of the contact.

As in previous years, most people in 2010 (93%) said they felt the officer(s) treated them with respect during the contact. This proportion was a notable increase over the proportion in 2009 (83%) and recent years, but similar to that seen in 2001 (90%) (Figure 10.8).

Similarly, for those who’d had contact with the police, the officers were rated as being more polite, more helpful, and more professional than in previous years. In 2010, 89% rated the officer’s courtesy as good or excellent during the contact, up from 66% in 2009 and 81% in 2001; 84% rated the officer’s helpfulness as good or excellent, up from 55% in 2009 and 76% in 2001.

\textsuperscript{526} 10% of respondents in 2010 said they’d had contact with the police in the past year, compared to 13% in 2009 and 35% in 2001.
2001; and, 88% rated the officer’s professionalism as good or excellent, up from 64% in 2009 and 82% in 2001. Of those who rated the officer’s overall professionalism as fair or poor during contact, one of the most commonly reported reasons in almost all years was that the officer ‘didn’t take the situation seriously enough’. In 2010, the other most commonly reported reason for rating the officer’s professionalism as fair or poor was that he/she had a ‘bad attitude’. The other most common reason given in 2009 was ‘inappropriate behaviour’, while in 2001 it was that the officer ‘didn’t seem to care’.

**G20 Policing – June 2010:**

Following the G20 Summit, held in Toronto on June 26th and 27th, 2010, a number of public opinion polls were conducted across Canada. Angus Reid, Harris Decima, and Ipsos Reid all posed questions to over 1,000 Canadians relating to their perceptions of policing during the Summit, with relatively similar results.

Angus Reid polled 1,506 adults, including 503 from Toronto, on June 28th and 29th.527 They found that 66% of Canadians and 73% of Torontonians felt that the police reaction to the demonstrations that took place was completely or moderately justified; 17% of Canadians and 23% of Torontonians felt that the police reaction was completely or moderately unjustified.

The Harris Decima poll of just over 1,000 Canadians between June 30th and July 4th, found that two-thirds of people polled felt the police response was appropriate, while about 20% said it was inappropriate.528

Ipsos Reid polled 1,859 adults, including 683 residents of the Greater Toronto Area (GTA), between June 30th and July 5th.529 They found that 76% of Canadians and 81% of GTA residents agreed that, all things considered, the police did a good job during the Summit; 24% of Canadians and 19% of GTA residents disagreed. They also found that 71% of Canadians and 74% of GTA residents agreed that the police properly balanced appropriate force and restraint, given the circumstances, and that 66% of Canadians and 71% of GTA residents agreed that police found a good balance between protecting the Summit leaders with allowing people to voice their views on the street.

On July 26th, in a non-scientific poll of readers of the CBC news website, 32% said they agreed with how the police handled the G20 protests, while 68% said they did not agree with how the police handled the protests.530

In an on-line survey of 702 adults conducted one year after the G20 Summit, Angus Reid found that Torontonians were reassessing their views on the performance of police. In contrast to the 73% in June 2010 who felt that the police actions were justified, only 41% of respondents

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530 The results were based on 9,331 responses. (Retrieved on July 28th, 2010, from http://www.cbc.ca/news/pointofview/2010/07/g20-police-response-was-it-appropriate.html.)
felt this way in 2011. In the latest poll, half of the respondents (50%) said they believed the use of ‘kettling’ was unjustified, while 43% said they believed it was justified. Those aged 18 to 34 were most likely to be critical of police. And, while 56% of respondents said they had confidence in the Toronto Police Service to enforce the law, protect property, and keep public order, 44% said their confidence in the police in these areas had decreased over the past year.531

B. COMMUNITY FOCUS GROUPS

In November 2010, six focus groups were conducted for the Police Service by the company that conducted the general community survey. Participants in three of the focus groups were 18 to 21 years of age, while participants in the remaining three focus groups were members of visible minority groups (Chinese, Black, and South Asian – the three largest visible minority groups in Toronto as of the 2006 Census). Each group had 8 to 10 participants, and participants in all six groups lived and/or worked in high-crime areas within the city.532 The purpose of the focus groups was to gain a better understanding of opinions and perceptions of the Toronto Police Service relating to safety/neighbourhood issues, interactions with communities, and communication.

Perceptions of Safety:

Overall, a majority of participants in most groups felt relatively safe in their neighbourhoods; the exception was one youth group whose participants said they did not feel that their neighbourhoods were safe, particularly at night. For the groups who did feel safe, the feeling was mainly the result of having lived in their neighbourhoods a long time and the sense of community they experienced there. Most participants said that police visibility in their neighbourhoods improved their feelings of safety, although many would prefer to see officers on foot or bikes rather than in cars. There were some variations however: the South Asian group all agreed that officers patrolling in cars helped them to feel secure, while the Black group felt that having police patrolling in cars was of little benefit.

The Black group also differed from the other groups in that these participants generally agreed the city overall was probably safer than their neighbourhoods. They felt that there were more likely to be people out and about in other areas of the city, and the presence of people gave them a sense of security. All other groups felt that their neighbourhoods were safer, because they were familiar with the people there, because there had been no major crimes that had occurred, because there were many families with young children, and/or because there were more fights and homeless people in other areas of the city.

The types of problems identified as the main safety issues in their neighbourhoods were relatively similar, with drugs, shootings, and break-ins (residential and car) being mentioned by all groups.


532 A ‘high-crime area’ was defined as a police zone that had a violent crime rate greater than the median rate. The boundaries of these areas were provided to the company by the Police Service.
Perceptions of Police/Policing:

When asked whether they would report a crime to police, participants’ willingness to do so was low in most groups. The main reason given by all was the perception that when crimes are reported, if the police come, they are usually slow to arrive, just take notes, and then nothing happens. While the South Asian group generally agreed that they would contact the police if they saw a crime being committed, they also acknowledged that depending on the type of crime, there may be cultural pressures not to call police. The Chinese community and Black community participants said they would be most likely to contact police if the situation concerned them personally. The youth group participants said they were most likely to call the police if weapons were involved, if violence was involved, or if it was a “crime that would make the news”. Some youth group participants qualified their answer by saying they might not call police if the perpetrator was someone they knew or a close relation, or if they were threatened.

When asked what would encourage more reporting, the most common suggestions were for police to respond quicker, provide follow-up to the person who made the call, provide cash or some kind of incentive to people who call, and, most importantly, interact with the community more to build up trust in the police. The Chinese community also suggested that interpreters be available to improve communication between police and the members of their community who don’t speak English well.

With regard to trust in the police, the participants generally agreed that they wanted to trust police, but were not sure that they always trusted them to provide good service or to get much done. Their opinions were mainly based not on personal experience, but on information from or the experience of people they knew. All groups also noted that it was difficult to respect police when you see the police themselves not following the rules (e.g. parking in ‘no parking’ zones when it’s not an emergency, talking on cell phones while driving, etc.). The lack of trust in police was particularly emphasized by the Black community participants. They felt that police often go after the ‘good’ people in the community rather than the ‘bad’ people, and that stories of police brutality and prejudice created a barrier between the police and the community.

None of the groups felt that police treated all members of the community equally, however the groups spoke to this issue differently. The youth group participants felt that while everyone may engage in profiling of one form or another, police, as professionals, should not do so. The youth participants also acknowledged that whether or not a person got treated differently depended very much on the officer and the situation. The South Asian participants felt that certain ethnic or racial groups commit more crimes and so the police have a more biased opinion of them stemming from experience. The Black community participants felt they were often targeted for enforcement or questioning because they were black, but also felt that police often treat people differently based on where they live rather than their race. And, the Chinese participants felt that the police had little patience when dealing with members of their community who did not speak the language well or had a strong accent.

In all groups, participants mentioned that they were unaware of any efforts made by the police to assist their neighbourhoods – it was felt there was too little information available about police activities. Almost all felt that newsletters or information in free newspapers (e.g. Metro, 24Hours) or community newspapers would be good ways to get information out.

With regard to on-line communication of information, relatively few participants were aware of the Toronto Police Service’s website; the ones that were, generally did not like the site.
(felt it was too cluttered, did not have enough specific information, and was not available in other languages). Similarly, few participants knew about the Service’s presence on Facebook or Twitter, and the common feeling about police presence on social networking sites was again not very positive. It was felt that police used these sites more to catch criminals and “spy” on people rather than provide information. The youth group participants also said that even if information was provided, they used these sites to interact with their friends, not get information. Many youth participants did acknowledge, however, that receiving ‘tweets’ about crimes and issues specific to their local communities might be a good idea.

Many participants were somewhat open to working with the police in their communities if they knew about the program or project, if they had the time, if it was relatively low risk, and if it involved children. Incentives were seen as the best way to get people involved.

The youth group participants were particularly reluctant to get involved in their neighbourhoods, unless it involved a pressing or critical issue. The reasons provided for not getting involved included: they were focused on their studies at the moment and had little time to volunteer, the activities mentioned were unnecessary or someone else’s responsibility, or they didn’t feel part of the community and weren’t willing to interact with their neighbours.

The South Asian, Black, and Chinese community participants were more willing to be involved in different activities in their neighbourhood (e.g. attending a meeting to discuss a problem, assisting children, distributing crime prevention information to neighbours, etc.), although no-one was willing to participate in cleaning up graffiti – all thought this was someone else’s responsibility. While relatively positive about the idea of working with the police, these groups did all emphasize that the police need to be approachable, and need to build trust and partnerships instead of being intimidating.

C. Civic Engagement

Civic engagement is increasingly being understood as a key component of community development. It requires individuals to take a more active role in their own communities, resulting in healthier and more productive communities. Research shows that such factors as education, income level, immigrant versus Canadian-born, age, gender, and the media may influence individuals’ level of civic engagement.

According to Statistics Canada’s Survey of Giving, Volunteering, and Participating (CSGVP), in 2007, almost 12.5 million Canadians or 46% of the population aged 15 and over, volunteered during the one-year period preceding the survey. However, the Survey also found that only a small number of people were highly engaged in these activities: 10% of volunteers contributed 54% of all volunteer hours. The overall rate of volunteering was similar to the rate (45%) reported in 2004.533,534

The highest rates of volunteering were found among young Canadians, those with higher levels of formal education and household income, those with school-aged children in the household, and those who were religiously active. Those who contributed the most hours were

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534 In the Canada Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating, volunteering is defined as doing activities without pay on behalf of a group or an organization, and includes mandatory community service.
more likely to be seniors, to have higher levels of education, to have lower household incomes, to be in households with no children, and to be religiously active.

A study by the Media Awareness Network explored the impact of media on the civic and political engagement of young people. The study found that Internet technology intensified civic engagement for those who were already interested, but it was unclear if it enabled less interested people to get involved. On the other hand, according to Statistics Canada, in 2007, the role of the Internet in volunteering appeared to be increasing compared to 2004 (23% compared to 20%).

According to the results of the CSGVP, the likelihood of volunteering in later life appeared to be linked to a number of prior life experiences, including having been active in student government at school (61% volunteered), having one or more parents who did volunteer work in the community (58% volunteered), and having been active in a religious organization (56% volunteered).

Reasons most frequently cited for volunteering were to make a contribution to the community, to use skills and experiences, and having been personally affected by the cause the organisation supported. The majority of both volunteers and non-volunteers reported lack of time as the main reason for not volunteering more and over half said that they were unable to make a long-term commitment to volunteering. Some respondents said they did not know how to become involved.

Given the current fiscally challenging environment, the Service should further explore the issue of civic engagement and those factors that contribute to a person’s decision as to whether or not to engage, to maximize this potential resource in communities.

**D. HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS**

At the end of each year, the Toronto Police Service’s Corporate Planning unit distributes surveys to all the high schools of the Toronto District and Toronto District Catholic School Boards for students in Grades 9 through 12. In 2010, 1,363 students responded, up from 1,257 students in 2009 and 681 students in 2001.

The results of the student survey were examined for all respondents, as well as by gender and grade (Grades 9, 10, 11, and 12).

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536 Hall, et al. (2007).

537 Ibid.

538 Ibid.

539 Over the past ten years, the confidence intervals for the student survey results have varied between ±3.9% and ±2.6%, 95 times out of 100.
Perceptions of Safety:

Each year, students are asked whether they think crime in and around the school had increased, decreased, or remained the same over the last year. The largest proportion of students in each year felt that the level of crime had remained at about the same. However, in 2010, only 18% of students felt that crime had increased. This was the lowest proportion seen in the past ten years, down from 22% in 2009 and 26% in 2001. The highest proportion – 36% – was seen in 2005.

In 2010, while relatively equal proportions of young men and young women felt that crime had increased around the school over the last year, the feeling that crime increased was significantly related to grade. Students in the older grades were more likely than those in the younger grades to feel that crime had increased in or around the school over the last year.

As shown in Figure 10.9, most students, in each of the past ten years said they felt safe in and around the school at any time of the day, with the proportion increasing slightly in recent years (89% in 2010, 86% in 2009, 85% in 2001). Feelings of safety in 2010 were not significantly related to either gender or grade.

When asked about the most serious policing problem in and around their school, drugs and fighting were usually the top two answers each year. The exception was 2007 when bullying replaced drugs. Also, in 2010, bullying/cyber-bullying tied with fighting as one of the two most frequently noted problems. Robbery has been the third most frequently identified problem since 2008. It should also be noted, however, that a considerable proportion of students in all years said that there were no serious policing problems in or around their school, with this proportion higher in 2010 than in 2001. The proportion of each of these five responses over the past ten years is shown in Figure 10.10.
In 2010, drugs were most commonly felt to be the most serious problem at school by both males and females, and by those in all grades. Fighting was the second most frequent problem identified by males and females, and by those in Grade 12. For those in Grades 9, 10, and 11, the second most frequently identified problem was bullying/cyber-bullying.

Students were asked to rate how concerned they were about a number of issues in relation to their school, the school grounds, and the area around their school (Table 10.3). Students were generally more concerned about all issues ten years ago; only robbery was of more concern in 2010 than in 2001. Compared to 2009, students were more concerned only about bullying, cyber-bullying, and drugs in 2010.

As indicated in Table 10.3, in 2010 both gender and grade were related significantly to level of concern felt for many of these crime and disorder issues in and around the school. Female students were significantly more concerned than male students about crime, being robbed, bullying, cyber-bullying, intimidation, speeding, fighting, racism/discrimination, drugs, and being harassed.

For the issues where there was a significant relationship between level of concern and grade, the Grade 12 students generally showed the least concern. Grade 9 students were most concerned about weapons in/around school, feeling safe, bullying, drugs, being harassed, and trespassers on school grounds. Grade 10 students were most concerned about speeding, fighting, and racism/discrimination. And, Grade 11 students were most concerned about crime, being robbed, disorderly youth, gangs, bullying (same level of concern as the Grade 9s), cyber-bullying, and intimidation. The only issue for which the Grade 12s were most concerned was litter/garbage in and around the school.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned</th>
<th>2009 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned</th>
<th>2010 'very' or 'somewhat' concerned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Robbed</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Safe/Secure</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kids Hanging Around/Being Disorderly</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullying</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber-Bullying</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intimidation</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litter/Garbage</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speeding</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aggressive Driving</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graffiti</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most students do not feel that their school or school grounds are generally violent places, and the proportion of students feeling this way has increased over the past ten years (Figure 10.11). In 2010, 80% of students said that their school wasn’t violent, up from 76% in 2009 and 67% in 2001. Correspondingly, the proportion of students who thought their school was ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ violent was 20% in 2010, down from 23% in 2009 and 33% in 2001. Perceptions about level of violence at their school in 2010 were not significantly related to either gender or grade.

Students were also asked about victimization. In each of the past ten years, roughly 1 in 10 students reported that they had been the victim of a crime at school during the past year. In 2010, 10% of students said they been the victim of a crime at school, up from 7% in 2009, but down from 11% in 2001. Over the past decade, these students have generally been victims of theft or been threatened, although robbery has also been noted in recent years. While there was no significant relationship with grade, in 2010, boys were significantly more likely than girls to say that they had been a victim of a crime at school during the past year.

In 2010, only just under one-quarter (23%) of those who said they’d been victimized said that they reported the crime to police, although this was up from 19% in 2009 and almost double the 12% in 2001. If they hadn’t reported their victimization to police, students were asked why they had not. The most common reason in most years was that there was no point/that the police wouldn’t do anything. Whether or not students reported to the police was not significantly related to either gender or grade in 2010.

With a recent additional question, almost half of students in the past three years said that if they were the victim of a crime during the school year, they think they’d report it to police. In 2010, girls were significantly more likely than boys to say that if they were the victim of a crime at school...
during the year, they thought they’d report it to police. There was no significant effect related to grade.

Also, starting in 2008, students have been asked specifically about whether they’d been bullied or cyber-bullied during the past 12 months. In 2010, 15% of students said that they’d been bullied in the past 12 months, and 14% said that they’d been cyber-bullied in the past 12 months. These proportions were slight increases from the 12% in 2008 who said that they’d been bullied and the 11% who said that they’d been cyber-bullied. In 2010, girls were significantly more likely than boys to say they’d been bullied, but there was no difference in likelihood of being cyber-bullied. There was also no relationship between the likelihood of being bullied or cyber-bullied and grade.

In new questions in 2010, 20% said that they felt their reputation had been damaged through social media and 23% of students said that they had at some time been concerned about their personal safety because of their use of social media. Expressing concern about personal safety was significantly related to both gender and grade: girls and Grade 9 students were most likely to say that they had been concerned about their personal safety because of social media use.

**Perceptions of Police/Policing:**

About one in five students (21%) in 2010 said they thought police presence at their school had changed over the past year, down slightly from 23% in 2009. Of these students, while 37% in both years felt the increased police presence was needed, 59% in 2010 said that the increased police presence made them feel safer, compared to the 48% who felt this way in 2009. It should also be noted however, that of the students who noted an increased police presence at their school, 26% in 2010 and 30% in 2009 said that the increased police presence made them feel less safe.

The largest proportion of students in all years said they would feel comfortable talking to police about crime or a problem at their school. In 2010, 64% of students said they would feel comfortable talking to police, up only slightly from 63% in 2009, but down from 67% in 2001. When those who said they were not comfortable talking to police were asked why, the most common reasons in each of the past ten years were that police made them nervous and that it wasn’t their place to talk about what others were doing. The third most common reason in all but one year was that they didn’t want to be a snitch. Feeling comfortable talking to police in 2010 was not significantly related to either gender or grade.

For the first time in 2008, students were asked whether they would report a crime if they witnessed it or if they would be willing to give information about a crime or a problem to police. In 2010, 29% of students said that if they witnessed a crime during the school year, they would report it to police, up slightly from 28% in 2009 and from 23% in 2008. In 2010, willingness to report a crime they witnessed was significantly related to gender and grade: boys and those in Grades 10 and 12 were most likely to say they would not report it. However, more students each year have said they would be willing to give information about a crime or problem to police: 83% in 2010, up from 80% in 2009 and 78% 2008. It should be noted that this willingness to provide information was conditional: about two-thirds of these students in each year said they would only be willing to give information if they could be anonymous. Willingness to provide information to police was also significantly related to gender and grade in 2010: boys and those in Grade 12 were most likely to say they would not provide information.
Compared to ten years ago, far more students in the past two years have felt positive about the relationship between police and the students in their school (Figure 10.12). More students in both 2010 and 2009, compared to 2001, felt that the relationship between police and students was good or excellent (46% in 2010, 47% in 2009, and 36% in 2001). Rating of the relationship between students and police in 2010 was not significantly related to either gender or grade. When students were asked in 2010 how the relationship between the police and students had changed over the past year, 25% said it had gotten better, 7% said it had gotten worse, and 68% said that it hadn’t changed.

Students were far less likely than people in the general community to say that police did a good job with regard to specific policing activities or services. And, in contrast to what was seen in the general community, students were not more positive about police provision of these services in 2010 than in previous years (Figure 10.13). With the exception of ‘enforcing the law’, the proportions of students who said that the police did a good job at these activities in and around their school in 2010 were generally lower than in 2001 or were relatively unchanged. Only the proportions of students who said the police did a good job ‘enforcing the law’ and ‘responding promptly to calls’ increased slightly between 2009 and 2010.

Perceptions of some of these specific police services were significantly related to both gender and grade. In 2010, boys were more likely than girls to say the police do a ‘good’ job of being approachable and of providing services to ethnic/racial groups in and around the school. Grade 9 students were more likely than other grades to say the police do a ‘good’ job at enforcing the law, of being approachable, of supplying crime prevention information, and of providing services to ethnic/racial groups in and around the school. Grade 12 students were
more likely than other grades to say the police do a ‘good’ job of being visible in and around the school.

Students were also more likely than the general community to believe that officers target minorities for enforcement. And, while this belief has decreased in the general community, it has increased among high school students. Just under one-third of students in 2010 (32%) said they believed Toronto officers targeted members of minority or ethnic groups for enforcement, compared to 18% of the general community. The 2010 proportion represented a slight increase from the 31% of students who said they believed this in 2009, and an increase from the 23% who said they believed it in 2007 when the question was first asked of them. In 2010, while there was no difference between the proportions of boys and girls who believed that the police targeted minorities for enforcement, boys were significantly more likely than girls to say that the police didn’t target minorities for enforcement, while girls were more likely to say they didn’t know. There was also a significant effect by grade: Grade 12 students were more likely than students in other grades to believe the police targeted minorities for enforcement, while Grade 9 students were most likely to say they didn’t know.

**School Resource Officers:**

As outlined previously in the Youth Crime chapter, a number of Toronto schools have a School Resource Officer (SRO) assigned to them. The primary goals of the SRO program are youth engagement and relationship building.

Over one-third (38%) of the high school students in the 2010 survey said that their school had a School Resource Officer (SRO); 62% said that their school did not have an SRO assigned or that they did not know. Students in SRO schools were significantly more likely than those in non-SRO schools to say they thought crime had decreased in/around the school during the last year (30% compared to 17%). However, there was no significant difference in feelings of safety at school between students in SRO schools and students in non-SRO schools: most students in both groups felt very or reasonably safe (90% and 89%, respectively).

Students in SRO schools and students in non-SRO schools were both most likely to say that drugs were the most serious policing problem in and around their school. The second most frequently identified problem in/around SRO schools was fighting, while the second most frequently identified problem in/around non-SRO schools was bullying/cyber-bullying.

Students in schools with an SRO were more concerned about various issues than students in schools without an SRO; the difference was significant for almost all of the issues asked about (Figure 10.14). Students in SRO schools were significantly more concerned about: crime in general, being robbed, weapons, feeling safe, disorderly youth, gangs, bullying, cyber-bullying, fighting, vandalism, graffiti, racism/discrimination, and being harassed.
Students in SRO schools were also significantly more likely than students in non-SRO schools to say that they had received information on crime prevention or safety (38% compared to 24%) and information on bullying or cyber-bullying (37% compared to 26%) in the past year. While there was no difference between the two groups of students in whether or not they were the victim of a crime in the past year, the students in the SRO schools were significantly more likely than students in non-SRO schools to say that they reported their victimization to police (32% compared to 14%).

While most students in both groups felt their school was not very or not at all violent, there was a difference in perception of level of violence between students in schools with an SRO and students in schools that did not have an SRO (Figure 10.15). Students in SRO schools were significantly more likely than students in non-SRO schools to say that their school and grounds were very or somewhat violent (27% compared to 16%).

Students in SRO schools were significantly more likely than students in non-SRO schools to say they felt comfortable talking to police about crime or other problems at the school (71% compared to 59%). They were also significantly more likely to say they had spoken to an officer at their school during the last year (44% compared to 21%). However, there was no significant difference in student willingness to provide information to police about a crime. And, while there was no difference between students in schools with SROs and students in schools without SROs in willingness to tell police if they witnessed a crime (31% and 27%, respectively), students in SRO schools were significantly more likely to say that they would tell police if they were the victim of a crime (52% compared to 44%).
Students in SRO schools were also significantly more likely than students in non-SRO schools to say that, in general, the relationship between students and the police was excellent or good (59% compared to 39%) (Figure 10.16). Students in SRO schools were significantly more likely to say that the relationship between students and police had gotten better over the past year (41% compared to 16%). Students in non-SRO schools were significantly more likely to say that the relationship had not changed (77% compared to 54%).

With regard to specific policing activities in and around their school, the largest proportion of both groups of students said that the police did an average job. That said, however, students in SRO schools were significantly more likely to say the police did a good job at being visible, being approachable, supplying crime prevention information, and providing services to ethnic/racial groups, while students in non-SRO schools were more likely to say the police did a poor job at these activities. There was no significant difference between the two groups of students on officer performance related to enforcing the law or responding promptly to calls.

While there was no difference between the two groups of students in whether or not they said they believed that Toronto officers targeted members of minority or ethnic groups for enforcement, students in SRO schools were significantly more likely to say that they believed Toronto officers were sensitive to different cultures when providing service to the community (70% compared to 63%).

**Recommendations for the Police Service**

- Fear of crime and perceptions of safety are important indicators of the way people feel about their cities and neighbourhoods, and can also be an indicator of confidence in their police services. Recognising this, it is important that police address perceptions of fear and safety.

- The public’s perception of the police and their level of satisfaction with police services are also indicators of the quality and effectiveness of police in a community – the ability of the Service to perform is, in large part, dependent upon the relations between the police and the public. Public confidence and trust are vital to successful policing, and may ultimately be reflected back in community perceptions of crime and safety. The Service must, therefore, continue to build and strengthen relationships and partnerships with all communities in Toronto.

- To maintain perceptions of safety and police service, and to ensure that these perceptions do not vary widely from reality, the Service must continue, and explore new ways to, communicate with the people of Toronto. Such communications should increase awareness of levels of crime, positive initiatives, and results; let people know what to expect when in
contact with police in a variety of situations; and ensure people are aware of the capabilities and limitations of the Police Service.

- The Service must increase efforts to address crime and disorder issues in neighbourhoods that, if not dealt with, may have a negative impact on the environment and perception of safety. Partnership with and input from the community are required for the police to understand, target, and address those offences or problems that are felt to be of most concern. As noted above, it is also important that the Service provide the community with information on the initiatives being used to address these problems, as well as the results of those initiatives.

- Community engagement is essential to addressing issues of concern in neighbourhoods. While not necessarily the role of police to co-ordinate residents in addressing quality of life or disorder issues, the Service should provide whatever level of support is possible, including, where feasible, connecting community members with services or agencies that can more appropriately provide leadership and guidance.

- Given the current fiscally challenging environment, the Service should further explore the issue of civic engagement and those factors that contribute to a person’s decision as to whether or not to engage, to maximize this potential resource in communities.

- The Service must continue and increase efforts to develop and be involved in initiatives that can enhance relations between the public, particularly ethnic and minority communities, and the police.

- To continue to improve satisfaction levels for those who have contact with police, the Service must maintain efforts to ensure professionalism, integrity, and high quality service by members in any and all dealings with the public.

- Perceived levels of violence in schools can have wide-ranging affects, including students’ feelings of safety as well as their interactions with police. Police, school boards, and the community must continue efforts to enhance safety, and perceptions of safety, in schools and to encourage positive interactions between police and students.

- Drugs, fighting, bullying (including cyber-bullying), and robbery continue to be perceived as issues of concern by students. Police, school boards, and parents should work in partnership to increase awareness of these issues and assist in the development of strategies to deal with them.

- The Service should work with school boards and community organizations to address the belief by students that if they report victimization, the police will not do anything. Given the positive effects of School Resource Officer presence on improved student perceptions of police and comfort in talking to police, this program should be maintained and be central to strategies developed to address reporting.
XI. LEGISLATIVE IMPACTS

Both statute law and case law set out many of the mandates and parameters by which the Toronto Police Service operates, and by which its members conduct themselves both on and off duty. Therefore, changes to those laws, actual or expected, affect the Police Service, its members, and the community as a whole. Laws also reflect the expectations a community has of its police. Changes to laws can reflect changes in those expectations. It is, therefore, vital that the Toronto Police Service takes legislation and legislative changes into account when planning and providing service, whether the changes come from the Police Services Board, the municipality, the province, or the federal government.

HIGHLIGHTS

- Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Citizen’s Arrest and the Defences of Property and Persons), received Second Reading and Referral to Committee in the House of Commons on March 22nd, 2011. This Act seeks to expand the circumstances where citizens’ arrests can be made, and to streamline and simplify Criminal Code provisions for citizens involved in cases of self-defence and defence of property.

- On January 16th, 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada released a unanimous decision in the matter of R. v. McNeil. The McNeil decision addressed the disclosure of convictions for police officers under the Police Services Act, Criminal Code, Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, or other federal statute meeting specific criteria.

- The Immigration Tribunal’s Cotos Decision in May 2010, dealt with the ineligibility of Mr. Cotos to make a refugee claim due to his participation in organized crime. The Tribunal accepted the evidence that ATM ‘skim’ groups operate in a manner that satisfies the definition of organized crime. Although the decision was specific to this case, the reasons for making the decision may apply to others who participate in such crimes.

- Bill C-14, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Protection of Justice System Participants), received Royal Assent on June 23rd, 2009, and came into force October 2nd, 2009. The Bill provides police and justice officials with important new tools in fighting organized crime.

- Bill 141, Health Protection and Promotion Amendment Act, gave the Chief Medical Officer of Health (CMOH) new powers during a pandemic or other public health emergency, and expanded the authority of the Minister of Health to use publicly owned spaces, on the advice of the CMOH, for public health purposes, such as holding immunization clinics.

- Bill 101, Narcotics Safety and Awareness Act, 2010, received Royal Assent on November 29th, 2010. It enables the province to collect and track information on narcotics dispensing, and take action against inappropriate or excessive prescribing or dispensing.

- Bill 163, Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender Registry) Amendment Act, 2011, received Royal Assent on May 4th, 2011. Amendments to the Act aligned it with recent changes made to the
National Sex Offender Registry [Bill S-2, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and Other Acts (Protecting Victims from Sex Offenders Act)].

- Bill 118, Countering Distracted Driving and Promoting Green Transportation Act, received Royal Assent on April 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2009. This Bill amended the Highway Traffic Act, prohibiting drivers, with some exceptions, from using hand-held wireless communication and entertainment devices while operating a vehicle.

- Bill 126, Road Safety Act, 2009, received Royal Assent on April 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2009. The Bill amended the Highway Traffic Act and makes a number of consequential amendments to two Acts that amend the Highway Traffic Act.

- Ontario Regulation 273/10 made under the Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009 was enacted on July 5\textsuperscript{th}, 2010. The purpose of this legislation was to streamline the process for cross-border police investigations with other Canadian jurisdictions.

- Bill 157, Education Amendment Act (Keeping Our Kids Safe at School), came into force February 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2010. The Bill requires school employees to report serious student incidents, such as bullying, to the principal.

- Bill 168, Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Act (Violence and Harassment in the Workplace), 2009, received Royal Assent on December 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2009. This legislation is aimed at further protecting workers from violence and harassment in the workplace.

- The Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005 (AODA) requires that Ontario workplaces and businesses be accessible for everyone who lives and visits Ontario by 2025.

A. CRIMINAL CODE

An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Citizen’s Arrest and the Defences of Property and Persons):

Bill C-60, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Citizen’s Arrest and the Defences of Property and Persons), received Second Reading and Referral to Committee in the House of Commons on March 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2011. This Act seeks to expand the circumstances where citizens’ arrests can be made and to streamline and simplify Criminal Code provisions for citizens involved in cases of self-defence and defence of property.\textsuperscript{540} Amendments would authorize a private citizen to make an arrest within a reasonable period of time after he or she finds someone committing a criminal offence that occurs on or in relation to property. This power of arrest would only be authorized when there are reasonable grounds to believe that it is not feasible in the circumstances for the arrest to be made by a peace officer.

Citizen’s arrests made without careful consideration of the risk factors may have serious unintended physical or legal consequences for those involved. As such, an educational

component for citizens, addressing such issues as personal and public safety, use of force, and legislative limitations, would be beneficial; it is likely that the Toronto Police Service would be involved in some aspect of this education.

**Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Shoker Act:**

Bill C-30, *An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Response to the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in R. v. Shoker Act)*, received Royal Assent on March 23rd, 2011. Bill C-30 established the ability of police and probation officers to collect bodily samples from offenders who are under a court order to abstain from consuming drugs and alcohol. The Supreme Court of Canada, in the *R. v. Shoker* case, ruled that demands for bodily samples from individuals under probation conditions were unlawful. As a result, police and probation officers have not been able to ensure proper monitoring and compliance with court orders prohibiting drug and alcohol use. Bill C-30 gives a court the authority to impose conditions requiring bodily samples to be provided to police and probation officers on demand or at regular intervals where the court sees fit to prohibit the individual from consuming drugs and alcohol. Bodily samples may include breath, blood, urine, saliva, hair and sweat samples. The amendments allow for conditions to be included in probation orders, conditional sentences and peace bonds. Under this legislation, failure to provide a sample for drugs or alcohol constitutes a breach of the court order.

The anticipated impact of this legislation on the Toronto Police Service policies, procedure, and workload is not expected to be substantial.

**Bill C-14, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Protection of Justice System Participants):**

Bill C-14, *An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Organized Crime and Protection of Justice System Participants)*, received Royal Assent on June 23rd, 2009, and came into force October 2nd, 2009. The Bill provides police and justice officials with important new tools in fighting organized crime. The Bill makes murders connected to organized crime subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years. A newly created offence to address drive-by and other reckless shootings carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 4 years in prison, with a maximum of 14 years. The minimum sentence increases if the offence was committed for a criminal organization or with a prohibited or restricted firearm such as a handgun. Finally, the Bill creates two new offences of aggravated assault against a peace or public officer and assault with a weapon on a peace or public officer. These offences are punishable by maximum penalties of 14 and 10 years, respectively.

The impact of these provisions on the Toronto Police Service policies, procedures, and workload are negligible, if any.

**Bill C-46, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, The Competition Act and the Mutual legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act and Bill C-47, An Act Regulating Telecommunications Facilities to Support Investigations:**

Bill C-46, *An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, The Competition Act and the Mutual legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act* and Bill C-47, *An Act Regulating Telecommunications Facilities to Support Investigations* are currently in the legislative process. These Bills are aimed
at modernizing certain offences in the *Criminal Code* relating to technology and rules governing lawful access with respect to intercepting communications and seizing information by law enforcement agencies. While it is expected that, if passed, the new legislation will result in changes to Toronto Police Service policies and procedures, it is difficult to predict the exact impact of this legislation on workload until wording and direction are finalized.

**B. FEDERAL DECISIONS**

*R. v. McNeil, 2009:*

On January 16th, 2009, the Supreme Court of Canada released a unanimous decision in the matter of R. v. McNeil. The McNeil decision addresses the disclosure of convictions for police officers under the *Police Services Act*, *Criminal Code*, *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act*, or other federal statute meeting specific criteria. In *R. v. McNeil*, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed that specific officer information must be turned over as part of disclosure obligation, including:

- any conviction or finding of guilt under the *Criminal Code*, the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act*, or other federal statute, for which a pardon has not been granted;
- any finding of guilt for misconduct under the *Police Services Act* after a formal hearing before the police tribunal and which does not fall within the disclosure exceptions;
- any outstanding charge under the *Criminal Code*, the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act*, or other federal statute; or
- any outstanding charge of misconduct under the *Police Services Act* for which a Notice of Hearing has been issued and which does not fall within the disclosure exceptions.

The impact of implementing this decision has been substantial for the Toronto Police Service. To ensure compliance and minimize potential liability, processes were developed, procedures written, and training developed and delivered. Going forward, police services can expect further applications for disclosure of various types of information, “in the spirit of McNeil”. As jurisprudence continues to develop, the Toronto Police Service will have to re-examine governance to ensure compliance.

*The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness v. Cotos:*

The Immigration Tribunal’s Cotos Decision in May 2010 dealt with the ineligibility of Mr. Cotos to make a refugee claim due to his participation in organized crime. The Toronto Police Service Financial Crimes Unit provided evidence outlining the reasons that it was believed that Mr. Cotos was a participant in an organized crime group. The Tribunal accepted the evidence that ATM ‘skim’ groups operate in a manner that satisfies the definition of organized crime. Although the decision was specific to this case, the reasons for making the decision may apply to others who participate in such crimes.

The Financial Crimes Unit used this matter to illustrate that many individuals are being brought into Canada for the purpose of committing such crimes, and that this type of crime is conspiratorial in nature and should be treated as such.

It is anticipated that the impact of this decision on the Toronto Police Service policies, procedure, and workload will be minimal.
C. Health Protection and Promotion Act

Bill 141, *Health Protection and Promotion Amendment Act*, received Royal Assent on May 4th, 2011. The Bill amended the *Health Protection and Promotion Act*. This Bill created new authority for the Chief Medical Officer of Health (CMOH) to direct boards of health and medical officers of health to adopt policies or measures in cases of a pandemic, public health, and/or emergency with health impacts. These directives may relate to such matters as infectious diseases, health hazards and public health, and emergency preparedness, and may only be in force for up to 6 months, unless the CMOH consults with every affected board of health and medical officer of health.

This Bill further provides for the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care to make an order for the possession of publicly-owned premises or part of publicly-owned premises for public health purposes if the CMOH is of the opinion that there exists or is an immediate risk of an outbreak of a communicable disease, or there is an immediate risk to the health of persons in Ontario.

These amendments strengthen and better co-ordinate the province’s ability to respond to future public health emergencies or events, including pandemics. The impact of this legislation to Toronto Police Service policies, procedures, and workload is expected to be minimal.

D. Child And Family Services Amendment Act

Bill 84, *Child and Family Services Amendment Act (Protection of Drug Endangered Children)*, was referred to the Standing Committee on Justice Policy on November 18th, 2010. Amendments to the Act would add drug endangered children as a category of children in need of protection. The Act defines that a child is drug endangered in circumstances such as those where a child is exposed to a substance that is used to manufacture an illegal drug or is exposed to that manufacture or production. The impact of this legislation on Toronto Police Service policies, procedures, and workload is expected to be minimal.

E. Narcotics Safety and Awareness Act, 2010

Bill 101, *Narcotics Safety and Awareness Act, 2010*, received Royal Assent on November 29th, 2010. It enables the Province to collect and track information on narcotics dispensing, and to take action against inappropriate or excessive prescribing or dispensing. Supported by the policing sector, this legislation is seen as a good first step in the fight to control the prescribing and dispensing of prescription opioids. As noted in both internal and external Environmental Scan consultations, there is a high rate of pain-relief drugs, such as OxyContin, being used for recreational purposes and/or to satisfy an addiction. Because they are prescribed drugs, and legitimately produced, there may often be a false sense of security in taking the pain killer.

As details of how the process will be administered have not yet been defined, it is difficult to determine the impact on of this legislation on the Toronto Police Service. However, as the legislation is intended to prevent offences by removing the opportunity to abuse the system (e.g., a person obtains more than one prescription by visiting multiple physicians), and not an enforcement tool for police, it is anticipated that the impact to the Toronto Police Service will be minimal.
F. TOBACCO TAX ACT

Bill 186, Supporting Smoke-Free Ontario by Reducing Contraband Tobacco Act, 2011, received Second Reading on May 11th, 2011 and is still under debate at time of writing. The Bill will amend the Tobacco Tax Act. The amendments deal with five matters: raw leaf tobacco; fine cut tobacco; arrangements and agreements with First Nations representatives; the enforcement of the Act; and terminology. If passed, among other amendments, this legislation proposes to have fine-cut tobacco marked similar to how packages of legal cigarettes are now marked, making it easier to identify illegal products. A key enforcement amendment in the Act would allow police officers to seize illegal, unmarked tobacco products found in plain view.

If passed, the impact of this legislation on Toronto Police Service policies, procedures, and workload is expected to be minimal.

G. CHRISTOPHER’S LAW (SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY), AMENDMENT ACT, 2011

Bill 163, Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender Registry) Amendment Act, 2011, received Royal Assent on May 4th, 2011. Amendments to the Act align it with recent changes made to the National Sex Offender Registry [Bill S-2, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and Other Acts (Protecting Victims from Sex Offenders Act)]. Previously, Christopher’s Law (Sex Offender Registry), 2000, required offenders to report within 15 days after or before various events; offenders are now required to report within 7 days. The Act was also amended so that if a person who was convicted or found not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder outside Canada becomes subject to an obligation to report under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act after he or she arrives in Canada, he or she will now be obliged to report under Christopher’s Law as well. Further amendments allow the Ontario Registry to maintain the records of registered offenders who have receive a pardon under the Criminal Records Act.

Although it is expected that additional time will be required to maintain the registry due to increased reporting frequency and the potential for increases in registrations, the overall impact to the Toronto Police Service policies, procedures, and workload is expected to be minimal. It is envisioned that these changes will make it easier to share information between registries and provide more data to support local crime investigations.

H. HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ACT

Bill 118, Countering Distracted Driving and Promoting Green Transportation Act, 2009:

Bill 118, Countering Distracted Driving and Promoting Green Transportation Act, received Royal Assent on April 23rd, 2009. This Bill amends the Highway Traffic Act to prohibit driving with display screens and other devices in motor vehicles. The Bill also amends the Public Vehicles Act with respect to car pool vehicles. The legislation prohibits drivers from using hand-held wireless communication devices (such as cell phones and Blackberries) and hand-held electronic entertainment devices (such as iPods and Playstation Portables), while operating a vehicle. Emergency use of wireless communication devices, such as to call 911, is allowed. Use of such devices in the hands-free mode is exempted. While in performance of their duties, drivers of ambulances, fire department vehicles, and police department vehicles are
exempted from the prohibitions respecting hand-held wireless communication devices. While driving, drivers are still permitted to use devices such as global positioning systems (GPS), commercially-used logistical transportation tracking systems (used to track vehicle location, driver status, or the delivery of packages or other goods), collision avoidance systems, and instruments that provide the driver with information about the vehicle systems.

Although Bill 118 took effect on October 26th, 2009, a 3-month grace period was given where fines were not issued until February 1st, 2010. Penalties are prescribed by the Highway Traffic Act.

Bill 118 expanded the enforcement repertoire for the Service in the area of distracted driving, and a driver’s lack of focus while using such devices has been compared to that of an impaired driver. An increased resource commitment was observed with the creation of new enforcement campaigns and education and awareness initiatives. Toronto Police Service members were also provided with information regarding this legislation through internal correspondence. There have been some internal costs associated with equipping personnel with the necessary hardware (e.g. Bluetooth hands-free devices) to comply with the legislation.

**Bill 126, Road Safety Act, 2009:**

Bill 126, Road Safety Act, 2009, received Royal Assent on April 23rd, 2009. The Act amended the Highway Traffic Act and made subsequent amendments to two Acts that amend the Highway Traffic Act. Effective January 1st, 2010, a number of amendments to the Highway Traffic Act and Ontario Regulations came into effect. These included:

- increased penalties for several serious Highway Traffic Act offences and supporting amendments to Ontario Regulation 339/94 (Demerit Point System) made under the Highway Traffic Act and Ontario Regulation 950 (Proceedings Commenced by Certificate of Offence) made under the Provincial Offences Act;
- amendments in requirements for vehicles displaying a slow moving vehicle sign; and
- amendments to ensure the consistent application of demerit points for drivers convicted of failing to properly secure a child in the appropriate prescribed child car seat or restraint system.

On August 1st, 2010, additional amendments to the Highway Traffic Act came into effect in relation to novice and young drivers. These amendments to the Highway Traffic Act included:

- a Novice Driver Escalating Sanction regime;
- that young drivers who are under 22 years of age, regardless of licence class, must have a blood alcohol concentration of zero when operating a motor vehicle; and
- that novice and young drivers who are caught drinking and driving will receive an immediate 24-hour roadside licence suspension, and additionally, young drivers will be subject to a 30-day licence suspension, while novice drivers and drivers who hold both a novice licence and full licence, will be subject to the Novice Driver Escalating Sanctions program.

On December 1st, 2010, further amendments to the Highway Traffic Act in relation to suspended and/or suspected alcohol impaired drivers came into effect. New sections were created in the Highway Traffic Act, imposing a 7-day vehicle impoundment for all drivers who are:
required to have a vehicle ignition interlock device and are found driving without the required device, including driving with a device that has been disabled;

caught with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) over 0.08 or who fail/refuse to comply with a demand made by a police officer under section 254 of the Criminal Code; and

caught driving with a driver’s licence that is under specific Highway Traffic Act suspensions(s), including default of family support, but not including suspensions for defaulted fines or medical conditions. Exemptions include ambulances, fire and police department vehicles, and some commercial motor vehicles.

These new 7-day impoundments do not replace or constitute an alternative to laying appropriate charges related to the noted Highway Traffic Act sections.

The impacts of Bill 126 required numerous process changes, procedural amendments, and additional training throughout the Service. Most notable were the downloading of data entry responsibilities from the Ontario Ministry of Transportation-Registrar to the Police Service, the creation of a new Service form to capture the 7-day Highway Traffic Act Vehicle Impoundments, and the update to contract towing and pound processes. The changes also required internal messaging through various internal communications mediums.

I. INTERPROVINCIAL POLICING ACT

*Ontario Regulation 273/10* made under the *Interprovincial Policing Act, 2009*, was enacted on July 5th, 2010. The purpose of this legislation was to streamline the process for cross-border police investigations between Canadian jurisdictions. Highlights include ensuring seamless policing across the Ontario/Quebec border, establishing a mechanism to grant police officer status to officers from another jurisdictions who are required to enter a province to perform police duties, and addressing issues of police oversight, discipline and indemnification for civil liability. The impact of this legislation on Toronto Police Service policies, procedures, and workload is expected to be minimal.

J. EDUCATION AMENDMENT ACT (KEEPING OUR KIDS SAFE AT SCHOOLS), 2009

Bill 157, *Education Amendment Act (Keeping Our Kids Safe at School)*, came into force February 1st, 2010. The Bill requires school staff to report serious student incidents, such as bullying, to the principal. It also requires principals to notify parents and guardians of students who are victims of such incidents in a timely fashion, except in cases where such notification could result in harm to the student.

Although police involvement is inevitable, the Toronto Police Service does not anticipate a significant impact on resources.
K. LABOUR-RELATED LEGISLATION

Bill 168, *Occupational Health and Safety Amendment Act (Violence and Harassment in the Workplace) 2009*, received Royal Assent on December 15th, 2009, and was enacted on June 15th, 2010. This legislation aims to further protect workers from violence and harassment in the workplace.

The legislation requires employers to:

- develop workplace violence and harassment prevention policies and programs and communicate them to workers;
- assess the risks of workplace violence, and take reasonable precautions to protect workers from possible domestic violence in the workplace; and
- allow workers to remove themselves from the harmful situations if they have reason to believe that they are at risk of imminent danger due to workplace violence.

Policies developed by the employer with respect to workplace violence and workplace harassment must set out how the employer will deal with incidents or complaints of workplace violence and workplace harassment, and must be reviewed at least annually. The risks associated with workplace violence must be reported to the joint health and safety committee and reassessed as often as necessary to protect workers from workplace violence.

The Toronto Police Service has comprehensive processes in place for workplace violence and harassment; processes have been amalgamated and streamlined into two new procedures. Training for Service personnel is currently being developed; it is anticipated that further impact to Service policies, procedures, and workload will be minimal.

Findings of the 2010 Toronto Police Service Personnel Survey indicated that three in four respondents agreed (43% agreed and 33% somewhat agreed) that their workplace is adequately protected from harassment and discrimination. Eight in ten agreed (45% agreed and 35% somewhat agreed) that, in general, they are satisfied with their work environment. And, finally, three in four respondents agreed (28% agreed and 47% somewhat agreed) that, overall, the Service does a good job of addressing Occupational Health and Safety concerns.

The *Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act, 2005 (AODA)*, came into force on July 13th, 2005. The goal of the AODA is to make Ontario workplaces and businesses accessible to all Ontarians by 2025. The AODA allows the government to develop and enforce specific accessibility standards. Accessibility standards will be developed to address Customer Service, Transportation, Information and Communications, Employment, and the Built Environment. These accessibility standards and the compliance reporting requirements will be phased in over time. The first standard for Customer Service is now law and the first compliance report is due to the Ministry of Community and Social Services on January 1st, 2012. The other accessibility standards are in various stages of development.

To ensure compliance with the Customer Service standard, the Service is currently developing and amending relevant Service governance, and ensuring that all members have completed the mandatory e-learning training module developed by the Ministry by January 1st, 2012, as well as making required changes to the Toronto Police Service Internet/Intranet websites. As the other four standards are being developed, it is anticipated that the impact to the Toronto Police Service will continue to be considerable with respect to resources, changes to processes and policies, and workload.
2011 Environmental Scan

Bill 154, *Employment Standards Amendment Act (Organ Donor Leave), 2009*, received Royal Assent on June 5th, 2009. The *Employment Standards Act, 2000*, has been amended to provide up to 13 weeks of leave of absence without pay for employees who undergo surgery in order to donate organs to other persons. The new section 49.2 applies to kidney, liver, lung, pancreas, and small bowel donations. Other organs and tissue may be added by regulation. The maximum leave period may be varied by regulation and the leave may be extended for medical reasons for a further period of up to 13 weeks. The impact to Toronto Police Service policies, procedures, and workload is expected to be minimal.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICE SERVICE**

- The Service must continue to ensure that Service members are made aware of relevant legislative changes and case law decisions in a timely manner.

- The Service must ensure Service governance is maintained in a manner which accurately and quickly reflects legislative changes, case law decisions, investigative techniques, technologies, and other requirements, so that officers remain current with legislation and prescribed standards for investigation.

- The Service must continue to ensure that internal training précis are kept current and incorporate changes in legislation, case law decisions, and investigative techniques.
XII. **Financial Resources**

*Police funding requirement constitutes a significant share of the tax burden financed by the people of Toronto. Increasingly, the taxpayer requires value for money and fiscal responsibility. The challenges presented are a major factor impacting on police service delivery.*

**Highlights**

- To fund the operating budget, the city relies on generating revenues from a number of sources. In 2011, property taxes accounted for 38% or $3.6 billion of the city’s annual revenue dollars, a significant decrease from the 46% level in 1999. A decreased reliance on property tax for budget funding reflected the city’s strategic direction toward reliance on more predictable and sustainable revenue sources.

- To address the 2012 operating budget pressures, originally estimated at approximately $774 million, the city implemented a Service Review Program – Core Service Review, Service Efficiency Studies, a User Fee Review, and Complement Management – and a multi-year approach to budgeting.

- The Toronto Police Service’s 2011 operating budget accounted for just over 10% of the city’s total 2011 total operating budget of $9.38 billion; however, it accounted for more than a quarter of the $3.6 billion tax-supported (net) budget.

- The city recommended 2012 operating budget target for the Toronto Police Service reflected an overall decrease of $84 million, about 10%, from the total 2011 approved budget.

**A. Budgeting within the City of Toronto**

As is provided by the *Municipalities Act, 2001*, the City of Toronto must prepare and adopt a balanced operating budget each year – spending can not exceed revenues. The city may not borrow money to balance the operating budget; if unplanned expenses arise, the city must find funds within the current year’s budget to pay for such expenses. There are no contingency funds and no provision for a deficit; current surpluses, on the other hand, must be used to offset costs in the next budget year.

The City of Toronto’s 2011 budget, including the Operating, Capital, Toronto Water, and Solid Waste Management budgets, totalled just over $13.3 billion. The 2011 Council approved operating budget – the budget from which the general day-to-day expenses of the city, including those of the Toronto Police Service, is drawn – totalled $9.38 billion. In 2011, the total gross operating expenditures of the city increased less than 0.5% from 2010; the net increase in the gross operating budget of $35.62 million or 0.4% was mainly attributed to the

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city’s Agencies ($113.17 million), a policy decision to increase contributions to capital funding, and increased debt service costs. Increased budgets – total budgets in excess of the recommended targets set by the city – submitted by the Toronto Police Service, Toronto Transit Commission, and Toronto Public Health budgets, accounted for most of the increase in Agency budgets in 2011. On the other hand, the city operations budget decreased by $150.18 million, largely offsetting increases noted above.

To fund the operating budget, the city relies on generating revenues from a number of sources, including property tax (Figure 12.1). In 2011, revenues generated through property taxation represented 38% of city revenue or $3.6 billion dollars. The tax rate is set based on the gap between anticipated expenditures and anticipated revenues from sources other than property tax. The property-tax supported portion of the budget is referred to as the net budget.

It should be noted that the reliance on property tax decreased from a high of 46% in 1999 to 38% in 2011; this decrease was consistent with the city’s strategic direction to ensure a balance and diversified set of predictable revenue sources and a reduced reliance on property tax. As will be discussed more fully later in this chapter, the Toronto Police Service operating budget is largely tax supported.

More than 70% of the $3.6 billion generated from property taxes (net budget) goes to Emergency Services, provincially-mandated Health and Social Services, and TTC. Approximately two-thirds of the operating (gross) of $9.38 billion will be spent on services over which the city has no direct control or that have significant implications if cut, including Police, Fire, and Emergency Medical Services (16%), Transit (16%), and cost-shared/provincially mandated services (31%).

In compliance with the Mayor’s direction, the 2011 city operating budget was balanced, included no service reductions, and did not require any increases to the property tax rate. However, it was also noted that the 2011 operating budget was not sustainable and the 2012 operating budget outlook indicated a budget pressure in excess of $700 million; that is, in 2012, service cuts, an increase to the property tax rate, or some combination thereof, would be necessary.

2012 City Budget:

Immediately after Toronto City Council approved the 2011 operating budget, the city announced an estimated 2012 beginning operating pressure of $774 million, before potential offsets including a prior year surplus, a TTC fare increase, a property tax rate increase, and other revenue increases. To address the 2012 operating budget pressures and capital program funding gap, the city implemented a Service Review Program and a multi-year approach to budgeting: “In 2011, the City will set the foundation for its services and service levels that will establish the
basis for multi-year planning and service delivery to meet its objectives in 2012 for 2013 and beyond and to address the City’s structural deficit.\textsuperscript{543}

The recommended Service Review Program included four components: a Core Service Review, Service Efficiency Studies, a User Fee Review, and Complement Management; it was further recommended that the city’s Boards, Agencies, and Commission be included in the Service Review Program. It was envisioned that the Core Services Review would:

- develop an inventory of all services, service levels, and service standards,
- define which services are legislated, core, and discretionary, and identify the role the city plays in each service,
- benchmark services and service levels against a range of comparable jurisdictions,
- confirm services and service levels, including public interest and public policy considerations,
- rank services for potential reductions and discontinuation,
- implement a public engagement strategy to elicit input into the process, and
- identify service, policy, human resource, and financial impacts of recommended service changes, including budget adjustments that will generate cost savings in 2012 and beyond.

In short, the Core Service Review was undertaken to identify what services and service levels the city should deliver (those that are required by law and those that should be provided by a city government), what is important to Torontonians, and what it will take to meet those important needs. The consultant contracted, KPMG, initiated the Core Service Review in May 2011 and delivered the final report to the city’s various Standing Committees in July 2011.

In conjunction with the Core Services Review, the city initiated a public consultation process.\textsuperscript{544} During late May and early June, the city hosted eight public consultations. Results of the consultations, specific to a discussion on the services considered necessary to the city, indicated that public health and safety were at the top of the list of necessary services in every consultation. In addition to the public consultations, the city provided an on-line feedback form; by June 7\textsuperscript{th}, more than 6,000 participants had provided their feedback either by mail or on-line feedback form.\textsuperscript{545,546}

Like the Core Services Review, the Service Efficiency Studies will examine the services provided by the city, but will concentrate on how the service is provided rather than what service is provided. The objective in this Review is to “examine the current delivery of a particular service or function and identify opportunities for improved efficiency and cost effectiveness through the use of technology and automation, shared service models, service innovation, business process re-engineering and outsourcing.”\textsuperscript{547} It should be noted that only specifically

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identified city services will be subject to a Service Efficiency Study; shared services (facilities, fleet, administration, finance, information technology, etc.) of various agencies, including the Toronto Police Service, were also included for review. At the time of writing, the Service Efficiency Studies were in the preliminary stages; findings are expected to be reported through the annual operating and capital budget processes in October 2011.

While most broad-based city services are tax-supported, additional fees – user fees – are charged to individuals, businesses, or organisations that choose services that do not benefit or are not available to the entire citizenry. The over 3,000 different types of user fees are collected by the city, and account for about 15% of the city’s revenues. Currently, user fees are established, implemented, and administered without direction from a coherent corporate policy. The User Fee Review will:

- identify all user fees,
- determine the basis of the fee calculation,
- identify fees for which full-recovery is or is not appropriate, and determine the extent to which the current fee fully recovers costs,
- identify additional opportunities for collecting user fees, and
- assess the economy and efficiency of delivery of user fee services.

The User Fee Review will produce a final report to Council that will recommend a comprehensive framework to ensure consistency in the identification, determination, and administration of the user fee program; it will also recommend best practices for its efficient administration. At the time of writing, the User Fee Review was in the preliminary stages; the Review is scheduled to be completed in August 2011.

The final component of the Service Review Program is the continuation of the city’s complement management efforts to optimise the use of city resources and contain costs. In short, complement management includes the regular monitoring and review of temporary and permanent positions to determine if they are required to meet the city’s service delivery requirements, and on the other hand, to ensure that vacancies do not adversely affect service delivery.

The multi-year financial planning and budgeting process includes two major components: service planning and priority setting, and multi-year budgeting. The primary objective of the overall process is to prioritise the allocation of scarce resources and ensure that their use is optimised to achieve desired outcomes. The city believes that the multi-year process will increase accountability and civic engagement, promote fiscal prudence, and maximize savings.

The 2012 city operating budget, to be developed based on the recommendations of the various studies of the Service Review Program and on a much shorter-than-usual timeline, will set the services and service level on a go forward basis. The 2013-2014 financial planning and budgeting process, based on approved service plans, will commence in February 2012; effective 2013, the approved service plan will roll through to 2104, subject to review and adjustment in future years.

B. POLICING WITHIN THE CITY OF TORONTO BUDGET

In relation to the day-to-day operations of the Toronto Police Service, the city’s operating budget is most relevant. Outlining the environment in which the city’s overall 2012 operating budget is developed illustrates the challenges faced by the Service in securing the resources necessary to deliver policing services in the neighbourhoods of Toronto. On the other hand, it is also clear that the fiscal decisions of the Service have considerable impact on the city budget and on those members of the community who pay Toronto property tax.

The Toronto Police Service approved 2011 operating budget – $976.6 million (gross), $906.2 million (net) – accounted for just over 10% of the city’s total 2011 total budget of $9.38 billion; however, the police budget (net) accounted for more than 26% of the $3.6 billion tax-supported (net) budget. In clearer terms, the tax-supported part of the police budget is that part of the annual gross expenditures that are not offset by revenues directly generated by the Service. Because the Service has limited sources of revenue, most of the Service budget is tax-supported. As was noted above, increases in the Toronto Police Service budget contributed to the increase in the city’s 2011 operating budget, and formed a significant part of the tax-supported (net) budget.

The city-established 2012 operating budget target for the Service reflects an overall decrease of $84 million from the 2011 approved budget, just less than 10% of the total Police budget. It was recognized that to achieve such a significant reduction, police services and service levels would need to be revised and significant staffing reductions would be required. A discussion of the impact of potential reductions in service levels and staffing is included in the Police Resources chapter.

At a special meeting on May 30th, 2011, the Toronto Police Services Board received (the report recommendation was to receive, not approve) the Service’s preliminary 2012 budget request, reflecting a 3.5% increase from the approved 2011 operating budget. The preliminary budget request supported a uniform staffing target of 5,617 officers and anticipated cost increases specific to contracted salary increases, reclassifications, benefits (CPP, EI, etc.), maturity of equipment life cycles, and gap funding for sick pay gratuities. Essentially, the preliminary budget reflected a status quo budget, without reduction to meet the city’s police budget target.

Both the Board and the Service held out the preliminary budget request only as a starting point. Due to the substantially restricted timeline for budget submission to the city, the Service was unable to integrate identified reductions, including the impact of a 10% reduction in non-fixed accounts, a voluntary exit package for up to 18 senior officers, etc., into the submission. Further, the Service has committed to not hire in 2011 and discussions surrounding the impact of suspending hiring in 2012 are also underway. Finally, it was anticipated that much of the service and service level reduction would flow from the findings and recommendations of the various components of the city’s Service Review Program.

To date, only the recommendations of the Core Service Review Project have been published. Specific to the Toronto Police Service, the KPMG City of Toronto Core Service Review Project Final Report to the City Manager identified the following options and opportunities for potential savings:

- a business process based approach to improving efficiency and effectiveness of front-line services,
• options for call taking and dispatch (e.g. amalgamation with other city emergency services),
• options (shared services with city or outsourcing) for critical infrastructure services including facilities, fleet, purchasing, financial management, IT services, and civilian hiring,
• reducing service levels or transferring to the city such non-core services as parking enforcement, by-law enforcement, and pound and towing management,
• transferring the lifeguard program to the city,
• eliminating or reducing service levels for School Crossing Guard Program,
• reduction in Service strength through reduced or temporary suspension of hiring and/or incentive for early retirement,
• removing the requirement for police officers at construction sites, and
• exploring various opportunities (one-officer patrols, reduced salaries and benefits, and shift scheduling) in discussion for the next collective bargaining agreement.

The options and opportunities identified in the report are neither new nor unexpected. Most were identified in the past as possible opportunities for service efficiencies and/or service cuts. However, barriers, particularly those set by external entities – politicians, city staff, collective bargaining agreements, legislation, budgets, etc. – made them impossible to achieve, even when wholly supported by the Service. The extent to which action must be taken to achieve budget targets may well be beyond that which was been experienced in the past and ways to remove these barriers may have to be explored.

**Recommendations for Police Service**

• It is clear that the fiscal decisions of the Toronto Police Service have a direct and significant impact on the tax-payers of Toronto. While the Service must be mindful of fiscal impacts, members of the Toronto neighbourhoods have given the city a clear mandate for public safety.

• It is critical that the Service carefully consider how, and to what extent, it will meet the city’s reduced budget target; reductions in staffing levels and non-fixed budget accounts in 2012 will likely establish the baseline for services, service levels, and resources in future years. Further, any reduction to Service strength must be sustainable, at least to the extent that the Service’s Uniform Establishment is affected.

• The Service must continue to seek out further efficiencies in service delivery, while at the same time, identify services which are over-delivered and those that could be delivered more efficiently and effectively by another government or private agency.

• To the extent of services or service level reductions, the Service must clearly communicate the facts and implications to the community, to more closely align community expectations with Service capacity.
APPENDIX – CONSULTATION PARTICIPANTS

Consultations with members of the community and with members of the Service are an essential part of the environmental scanning process, providing information and issues for further research and analysis. For the 2011 Environmental Scan, eight external consultations, eight internal consultations, and four forums open to all members of the public were held. Below is a list of the participants in each of the external and internal consultations. A summary of the information provided by participants is available in a separate Appendix to this Scan document.

EXTERNAL CONSULTATIONS

City Councillors (Invitations sent to all Councillors and the Mayor) – March 24th, 2011:

- Mike Layton (Ward 19 Trinity-Spadina)
- Chin Lee (Ward 41 Scarborough-Rouge River)
- Sarah Doucette (Ward 13 Parkdale-High Park) (written submission)
- Mary Fragedakis (Ward 29 Toronto-Danforth) (written submission)

Business/Education/Academic Communities – April 4th, 2011:

- Peter Barrans, Toronto Catholic District School Board
- William Crate, Canadian Banks Association
- Carmela Demkiw, TD Canada Trust
- Dr. Anthony Doob, Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto
- Tom Keefe, Community Planning, City of Toronto
- John Kiru and Michael Comstock, Toronto Association of Business Improvement Areas
- Ted Libera, Toronto District School Board
- Harvey Low, Social Research and Analysis Unit, City of Toronto
- Stephen McCammon, Office of the Information and Privacy Commission
- Peter Nguyen, Jane-Finch.com
- Susan Vardon, United Way Toronto

Consultative Committees, Chief’s Advisory Council, Chief’s Youth Advisory Council (invitations to all members) – April 4th, 2011:

- Sid Ikeda, Japanese Community representative
- Zul Kassamali, South and West Asian Community representative
- Wendy Lampert, Jewish Community representative
- Abdul Hai Patel, Muslim Community representative
- Rosa Chan, Chinese Community representative
- Gérard Parent, French Community representative (written submission)
Community Police Liaison Committee Chairs (invitations to all chairs) – April 6th, 2011:

- Linda Martin, 11 Division CPLC
- Michael Wheeler, 13 Division CPLC
- Angela Burns, 14 Division CPLC
- Ellen Hudgin, 31 Division CPLC
- Marie Belanger, 41 Division CPLC
- Randy Sidhu, 52 Division CPLC
- Masood Alam, 53 Division CPLC
- Faiza Ansari, 55 Division CPLC
- Barbara Spyropoulos, 12 Division CPLC (written submission)
- Rick Ross, 32 Division CPLC (voice mail submission)

Social Service Agencies – April 12th, 2011:

- Bob Duff, St. Simon Shelter
- Richard Gosling, City of Toronto Residents in Partnership
- Andrea Gunraj and Michelle Davis, Metropolitan Action Committee on Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC)
- Fraser Stewart, St. Christopher House

Criminal Justice Partners – April 19th, 2011:

- Fred Braley, Guns & Gangs
- Sharon Burdette and Jennifer Strong, York Regional Police, Planning & Research Bureau
- Loretta Chandler, Office of Emergency Management
- Barbara Lynch, Assistant Crown Attorney – Domestic Violence Prosecutions
- Jon Schmidt and Ramona Morris, Ontario Police College
- Dan Schwartz, Criminal Intelligence Service Ontario

Social Service Agencies (operating in city-defined priority neighbourhoods) – April 26th, 2011:

- Shirley Broekstra, Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence Care Centre, Scarborough Hospital, Birchmount Campus
- Jabari Lindsay, Prevention Intervention Toronto, City of Toronto
- Scott McKean, Community Crisis Response, City of Toronto
- Mike Mously, Thistletown Regional Centre for Children and Adolescents
- Gary Newman, Breaking the Cycle
Youth in Policing Initiative Students – August 16th, 2010:

- Ricardo Araujo
- Mursal Aziz
- Marjahn Begum
- Kelsey Bull
- Rochelle Dawkins
- Tiana Ellis
- Endurance Eruabor
- Shevon Graham
- Siman Ibrahim
- Kidisha Joseph
- D’Jaun Fraser-Morgan
- Philsan Omar
- Brittany Pinnock
- Russell Polecina
- Rochelle Robinson
- Keyonn Thompson
- Whitney Van
- Phuntsok Wangyal

Four Public Forums (open to all community members):

- Scarborough Civic Centre – April 11th, 2011
- Metro Hall – April 12th, 2011
- Etobicoke Civic Centre – April 13th, 2011
- North York Civic Centre – April 27th, 2011

INTERNAL CONSULTATIONS

Internal Consultation – November 24th, 2010:

- David Gillis, Staff Sergeant, Toronto Police College
- Elisa Higgitt, Constable, Mounted & Police Dog Services
- Graeme Philipson, Sergeant, TAVIS
- Ajwaid (Paul) Qureshi, Sergeant, 23 Division
- Daniel Sabadics, Staff Sergeant, 53 Division
- Dave Shaw, Sergeant, 42 Division

Internal Consultation – November 29th, 2010:

- Charlene Baptist, Staff Sergeant, Staff Development Unit
- Jennifer Conchada, Budgeting & Control
- Brad Donais, Detective Constable, Forensic Identification Services
- Wayne Jackson, Constable, Employment
- John Kmiecik, Sergeant, 54 Division
- Leslie Lester, Court Services
- Jim Makris, Detective Constable, Fraud
- Karlene Millwood, Information Technology Services
- Paul Myers, Sergeant, Employment
- Morgan Robinson, Detective Sergeant, Professional Standards
- Rosemary Scaglione, Central Paid Duty Office
- Elsie Thompson, Information Technology Services
**Internal Consultation – December 1st, 2010:**

- John DeCourcy, Staff Sergeant, Organised Crime Enforcement
- Joe Dorey, ITS Customer Service
- Tony Forchione, Sergeant, 43 Division
- Joshua Jamshidi, Operational Systems Support Group
- Adrienne Johnstone, Detective Sergeant, 55 Division
- Peter Koutsovasilis, Audit & Quality Assurance
- Tom Lynch, Staff Sergeant, Divisional Policing Command
- Rob MacInnis, Detective, 14 Division
- Glen McBryde, Detective, 12 Division
- Wendy Ryzek, Labour Relations
- Niels Sondergaard, Detective Sergeant, 11 Division
- Arland Stave, Constable, 41 Division
- Dave Stirling, Sergeant, Traffic Services
- Ron Tapley, Staff Sergeant, Marine Unit
- Lee Ann West, Constable, 22 Division
- Kim Wood, Communications Services

**Internal Consultation – December 9th, 2010:**

- Bill Carter, Parking Enforcement
- Jamie Clark, Detective, Hold Up
- Russ Cook, Staff Sergeant, Public Safety & Emergency Management
- Mick Damani, Information System Services
- Les Dunkley, Detective, 52 Division
- Virginia Fry, Property & Evidence Management Unit
- Robert Harvey, Sergeant, Provincial ROPE/Bail & Parole
- Eric Kowal, Fleet & Materials Management
- Cheryl MacNeil, Operational Services
- David Marks, Staff Inspector, Emergency Task Force
- Joe Naccarato, Telecommunications Services
- David Roberts, Detective, 51 Division
- Kimberley Scanlan, Detective Sergeant, Sex Crimes Unit
- Tapan Sen, Police Liaison Services
- Garry Silliker, Staff Sergeant, Emergency Task Force
- Brent Swackhamer, Staff Sergeant, 31 Division
**Senior Officers – January 10th, 2011:**

- Clay Beers, Manager, Telecommunications Services
- Liz Byrnes, Staff Inspector, Sex Crimes Unit
- Sandra Califaretti, Manager, Financial Management
- Gerry Cashman, Inspector, Professional Standards Risk Management Unit (Duty Operations)
- Michael Ellis, Manager, Facilities Management
- Len Faul, Inspector, Traffic Services
- Randy Franks, Inspector, Organised Crime Enforcement
- Kimberley Greenwood, Superintendent, Toronto Police College
- Paul Gross, Manager, Information Systems Services
- Richard Hegedus, Inspector, Professional Standards Risk Management Unit (Prosecutions)
- Sandra Richardson, Inspector, Staff Development Unit
- Wendy Ryzek, Analyst, Employee Records/Psychological Services
- Mark Saunders, Staff Inspector, Homicide
- Jacqueline Thompson, Assistant Manager, Occupational Health & Safety
- Jerome Walker, Manager, Infrastructure & Operations Support Services
- Chris White, Superintendent, 31 Division
- Crisalida White, Manager, Employment Unit
- Ruth White, Superintendent, 14 Division
- Kim Yeandle, Staff Inspector, Operational Systems Support Group
- Peter Yuen, Inspector, Professional Standards Investigative Unit

**Corporate Services, Executive Command – January 19th, 2011:**

- Donald Bevers, Manager, Corporate Planning
- Brenda Radix, Manager, Property & Evidence Management Unit
- Dana Styra, Manager, Audit & Quality Assurance
- Rita Vigna, Assistant Manager, Records Management Services

**Executive Management Team – January 24th, 2011:**

- Tony Corrie, Staff Superintendent, Central Field
- Angelo Cristofaro, Director, Finance & Administration
- Cyril Fernandes, Staff Superintendent, Professional Standards
- Richard Gauthier, Staff Superintendent, Detective Services
- Cel Giannotta, Director, Information Technology Services
- Kristina Kijewski, Director, Corporate Services

**Internal Consultation – January 27th, 2010:**

- Andy Sawyer, Detective, Toronto Drug Squad